FOOLS_NIGHTMARE
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India could find itself in a catch-22 situation as engagement with the Taliban may lead Pakistan to up the ante in J&K
While the return of the Taliban to Kabul may have ended the internecine warfare within Afghanistan, the geopolitical contestation to own the spoils of Taliban’s victory has just begun. In a rather unfriendly neighbourhood, New Delhi’s attempts at forming a regional consensus to stabilise Afghanistan, albeit wise and timely, will only achieve limited success thanks to the China-Pakistan coalition and its interests at play in and over Afghanistan. What is worse, India’s advances to court the Taliban and attempts to evolve a regional consensus on Afghanistan might deteriorate India-Pakistan relations and pose challenges for India in Kashmir.
Post-American Afghanistan
Although the recent talks at the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue in Afghanistan on November 10, 2021 were an important way to help stabilize Afghanistan, the reality is that the two countries most important for peace in Afghanistan – China and Pakistan – decided to stay away. . Russia or Central Asian countries have no power or desire to participate in Afghanistan’s independence from the major Chinese or Pakistani nationalities. Iran has less interest in Afghanistan and is less likely to oppose China’s regional plans, especially when it comes to the imposition of US sanctions.
While China appears to be moving closer to Afghanistan under the auspices of the Taliban, it is clear that it is expected to take a regional, if not global, action in the coming months. It is time for Beijing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and he needs to reconcile his recognition with Russia and Pakistan. The long-term vision of Afghanistan to China revolves around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project that Afghanistan has been in place since May 2016. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is also seen as an important part within China’s largest BRI. The project with Afghanistan could eventually become part of the CPEC if the Taliban government is established in the country. In China, there are many riders on the Taliban.
While Pakistan recognizes its challenges from an unstable Afghanistan, its modern approach to Afghanistan has a positive connotation. While urging the international community to help keep Afghanistan afloat, it is determined to keep India as far away from Kabul as possible even if the Taliban want India to continue to act and provide development assistance. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is the mother of all zero sports.
Help or not
The international community is facing a crisis in Afghanistan as it seeks to help the country recover. The Taliban and Pakistan refer to the US-led coalition as ‘colonists’ who have just left Afghanistan; and in the same breath, they seek help from the very ‘ancient settlers’. Second, if the US and the West actually send aid to Afghanistan, it may or may not reach the people. And yet, if they do not help, the Afghan people will face untold suffering. But perhaps the biggest problem for the West is that if he had established the country, he would still be called an ancient colonist, and Pakistan and China would benefit geopolitically, resulting in, in that sense, a thankless work in the West. Hence the question before Western leaders is how they can give encouragement to the Taliban, and when.
India’s problems
India is now facing a new crisis in Afghanistan – the first one to decide whether to join the Taliban or not. Subsequent governments in Afghanistan, including the current Taliban government, have demanded ties with India which has upset Pakistan. Pakistan has always been very skeptical of the growth of India-Afghanistan relations regardless of who is in charge of Kabul. The problem in India is the same. The Taliban want India to take action and help the country stabilize, but Pakistan hates it. Not so long ago, Pakistan National Security Adviser criticized India for (India) reaching out to Taliban envoys in Doha. And now, Pakistan has refused to attend a regional security summit in Afghanistan called by India. This shows that Pakistan would not want India to form close ties with the Taliban or be part of any region set up to establish the country. In addition, it is possible that as India gets closer to the Taliban, the Pakistani side increases the heat (read ‘attack’) on Jammu and Kashmir. By maintaining ties with the Taliban and convening a regional security conference in New Delhi, India has shown that this is a legitimate threat.
Let me explain the problem further. Seriously, if the Taliban government settled in Kabul without India’s assistance to the country, then it could do more for Pakistan. and vis India. On the other hand, India is heavily involved in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Pakistan is very high in Kashmir. This is the 22 events that India finds itself in. However, India has nothing to do but engage with the Taliban.
Pakistani policy of Kashmir
Pakistan’s initial desire to reconcile with India in Kashmir before and in preparation for the capture of the Taliban in Kabul in August 2021 seems to be on the horizon. This is due to the Pakistani victory over the occupation of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Negotiations between the two countries in late 2020 and early 2021 are said to have focused on regular reduction of violence in Kashmir and political understanding in Kashmir. The February alliance between India and Pakistan and the reduction of violence in Kashmir (e.g., the influx of terrorists from the Pakistani side to Kashmir, the terrorists in Kashmir and violations of fire control laws on the Line of Control) were a direct result of the backchannel understanding. between the two sides. This understanding lasted until August when the Taliban took over. Since then, violence has shown that backchannel awareness is fading and violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is progressing slowly. In addition, views from the border point out that what Pakistan has already demanded in support of India’s decision to abolish special status in Kashmir (instead of New Delhi to restore Statehood in Kashmir and allow politics in the state) has now changed. . It now wants India to fully return to pre-August 5, 2019 at Kashmir. In other words, the Pakistani communist route in Kashmir continued until the Taliban seized Kabul. Best of all, this is a backward change in Pakistani ideology, and worst of all, Pakistan was forcing India.
The appointment of Sardar Masood Khan, the former President of Pakistan, became the President of Kashmir, as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States is probably another sign of Kashmir’s involvement in Pakistan’s foreign policy after the Taliban coup in Kabul.
If this analysis is accurate, then we can see the many verbal and violent wars in J&K. This means that any potential for the India-Pakistan agreement in Afghanistan could be extremely difficult to achieve. Beijing will play together; so are Iran and Central Asian countries, in particular. For New Delhi, then, the decision is to align its policies with Afghanistan and Moscow, Washington with major Western cities while working closely with the Taliban.
Happymon Jacob teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research.
