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Multiple Militaries Within a Military
Published inHilal English
Written By: Ejaz Haider
There was a time, not very long ago, when cricket meant a five-day Test match. The teams wore white and used a red ball. They strategized on the basis of the five-day play. Every day would have on-field drinks breaks, a lunch break and a tea break. A match could be won, lost, or drawn. It was a leisurely affair.
Then came the one-day international, a 50-over game. ODIs were initially played in white kits with a red ball, just like Test cricket. In walked Kerry Packer. He revolutionised the format, bringing in international players, coloured kits, on-field cameras, relaying live the matches on TV channels and getting sponsors. This was the beginning of big money, different rules, fierce competition, bigger crowds, and millions of viewers. ODIs were quick affairs compared to a Test. Usually played over 7 hours, they began attracting far bigger crowds. The pace is much faster and the strategies very different from a Test match.
The great commercial success of ODIs ultimately led people to come up with a yet faster format of the game: Twenty20. T20 is an even more explosive format than the ODI with one team trying to restrict and bowl out the other while the batting side needs to go big on its shots and score as high as possible. Boundaries are common. In fact, the batsmen play to score boundaries. The format witnesses big shots. The crowds roar.
It was not long before teams began to select players according to their temperament and fitness for the three formats. While some players are good for all the three formats, every side now has specialists. It is highly unlikely for teams to include a technically-sound Test batsman, who scores slow and steady, in a T-20 side. The time a batsman would take to play himself in a Test match is about the entire time his side will have in a T-20 to finish their innings.
There’s a lesson in this for the military, too. Not only is war changing, it has, like cricket, different formats now, each very different from the other and each requiring different types of training and leadership. Put another way, there’s no one type of war and specialisation in one type is unlikely to be useful in fighting another, different kind of war.
Consider.
Since the time of Napoleon, and later in the World Wars, militaries trained for interstate, industrial war. Large-scale, army, corps and division-sized movement of infantry, mechanised infantry, armour, artillery, including self-propelled artillery, and supporting elements. Wars were fought along and across large fronts and axes. With the advent of air power, ground troops and movements were supported by the air arm. The air forces not only fight against other air forces, they attack targets in enemy territory, perform interdiction and, very often, close air support operations. This necessitated air-ground coordination, with the air arm degrading the lines of communication to the enemy’s front by operating in the rear and ground troops engaging the enemy frontline through aggressive manoeuvres. This formed the basis of the U.S. military’s Air Land Battle Doctrine in the 80s and 90s.
But the world, as also war, has changed. In fact, today’s war contains several nonlinear wars. The U.S. military’s Full Spectrum Operations doctrine is an acknowledgement of that. The doctrine seeks to dominate all dimensions of the battlespace: terrestrial, maritime, subterranean, NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical), psychological and cyber space. Equally, kinetic force and activities at different levels of war are just one aspect. Wars are now fought at the socioeconomic and political levels, too. Confronting the adversary (or adversaries) at those levels requires strengthening elements of national power other than the military itself, though we shall confine ourselves to the military in this space.
Before the U.S.-led and initiated GWOT kicked off after the 9/11 attacks, the Pakistani military trained for fighting against India in a known terrain. It has always been a disciplined, cohesive force but its capacity, training and doctrines were more WWII type than a force configured for modern changing scenarios. It was, and to a large extent still is, labour-intensive. Its maintenance budget, at about USD7 billion, is slightly high as a percentage of the country’s GDP but much less than what most modern militaries spend. The country’s economy, weak and riddled with structural problems, does not have the industrial and R&D base which can help the military move towards becoming capital and technology-intensive.
When troubles began in the northwestern borderlands, the army was ill-prepared for deployment to those areas and fighting a different kind of war. More than a decade down the road, the army has learnt many of its lessons the hard way. It has lost officers and men and continues to fight in those areas and lose more, though it has become far more adept at handling the elusive groups it has to fight.
Yet, it needs to do much more and better in terms of equipment acquisition, training, planning and doctrines. A better industrial and R&D base would have helped it more, but that is hard to come by.
