Karzai out to prove he is no US puppet

[UmarJustice]

As he contemplates retirement next year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai appears to have one over-riding ambition -- to ensure that his people do not remember him as a puppet of the United States.

Karzai will stand down after elections in April 2014, and his final year in office promises to be turbulent as he launches strident criticism of the US government, which has backed him since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

In the latest of a series of verbal attacks, this week he accused the United States of colluding with Taliban militants to justify the presence of 100,000 international troops in Afghanistan.

Karzai has a record of inflammatory outbursts which his detractors say are evidence that he is unstable, unreliable and prone to off-the-cuff remarks that make little sense and cause serious damage.

But others say his words are carefully chosen and speak directly to Afghanistan's young, often illiterate and poorly educated population.

One independent observer with a recent insight into Karzai's state of mind is British historian William Dalrymple, who spent 90 minutes discussing his new book with the president at a private audience in Kabul last week.

"I was in Pakistan beforehand, and everyone there from the foreign ministry downwards told me he was a nutter and off his trolley," Dalrymple told AFP.

"British diplomats told me that he was at best 'emotional'. My own impression was that he is a charismatic, erudite and very intelligent man who knows exactly what he is saying."

Dalrymple said Karzai had spoken of the fate of Shah Shuja, the puppet leader whom British colonialists put on the throne in Kabul in 1839 and who was later assassinated.

"His view was that the US were doing to him what the British had done to Shah Shuja, which was to treat him as a puppet and to use him for their own interests," Dalrymple said.

"Karzai thinks Shah Shuja didn't stress his independence enough, and... I do think he is concerned with his legacy."

Dalrymple also said that during their meeting Karzai aired the allegations that the US and Taliban were somehow acting in concert -- remarks that were to blind-side US officials when the president repeated them in a public speech on Sunday, during a visit by new Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel.

Karzai, now 55, was a darling of the West when he became leader of Afghanistan after the US-led invasion that ousted the Taliban.

Speaking perfect English, moderate in his views and stylishly dressed in a tunic and lambskin hat, he charmed then US president George W. Bush, who praised him as a man of "honour, courage and skill".

But US-Afghan ties became increasingly strained as the bloody Taliban insurgency gained pace, American casualties mounted and Karzai's government became a by-word for corruption.

Now, with the US-led military operation winding down, Karzai appears happy to cross his biggest overseas backer and eager to secure a reputation as an Afghan leader who stood up to foreign powers.

In recent weeks he has ordered US special forces out of the key province of Wardak, banned international troops from university campuses due to unproven harassment claims, and stopped Afghan forces from calling in US air strikes.

"These are desperate attempts by President Karzai trying to justify himself before history," Waheed Mujda, a former Taliban government official and political analyst, told AFP.

"His remarks remind me of president Najibullah (leader of the pro-communist government that fell in 1992) who made similar remarks as the Soviets were preparing to leave and who started holding talks with mujahideen fighters."

Like Shah Shuja, Najibullah met an untimely end. When the Taliban seized power in 1996, they hanged him from a traffic light in central Kabul.

Karzai is also motivated by anger that the Taliban refuse to include him in any peace talks and further delays over the handover of Afghan detainees held by the United States -- an issue he has made a symbol of national sovereignty.

For ordinary Afghans, his attacks on Washington echo their own outrage over civilian deaths caused by coalition operations, night raids and a sense that foreign troops trample on local culture.

"Over the past few years, the trust between Karzai and the US administration has completely faded," said Waheed Wafa, director of the Afghanistan research centre at Kabul University. "What he says now shows his frustration."

US political and military officials were stunned by Karzai's accusation that they collude with the Taliban, and furious lawmakers in Washington said he could pay a heavy price.

Senior Republican Senator Lindsey Graham spoke of his "disgust and resentment" at Karzai, and warned that he could support a withdrawal of US funding for his government.

"I am perfectly capable of pulling the plug on Afghanistan," Graham told Foreign Policy.


Karzai out to prove he is no US puppet | The Nation

 

[Ayush]

now we know the reason behind his last few comments.

 

[A.Rafay]

He dont need to prove! People already know he is a clown and a puppet!

 

[mehboobkz]

Karzai and his brother are clandestine billionaires...

Funds in Dubai transported in aircrafts with large stash of cash.
Money already got siphoned off, now Mr Karzai does not need US.
The hand that fed him, is ready to be bitten.

Kabul Bank 'diverted £540 million to group of 12 in massive fraud' - Telegraph

 

[muse]

He's also very Afghan -- dead man walking

 

[khanboy007]

he is a disgrace, sold his peoples blood out on the cost of RELATIONSHIPS with the US !!!!!!!

tarbooz tarbooz ko dekh ke rang pakar ta hai..............he is looking at the weather around him and changing his colours, he knows this very well that he is not to survive after these foreign forces leave and is certainly trying to make himself safe by making comments against the US and Taliban to get popularity.

typical IDIOT !!!!

 

[Alshawi1234]

Quick question. What do you guys think is the solution other than taking advantage of the US to stand up and then asking them to leave. Do you guys really thing that "fighting off the occupier" will take the allies put? Let's say the the allies did leave. The Taliban come back into power and gain an even stronger grip than they had before. Returning Afghanistan to the stone ages.

Any afghan members to answer this question?

