Sam Manekshaw
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BJP:
Indian voters started voting on Monday and will decide the next occupants of the Lok Sabha in what will be the largest democratic exercise in history. Voting is staggered over a period of several weeks, accommodating the needs of an electorate of more than 800 million. As of today, voters in the northeastern states of Assam and Tripura are heading to the polls to cast their votes.
As voting began, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) released its 2014 manifesto, a 52-page document outlining the party’s plans on economic, social, political, and foreign policy issues (the Congress Party has also issued an analogous document). The BJP has released manifestos ahead of previous elections as well. Most pre-election polling indicates that the BJP is likely to take a plurality if not a majority in the Lok Sabha, allowing it to form the next government with Narendra Modi as prime minister.
I’ve excerpted a few choice statements (focusing on foreign policy mainly) outlined in the 2014 manifesto, but encourage Pulse readers to give the entire document a read. If the BJP does come to power at the end of May, parliamentary politics will likely prevent it from being able to deliver fully on many of the promises outlined in the document but the manifesto nonetheless serves as an important reference point for understanding the ideas of what is likely the party forming India’s next government.
The manifesto addresses foreign policy and India’s place in the world directly, setting out a “Nation First, Universal Brotherhood” slogan for what the party believes should be priorities in Indian foreign policy. As its first guiding principle for foreign policy, the BJP document is remarkably oblique, noting that “equations will be mended through pragmatism and a doctrine of mutually beneficial and interlocking relationships, based on enlightened national interest.” I’m not entirely sure what that means and I’m not sure the BJP does either.
What is slightly more helpful is this general introduction to the section on foreign policy:
BJP believes a resurgent India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India’s global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora.
The declamation remains vague in terms of concrete policies and deliverables but indicates that the party will not veer away from the Congress-era focus on economic development as the first priority of India’s foreign relations. What is interesting is that the manifesto is especially critical of the Congress for allowing India’s leadership in its immediate neighborhood to wane and indicates that the BJP is interested in establishing regional leadership for India in SAARC and ASEAN.
The manifesto is also big on Indian soft power, noting that the country has always undercapitalized its “ancient wisdom and heritage” which continue “to be equally relevant to the world today.”
The manifesto generally seems to support India’s troubled tendency to pursue non-alignment and strategic autonomy in international affairs. The BJP notes that India ought to remain independent of “big power interests” and “engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighborhood and beyond.” There is no mention of the United Nations on the list of international fora in which India should take the lead; the focus is instead on the BRICS, G20, IBSA, SCO and ASEM.
Regarding cross-border terrorism, the BJP rather vaguely notes that it would deal with incursions “with a firm hand” and take “strong stand and steps” when the situation calls for it. It offers a clearer vision on Kashmir – namely that it won’t be conciliatory to Pakistani interests and will maintain the region as “an integral part of the Union of India.” There is no mention of the Composite Dialogue Process between India and Pakistan.
The manifesto demonstrates a BJP that is committed to the development of India’s long-neglected northeastern states – an initiative that will not only benefit those living east of the Siliguri Corridor but also bolster India’s strategic interests along the disputed Arunachal Pradesh border with China. While the manifesto does not mention China even once, it notes that “there will be special emphasis on massive infrastructure development, especially along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.” Modi has warned China to abandon its “expansionist attitude” in the past. Despite his tough tone on foreign policy issues, Modi and BJP would likely pursue closer commercial ties with China.
On defense, the party will aim to bolster India’s indigenous arms industry, including improving India’s defense research and development capabilities by strengthening the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). While the manifesto sets this out as a goal, it is considerably vague on how it will solve the seemingly intractable problems in the defense industry that India has struggled with for decades.
One area where the BJP could potentially alter India’s foreign policy is with regards to India’s strategic nuclear weapons. The manifesto notes that the party would follow a “two-pronged independent nuclear program, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes.” It also notes that the party is interested in revising and updating India’s nuclear doctrine, “to make it relevant to challenges of current times.” Currently, India practices a “no-first use” policy against Pakistan (which does not do the same in return). This is a new addition to this year’s manifesto and did not make an appearance in the party’s 2009 document.
It is perhaps telling that the BJP manifesto addresses national defense, India’s nuclear program, and terrorism before it addresses foreign policy more generally. It is even more telling that only three pages in the entire manifesto are devoted to defense, security, and international affairs. Should the BJP take the reins in New Delhi this May, India’s relations with both Pakistan and China will be at a tipping point. With Pakistan, in particular, a thaw is currently underway with good progress being made on cross-border trade deals and a significant dip in border skirmishes (particularly compared to 2013).
