Jhungary Guide to COIN

[jhungary]

COIN – Counter Insurgency, is a new kind of warfare, the term Counter Insurgency is very self explaining, it was used to counter insurrection. I am going to spare you the history and development of COIN, this guide is just a brief guide to the method for Counter Insurgency activities.

To understand COIN, one must first understand how Insurgency works.
INSURGENCY basically works by disguising your troop in civilian population and using harassing tactics to engage their enemy. As Chairman Mao puts it,

“Insurgency swims within people as a fish swim within the sea”

There are 4 common characteristic on any Insurgency Operation
1.) Insurgency always happens in occupied territories. When an occupying army has overall advantage on troop strength and troop level that render a normal warfare unendurable.

2.) Insurgency can hold out indefinitely as long as population support can be maintained and ranks can be filled.

3.) Insurgency can strike anywhere, anytime with the help of local population, without local population support, a detail plan and a staging area is needed, Usually conduct in both

4.) Insurgency group usually operate independent from each other, while a smaller number action is not as obvious as big unit action, coordinated effort did exist, but generally after a series of local operation to either hammer the communication or acted as a diversion.

Insurgency lives on civil population support, the very issue with insurgent is, they pass themselves in the local population, and by drawing out attacks on the occupation force. The aim of insurgency is to make as much damage to the occupation force that the lost does not justify the occupation anymore and the occupation will end. Otherwise there are no other ways that an insurgency can win over the occupying force.

So, Counter-Insurgency is born under the very fact that insurgency present and trying to cut off the attacker from the local population. The only way to defeat insurgency is for the occupying troop to separate the local population and the insurgent. Either make the insurgent lose support from the local population or make it hard for the population to support the insurgent.

Successful COIN ops should therefore include the following aspect within their operation

1 – Security

First of all, you cannot do anything if you cannot secure a certain area, therefore in theory, the first thing you do is to secure your specific area.

That goes in two, first, you need to expunge all large scale enemy/insurgent activities and taking the foothold from the insurgent and make them start from scratch, it will buy you time to take care of the local population when the insurgent regroup.

It also goes to provide direct security to local population so that they can talk to you without any repercussion.

By achieving security, you essentially put you and the insurgent in the same level playing field, you do not enjoy any initial population support, and the insurgent should also not enjoy any pre-existing advantage on the local population. In effect, you would have the insurgent works for it.

That’s mean patrol, standby unit (Quick Reaction Force), and establishes a base of operation is crucial to the success to establish a secure environment. When the population is secure enough, they will talk

2 – Information

Now that you have a base of Operation, the next thing you will consider is information, information such as which part of your AO is controlled by the insurgent, and which part is with heavy insurgent activities.

Now with a constant secure environment, you effectively took the insurgent threat to the population out of their concern, and now the population is more willing to talk to you and provide you with information, instead of worrying about retribution.
While most population will be starting neutral to begin with, the question is for you to flip them into helping your clause. Information regarding the top 3 (Manpower, Weapon & Ammo and Food) should be the information you are looking for.

Manpower, Weapon & Ammo and Food is the 3 most important elements to keep a certain insurgence going. This is also your job as a COIN Officer to destroy the insurgent cycle of this 3 item. Without these 3, an insurgent group cannot sustain its operation.

So, basically, you only ever need information in 3 things.

1 – Manpower. Specifically the military age young man. Depending on situation, sometime military age female and/or non-military age man are also considered. Question you want to ask and thing you want to knows including.

How many of them in the location population?

The population traffic (people in and out of the village/area)?

Any suspected insurgent activities (Regrouping, recruiting R&R and so on?

Population with military training? (I.e. can handle firearms, explosive and etc)

2 – Weapon and Munitions, a dude with a gun will stood up in a crowd of people, basically the answer you want to knows is,

Are there any places large enough but secluded enough to stash weapon.

Any suspicious looking character around? (like late night delivery with large and heavy crate)

Who have firearms in their home?? And what sort??

3 – Food, farmers, producer, bread maker and any goat herder, people who grow, produce food are the next, and you would want to ask the following question.