 

[muse]

Karzai's Balancing Act
Kip Whittington
March 15, 2013

Recent weeks have highlighted Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s desire to assert more control over the use of military force by coalition forces in Afghanistan. First Karzai signed a presidential order that prevents Afghan security forces from requesting air support from coalition forces during operations in residential areas. Then the Afghan leader announced that he will ban U.S. special-operations forces from operating in the Maidan Wardak province near Kabul. Karzai even said that the Taliban “want longer presence of foreigners—not their departure from Afghanistan.” These are risky moves, but show that Karzai is driven by internal political concerns.

Both decisions were prompted by what have been cited as significant abuses by international forces and armed Afghan units working independently from the government. Local Afghan officials had repeatedly claimed that civilians were being killed in NATO airstrikes. Karzai finally decided to issue a ban after an airstrike in Kunar province killed 10 civilians.

In the Wardak province, local residents have filed complaints with Karzai’s government claiming that Afghan irregulars working with U.S. special-operations forces were systematically involved in the disappearances and deaths of local villagers (confusion remains as to who exactly is suspected of the alleged abuses, and an inquiry is underway). These reports finally drove Afghanistan’s National Security Council (NSC) to issue the edict against the use of U.S. special-operations units in Wardak. In addition, Karzai has also voiced that he wants to establish control over all Afghan forces.

While the bans might not last forever, the underlying issues are nothing new. For some time Karzai has demanded that coalition forces stop conducting airstrikes and night raids—targeted raids designed to capture or kill suspected insurgents—in residential areas. For Karzai, when collateral damage occurs as a consequence of these operations, it ultimately breeds alienation, as the population equates violence not only with the Taliban, but with the very international forces Karzai’s government allows to operate on Afghan soil. This has created immense distrust between many Afghans, the Karzai government and NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).

The edicts reveal a more forceful Karzai, a leader willing to take control of the use of military force in his country. The moves are meant to strengthen the legitimacy of his government in the Afghan population’s eyes. Thus, this is largely a strategic political move—not a military one—designed to shore up support for the Afghan government in a time of great uncertainty and as the security and political transitions of 2014 loom on the horizon.

An Opening for Insurgents?

But Karzai’s recent political moves will cause an inevitable loss of tactical gains in combatting the insurgent threat. The use of coalition airpower (close air support and drone strikes) by friendly ground forces has allowed them to hit the enemy effectively with low risk to themselves.

U.S. special-operations units have become quite adept at using direct action (night raids) to quickly identify and neutralize terrorist and insurgent targets in Afghanistan. Special operators and intelligence officers use a targeting cycle, perfected during the Iraq War, called F3EA – “find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze.” Essentially, special operators find their target, capture or kill the individuals, gather intelligence at the site, and use the information to precisely identify new targets.

These operations usually occur in the form of multiple night raids all throughout the war zone in order to degrade enemy networks quickly—and they work. In strategic provinces, such as the Wardak province, direct action by special-operations forces has kept the Taliban threat to Kabul at bay. And in an effort to train Afghan forces in the uses of direct action, many are accompanying U.S. forces on raids today.

While immensely useful, both tactics have proven to be controversial due to the inevitable mistakes and social disturbances that come with collateral damage, inaccurate targeting and foreigners bursting into Afghan homes at night. The tactics strengthen deep local resentment.

Even when used correctly, the tactics only help accomplish short-term objectives. Referencing the direct-action methods in a Foreign Affairs interview, former ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal reaffirmed this point: “The tactics we developed do work, but they don’t provide decisive effects absent other, complementary activities.”

A Strategic Calculation

Do the political risks outweigh the battlefield gains? For the Afghan government the answer is beginning to look like a yes. Karzai, like President Obama, has to weigh domestic political concerns when making military decisions. But the Karzai government currently does not have a monopoly on the use of force in its country. By making such moves as banning foreign air support, raids in Wardak, unilateral detentions and the presence of private security companies, Karzai will slowly ensure that the Afghan government can wrest control from international forces and other armed groups operating in Afghanistan.

While the decisions are likely to limit military commanders (both ISAF and Afghan) in the field, they are important when balancing long- and short-term goals in the larger strategic picture. After all, the ultimate objective is to have a competent Afghan government that is both capable of providing security and seen as legitimate by the Afghan people.

Night raids and airstrikes may degrade enemy networks effectively, but how much are they hurting long-term strategic objectives by simultaneously angering the population? This is a serious question because the coalition is leaning towards a light-footprint approach after 2014 that, amongst other things, utilizes special-operations forces’ direct-action methods and ISAF’s airpower (the Afghan air force is largely incapable of providing the required support) against terrorist and insurgent networks. If Karzai continues to place limitations on ISAF, they could alter the calculus of what the new Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. permits.

In the end, it is the Afghan government that will have to counter the insurgency by providing security, law and order, and governance to the people—not ISAF. With the upcoming 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections, and a government already rife with problems, Afghan institutions will continue to take a more sensitive approach to the use of violence in order to assuage political concerns. Perhaps this is a sign of growing confidence in their security forces. But it could merely be motivated by fear of angering the population.

Either way, if the Afghan government is willing to accept more responsibility, it should be seen by the international community as an important step towards the development of a weak state’s institutions.

Kip Whittington is a Research Associate at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. You can follow him on Twitter at @KipTWhit. Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

 

[somebozo]

900 choohay kha ker billi haj ko chale!

more appropriate headline would be "Karzai out to prove he is namak haram!