While the return of the Taliban to Kabul may have ended the internecine warfare within Afghanistan, the geopolitical contestation to own the spoils of Taliban’s victory has just begun. In a rather unfriendly neighbourhood, New Delhi’s attempts at forming a regional consensus to stabilise Afghanistan, albeit wise and timely, will only achieve limited success thanks to the China-Pakistan coalition and its interests at play in and over Afghanistan. What is worse, India’s advances to court the Taliban and attempts to evolve a regional consensus on Afghanistan might deteriorate India-Pakistan relations and pose challenges for India in Kashmir.
Post-American Afghanistan
Although the recent talks at the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue in Afghanistan on November 10, 2021 were an important way to help stabilize Afghanistan, the reality is that the two countries most important for peace in Afghanistan – China and Pakistan – decided to stay away. . Russia or Central Asian countries have no power or desire to participate in Afghanistan’s independence from the major Chinese or Pakistani nationalities. Iran has less interest in Afghanistan and is less likely to oppose China’s regional plans, especially when it comes to the imposition of US sanctions.
While China appears to be moving closer to Afghanistan under the auspices of the Taliban, it is clear that it is expected to take a regional, if not global, action in the coming months. It is time for Beijing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and he needs to reconcile his recognition with Russia and Pakistan. The long-term vision of Afghanistan to China revolves around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project that Afghanistan has been in place since May 2016. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is also seen as an important part within China’s largest BRI. The project with Afghanistan could eventually become part of the CPEC if the Taliban government is established in the country. In China, there are many riders on the Taliban.
While Pakistan recognizes its challenges from an unstable Afghanistan, its modern approach to Afghanistan has a positive connotation. While urging the international community to help keep Afghanistan afloat, it is determined to keep India as far away from Kabul as possible even if the Taliban want India to continue to act and provide development assistance. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is the mother of all zero sports.
Help or not
The international community is facing a crisis in Afghanistan as it seeks to help the country recover. The Taliban and Pakistan refer to the US-led coalition as ‘colonists’ who have just left Afghanistan; and in the same breath, they seek help from the very ‘ancient settlers’. Second, if the US and the West actually send aid to Afghanistan, it may or may not reach the people. And yet, if they do not help, the Afghan people will face untold suffering. But perhaps the biggest problem for the West is that if he had established the country, he would still be called an ancient colonist, and Pakistan and China would benefit geopolitically, resulting in, in that sense, a thankless work in the West. Hence the question before Western leaders is how they can give encouragement to the Taliban, and when.
India’s problems
India is now facing a new crisis in Afghanistan – the first one to decide whether to join the Taliban or not. Subsequent governments in Afghanistan, including the current Taliban government, have demanded ties with India which has upset Pakistan. Pakistan has always been very skeptical of the growth of India-Afghanistan relations regardless of who is in charge of Kabul. The problem in India is the same. The Taliban want India to take action and help the country stabilize, but Pakistan hates it. Not so long ago, Pakistan National Security Adviser criticized India for (India) reaching out to Taliban envoys in Doha. And now, Pakistan has refused to attend a regional security summit in Afghanistan called by India. This shows that Pakistan would not want India to form close ties with the Taliban or be part of any region set up to establish the country. In addition, it is possible that as India gets closer to the Taliban, the Pakistani side increases the heat (read ‘attack’) on Jammu and Kashmir. By maintaining ties with the Taliban and convening a regional security conference in New Delhi, India has shown that this is a legitimate threat.
Let me explain the problem further. Seriously, if the Taliban government settled in Kabul without India’s assistance to the country, then it could do more for Pakistan. and vis India. On the other hand, India is heavily involved in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Pakistan is very high in Kashmir. This is the 22 events that India finds itself in. However, India has nothing to do but engage with the Taliban.
Pakistani policy of Kashmir
Pakistan’s initial desire to reconcile with India in Kashmir before and in preparation for the capture of the Taliban in Kabul in August 2021 seems to be on the horizon. This is due to the Pakistani victory over the occupation of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Negotiations between the two countries in late 2020 and early 2021 are said to have focused on regular reduction of violence in Kashmir and political understanding in Kashmir. The February alliance between India and Pakistan and the reduction of violence in Kashmir (e.g., the influx of terrorists from the Pakistani side to Kashmir, the terrorists in Kashmir and violations of fire control laws on the Line of Control) were a direct result of the backchannel understanding. between the two sides. This understanding lasted until August when the Taliban took over. Since then, violence has shown that backchannel awareness is fading and violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is progressing slowly. In addition, views from the border point out that what Pakistan has already demanded in support of India’s decision to abolish special status in Kashmir (instead of New Delhi to restore Statehood in Kashmir and allow politics in the state) has now changed. . It now wants India to fully return to pre-August 5, 2019 at Kashmir. In other words, the Pakistani communist route in Kashmir continued until the Taliban seized Kabul. Best of all, this is a backward change in Pakistani ideology, and worst of all, Pakistan was forcing India.
The appointment of Sardar Masood Khan, the former President of Pakistan, became the President of Kashmir, as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States is probably another sign of Kashmir’s involvement in Pakistan’s foreign policy after the Taliban coup in Kabul.
If this analysis is accurate, then we can see the many verbal and violent wars in J&K. This means that any potential for the India-Pakistan agreement in Afghanistan could be extremely difficult to achieve. Beijing will play together; so are Iran and Central Asian countries, in particular. For New Delhi, then, the decision is to align its policies with Afghanistan and Moscow, Washington with major Western cities while working closely with the Taliban.
Happymon Jacob teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research.
Kabul, Kashmir is a return to realpolitik - Mythinkings.in
India could be found to be at risk of 22 as alliance with the Taliban could lead to Pakistan being promoted to J&K. Although the return of the Taliban to…
mythinkings.in
