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ISIS Improves Hezbollah’s Standing

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ISIS Improves Hezbollah’s Standing

November 4th, 2014 | by Aurélie Daher


When protests began in Syria against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2011, the leadership of Lebanon’s Hezbollah did not play for time. It immediately and officially announced that it preferred the current regime but also encouraged both Assad and the newborn opposition to give priority to a political, negotiated solution. Two years later, in the spring of 2013, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (IRL)—Hezbollah’s paramilitary mother organization that fought Israeli occupation for 18 years in southern Lebanon (1982-2000)—set foot for the first time on a Syrian battlefield to back up the Syrian army. Focusing its intervention on only one part of Syria—the coastal North and western frontiers along Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley—the IRL has been fighting there less to save the Assad dynasty than to secure its own interests. Its strategic objective there is to set up a territory within Syria that would remain Hezbollah- and Iran-friendly if the Ba’ath regime were to fall.

One year later, numerous articles appearing in the Western press assert that Hezbollah finds itself in a state of irreversible decline if not eventual demise and disappearance. Citing what they insist are serious losses among Hezbollah’s fighters in Syria as well as the negative political repercussions of its intervention on its political position within Lebanon, these reports argue that Hezbollah is losing momentum in favor of its adversaries, mainly the (Sunni) Future Current and the (Christian) Lebanese Forces. Moreover, these articles cite the increasing number of terrorist attacks by Syrian jihadists in Shi’a regions of Lebanon—in retaliation for the IRL’s support for Assad—as turning the Lebanese Shi’a community, once extremely supportive of Hezbollah, away from the party. Needless to say, many of these same observers believe, as they have from the beginning of the Syrian civil war, that Assad’s fall will inevitably lead to Hezbollah’s implosion.

But a clear-eyed analysis of the facts on the ground and a careful reading of Lebanese news media suggests that these scenarios are more wishful thinking than grounded in reality.

Hezbollah in Syria

In the first place, there is a serious reliability problem regarding the sources of the IRL’s casualty figures in Syria. News outlets have tended to quote each other on this questioning, insisting that hundreds, if not thousands of IRL fighters have died. But a simple tally of burials by the IRL, which has never hidden its losses, shows that the casualties appear to be many fewer than what is being reported (around 200 dead in a year and a half, compared to the thousands of jihadists who have died). Reports from the field also cite how quickly and abundantly the dead have been replaced by Shi’a youth who appear increasingly motivated to settle scores with the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) as the events of late August and October had shown (see more below). Indeed, news reports about specific engagements involving the IRL and its jihadist foes suggest that the IRL has achieved an unbroken series of battlefield victories. And even Hezbollah’s most fervent critics agree that it was thanks to the IRL’s intervention that the strategic zones of Qusayr and Qalamun along the Lebanese border were recaptured from IS and JN by the Assad regime, thus “securing” almost the entire coastal north and western part of the country.

In other words, the IRL’s situation in Syria is, according to all reliable indicators, stable and showing no signs of destabilization thus far. Quite the opposite, actually. Its current force is on the Qalamun region, which is linked to Lebanon through—among others—Ersal, a Sunni Lebanese border town in the Bekaa. Ersal has, for more than three years, offered a relatively comfortable and welcoming rear base and haven for the Syrian opposition, including jihadists from IS and JN, as well as fighters from the various factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Not only have they been able to come and go there for rest and resupply; many have settled their families there. Following a major offensive launched by IS and JN in the surrounding area in August, the Lebanese Army moved to close off access to Ersal, essentially confining the jihadi fighters to an arid, mountainous, and unpopulated pocket in the Qalamun. Hemmed in on the Syrian side of the border by the regime’s army and the IRL, these forces may not be able to hold out during the winter and could perish from the cold and lack of supplies. It’s no coincidence that IS and JN, which abducted more than 20 members of the Lebanese army and police during the battle for Ersal, have recently abandoned their former conditions for setting their hostages free in exchange for the reopening of the passage to Ersal. If they were to remain trapped at the border—caught between the IRL and the Syrian army on the one side and the Lebanese security forces on the other—that would certainly ease the IRL’s job.

