jhungary
MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2012
- Messages
- 19,295
- Reaction score
- 387
- Country
- Location
Today battles are the part of 2 battles that fought with the same regiment at the same day and both battle ended up being the last stand for the defender, which is a very rare occasion in any history of war. I don’t think I can think of any battle that would lead to 2 last stands back to back.
Today’s topic is Anglo-Zulu war during the 1870s British invasion to Natal (Modern day South Africa) and face off with the Zulu tribe. Today’s battle is the first and second battle for the campaign. When the British start the war with a humiliate defeat in Isandlwana.
And this back to back battle report will investigate why one battle failed and another succeed, it would give you an overall comparative view on both battles, which fought with the same unit, 24 hours apart.
Background of the battle
After the federation of Canada, the British was contemplating a similar campaign to federate the republic of South Africa, which would mean to united a bunch of kingdom, tribe and Boer republic. South Africa laid in a strategic trading position between Europe and Asian continent via cape of good hope. Controlling of South Africa would mean a dominance of sea trade route between the 2 continents and also the wealthy diamond reserve in South Africa. The first to fall in line is, the Kingdom of Zulu
There are 2 reasons why Zulu is first in line. First, Kingdom of Zulu is the biggest threat to the British, once they fall, all other Zulu settlement and smaller tribe will fall without a fight. Also, Kingdom of Zulu present as the biggest threat of the Boer as well, and for the British, it’s either work with Zulu and against Boer or work with Boer and against Zulu. It’s very apparent that what is the Brits choice will be.
So, the British issued an ultimatum for the Zulu to cede in British Demand before December 11, 1878, which was extended to January 11, 1879. British Deployed their troop on the border on Jan 10 and at Jan 11, when the demand did not meet, the British invade the Zululand
The British set up camp at Isandlwana on the 20th and at the same time the Zulu camped just 6 km NE from the British Camp
Deposition of force
The British Force of Half the invasion force contains half the 2nd column and the 3rd column. Coercion troop mainly comprise of the 1/24 Warwickshire Regiment of Foot. Which contribute roughly 600 troops to British Defense in Isandlwana. Native Natal Contingent also present in the battle numbered about 700 troops. Plus other British troop present Medical detachment, Royal Engineer, Royal Artillery and Other service like Regimental Band. Put the number of British Troop to about 1,800
Detail complements are as follow
2 Battery from Royal Artillery
5 Companies from 1/24
1 Company from 2/23
5 Troop2 from NNH (Natal Native Horse)
2 Companies from 1/1 NNC
2 Companies from 1/3 NNC
2 Companies from 2/3 NNC
Assorted British Colonial and Native detachment
Zulu forces comprise of 3 fields Corps Act as 2 horns and a breast. Left Horn from inGobamakhosi, uMbonambi, uVe regiments numbered 5-6000 men. Right Horn from uDududu, uNokenke regiments, part uNodwengu corps numbered 3 - 4,000 men And a center force from umCijo,uKhandampevu, uThulwana regiments; part uNodwengu corps, numbered 7 - 9,000 men
Tactical Consideration
The tactical goal for the British is to hold the camp, which connect from their outpost in Rorke’s Drift and Lord Chelmsford half invasion force. The camp sit squarely middle of both point and if the camp was overran, that will expose either the back of Lord Chelmsford Column or the Camp in Rorke’s Drift would be open to attack, if the Zulu deal a decisive defeat in both or either place. The British have to consider the invasion a failure and their position in Natal would be in jeopardy
On the other hand, Zulu warrior cannot be in the fight forever, they double as the main work force in their respective village. So the Zulu would also be shooting for a decisive victory on the British as soon as possible and force the British out. Everyday the war drag on for the Zulu, the village would suffer as there are no man power for building/repairing, and harvesting.
Beginning of Battle
Nobody really knows exactly how the first 5 hours (0300-0800 Jan 22) of the battle started. Detail emerge is sketchy from both side and the intention of the Zulu at the beginning of battle, and most historian debated whether or not the Zulus main intention is the camp itself or that they are trying to tail and ambush Lord Chelmsford column. Why would the Zulu be that close to the camp and why Colonel Pulleine patrol from the camp did not pick up the Zulu at all is still currently debating heavily.
What we did know is, by 0800, Lieutenant Charles Raw’s NNH troop discovered the main force of Zulu, and the Zulu was well hidden and jump at the chance when they were discovered.