What did you grow? Feed? And Making? And in what quantity?

Location of each farm, herder, food market and bakery

General Food consumption in the area.

To get the information you need, it’s important to do it with the local connection, Police force or local government is the most important, as they know where to go, who to talk to and how to avoid certain people and danger.

3 – Political Control

As I said, we need to assume most of the population is neutral and you and the insurgent were starting at the same footing. The game of counter insurgency is you pull the population closer to you and away from the insurgent.

Therefore, you need to inert political control on your local population, with the method and means to control a certain population; you essentially separate the local population (Non-Combatant) and the insurgent.

Normally you can establishes Political Control by doing Heart and mind stuff, win over the local population and distant themselves from the insurgent. However, sometime you just cannot reach every corner of the population, if that happened, you will need to pull the people with power in. Local politician and people in power would need to be your next move.

Problem is, by asserting political control; you should avoid large scale battle/operation, large scale ops cost live, especially civilian live. And the property damage would pull any civilian population and government away from you. So the core goal is achieve mainly by aggressive patrolling the area and making the present felt, all in while you try to win the heard and mind with the population

4 – Surgical Strike.

If you can’t seems to gain popularity from the population, then either that mean you are doing a worse job than you thought, or your enemy is doing a better job then you. First the first one, there are pretty nothing much you can do about it, you may want to target your population from another angle, however, for the second one, you have a way out.

When the insurgent is doing better than you do, it’s times to think about trying to hamper the insurgent effort to recruit and earn the population trust. One of the ways is to try and find out who’s important in the other camp, and you try to take him out.

See, the leader of any insurgent group yield a lot of power, usually these group operate independently and the person on the top of the totem post would be the one who decide everything.

To have this work, you will still need a formidable Intel network, so you can pin point where he is when he was out there. Otherwise you will need to conduct a large scale operation to weed him out. That would be a double edge sword as you will have a chance to take out the competition but at the same time you also risk losing the trust from the population altogether.

But when you have to resort to this, you probably have not much of a choice anyway anymore, by attacking the chain of command of the insurgent, you can expect a halt or at least a slow down on insurgent progress. Once this is done, you will need to redo the first 3 step to regain the population, and hopefully you will do better this time.

Conclusion


In summation, COIN is a game of tug-of-war. You need to do whatever best to pull the population to your side and meanwhile let the insurgent bleeding out support, if the population would not support insurgency anymore, the insurgent activities cannot be sustained for long, without the cover, they would eventually died out and either have to assimilate or move to another population
Hope you enjoy this article.

@jaibi @Slav Defence @Alpha1 @Aeronaut @Manticore @WebMaster @Secur @AUSTERLITZ @mafiya

This is the COIN piece i promised, i am now working on my fianl piece of Vietnam War, which is proven to be a long one.....

if you have any question not related to national security, you can fire away here I will tell you what i know and what's i think, this is just a prelim stuff, i can probably wrote a book about COIN, but i am not going to do it here.....

@A.Rafay sorry dude, forgot about you when i put in my mention list

 

[Kompromat]

@Jungibaaz @nuclearpak

Can any of you gents take the first picture and alter its dimensions in paint...to 500X250 ... We need one for publishing this article.

I'm on a tablet and unable to do it. Pls alter the first picture and replace it with new dimensions.

Thanks in advance...aero.

 

[A.Rafay]

@A.Rafay sorry dude, forgot about you when i put in my mention list

No problem mate, Your article is a Good read and well written.

I think gathering Intelligence in order to Counter Insurgency is the most difficult part, one need to have solid info regarding all the insurgent activities going on in the region, the problem is no one will talk from the fear of becoming a target of insurgents, winning the trust of local population should be the priority.

 

[jhungary]

@Jungibaaz @nuclearpak

Can any of you gents take the first picture and alter its dimensions in paint...to 500X250 ... We need one for publishing this article.

I'm on a tablet and unable to do it. Pls alter the first picture and replace it with new dimensions.

Thanks in advance...aero.

lol, have you have my permission to publish this article lol......

just kidding, publish this away gentlemen

No problem mate, Your article is a Good read and well written.