Overall, I’d say don’t hold your breath for any major changes in India’s foreign policy trajectory regardless of the outcome of India’s elections. Indian foreign policy is remarkably good at remaining immune to the whims of grand ideas laid out in political manifestos (and to the preferences of individual prime ministers). With India, it’s often easy to get lost in the myopia of looking at foreign policy exclusively, but when one takes a step back and examines at the broader political forces driving this election, including broad economic malaise and sweeping anti-incumbency sentiment, it is apparent that Indian foreign policy will likely remain a function of its economic needs
Congress:
Foreign policy, however, has been largely invisible throughout this campaign cycle, except for the contributions of the two main regional parties in Tamil Nadu, which have a long-standing and special focus on Sri Lanka. Of the two main national parties, only Congress has released its official manifesto so far, putting its foreign policy platform on view for all. (The BJP appears to be in an internal squabble about its manifesto, which was slated for an April 3 release but now may not come out until next week).
The Congress Party manifesto provides some important insights into how the party views India’s role in the world, and indeed how the party views India itself. For Congress, foreign policy comes at the very end of its fifty-page platform document, and occupies less than two pages. The most striking aspect for an American reader is the absence of any specific reference to the United States—not one mention.
While the document prioritizes India’s role as a “critical bridge between the developed world and developing world,” and refers by name to China, Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Sri Lanka, there’s not a hint of any specific interest in furthering ties with the United States beyond doing so as part of “building peaceful, stable and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers” as prioritized at the top of the foreign policy platform.
What the platform does emphasize at the very top, however, are the party’s commitments to contribute to global challenges like “climate change and sustainable development, non-proliferation, international trade and cross-border terrorism.” Its second and third priorities focus on support for an Indian seat on the UN Security Council, and in combating global terrorism.
At that point the document turns to describing India’s unique role in the world—using the “critical bridge” language, but additionally highlighting the “cumulative heritage of Non-Aligned Movement” (NAM) and pledges to “continue to support the goodwill nurtured for decades amongst socialist countries.” These elements come as something of a surprise given that they have no counterpart language in the platform situating India as a rising power, or more fully describing India’s interests and partnerships with the United States, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, or other powers with which India has strong ties. Given anticipation around the world for an India rising to global power, it’s worth noting that the Congress worldview appears focused on India as a “bridge” more than India as a “power.”
Within the region, as one might expect, the platform pledges to strengthen SAARC, resolve border differences with China, improve relations with Pakistan while “calibrating” according to Pakistani action in tackling terror, and affirms support for Afghanistan’s peace process. The section on Sri Lanka is relatively detailed in comparison to other countries, committing to press for “full equality” for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority as well as a credible inquiry into allegations of excesses at the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009.
Although not included in the section on foreign policy, the Congress manifesto contains substantial attention to trade and economics, including a commitment to get back to eight percent growth, and a road map for the next half decade. The platform promises to promote “greater integration with the global economy” and encourage foreign direct investment.
The manifesto also pledges to “ensure that India has a globally competitive business and investment-friendly environment.” It specifically calls to improve India’s rank in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index from its current 134 to 75 within five years. These are welcome words for foreign investors and governments supportive of enhancing trade and investment ties. They also serve as an acknowledgement that recent years—in a Congress-led government—have dampened perceptions of India.
Outside observers will be watching to see how the foreign policy discussion in India evolves further during the coming weeks, especially after the BJP releases its manifesto. In an effort to focus on foreign policy positions in the Indian elections, Mumbai’s Gateway House convened a panel discussion April 1, which featured representatives of the BJP, Congress, and the Aam Aadmi Party. I was delighted to participate as a discussant with some thoughts on what Americans have in mind as they await the outcome in India. As the April 1 panel proceeded, it appeared as if the three parties represented had similar positions on trade, UN Security Council, China, and other issues—so the coming weeks and more fully articulated statements from all the parties on their foreign policy positions will be helpful.
For now, the Congress Party’s platform puts into writing an approach to the region consistent with its years in government. It’s the framing of India’s role in the world, however, that officially presents some ideas that sit less comfortably alongside the notion of India as a rising global power.
Alyssa Ayres is Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. She blogs at Asia Unbound, where this piece originally appeared.