Pulleine first realize the situation soon after the Zulu ambushed Raw’s NNH troop, and a preparation of battle was made and also runner was sent to warn Lord Chelmsford column.
What Pulleine did is to lay out 6 of his company flat against the NE, where the Zulu were expected to attack form, effectively forming a firing line, with support of 2 Guns from Royal Artillery. Another company from Colonel Durnford double time back and hold the line East of Pulleine. Effectively refusing the right flank from the Zulu and act as the Flank guard. The Camp left flank is protected by the wagon and the camp site. Completing the defence of British Camp
While the Zulu attacks in number, first by hooking the right horn against the left flank of Pulleine troop and the Breast then attack the main skirmish line formed by Pulleine 6 companies. Meanwhile the Left horn met with Durnfords NNC and Durnford retreated SE to a dry up creek bed.
Even with superior number (20,000 against 1,800 british) the British line hold and pin down the bulk of the Zulu force by accurate and intense musket fire., combine with 2 cannons, the Main line held for more than 4 hours till noon.
Things started to take a turn for the worse for the British. By now Durnsford NNC have almost ran out of ammunition and they cannot sustain intense fire rate to hold off the Zulu. Without Canon battery support, resupplying the company during battle is impossible. Thus Durnsford Company retreated to a position closer to the camp to be supplied.
At that point, it opened up the Right flank of Pulleine line and the G company (The further right) got rolled up almost immediately after losing mutual support from Durnford’s NNC. The remaining 5 companies then retreat to a second position. However, the withdrawal did not do without casualty.
With the perimeter getting significantly smaller and the number of British Troop dwindling (At least 2 company have been wiped out before 1400) Now at reduced number, the defense line turns to a chaotic individual defenses and then got turn into a last stand where different company have hold their last ground.
By 1500, the battlefield is then filled with silence. The battle is over slightly after 1500
Most of the British troops were now dead and lay where they felt.
What Went Wrong??
The problem with the English is, they seriously underestimate the capability of the Zulu. Every move the British made in Isandlwana is an testimony of their underestimation of their opponent.
First of all, they did not fortify their camp. The camp was not defended according to the terrain and the defender did not enjoy force multiplying effect from static defenses. Sandbags, wagons were not utilized to give a better defense posture and resulting the Zulu able to break apart the British troop when the troop were dispersed.
Secondly, Pulleine did not send out patrol regularly even tho there are intelligence that Zulu is approaching the camp. However, Col. Pulleine underestimates the capability of Zulu and incorrectly assumes the Zulu do not have enough power to attack the camps. Since the order for Pulleine is to defend the camp, he did exactly just that.
While later when Col Durnsford arrives and notice the Zulu movement, when he request to send a recon-in-force with a company to investigate and even though Durnsford outrank Pulleine, Pulleine did not send out the company as needed. And that’s where Durnsford go by himself and effectively cast the die on the defeat. That also lay the road for the Zulu to achieve total tactical surprise when they jump at the British
Tactically, Pulleine put their force quite disperse (See Map) and quite far from their main camp, thus stretching their defenses. While they were beat back and pulled back some time, without interconnect support. Basically every time the British want to move closer to the camp, they needed to conduct a fighting retreat.
Also the distant between companies and camp also create supplies problem. Ammo brought up from the camp, and back then bullet were individually stored in metal box, where the box was sealed by an aluminum foil and the box is locked by screwed down. When the box is brought in the front line, it would take longer for the British to break open the box and retrieve the Ammo. When you combine this with the numeral inferiority, it doomed the British campaign in Zululand
Perhaps the most important tactic error committed by the British that day is to ignore the pled for help from the camp. Message, as early as 0830 was transmitted to the Chelmsford Column describing the situation. Several messages with different tone were also sent from the camp. And none were responded by Chelmsford and only at 3:30 when everything is over did he return with his force to Isandlwana.
As the position between Isandlwana and Chelmsford column only less than 2 hours apart, had Chelmsford react to the message the first time, the Camp would still pinning down the Zulu and it will form a pincer movement from the Zulu rear and will destroy the bulk of Zulu force.
