Mhmoud
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@Mhmoud
Sorry brother, I feel that your quality posts deserves a substantial reply and such a reply will obviously take some time (longer than I thought) so if you don't mind, I will try to reply whenever my reply has written which might take a few days. Not writing the reply itself, lol, but you know what I mean. I don't want to make a reply for the sake of it while I am visiting this thread and online.
@Wilhelm II @The SC @Philip the Arab
I have not seen any Saudi Arabian involvement on the ground in Libya or any weapons support. We were never really involved in Libya that much neither when Gaddafi was toppled. That was mostly Qatar.
As written earlier we have ties with both elements and all parties in Libya. Including the tribal and clan elements. I see no need (IMO) to pick any side. Let our Libyan brothers and sisters decide on their own. No need to be afraid of any non-Arabs they won't ever be able to (if that is the goal) make Libya an enemy of fellow Arab states let alone the people. Nor will they change any culture or "de-Arabize". Not possible with Arabs.
Extremists must be combated for the sake of Libya itself and the neighborhood but all parties involved are doing it from what I can see.
A reminder from less than 10 days ago (Arab League and OIC summit in Makkah):
This means that KSA is pursuing the diplomatic option for now and talking with both sides. Similar with visits of other Libyan leaders.
Thank you brother for your reply. I am looking forward to your opinion on the matter. Please feel free to take your time.
Although I do agree that there was no weapons support in Libya coming from the KSA, there was some non-lethal aid from the country, including the Hilux pickups, as mentioned in the UN Panel of Experts report in 2017. Although you are completely correct that the new weaponry in Libya is mainly sourced from Europe, Egypt, the rest of the Gulf and Turkey. Saudi Arabia has been taking more of a hands-off and touch-and-go approach when it comes to its relations with Libya, being careful not to jeopardise its relations with both sides.
Although I do agree that there are elements that want to de-Arabise or deculture the individual Arab states, we must also recognise that there are fault lines and opposing interests between the leaders of various Arab states, like the power axes of Doha and Abu Dhabi, along with others. These aren't because of any enmety between people, as the Arab people will always be close to one another, but there are fault lines within adn between states that render them at odds with one another. This is absolutely normal within the context of international relations, and when people say that they 'hate a country' they usually mean its government, and very rarely do they mean its actual people. So I am not as concerned about any hate or splitting of people, but in an enmity in the political context, in the form of cold relations extending to the extreme possibility of proxy conflict.
I also agree that both sides are on their paths to eliminating extremists in Libya, but the context within this elimination must also be taken to account. On the GNA's side, the major war that they had was between them and ISIS in the Bunyan al-Marsous Operation. The operation was a success, and its effort to rout the presence of extremists, as well as its effectiveness in preventing attacks, were commendable. However, much of Haftar's efforts in Benghazi and Derna were more of thinly disguised power-grabs. The dubious relations twice removed of various smaller groups in the two cities were more of a pretext for foreign help to gain the control, rather than actual counterterror operations on the ground.
I appreciate the KSA taking the role of the mediator here, but I am afraid that the ship has already sailed. Serraj has been supporting a political solution with Haftar for years and it took him until the Battle for Tripoli to realise that he is there for absolute power and not for the talks or a position in the military. Serraj's mistake of genuinely believing Haftar despite similar power grabs may be a sign that he is better suted as a bureaucrat than an actual impromptu leader. Although he is paying for his mistake politically, he has learned from this mistake and has said multiple times that the political solution with Haftar is effectively dead. Haftar has also refused any political solution of any sort, which doubles the issue of bringing them back to the negotiating table. Currently, GNA officials have managed to reunite the HOR and form a functioning legislature once more, and has also started talks with delegations of Elders in the East. So any political solution will involve them and not Haftar.
I hope that the civil war ends, likely this year or the next, and Libya will resume its warm relations with the KSA.