While the world thought that future wars will be about developing techniques to fight terrorist groups and insurgents, developments in the region and beyond indicate that interstate war is not entirely obsolete. This means the military will have to train for both the formats: fighting an interstate war as well as training for small-unit operations. Add to that other formats like cyber and robotic warfare and we have entered an era like none before.
Going by the example with which we began, this means not just one military that can fight one kind of war. We need militaries within a Military that specialise in fighting different kinds of wars. The Pakistani military took more than a decade to learn to fight elusive adversaries. Its fighting edge has become sharp. But is it also as sharp in terms of fighting a large-scale war?
The nuclear dimension has not only introduced missilery and force reconfiguration (strategic commands), it has also put the weight of C4I2 requirements on the military. As and when Pakistan decides to deploy its strategic assets, it will be subjected to the requirements of safety and security of its deployed assets, including countering physical and cyber attacks. Modern militaries are putting a huge premium on enhancing cyber capacities. In our neighbourhood, Iran is reported to have invested heavily in cyber war and might have acquired the capability to neutralise the communication channels of armed and surveillance drones. In simple words that means one can neutralise and crash a drone without having to shoot it down.
It should be obvious that cyber war will require a different kind of soldier, perhaps civilians who can form an integral part of the military and enhance its capacity.
How does one face these challenges? First and foremost, economy is crucial. Without a robust, growing economy, nothing is possible. Within the ambit of that comes education, a growing industrial base and R&D. Since Pakistan’s inception, we have gone about securing ourselves the wrong way, focusing too much on the kinetic and ignoring those elements that are a prerequisite for a strong military. That must change.
It’s a bad time for good advice. Normally, doing this would require respite from war. That is unlikely. Pakistan is fighting at multiple levels. But despite this situation, this can be done if we pursue policies that help us to reach out to the neighbours and create mechanisms for crisis management. That’s another topic, however.
The writer was a Ford Scholar at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1997) and a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. (2002-03). He is currently Editor, National Security Affairs, at a private TV channel and contributes to several publications
Twitter: @ejazhaider
Published inHilal English
Written By: Ejaz Haider
There was a time, not very long ago, when cricket meant a five-day Test match. The teams wore white and used a red ball. They strategized on the basis of the five-day play. Every day would have on-field drinks breaks, a lunch break and a tea break. A match could be won, lost, or drawn. It was a leisurely affair.
Then came the one-day international, a 50-over game. ODIs were initially played in white kits with a red ball, just like Test cricket. In walked Kerry Packer. He revolutionised the format, bringing in international players, coloured kits, on-field cameras, relaying live the matches on TV channels and getting sponsors. This was the beginning of big money, different rules, fierce competition, bigger crowds, and millions of viewers. ODIs were quick affairs compared to a Test. Usually played over 7 hours, they began attracting far bigger crowds. The pace is much faster and the strategies very different from a Test match.
The great commercial success of ODIs ultimately led people to come up with a yet faster format of the game: Twenty20. T20 is an even more explosive format than the ODI with one team trying to restrict and bowl out the other while the batting side needs to go big on its shots and score as high as possible. Boundaries are common. In fact, the batsmen play to score boundaries. The format witnesses big shots. The crowds roar.
It was not long before teams began to select players according to their temperament and fitness for the three formats. While some players are good for all the three formats, every side now has specialists. It is highly unlikely for teams to include a technically-sound Test batsman, who scores slow and steady, in a T-20 side. The time a batsman would take to play himself in a Test match is about the entire time his side will have in a T-20 to finish their innings.
There’s a lesson in this for the military, too. Not only is war changing, it has, like cricket, different formats now, each very different from the other and each requiring different types of training and leadership. Put another way, there’s no one type of war and specialisation in one type is unlikely to be useful in fighting another, different kind of war.
Consider.
