Solomon2
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Studying the past few years, one could arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is epically incompetent. One could similarly arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is competent -- but fighting for the other side. The evidence for both theses is strong. Some lowlights of the Pakistani Army's recent history, provided from Kilcullen's testimony last Thursday:
* The 2004 Shakai agreement, where the Pakistani army surrendered to militant demands after losing a campaign in Waziristan, and negotiated directly with Pakistani Taliban leaders, empowering them over local community leaders and ceding control of parts of Waziristan to them.
* The subsequent takeover by Pakistani Taliban of large portions of the FATA, the Malakand Division, the Northern Areas, and parts of Baluchistan.
* The September 2006 North Waziristan agreement, which again was signed directly between militants and the military (after another failed campaign), and led to a seasonally‐adjusted spike in Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan of 400‐600% over the fall and winter of 2006‐7.
* The December 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi, close to Pakistani Army headquarters, after she had publicly expressed concern that members of the military and intelligence services were trying to kill her.
* The July 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul, which Afghan Intelligence concluded was supported by ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service, and was allegedly carried out by members of the Haqqani Network, a Pakistan‐based terrorist organization that operates in Afghanistan, targets US forces in Regional Command – East, and has close ties to ISI.
* The closing of the US/NATO line of communications through Pakistan to Afghanistan at least 6 times in 2008, including the destruction of hundreds of NATO vehicles and other equipment along a route that is supposedly protected by the Pakistani military.
* Ongoing relationships between militants, terrorists and members of the Pakistani military and intelligence service, which were acknowledged by senior Pakistani officials in interviews with the New York Times in March 2009.
* Numerous incidents in which Pakistani military or Frontier Corps posts have allegedly fired on US forces inside Afghanistan, preventing them from chasing Taliban who were withdrawing from Afghanistan into Pakistan, and allowing the Taliban to escape back to their sanctuaries in Pakistan.
* Several incidents of Taliban allegedly setting up firing positions for mortars or rockets, either next to or in clear view of Pakistani military bases on the frontier, without interference from the Pakistani army.
* The Swat Agreement of March and April 2009, which ceded control over Swat, along with other parts of the Malakand division of NWFP, to Taliban and TNSM militants, and the imposition of Sharia law.
* The continuing insurgency in Baluchistan which has resulted in parts of the province becoming a no‐go area for Pakistani forces, and the maintenance of Taliban headquarters and base camps in and around Quetta and in refugee camps in the province.
* Desertions, defections and cooption of Pakistani military, police, frontier corps and civil officials in large numbers across much of western Pakistan, as well as the intimidation of security forces so that many troops remain in their garrison areas and over‐react when provoked.
Just to remind you, we have provided nearly $10 billion to the Pakistani military since 11 September 2001. You would, incredibly, have been better off putting that money in the stock market. So to review, either a) the Pakistani military is incompetent or b) it is fighting for the other side. And if the later is true, then either the Pakistani government has a) lost control over its military and intelligence services or b) it is not the valued ally we keep saying it is.
***********
Rather than continuing to pretend that Pakistan is a weak but willing ally against extremism, we need to recognize that while some elements in Pakistan – some elected civilian political leaders, the majority of the Pakistani people, many tribal and community leaders and some appointed administrative officials – are genuinely committed to the fight against extremism, substantial parts of the Pakistani security establishment are complicit with the enemy, whether through incompetence, intimidation or ill intent. Our approach in assisting Pakistan should be to strengthen our friends and limit the power of our enemies, while helping Pakistan stabilize itself and govern its people responsibly and humanely. Increasing assistance to the police – making the police, in effect, the premier counterinsurgency force – while channeling all military support through civilian authorities and ensuring greater accountability and conditionality on military assistance, is the correct approach. We are way past prevention in 2009, and need to focus on stopping the rot and stabilizing the situation in 2009‐2010, then rolling back extremism and militancy thereafter.
* The 2004 Shakai agreement, where the Pakistani army surrendered to militant demands after losing a campaign in Waziristan, and negotiated directly with Pakistani Taliban leaders, empowering them over local community leaders and ceding control of parts of Waziristan to them.
* The subsequent takeover by Pakistani Taliban of large portions of the FATA, the Malakand Division, the Northern Areas, and parts of Baluchistan.
* The September 2006 North Waziristan agreement, which again was signed directly between militants and the military (after another failed campaign), and led to a seasonally‐adjusted spike in Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan of 400‐600% over the fall and winter of 2006‐7.
* The December 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi, close to Pakistani Army headquarters, after she had publicly expressed concern that members of the military and intelligence services were trying to kill her.
* The July 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul, which Afghan Intelligence concluded was supported by ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service, and was allegedly carried out by members of the Haqqani Network, a Pakistan‐based terrorist organization that operates in Afghanistan, targets US forces in Regional Command – East, and has close ties to ISI.
* The closing of the US/NATO line of communications through Pakistan to Afghanistan at least 6 times in 2008, including the destruction of hundreds of NATO vehicles and other equipment along a route that is supposedly protected by the Pakistani military.
* Ongoing relationships between militants, terrorists and members of the Pakistani military and intelligence service, which were acknowledged by senior Pakistani officials in interviews with the New York Times in March 2009.
* Numerous incidents in which Pakistani military or Frontier Corps posts have allegedly fired on US forces inside Afghanistan, preventing them from chasing Taliban who were withdrawing from Afghanistan into Pakistan, and allowing the Taliban to escape back to their sanctuaries in Pakistan.
* Several incidents of Taliban allegedly setting up firing positions for mortars or rockets, either next to or in clear view of Pakistani military bases on the frontier, without interference from the Pakistani army.
* The Swat Agreement of March and April 2009, which ceded control over Swat, along with other parts of the Malakand division of NWFP, to Taliban and TNSM militants, and the imposition of Sharia law.
* The continuing insurgency in Baluchistan which has resulted in parts of the province becoming a no‐go area for Pakistani forces, and the maintenance of Taliban headquarters and base camps in and around Quetta and in refugee camps in the province.
* Desertions, defections and cooption of Pakistani military, police, frontier corps and civil officials in large numbers across much of western Pakistan, as well as the intimidation of security forces so that many troops remain in their garrison areas and over‐react when provoked.
Just to remind you, we have provided nearly $10 billion to the Pakistani military since 11 September 2001. You would, incredibly, have been better off putting that money in the stock market. So to review, either a) the Pakistani military is incompetent or b) it is fighting for the other side. And if the later is true, then either the Pakistani government has a) lost control over its military and intelligence services or b) it is not the valued ally we keep saying it is.
***********
Rather than continuing to pretend that Pakistan is a weak but willing ally against extremism, we need to recognize that while some elements in Pakistan – some elected civilian political leaders, the majority of the Pakistani people, many tribal and community leaders and some appointed administrative officials – are genuinely committed to the fight against extremism, substantial parts of the Pakistani security establishment are complicit with the enemy, whether through incompetence, intimidation or ill intent. Our approach in assisting Pakistan should be to strengthen our friends and limit the power of our enemies, while helping Pakistan stabilize itself and govern its people responsibly and humanely. Increasing assistance to the police – making the police, in effect, the premier counterinsurgency force – while channeling all military support through civilian authorities and ensuring greater accountability and conditionality on military assistance, is the correct approach. We are way past prevention in 2009, and need to focus on stopping the rot and stabilizing the situation in 2009‐2010, then rolling back extremism and militancy thereafter.
