Mixed signals for China, India from Russia’s S-400 in Syria

[thesolar65]

Aside from all sorts of political considerations, Chinese and Indian strategic planners will have to assess carefully the strict military dimension of the missile strike that the United States launched against a government-controlled airbase in Syria early on Friday.

China and India are both clients of Russia’s arms industry, and have bought a number of S-400 long-range air defense missile systems. The Kremlin is a historical ally of Damascus and deployed batteries of this advanced missile platform at the Khmeimim airbase near Latakia in western Syria after its intervention in support of President Bashar al-Assad.

On paper, the S-400 system is designed to destroy aircraft, drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles up to 400 kilometers away; it is also equipped with a radar able to detect targets at a range of 600km. Since its installation in Syrian territory, the action of Western and Turkish warplanes in support of rebel forces has been limited. The presence of S-400 platforms in the Syrian theater possibly influenced the US strategy of attack against the Assad regime.

The USS Porter and USS Ross, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean, bombarded the Shayrat airbase in central Syria, which the Syrian Air Force used to launch suspected chemical attacks that left dozens of civilians dead in rebel-held Khan Shaykhun. Though the Pentagon informed the Russian military beforehand of the impending operation, the US military command decided to attack from a safe distance.

Tomahawk missiles have a range of 1,600km and their use in place of strike aircraft was probably intended to minimize potential losses caused by the very fast and precise S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Syria_Airstrike_Map-01 This could mean that the Pentagon acknowledges the effectiveness of the S-400 against warplanes and the electronic jamming capabilities of the US EA-18G Growler jets, which can weaken the operability of the Russian air shield in Syria but not neutralize it completely.

Thus the S-400’s deterrent function against aircraft sorties appears to be confirmed by the military option chosen by the United States to punish Assad. Chinese and Indian generals will be delighted with this outcome, which proves they have been right to bet on the S-400 system for their respective air defenses. In particular, Delhi can reasonably be confident it will manage to undercut Beijing’s airborne capacities so as to gain aerial strategic parity in the Himalayan region, where the two countries have long-standing border disputes. S-400’s vulnerability to swarm missile attacks On the other hand, the barrage of Tomahawks demonstrated the Pentagon’s capacity to perforate the Russian defenses in Syria, possibly showing the vulnerability of the S-400 to low-flying missiles with small radar cross-sections.

The S-400 radar probably detected the Tomahawk swarm but the firing system apparently did not attempt to hit any missiles. It is now an open question whether Moscow’s military command in Syria deliberately opted not to engage the US missiles once informed of the imminent attack or, in contrast, was unable to react. The Russian camp obviously leans toward the first scenario. In Moscow’s view, the interception of US Tomahawks by the S-400 system would have provoked a dangerous escalation. The fact that, after the US strike, Moscow announced its intention to strengthen the Syrian air defenses, however, is a sign that the Russian defense shield in war-torn Syria needs some improvements.

That said, all types of air defense systems, including the S-400, are still in large part untested as to whether they can resist multiple missile attacks. India and China should take that into account while focusing on the reinforcement of their own air and missile defenses. In this sense, the S-400’s mixed performance in Syria against the US Tomahawks should at least raise some doubt in Delhi and Beijing over the capabilities of this Russian arms system. Posted in India Search Bar Follow us Categories Asia Europe Exclusive India My Take N & S America Copyright © Idrw.org 2006. All Rights Reserved.Fair Use idrw.org

http://idrw.org/mixed-signals-for-china-india-from-russias-s-400-in-syria/

 

[Penguin]

"It is now an open question whether Moscow’s military command in Syria deliberately opted not to engage the US missiles once informed of the imminent attack or, in contrast, was unable to react."

I'm leaning towards the former (doubt the US would tip it's hand at this stage if it could achieve the latter)

 

[RoadRunner401]

No one can shoot a bullet with bullet......I have heard many excuses before for instance the system was shut down

OR

'Hand of God' prevents rocket from striking its target: Israeli Iron Dome operator says sudden gust of wind blew missile into sea when defense system failed

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2717659/Hand-God-prevents-rocket-striking-target-Israeli-Iron-Dome-operator-says-sudden-gust-wind-blew-missile-sea-defence-failed.html


Israeli Rocket Defense System Is Failing at Crucial Task, Expert Analysts Say

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/528916/israeli-rocket-defense-system-is-failing-at-crucial-task-expert-analysts-say/



Postol vs. the Pentagon
Ted Postol is challenging the government’s claims about a proposed a missile defense system. He’s a prickly character, but he has a track record that’s hard to beat.