Since the time of Napoleon, and later in the World Wars, militaries trained for interstate, industrial war. Large-scale, army, corps and division-sized movement of infantry, mechanised infantry, armour, artillery, including self-propelled artillery, and supporting elements. Wars were fought along and across large fronts and axes. With the advent of air power, ground troops and movements were supported by the air arm. The air forces not only fight against other air forces, they attack targets in enemy territory, perform interdiction and, very often, close air support operations. This necessitated air-ground coordination, with the air arm degrading the lines of communication to the enemy’s front by operating in the rear and ground troops engaging the enemy frontline through aggressive manoeuvres. This formed the basis of the U.S. military’s Air Land Battle Doctrine in the 80s and 90s.
But the world, as also war, has changed. In fact, today’s war contains several nonlinear wars. The U.S. military’s Full Spectrum Operations doctrine is an acknowledgement of that. The doctrine seeks to dominate all dimensions of the battlespace: terrestrial, maritime, subterranean, NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical), psychological and cyber space. Equally, kinetic force and activities at different levels of war are just one aspect. Wars are now fought at the socioeconomic and political levels, too. Confronting the adversary (or adversaries) at those levels requires strengthening elements of national power other than the military itself, though we shall confine ourselves to the military in this space.
Before the U.S.-led and initiated GWOT kicked off after the 9/11 attacks, the Pakistani military trained for fighting against India in a known terrain. It has always been a disciplined, cohesive force but its capacity, training and doctrines were more WWII type than a force configured for modern changing scenarios. It was, and to a large extent still is, labour-intensive. Its maintenance budget, at about USD7 billion, is slightly high as a percentage of the country’s GDP but much less than what most modern militaries spend. The country’s economy, weak and riddled with structural problems, does not have the industrial and R&D base which can help the military move towards becoming capital and technology-intensive.
When troubles began in the northwestern borderlands, the army was ill-prepared for deployment to those areas and fighting a different kind of war. More than a decade down the road, the army has learnt many of its lessons the hard way. It has lost officers and men and continues to fight in those areas and lose more, though it has become far more adept at handling the elusive groups it has to fight.
Yet, it needs to do much more and better in terms of equipment acquisition, training, planning and doctrines. A better industrial and R&D base would have helped it more, but that is hard to come by.
While the world thought that future wars will be about developing techniques to fight terrorist groups and insurgents, developments in the region and beyond indicate that interstate war is not entirely obsolete. This means the military will have to train for both the formats: fighting an interstate war as well as training for small-unit operations. Add to that other formats like cyber and robotic warfare and we have entered an era like none before.
Going by the example with which we began, this means not just one military that can fight one kind of war. We need militaries within a Military that specialise in fighting different kinds of wars. The Pakistani military took more than a decade to learn to fight elusive adversaries. Its fighting edge has become sharp. But is it also as sharp in terms of fighting a large-scale war?
The nuclear dimension has not only introduced missilery and force reconfiguration (strategic commands), it has also put the weight of C4I2 requirements on the military. As and when Pakistan decides to deploy its strategic assets, it will be subjected to the requirements of safety and security of its deployed assets, including countering physical and cyber attacks. Modern militaries are putting a huge premium on enhancing cyber capacities. In our neighbourhood, Iran is reported to have invested heavily in cyber war and might have acquired the capability to neutralise the communication channels of armed and surveillance drones. In simple words that means one can neutralise and crash a drone without having to shoot it down.
It should be obvious that cyber war will require a different kind of soldier, perhaps civilians who can form an integral part of the military and enhance its capacity.
How does one face these challenges? First and foremost, economy is crucial. Without a robust, growing economy, nothing is possible. Within the ambit of that comes education, a growing industrial base and R&D. Since Pakistan’s inception, we have gone about securing ourselves the wrong way, focusing too much on the kinetic and ignoring those elements that are a prerequisite for a strong military. That must change.
It’s a bad time for good advice. Normally, doing this would require respite from war. That is unlikely. Pakistan is fighting at multiple levels. But despite this situation, this can be done if we pursue policies that help us to reach out to the neighbours and create mechanisms for crisis management. That’s another topic, however.
The writer was a Ford Scholar at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1997) and a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. (2002-03). He is currently Editor, National Security Affairs, at a private TV channel and contributes to several publications
Twitter: @ejazhaider