I think gathering Intelligence in order to Counter Insurgency is the most difficult part, one need to have solid info regarding all the insurgent activities going on in the region, the problem is no one will talk from the fear of becoming a target of insurgents, winning the trust of local population should be the priority.

Intelligence is very hard, i agree, that mean you have to "reach out" to the inner population but not just "Significant" mass of popluation. In Medical term we have a word for it, it was called "Herd of Immunity" which does not apply one bit in any COIN ops.

Although i know i said we should treat all population as neutral, you still need to know who are you to trust.

Some people will just belt out people they don't like and point them as insurgent, and some, mostly plants will simply put you in the wrong way. But in the end, as you gain trust with local population, you will know who is trsuted source and who's not.

In my time in Afghanistan, i used to run a network of 6 ODA team in eastern pakistan and they jump from village to village to collect info. But that can only be done after you established your trust to your local, if they trust the taliban more than you, then it's game over.

Well, sorry i cannot reveal any operational detail as in "how do we do it", i don't get arrested by the NSA lol.

@hindguy i missed you as well, i will put you on my list now

 

[Jungibaaz]

@Jungibaaz @nuclearpak

Can any of you gents take the first picture and alter its dimensions in paint...to 500X250 ... We need one for publishing this article.

I'm on a tablet and unable to do it. Pls alter the first picture and replace it with new dimensions.

Thanks in advance...aero.

Done, publish away.

 

[Slav Defence]

@jhungary..
Ofcourse,well written... Thank you first of all for providing us such interesting piece of knowledge,I would like to express my two cents as well monsieur...at this point:

Environmental factors:

>One of the most important factor which do effect this tug-of-war.Here by environement,my context is to describe factors such as:
-The place which you have occupied,and where insurgency is prospering,if 'gun culture' is common practice,then it will be quite difficult for army to distinguish and recognize the clear difference between 'terrorist' and 'common man'.

The objective behind occupation:

-We need to clear this first that which area we have occupied and why?

Case-I:

>If we have occupied an area of other country,then I reckon that it will be extremely difficult for us to halt insurgencies from prospering,since the 'occupied neutral subject' will not be completely neutral,instead they will identify you as attacker and enemy,for this purpose,surgical strike is best option ie Afghanistan scenario.

Case-II:

>Now coming to situation B,if your armed sectors have occupied an area of your own country,in order to stop 'foreign funded' proxy wars,then I reckon that our chances of secession are greater,as there are quite less chances when your population recognizes 'you'
as your enemy.At this point,option one and two which you have described 'fits' perfectly ie current Pakistani situation.

...once again very well written..I have enjoyed it a lot,thanks bro

-Regards

 

[jhungary]

@jhungary..
Ofcourse,well written... Thank you first of all for providing us such interesting piece of knowledge,I would like to express my two cents as well monsieur...at this point:

Environmental factors:

>One of the most important factor which do effect this tug-of-war.Here by environement,my context is to describe factors such as:
-The place which you have occupied,and where insurgency is prospering,if 'gun culture' is common practice,then it will be quite difficult for army to distinguish and recognize the clear difference between 'terrorist' and 'common man'.

The objective behind occupation:

-We need to clear this first that which area we have occupied and why?

Case-I:

>If we have occupied an area of other country,then I reckon that it will be extremely difficult for us to halt insurgencies from prospering,since the 'occupied neutral subject' will not be completely neutral,instead they will identify you as attacker and enemy,for this purpose,surgical strike is best option ie Afghanistan scenario.

Case-II:

>Now coming to situation B,if your armed sectors have occupied an area of your own country,in order to stop 'foreign funded' proxy wars,then I reckon that our chances of secession are greater,as there are quite less chances when your population recognizes 'you'
as your enemy.At this point,option one and two which you have described 'fits' perfectly ie current Pakistani situation.

...once again very well written..I have enjoyed it a lot,thanks bro

-Regards

The prospect of pacifying a region is of course is harder if said region have unlimited weapon supply. However, the gun culture is a two way street, it will help your enemy (the insurgent) but it will also help your population defending from the surgent.