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/401412/postol-vs-the-pentagon/

Ted Postol’s credentials as a serious analyst of military defense systems are impeccable. Trained at MIT as a nuclear engineer, he spent five years doing basic physics research at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois before moving to Washington in 1980 to work with the U.S. Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment. At the time, he says, he believed the steadily growing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals “would get us all killed” and that Washington was where his influence could help avert this fate. He spent two years at the technology assessment agency analyzing, among other things, deployment of the MX nuclear missile, and another two working as senior scientific advisor to the chief of naval operations in the Pentagon.

In 1984, he moved to Stanford University, lured by physicist and national-security expert Sidney Drell to work at Drell’s new Center for International Security and Arms Control. Drell describes Postol as “a unique resource for doing hard-nosed, accurate, reliable and important technical analysis of military systems.” Drell also says he has never known Postol to be wrong on an important issue. The respect is mutual. When Drell resigned from the Stanford program in 1989, Postol left as well, moving on to his current position at MIT.

Two years later, when the Gulf War broke out, Postol made his first overtly public appearance as a whistle-blower on the issue of antiballistic missiles. The subject was the Patriot missile system, which won near universal acclaim for what appeared to be its remarkable ability to shoot down the Iraqi Scud missiles. In the few short months of the war, according to the official U.S. Army tally, Patriot missiles shot down 45 of the 47 Scuds that they were sent forth to engage. As a result, the Patriot had become what the press would call “Exhibit A” in the push for a national missile defense program and, in the words of the first President Bush, “proof positive that missile defense works.” A convinced Congress promptly doubled the funding for national missile defense, allocating more than $800 million in 1992.

But Postol was skeptical. Using as his primary data televised video of Patriot-Scud engagements, he asserted that the Patriot almost certainly missed all the Scud warheads at which it was fired. Simply put, “The Patriot didn’t work,” says George Lewis, who worked with Postol on the Patriot analysis and is now associate director of the Security Studies Program at MIT.

Pentagon officialdom was not amused. The Defense Department launched an investigation into whether Postol had committed security violations and slapped a classified rating on his 1992 article in International Security, the journal in which he made his case against the Patriot. Raytheon, the Lexington, MA-based company that built the Patriot, also attacked Postol’s credibility and his analysis. Raytheon officials accused Postol of doctoring the video footage to make his point, and then claimed that his analysis was fundamentally worthless.

In the end, Postol’s assessment of the Patriot’s performance would be vindicated, but it would take years. Even the Pentagon eventually admitted that the Patriot had failed (though Raytheon still insists otherwise), while an independent American Physical Society panel reported in April 2000 that the criticisms of Postol’s analysis had been “without merit.”

Along the way, Postol’s relationship with MIT took a beating. A series of episodes, each relatively minor in itself, led Postol to conclude-and the local press to report-that the MIT administration was less interested in defending members of its faculty (i.e., Postol) than it was in protecting its relationship with Raytheon, a company that generously supported the university. In the midst of the controversy, for instance, and in the midst of Raytheon’s attacks on Postol’s credibility and analysis, MIT appointed Raytheon CEO Dennis Picard to the advisory board of Lincoln Laboratory-an MIT-owned lab that conducts R&D on a range of defense technologies.

Why Missile Defense Won't Work
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/401407/why-missile-defense-wont-work/

Conclusion claims are just that claims unless you can prove it otherwise which so far no one has, so far it's all be a big hoopla

 

[Sully3]

the best thing about the news is that the Babur cruise missile is a copy of a tomahawk

 

[axisofevil]

the best thing about the news is that the Babur cruise missile is a copy of a tomahawk

No the best part of the news.... is that Russia chose not to escalate the situation.


The other best part of this thread....a pakistani finally admits...your missile is an exact copy....LMAO>>>