On the other hand, Zulu also committed Tactical error after they finished off the camp, had they move on to engage/ambush the Main column; the Zulu would have inflicted a decisive victory on the British. Thus eliminating any further campaign and eventual defeat of Zulu Kingdom
you can check out part 2 of this article here :https://defence.pk/threads/last-sta...part-2-battle-of-rorke’s-drift-1879ad.298484/
Today’s topic is Anglo-Zulu war during the 1870s British invasion to Natal (Modern day South Africa) and face off with the Zulu tribe. Today’s battle is the first and second battle for the campaign. When the British start the war with a humiliate defeat in Isandlwana.
And this back to back battle report will investigate why one battle failed and another succeed, it would give you an overall comparative view on both battles, which fought with the same unit, 24 hours apart.
Background of the battle
After the federation of Canada, the British was contemplating a similar campaign to federate the republic of South Africa, which would mean to united a bunch of kingdom, tribe and Boer republic. South Africa laid in a strategic trading position between Europe and Asian continent via cape of good hope. Controlling of South Africa would mean a dominance of sea trade route between the 2 continents and also the wealthy diamond reserve in South Africa. The first to fall in line is, the Kingdom of Zulu
There are 2 reasons why Zulu is first in line. First, Kingdom of Zulu is the biggest threat to the British, once they fall, all other Zulu settlement and smaller tribe will fall without a fight. Also, Kingdom of Zulu present as the biggest threat of the Boer as well, and for the British, it’s either work with Zulu and against Boer or work with Boer and against Zulu. It’s very apparent that what is the Brits choice will be.
So, the British issued an ultimatum for the Zulu to cede in British Demand before December 11, 1878, which was extended to January 11, 1879. British Deployed their troop on the border on Jan 10 and at Jan 11, when the demand did not meet, the British invade the Zululand
The British set up camp at Isandlwana on the 20th and at the same time the Zulu camped just 6 km NE from the British Camp
Deposition of force
The British Force of Half the invasion force contains half the 2nd column and the 3rd column. Coercion troop mainly comprise of the 1/24 Warwickshire Regiment of Foot. Which contribute roughly 600 troops to British Defense in Isandlwana. Native Natal Contingent also present in the battle numbered about 700 troops. Plus other British troop present Medical detachment, Royal Engineer, Royal Artillery and Other service like Regimental Band. Put the number of British Troop to about 1,800
Detail complements are as follow
2 Battery from Royal Artillery
5 Companies from 1/24
1 Company from 2/23
5 Troop2 from NNH (Natal Native Horse)
2 Companies from 1/1 NNC
2 Companies from 1/3 NNC
2 Companies from 2/3 NNC
Assorted British Colonial and Native detachment
Zulu forces comprise of 3 fields Corps Act as 2 horns and a breast. Left Horn from inGobamakhosi, uMbonambi, uVe regiments numbered 5-6000 men. Right Horn from uDududu, uNokenke regiments, part uNodwengu corps numbered 3 - 4,000 men And a center force from umCijo,uKhandampevu, uThulwana regiments; part uNodwengu corps, numbered 7 - 9,000 men
Tactical Consideration
The tactical goal for the British is to hold the camp, which connect from their outpost in Rorke’s Drift and Lord Chelmsford half invasion force. The camp sit squarely middle of both point and if the camp was overran, that will expose either the back of Lord Chelmsford Column or the Camp in Rorke’s Drift would be open to attack, if the Zulu deal a decisive defeat in both or either place. The British have to consider the invasion a failure and their position in Natal would be in jeopardy
On the other hand, Zulu warrior cannot be in the fight forever, they double as the main work force in their respective village. So the Zulu would also be shooting for a decisive victory on the British as soon as possible and force the British out. Everyday the war drag on for the Zulu, the village would suffer as there are no man power for building/repairing, and harvesting.
Beginning of Battle
Nobody really knows exactly how the first 5 hours (0300-0800 Jan 22) of the battle started. Detail emerge is sketchy from both side and the intention of the Zulu at the beginning of battle, and most historian debated whether or not the Zulus main intention is the camp itself or that they are trying to tail and ambush Lord Chelmsford column. Why would the Zulu be that close to the camp and why Colonel Pulleine patrol from the camp did not pick up the Zulu at all is still currently debating heavily.
What we did know is, by 0800, Lieutenant Charles Raw’s NNH troop discovered the main force of Zulu, and the Zulu was well hidden and jump at the chance when they were discovered.
Pulleine first realize the situation soon after the Zulu ambushed Raw’s NNH troop, and a preparation of battle was made and also runner was sent to warn Lord Chelmsford column.