Indian voters started voting on Monday and will decide the next occupants of the Lok Sabha in what will be the largest democratic exercise in history. Voting is staggered over a period of several weeks, accommodating the needs of an electorate of more than 800 million. As of today, voters in the northeastern states of Assam and Tripura are heading to the polls to cast their votes.
As voting began, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) released its 2014 manifesto, a 52-page document outlining the party’s plans on economic, social, political, and foreign policy issues (the Congress Party has also issued an analogous document). The BJP has released manifestos ahead of previous elections as well. Most pre-election polling indicates that the BJP is likely to take a plurality if not a majority in the Lok Sabha, allowing it to form the next government with Narendra Modi as prime minister.
I’ve excerpted a few choice statements (focusing on foreign policy mainly) outlined in the 2014 manifesto, but encourage Pulse readers to give the entire document a read. If the BJP does come to power at the end of May, parliamentary politics will likely prevent it from being able to deliver fully on many of the promises outlined in the document but the manifesto nonetheless serves as an important reference point for understanding the ideas of what is likely the party forming India’s next government.
The manifesto addresses foreign policy and India’s place in the world directly, setting out a “Nation First, Universal Brotherhood” slogan for what the party believes should be priorities in Indian foreign policy. As its first guiding principle for foreign policy, the BJP document is remarkably oblique, noting that “equations will be mended through pragmatism and a doctrine of mutually beneficial and interlocking relationships, based on enlightened national interest.” I’m not entirely sure what that means and I’m not sure the BJP does either.
What is slightly more helpful is this general introduction to the section on foreign policy:
BJP believes a resurgent India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India’s global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora.
The declamation remains vague in terms of concrete policies and deliverables but indicates that the party will not veer away from the Congress-era focus on economic development as the first priority of India’s foreign relations. What is interesting is that the manifesto is especially critical of the Congress for allowing India’s leadership in its immediate neighborhood to wane and indicates that the BJP is interested in establishing regional leadership for India in SAARC and ASEAN.
The manifesto is also big on Indian soft power, noting that the country has always undercapitalized its “ancient wisdom and heritage” which continue “to be equally relevant to the world today.”
The manifesto generally seems to support India’s troubled tendency to pursue non-alignment and strategic autonomy in international affairs. The BJP notes that India ought to remain independent of “big power interests” and “engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighborhood and beyond.” There is no mention of the United Nations on the list of international fora in which India should take the lead; the focus is instead on the BRICS, G20, IBSA, SCO and ASEM.
Regarding cross-border terrorism, the BJP rather vaguely notes that it would deal with incursions “with a firm hand” and take “strong stand and steps” when the situation calls for it. It offers a clearer vision on Kashmir – namely that it won’t be conciliatory to Pakistani interests and will maintain the region as “an integral part of the Union of India.” There is no mention of the Composite Dialogue Process between India and Pakistan.
The manifesto demonstrates a BJP that is committed to the development of India’s long-neglected northeastern states – an initiative that will not only benefit those living east of the Siliguri Corridor but also bolster India’s strategic interests along the disputed Arunachal Pradesh border with China. While the manifesto does not mention China even once, it notes that “there will be special emphasis on massive infrastructure development, especially along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.” Modi has warned China to abandon its “expansionist attitude” in the past. Despite his tough tone on foreign policy issues, Modi and BJP would likely pursue closer commercial ties with China.
On defense, the party will aim to bolster India’s indigenous arms industry, including improving India’s defense research and development capabilities by strengthening the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). While the manifesto sets this out as a goal, it is considerably vague on how it will solve the seemingly intractable problems in the defense industry that India has struggled with for decades.
One area where the BJP could potentially alter India’s foreign policy is with regards to India’s strategic nuclear weapons. The manifesto notes that the party would follow a “two-pronged independent nuclear program, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes.” It also notes that the party is interested in revising and updating India’s nuclear doctrine, “to make it relevant to challenges of current times.” Currently, India practices a “no-first use” policy against Pakistan (which does not do the same in return). This is a new addition to this year’s manifesto and did not make an appearance in the party’s 2009 document.
It is perhaps telling that the BJP manifesto addresses national defense, India’s nuclear program, and terrorism before it addresses foreign policy more generally. It is even more telling that only three pages in the entire manifesto are devoted to defense, security, and international affairs. Should the BJP take the reins in New Delhi this May, India’s relations with both Pakistan and China will be at a tipping point. With Pakistan, in particular, a thaw is currently underway with good progress being made on cross-border trade deals and a significant dip in border skirmishes (particularly compared to 2013).