It's mostly based on how a particular region's attutide toward you, if they are almost always hostile, then you will need to crack down hard on insurgent activities first. Then the "Security" part of my objective would become obiviously important. However. If that was a peaceful region to begin with, Military activities at all side will destablise the situation, then the "Political Control" would take the most important charge.

As in the situation in Pakistan. The problem now as i see it is the need of insurgency for the occupation to your West (Afghanistan) and the political factor and the border issue played an important role in insurrection within Pakistan as well. Until either the Afghanistan problem had settle down or the political environment start changing within Pakistan. The insurgent problem would not be able to contain if the train keep going in that direction.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

Came across a nice read on the Indian army CLAWS [centre of land warfare studies]published article papers site on modern Trends and Evolution of principles of Counter insurgency ops.Thought i would post this for interested guys.Here's an excerpt.

Tenets of War for CI/CT Operations
The traditional Principles of War work fine in a conflict between nations. It involves a clash between large,
organised forces where we have clear centres of gravity and lines of operation that are tangible and can be
destroyed. CI operations comprise a fight for the hearts and minds of the people. Would the same principles be equally relevant to such subversive, covert wars involving
terrorism, military, insurgency, etc, or do we need to enumerate separate principles for them? This kind of warfare may take place in own territory and impose limitations on the applicability of the established principles.

There is a strong feeling that a separate set of Principles of War be made for such undefined, complex and asymmetric war.In the fall of 1946, in a Hanoi colonial office, a French general spoke with a Vietnamese guerrilla war leader. The French general was there to reclaim French sovereignty over Indochina from the Japanese after World War II.He asked the Vietnamese leader what Principles of War he used in his war against the Japanese. The guerrilla said that his Bible had been TE Lawrence’s[Lawrence of Arabia] Seven Pillars of Wisdom.

TE Lawrence’s Principles of Counter-Insurgency
> Need to think like the insurgents – like raiders, not conventional forces.
> Need speed, shock, endurance (of logistics and will).
> Need unblinking eyes of persistence, surveillance and targeting.
> Present no obvious pattern or organisational structure.
> Strategy of innoculation – organise forces into small units to ‘vaccinate’ the local population.
> Separate the raiders from the local populace somehow.
> Remember that one dollar may equal ten bullets.
Most people actually can be bought for some fee.
Bribery can be a weapon.

David Galula’s Principles
The treatise on Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula on the French experience in Algeria is a must read for all students of CI operations and is extensively quoted nowadays in the US military circles.
Galula proposed six principles of waging counter-insurgency. They were:
>Initiative.
> Full Utilisation of the Counter-insurgent’s Assets.
> Economy of Force.
> Irreversibility.[Of the consequence of actions-especially the effect on mindset of civilian populace]
>To Command is to Control.
>Simplicity.

Principles of COIN
In December 2006, the US Army published its latest Field Manual on Counter-Insurgency Field Manual FM – 3.24/Marine Corps War-Fighting publication MCWP 3-33.5. It is an extremely well researched and widely discussed document in contemporary warfare. This Field Manual enunciated
a separate set of Principles of War for CI operations. They are given in the succeeding paragraphs.


>Importance of Legitimacy:
By definition, combatants on opposing sidesof an internal war seek political power. Based on their own definition of legitimacy, the people of the contested region will
decide upon the victor.All governments rule by a combination of consent and coercion and those defined as legitimate rely primarily on the consent of the governed. Counter insurgents must aim to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

>The Primacy of Political Factors: Rarely are counter-insurgents successful with purely military action. Usually, peace is restored with somesort of political solution that addresses the root causes of the insurgency or creates broad popular acceptance for the government. The political andmilitary aspects of internal wars are inseparably bound and must always be evaluated in concert. Counter-insurgents must stay focussed on their vision for the political end state that will establish a legitimate government.

>Unity of Effort: The consensus was that even though unity of command is ideal and preferred, it is also impossible to achieve in most CI operations.
Military commanders will find a myriad players in their area of operations, ranging from government agencies ,units of the Reserve Police Force /Intelligence Bureau (IB), , State Police to non-governmental organisations. The chain of command will also be different. The elected government where CI/CT operations are in full swing
makes the issues more complicated.


>Understanding the Environment: Insurgents begin with a big advantage in local knowledge. Counter-insurgents must understand the power relationships, values and ideologies, attitudes, languages, customs, lifestyles,economics within the society in order to understand the nature and nuances of the existing conflict. Accordingly, CI operations require greater emphasis on skills such as language and cultural awareness. .

>Intelligence-Driven Operations: Counter-insurgents need increased cultural understanding to gather, comprehend and apply intelligence essential for success in CI operations. Without timely and accurate intelligence, military actions may be ineffective at best and counter-productive at worst. Effective operations must be shaped by timely, specific and reliable intelligence that is
gathered, analysed and applied at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. Properly conducted CI activities generate more important intelligence.

Isolating Insurgents from Their Cause and Support: It is much easier to cut off an insurgency from its support and let it wither thanto kill or capture every insurgent. To achieve long-term success,skillful counter-insurgents must eliminate the source of an insurgency’s
recuperative power. Social, political, and economic grievances that fuel discontent must be addressed. Population control and border security can shut off physical support. In the 21st century, biometric identification cards will accomplish the same objectives with much less disruption to people’s lives.

Security Under the Rule of Law: The ability to achieve security serves as a foundation of government legitimacy. Acting in accordance with a legal system established in line with the local culture and practices enhances the
legitimacy of the government. But illegitimate acts by government officials or security forces can undermine any progress and help fuel the insurgency.These actions include unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture and punishment without trial. Insurgents often capitalise on abuses by police or soldiers.

Long-Term Commitment: Insurgencies are protracted by nature,designed to wear down opponents who have greater material assets. Resourceintensive, CI operations always require considerable money, manpower and
time. However, commanders should ensure that their conduct of operationsdoes not make it harder for elected leaders to maintain public support andundermine public confidence.
x------x-
Contemporary Imperatives of Counter-insurgency
Recent CI experiences have identified an important set of additional imperatives for success in the CI battlefield:


Manage Information and Expectations: Information and expectations are related; skillful counter-insurgents manage both. To limit discontent andbuild support, the government and any counter-insurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace. Information operations (including psychological operations and the related activities of
public affairs and civil-military operations) are key tools to accomplish this.

Use Appropriate Level of Force: Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times when overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. Extremist
insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, counter-insurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is
counter-productive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

Learn and Adapt: An effective counter-insurgent force is a learning organisation. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. In addition, networked insurgents regularly exchange information about their enemy’s vulnerabilities. However, skillful counter-insurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every unit needs to be able to make
observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their
command.

Empower the Lowest Levels: Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralised execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of
trust and mutual understanding.

Continuity of Action: Insurgents/terrorists should not be allowed to rest,redeploy and plan their action. They should be under relentless, continuous pressure.

 

[Eland76]

Interesting OP...but as was proved in Rhodesia the concept of "strategic hamlets" ie separating insurgents from the population to deprive them of support doesn't always work. The Rhodesian Security Forces thought they would 'solve' their problem by moving civilians from ops areas into protected villages, where they could be safeguarded from guerrillas operating in the countryside. This worked in Malaya, when the Brits moved Chinese civilians away from areas where they might be subverted by the communists.

It failed in Rhodesia (and to a lesser extent, Vietnam) for two reasons:

1) The British strategy of separating insurgent from civvie by moving them to protected villages was possible because they only moved Chinese civilians from certain areas. Chinese are a minority in Malaya. As for Vietnam and Rhodesia, the enemy was of the same ethnic majority as the civvies and operated everywhere in the country. Therefore, it was nearly impossible to separate them from guerrillas or agents of the guerrillas.

2) If you're going to separate the population from the guerrillas to isolate their base of support, you must also have the resources and the men to police the "strategic hamlets" in question, inside or out. The Rhodesian practise of simply moving people en masse into a kraal with a fence around it failed because they inevitably transplanted insurgents or their supporters with the rest of the innocents. Therefore, it was actually easier for guerrillas to subvert their people from inside the protected villages.