What Pulleine did is to lay out 6 of his company flat against the NE, where the Zulu were expected to attack form, effectively forming a firing line, with support of 2 Guns from Royal Artillery. Another company from Colonel Durnford double time back and hold the line East of Pulleine. Effectively refusing the right flank from the Zulu and act as the Flank guard. The Camp left flank is protected by the wagon and the camp site. Completing the defence of British Camp
While the Zulu attacks in number, first by hooking the right horn against the left flank of Pulleine troop and the Breast then attack the main skirmish line formed by Pulleine 6 companies. Meanwhile the Left horn met with Durnfords NNC and Durnford retreated SE to a dry up creek bed.
Even with superior number (20,000 against 1,800 british) the British line hold and pin down the bulk of the Zulu force by accurate and intense musket fire., combine with 2 cannons, the Main line held for more than 4 hours till noon.
Things started to take a turn for the worse for the British. By now Durnsford NNC have almost ran out of ammunition and they cannot sustain intense fire rate to hold off the Zulu. Without Canon battery support, resupplying the company during battle is impossible. Thus Durnsford Company retreated to a position closer to the camp to be supplied.
At that point, it opened up the Right flank of Pulleine line and the G company (The further right) got rolled up almost immediately after losing mutual support from Durnford’s NNC. The remaining 5 companies then retreat to a second position. However, the withdrawal did not do without casualty.
With the perimeter getting significantly smaller and the number of British Troop dwindling (At least 2 company have been wiped out before 1400) Now at reduced number, the defense line turns to a chaotic individual defenses and then got turn into a last stand where different company have hold their last ground.
By 1500, the battlefield is then filled with silence. The battle is over slightly after 1500
Most of the British troops were now dead and lay where they felt.
What Went Wrong??
The problem with the English is, they seriously underestimate the capability of the Zulu. Every move the British made in Isandlwana is an testimony of their underestimation of their opponent.
First of all, they did not fortify their camp. The camp was not defended according to the terrain and the defender did not enjoy force multiplying effect from static defenses. Sandbags, wagons were not utilized to give a better defense posture and resulting the Zulu able to break apart the British troop when the troop were dispersed.
Secondly, Pulleine did not send out patrol regularly even tho there are intelligence that Zulu is approaching the camp. However, Col. Pulleine underestimates the capability of Zulu and incorrectly assumes the Zulu do not have enough power to attack the camps. Since the order for Pulleine is to defend the camp, he did exactly just that.
While later when Col Durnsford arrives and notice the Zulu movement, when he request to send a recon-in-force with a company to investigate and even though Durnsford outrank Pulleine, Pulleine did not send out the company as needed. And that’s where Durnsford go by himself and effectively cast the die on the defeat. That also lay the road for the Zulu to achieve total tactical surprise when they jump at the British
Tactically, Pulleine put their force quite disperse (See Map) and quite far from their main camp, thus stretching their defenses. While they were beat back and pulled back some time, without interconnect support. Basically every time the British want to move closer to the camp, they needed to conduct a fighting retreat.
Also the distant between companies and camp also create supplies problem. Ammo brought up from the camp, and back then bullet were individually stored in metal box, where the box was sealed by an aluminum foil and the box is locked by screwed down. When the box is brought in the front line, it would take longer for the British to break open the box and retrieve the Ammo. When you combine this with the numeral inferiority, it doomed the British campaign in Zululand
Perhaps the most important tactic error committed by the British that day is to ignore the pled for help from the camp. Message, as early as 0830 was transmitted to the Chelmsford Column describing the situation. Several messages with different tone were also sent from the camp. And none were responded by Chelmsford and only at 3:30 when everything is over did he return with his force to Isandlwana.
As the position between Isandlwana and Chelmsford column only less than 2 hours apart, had Chelmsford react to the message the first time, the Camp would still pinning down the Zulu and it will form a pincer movement from the Zulu rear and will destroy the bulk of Zulu force.
On the other hand, Zulu also committed Tactical error after they finished off the camp, had they move on to engage/ambush the Main column; the Zulu would have inflicted a decisive victory on the British. Thus eliminating any further campaign and eventual defeat of Zulu Kingdom
you can check out part 2 of this article here :https://defence.pk/threads/last-sta...part-2-battle-of-rorke’s-drift-1879ad.298484/
Last edited:
