Middle East Now Without a US Carrier

[Zarvan]

WASHINGTON — The Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group chopped out of the European theater of operations Dec. 26 and headed home to Norfolk after months of operating in the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean, where the strike jets of Carrier Air Wing 3 flew hundreds of missions against Islamic State group targets in Syria and Iraq. The homecoming is set for Dec. 30 — two days shy of the Navy’s stated goal of bringing the group home in seven months.

US carrier groups regularly relieve each other in theater, often handing off duties within sight of the other in the Arabian Gulf or Arabian Sea. But this time, no carrier is in the Eisenhower’s wake.

The relief ship, the carrier George H. W. Bush, has yet to leave Norfolk, and it's unlikely to do so before the Jan. 20 presidential inauguration of Donald Trump, according to a Navy source. The gap could last as long as two months, sources said, between the time the Eisenhower left the combat theater and the Bush arrives.

And that gap comes at a particularly inopportune time. Numerous media reports indicate intelligence organizations and analysts are on the lookout for provocative actions by potential antagonists — in particular Russia, China, North Korea, Iran or ISIS. Terror alerts, according to media reports, are high in many regions, including Europe, the Middle East and North America, due to a confluence of factors — the new year, ISIS’ diminishing power in the face of counterattacks in Iraq and Syria, and a natural tendency to test a new administration.

Other Central Command carrier gaps have taken place in the past, usually when a strike group is needed elsewhere or maintenance issues at home have forced ships to deploy late. The Pentagon plans for such events, often dispatching expeditionary US Air Force units to the region to pick up the slack — something that seems to have taken place now.

The newest gap is not a surprise, and actually has been months in the making — arguably well over a year. The Bush entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Virginia in mid-June 2015 for what started out as a planned six-month repair period, extended just before it began to eight months. Facing a scheduled early-December 2016 departure date to relieve the Eisenhower group, the initial delay seemed manageable, giving the group nearly nine months to work through the pre deployment training cycle.

But the overhaul dragged on well past the March completion date. Navy officials have been sparing at best and sometimes contradictory in explaining why the overhaul took so long — the explanations complicated by multiple oversight commands, including Naval Nuclear Reactors, Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Forces and US Fleet Forces Command. The reasons given ranged from poor planning to emergent work — often unspecified — to the lack of enough trained personnel at Norfolk Naval Shipyard due to previous layoffs and funding interruptions.

In the event, the Bush finally left the shipyard July 23 after more than 13 months in overhaul, facing a drastically compressed training period if the early December date could be met. But the command responsible for training the Bush and her strike group, US Fleet Forces Command, apparently did not have a plan in hand to deal with the short training cycle, although something called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is supposed to deal with such eventualities. According to several sources, Fleet Forces didn’t hold a major meeting of all parties to determine a way ahead until late August.

Fleet Forces Command has declined numerous requests for comment on the Bush’s situation. The command has not issued a direct statement on its plans for the Bush.

Among the obstacles in getting the training going, several sources said, were defects on the carrier that remained unaddressed during the overhaul.

The Bush is not alone in experiencing delays. The Eisenhower itself missed a deployment due to shipyard and maintenance issues, and had to be spelled in 2015 by the carrier Harry S. Truman. Chronic problems in the Navy’s four shipyards, which perform the majority of heavy maintenance work on the carriers, has meant that most recent carrier overhauls are running long. Naval Sea Systems Command has acknowledged these problems and is working to restore and improve the workforces in the yards.

But it is not clear why Fleet Forces did not have a training plan in hand even before the Bush returned to the fleet. The ship and its strike group completed their last major pre deployment exercise Dec. 21, but Navy officials expect another month to go by before the Bush deploys.

The Navy did not respond to a request for comment before press time.

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/no-us-carrier-now-in-the-mideast

 

[C130]

you would think we would build a few 65,000 tonne non-nuclear carriers to take over for a few months while the larger Nimitz class head back to base.

10 supercarrier or go with 7 or 8 instead
4 or 5 60,000 to 70,000 carriers to take over the slack.

 

[Penguin]

https://www.stratfor.com/topics/military/tracking-u.s.-naval-power

U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2016

https://webcache.googleusercontent....16+&cd=1&hl=nl&ct=clnk&gl=nl&client=firefox-b

 

[Penguin]

you would think we would build a few 65,000 tonne non-nuclear carriers to take over for a few months while the larger Nimitz class head back to base.

10 supercarrier or go with 7 or 8 instead
4 or 5 60,000 to 70,000 carriers to take over the slack.

Given carriers' vulnerability in combat and to peacetime asymmetrical warfare attacks, the use of more and smaller carriers rather than large vessels has been suggested over the years, such as Elmo Zumwalt's Sea Control Ship, and carriers the size of USS America carrying STOVL aircraft and Unmanned combat aerial vehicle.[27][28][29] However, supercarrier advocates consider them to be more cost-effective than a larger number of smaller carriers.[30] An American carrier strike group costs $25 million per week for routine operations, rising to $40 million during combat operations.[31]

27 Patch, John (January 2010). "Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth". Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. 136 (1). Retrieved 17 May 2015.
28 "Lawmaker Calls for Study on Small Carriers". military.com.
29 Hendrix, Henry J.; Williams, J. Noel (May 2011). "Twilight of the $UPERfluous Carrier". Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. 137 (05). Retrieved 17 May 2015.
30 Musciano, Walter A. (1997). Warbirds of the sea: a history of aircraft carriers & carrier-based aircraft. Schiffer. p. 553. ISBN 0-88740-583-5.
31 "US Navy: Cost Of Syria Strikes Would Not Be 'Extraordinary'". DefenseNews. Gannett. Agence France-Presse. 5 September 2013. Retrieved 17 May 2015.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercarrier

Each smaller carrier, while perhaps cheaper to build, equip and man, would deliver less punch yet would still require a similar escort group. To provide equal or better punch than CVNs of today, you'ld need more than one CV and the extra cost of the second vessel is not off-set by the lower per ship acquisition cost of each CV.

 

[C130]

Given carriers' vulnerability in combat and to peacetime asymmetrical warfare attacks, the use of more and smaller carriers rather than large vessels has been suggested over the years, such as Elmo Zumwalt's Sea Control Ship, and carriers the size of USS America carrying STOVL aircraft and Unmanned combat aerial vehicle.[27][28][29] However, supercarrier advocates consider them to be more cost-effective than a larger number of smaller carriers.[30] An American carrier strike group costs $25 million per week for routine operations, rising to $40 million during combat operations.[31]

27 Patch, John (January 2010). "Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth". Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. 136 (1). Retrieved 17 May 2015.
28 "Lawmaker Calls for Study on Small Carriers". military.com.
29 Hendrix, Henry J.; Williams, J. Noel (May 2011). "Twilight of the $UPERfluous Carrier". Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. 137 (05). Retrieved 17 May 2015.
30 Musciano, Walter A. (1997). Warbirds of the sea: a history of aircraft carriers & carrier-based aircraft. Schiffer. p. 553. ISBN 0-88740-583-5.
31 "US Navy: Cost Of Syria Strikes Would Not Be 'Extraordinary'". DefenseNews. Gannett. Agence France-Presse. 5 September 2013. Retrieved 17 May 2015.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercarrier

Each smaller carrier, while perhaps cheaper to build, equip and man, would deliver less punch yet would still require a similar escort group. To provide equal or better punch than CVNs of today, you'ld need more than one CV and the extra cost of the second vessel is not off-set by the lower per ship acquisition cost of each CV.

Each smaller carrier, while perhaps cheaper to build, equip and man, would deliver less punch yet would still require a similar escort group


I don't agree with that statement though. from reading this article the U.S would get by with smaller carriers, and possibly not even noticethe less punch as you put it.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-the-us-navy-should-build-smaller-aircraft-carriers-1600899834


you gotta remember supercarriers were designed to carry a lot of different planes for different roles... but today that's not the case



if we could build these smaller carriers for 1/2 the cost and cost signically less to maintain and have less downtime then I believe they would still be just as potent in bombing weak countries and terrorist rats that have no navy or air force.

and as for escort protection you are right, but we could fix that as well by building cheap frigates to protect them.

not sure what the current escort is for a CBG think it's a cruiser, a destroyer or two, and attack submarine?? the U.S could instead retire the cruisers and replace them with two frigates in the CBG something like a modification of Incheon Class or Alvaro de Bazan class.

I could see these carriers operating mostly in the Atlantic and the Middle East, and let the supercarriers roam the Pacific.

 

[Penguin]

Each smaller carrier, while perhaps cheaper to build, equip and man, would deliver less punch yet would still require a similar escort group


I don't agree with that statement though. from reading this article the U.S would get by with smaller carriers, and possibly not even noticethe less punch as you put it.

You can biuld a smaller carrier but you have to prtect it all the same, esp. if your the US and go in harm's way

you gotta remember supercarriers were designed to carry a lot of different planes for different roles... but today that's not the case

Aircraft have gotten larger and heavier e.g. F18E Super Hornet much bigger than F-18C. E2C hasn't gotten smaller or lighter. S-3 has vanished but not so small V22 will take on COD and tanker roles with navy and USMC respectively. Fewer types will be used in future relative to past.

not sure what the current escort is for a CBG think it's a cruiser, a destroyer or two, and attack submarine?? the U.S could instead retire the cruisers and replace them with two frigates in the CBG something like a modification of Incheon Class or Alvaro de Bazan class.

It used to be 1 CG (Tico) and 2 DDG (Burke) and 1 FFG (Perry) and at least 1 SSN. This is standard escort. As Tico's retire, more Burke's will taker up slack, including flight IIIs and modernizations for BMD roles. Meanwhile, USN has already determined future escort group would have to be more than 4 surface units, more like 6-8, to cope with increased threat levels e.g. vis-a-vis SCS/China. This will apply also to any small carriers.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=98160

The Navy released a new fleet plan that calls for 355 ships, outlining a massive increase in the size of its high-end large surface combatant and attack submarine fleets but a modest increase in its planned amphibious ship fleet, according to a Dec. 14 summary of the assessment.

The largest change to the 2014 totals are in the high-end ships classes of attack submarines, large surface combatants – like guided-missile cruisers and destroyers – and aircraft carriers. The new total adds 16 large surface combatants, 18 attack submarines and an additional carrier over the 2014 plan.

The uptick in large guided-missile ships are to “deliver increased air defense and expeditionary [ballistic missile defense] capacity and provide escorts for the additional aircraft carrier,” reads the summary.

Last year, USNI News reported the surface Navy was increasingly concerned with the speed and sophistication of new anti-ship guided missiles emerging from China. Officials worried the service’s assumption of 88 large surface combatants was too low.

That total was based on filling a carrier strike group with five guided-missile combatants to perform anti-submarine warfare (ASW), protect the ship from surface and air threats and protect the CSG from ballistic missiles.

However, ongoing studies and wargaming conducted by the Navy’s surface warfare establishment concluded the number of ships to keep carrier safe should potentially be increased to seven or eight due to how rapidly the Chinese have increased their high-end capability.

https://news.usni.org/2016/12/16/navy-wants-grow-fleet-355-ships-47-hull-increase-previous-goal

I could see these carriers operating mostly in the Atlantic and the Middle East, and let the supercarriers roam the Pacific.

How do you propose to deal with modernized Kirovs, carrying huge number of missiles? Not to mention increasing numbers of cruisemissile capable smaller sea platforms.

'In the case of the Pyotr Velikiy, we have a nuclear-powered ship with theoretically unlimited endurance [that is] a sort of versatile arsenal, stuffed with a full range of guided missiles — including up to 80 cruise missiles and 216 surface-to-air missiles,'

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...-nation-s-military-machine.html#ixzz4UX7z54sP

The Sevmash Shipyard and the Special Machinebuilding Design Bureau (KBSM, a subsidiary of Almaz-Antei) made a deal for 10 3S-14-11442M vertical launch systems (VLS) to equip the Project 11442M Admiral Nakhimov missile cruiser being upgraded now. The contract is valued at 2.559 billion rubles ($33.5 million).

Thus, the ship’s 20 inclined below-deck launchers of P-700 Granit antiship missiles (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) will be replaced with 10 VLS modules of the UKSK versatile ship-based launch system. The VLS modules will total 80. The same solution is expected to be applied to the Pyotr Veliky cruiser.

The 3S-14 VLS can launch the missiles of the Kalibr family (SS-N-27 Sizzler). In addition, the equipment for testing the VLS using mockups of the 3M-54, 3M55 and 3M22 antiship missiles is to be ready be December 2016.”
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russias-kirov-class-battlecruiser-fleet-is-expanding-an-1763392754

 

[C130]

You can biuld a smaller carrier but you have to prtect it all the same, esp. if your the US and go in harm's way



Aircraft have gotten larger and heavier e.g. F18E Super Hornet much bigger than F-18C. E2C hasn't gotten smaller or lighter. S-3 has vanished but not so small V22 will take on COD and tanker roles with navy and USMC respectively. Fewer types will be used in future relative to past.


It used to be 1 CG (Tico) and 2 DDG (Burke) and 1 FFG (Perry) and at least 1 SSN. This is standard escort. As Tico's retire, more Burke's will taker up slack, including flight IIIs and modernizations for BMD roles. Meanwhile, USN has already determined future escort group would have to be more than 4 surface units, more like 6-8, to cope with increased threat levels e.g. vis-a-vis SCS/China. This will apply also to any small carriers.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=98160


https://news.usni.org/2016/12/16/navy-wants-grow-fleet-355-ships-47-hull-increase-previous-goal



How do you propose to deal with modernized Kirovs, carrying huge number of missiles? Not to mention increasing numbers of cruisemissile capable smaller sea platforms.

'In the case of the Pyotr Velikiy, we have a nuclear-powered ship with theoretically unlimited endurance [that is] a sort of versatile arsenal, stuffed with a full range of guided missiles — including up to 80 cruise missiles and 216 surface-to-air missiles,'

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...-nation-s-military-machine.html#ixzz4UX7z54sP

The Sevmash Shipyard and the Special Machinebuilding Design Bureau (KBSM, a subsidiary of Almaz-Antei) made a deal for 10 3S-14-11442M vertical launch systems (VLS) to equip the Project 11442M Admiral Nakhimov missile cruiser being upgraded now. The contract is valued at 2.559 billion rubles ($33.5 million).

Thus, the ship’s 20 inclined below-deck launchers of P-700 Granit antiship missiles (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) will be replaced with 10 VLS modules of the UKSK versatile ship-based launch system. The VLS modules will total 80. The same solution is expected to be applied to the Pyotr Veliky cruiser.

The 3S-14 VLS can launch the missiles of the Kalibr family (SS-N-27 Sizzler). In addition, the equipment for testing the VLS using mockups of the 3M-54, 3M55 and 3M22 antiship missiles is to be ready be December 2016.”
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russias-kirov-class-battlecruiser-fleet-is-expanding-an-1763392754

let's be honest here it's no secret that the U.S CBG would be annihilated fairly quick if a major was to happen between Russia, Russia just has to many assets with long range missile carrying nuclear warheads.

smaller carriers would be for attacking weaker nations that don't possess such assets

 

[Penguin]

let's be honest here it's no secret that the U.S CBG would be annihilated fairly quick if a major was to happen between Russia, Russia just has to many assets with long range missile carrying nuclear warheads.

The discussion was not about the vulnerability of (super)carriers in general or against a particular nation. The discussion was about whether smaller carriers are a better option or a good option as complement.

In any scenario in which a supercarrier would be vulnerable, a smaller carrier would be at least as vulnerable, particularly if it is not given the same escort 'because smaller and to be used in lower threat areas'.

 

[Blue Marlin]

https://www.stratfor.com/topics/military/tracking-u.s.-naval-power

U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2016

https://webcache.googleusercontent....16+&cd=1&hl=nl&ct=clnk&gl=nl&client=firefox-b

why are most of the carriers at port?

let's be honest here it's no secret that the U.S CBG would be annihilated fairly quick if a major was to happen between Russia, Russia just has to many assets with long range missile carrying nuclear warheads.

smaller carriers would be for attacking weaker nations that don't possess such assets

its very hard, near enough impossible to shoot down a conventionally/nuclear armed icbm. lets get that out there.
the only remote chance you have whilst its in boost phase.

anti ship ballistic missiles that fly in depressed trajectories which are able manoeuvrer quiet well whilst being hypersonic, are just as hard to shoot down as you cant determine its trajectory ,
also note carriers are not meant to go into the "fight" but send assets which go into the fight

 

[NakedLunch]

I cant remember where I heard it, maybe it was Jeff Rense or some other American alt-right Radio show like Michael Savage , but seems like all of America's carriers are now docked in some port instead of patrolling the high seas keeping an eye on all those those retarded third worlders who want to invade Merika via Mexico and Canada and take their jobs and fat *** women. Either that or Obama just wants to make life difficult for when the Orange cracker comes to town.

 

[Penguin]

Besides, the Russians do not operate antiship ballistic missiles. So effectively we're talking cruise missiles here. And that's not a threat any different then faced during the cold war.

why are most of the carriers at port?

THey wear out lest quickly that way? And two of those homeports are actually in Japan....