Overall, I’d say don’t hold your breath for any major changes in India’s foreign policy trajectory regardless of the outcome of India’s elections. Indian foreign policy is remarkably good at remaining immune to the whims of grand ideas laid out in political manifestos (and to the preferences of individual prime ministers). With India, it’s often easy to get lost in the myopia of looking at foreign policy exclusively, but when one takes a step back and examines at the broader political forces driving this election, including broad economic malaise and sweeping anti-incumbency sentiment, it is apparent that Indian foreign policy will likely remain a function of its economic needs
Congress:
Foreign policy, however, has been largely invisible throughout this campaign cycle, except for the contributions of the two main regional parties in Tamil Nadu, which have a long-standing and special focus on Sri Lanka. Of the two main national parties, only Congress has released its official manifesto so far, putting its foreign policy platform on view for all. (The BJP appears to be in an internal squabble about its manifesto, which was slated for an April 3 release but now may not come out until next week).
The Congress Party manifesto provides some important insights into how the party views India’s role in the world, and indeed how the party views India itself. For Congress, foreign policy comes at the very end of its fifty-page platform document, and occupies less than two pages. The most striking aspect for an American reader is the absence of any specific reference to the United States—not one mention.
While the document prioritizes India’s role as a “critical bridge between the developed world and developing world,” and refers by name to China, Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Sri Lanka, there’s not a hint of any specific interest in furthering ties with the United States beyond doing so as part of “building peaceful, stable and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers” as prioritized at the top of the foreign policy platform.
What the platform does emphasize at the very top, however, are the party’s commitments to contribute to global challenges like “climate change and sustainable development, non-proliferation, international trade and cross-border terrorism.” Its second and third priorities focus on support for an Indian seat on the UN Security Council, and in combating global terrorism.
At that point the document turns to describing India’s unique role in the world—using the “critical bridge” language, but additionally highlighting the “cumulative heritage of Non-Aligned Movement” (NAM) and pledges to “continue to support the goodwill nurtured for decades amongst socialist countries.” These elements come as something of a surprise given that they have no counterpart language in the platform situating India as a rising power, or more fully describing India’s interests and partnerships with the United States, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, or other powers with which India has strong ties. Given anticipation around the world for an India rising to global power, it’s worth noting that the Congress worldview appears focused on India as a “bridge” more than India as a “power.”
Within the region, as one might expect, the platform pledges to strengthen SAARC, resolve border differences with China, improve relations with Pakistan while “calibrating” according to Pakistani action in tackling terror, and affirms support for Afghanistan’s peace process. The section on Sri Lanka is relatively detailed in comparison to other countries, committing to press for “full equality” for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority as well as a credible inquiry into allegations of excesses at the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009.
Although not included in the section on foreign policy, the Congress manifesto contains substantial attention to trade and economics, including a commitment to get back to eight percent growth, and a road map for the next half decade. The platform promises to promote “greater integration with the global economy” and encourage foreign direct investment.
The manifesto also pledges to “ensure that India has a globally competitive business and investment-friendly environment.” It specifically calls to improve India’s rank in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index from its current 134 to 75 within five years. These are welcome words for foreign investors and governments supportive of enhancing trade and investment ties. They also serve as an acknowledgement that recent years—in a Congress-led government—have dampened perceptions of India.
Outside observers will be watching to see how the foreign policy discussion in India evolves further during the coming weeks, especially after the BJP releases its manifesto. In an effort to focus on foreign policy positions in the Indian elections, Mumbai’s Gateway House convened a panel discussion April 1, which featured representatives of the BJP, Congress, and the Aam Aadmi Party. I was delighted to participate as a discussant with some thoughts on what Americans have in mind as they await the outcome in India. As the April 1 panel proceeded, it appeared as if the three parties represented had similar positions on trade, UN Security Council, China, and other issues—so the coming weeks and more fully articulated statements from all the parties on their foreign policy positions will be helpful.
For now, the Congress Party’s platform puts into writing an approach to the region consistent with its years in government. It’s the framing of India’s role in the world, however, that officially presents some ideas that sit less comfortably alongside the notion of India as a rising global power.
Alyssa Ayres is Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. She blogs at Asia Unbound, where this piece originally appeared.
) have to work hard for next 5 years to get votes after 5 years. Because the votes on the basis of Caste, Religion are decreasing now and are more based on Development, Defense, Economy now. It's my opinion 