So - as you can see - although the principle of separating insurgents from the people is sound, one has to be very careful as to how it is ultimately implemented.

While winning hearts and minds is also desirable, this doesn't work in every situation, either. For example, when the Saffies were fighting SWAPO in Namibia, the insurgents always depended on intimidation of the people, especially if they weren't of the same tribe. While we wasted millions of rand naively trying to win hearts and minds by giving medical attention to locals or developing infrastructure, the SWAPO guys would just go into their villages, point an AK at somebody's head, and demand cooperation. Blunt but effective. In this manner they received food, shelter, and a seemingly endless supply of new recruits...meanwhile, the security forces simply got more puzzled/frustrated.

See, that shouldn't happen. COIN wars aren't supposed to be fought this way - theoretically if the guerrillas are only deriving their support from the people by fear they won't be an efficient or popular movement much longer. But the only rule in an insurgency is there are no rules. Insurgents never play by the book.

 

[jhungary]

Interesting OP...but as was proved in Rhodesia the concept of "strategic hamlets" ie separating insurgents from the population to deprive them of support doesn't always work. The Rhodesian Security Forces thought they would 'solve' their problem by moving civilians from ops areas into protected villages, where they could be safeguarded from guerrillas operating in the countryside. This worked in Malaya, when the Brits moved Chinese civilians away from areas where they might be subverted by the communists.

It failed in Rhodesia (and to a lesser extent, Vietnam) for two reasons:

1) The British strategy of separating insurgent from civvie by moving them to protected villages was possible because they only moved Chinese civilians from certain areas. Chinese are a minority in Malaya. As for Vietnam and Rhodesia, the enemy was of the same ethnic majority as the civvies and operated everywhere in the country. Therefore, it was nearly impossible to separate them from guerrillas or agents of the guerrillas.

2) If you're going to separate the population from the guerrillas to isolate their base of support, you must also have the resources and the men to police the "strategic hamlets" in question, inside or out. The Rhodesian practise of simply moving people en masse into a kraal with a fence around it failed because they inevitably transplanted insurgents or their supporters with the rest of the innocents. Therefore, it was actually easier for guerrillas to subvert their people from inside the protected villages.

So - as you can see - although the principle of separating insurgents from the people is sound, one has to be very careful as to how it is ultimately implemented.

While winning hearts and minds is also desirable, this doesn't work in every situation, either. For example, when the Saffies were fighting SWAPO in Namibia, the insurgents always depended on intimidation of the people, especially if they weren't of the same tribe. While we wasted millions of rand naively trying to win hearts and minds by giving medical attention to locals or developing infrastructure, the SWAPO guys would just go into their villages, point an AK at somebody's head, and demand cooperation. Blunt but effective. In this manner they received food, shelter, and a seemingly endless supply of new recruits...meanwhile, the security forces simply got more puzzled/frustrated.

See, that shouldn't happen. COIN wars aren't supposed to be fought this way - theoretically if the guerrillas are only deriving their support from the people by fear they won't be an efficient or popular movement much longer. But the only rule in an insurgency is there are no rules. Insurgents never play by the book.

May be you mistook my point...

What i suggested is that we build the trust to the local population and have them supply you the information you need to squeeze out the insurgent hiding amongst the population, while you can only work in one city or village aat a time, but on the grand level you would also be required to work on all governmental level (province, state or district) to stop the spreading and the funding flow into the insurgent activities

What you were referring to is the relocation method, where you move a bunch of lical to a secure area and monitor them away from your AO. That is exactly what the US is doing in Vietnam war. That does not work simply because that actually did nothing to insurgent activities, you move them, the insurgent will simply just find another enclave and another support, where they will actually started ahead as they can say cooperate with the insurgent or you will be forcibly moved from your home....

Most insurgent is not from around your AO anyway to begin with, removing population will only give the insurgent a reason and create a lot of pissed off resident

This work in malay emergency simply because those malay is different from Chinese and Indian descent, ie they cannot hide, and once you take out the suppirt, the insurgence would simply cumble