Bad for Assad, Good for March 14?

More significantly, however, it is mainly in Lebanon, on both the social and political fronts, that Hezbollah’s situation is satisfactory according to its standards—if not improving. Indeed, the car-bomb attacks carried out since last year—by the Abdallah al-Azzam Brigades (an al-Qaeda-affiliated group), JN and IS in the northeast of the Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut, which include two main Shi’a strongholds—have never succeeded in turning the Shi’a community against Hezbollah. In fact, since the first year of the Syrian uprising, the community has understood that the attacks against it by the jihadists are motivated as much by the perpetrators’ sectarian hatred for the Shi’a as they are by the IRL’s intervention in Syria. Accepting the notion that the IRL’s intervention was a “necessary evil” to keep IS and JNfar from Lebanon’s borders, and that Hezbollah and the IRL “had no other choice,” the Lebanese Shi’a have remained, in the end, loyal to their favorite party.

The horrors perpetrated by IS in Iraq against religious minorities and Sunni opponents in areas that have come under its control have, if anything, rallied Lebanese Shi’a behind Hezbollah, particularly in the absence of a strong Lebanese state and security forces that are able to protect the country. Indeed, Hezbollah has effectively come to be seen as the only armed group that can defend Lebanon against a possible “invasion” by the “beheaders gang.” (According to experts, the Lebanese army for all intents and purposes is chronically undermanned. Today it has 56,000 arguably under-trained troops, and it remains underfunded. At the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, the institution received large subsidies from the state, up to more than 20% of total budget expenditures, but not for modernization, equipment, or training. The aim instead was to lower the unemployment of recently disarmed militia members after they had been fighting each other for 15 years by integrating them into the army with generous socio-professional benefits.)

It is certainly on this particular point that Hezbollah has excelled since last summer. As a reminder, the Lebanese political scene has been divided since 2005 into two main coalitions. The first, the anti-Assad and pro-Western March 14 Coalition, is essentially represented by the (Sunni) Future Current (FC) of Saad Hariri, the (Christian) Lebanese Forces (LF) of Samir Geagea, and the (Christian) Kataeb of the Gemayel family. The second, known as the March 8 Coalition, favors a strategic alliance with Damascus and is led by (Shi’a) Hezbollah and AMAL, backed by the (Christian) Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun. Until 2012-13, the two fierce Christian rivals LF and FPM disagreed vehemently over Hezbollah, and specifically over the IRL’s retention of its arms, and the possible danger they represent for Lebanon in the event that these weapons—which Hezbollah argued were necessary to defend against Israeli aggression—were to be used one day against the Lebanese population. The LF declared them a “public and national source of threat,” demanded the IRL’s disarmament, and insisted that only the state and its security forces should be charged with securing the independence and defense of the nation. Noting that Hezbollah was far from being the only armed political group in the country, the FPM argued, on the other hand, that the IRL’s weapons were no more dangerous than those of any other militia and that, given the shortcomings of the Lebanese Army, an armed IRL was the only force capable of effectively deterring Israel.

The August 2014 attack on Ersal has, however, put that very fundamental disagreement on hold, and with good reason.

One month after June’s proclamation of the “Islamic State” by “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Imad Jomaa, a prominent Syrian jihadist, was arrested by the Lebanese army. IS and JN—whether working in cooperation or independently (it’s not clear)—used his arrest as a pretext to launch a massive attack on the Lebanese Army’s positions and checkpoints in Ersal. The attack was launched by 3,000-6,000 fighters, according to national newspaper reports. The modus operandi of the jihadists and the confessions made by leaders of both organizations held in custody soon produced an explanation for the attack. The IS, in particular, had apparently planned to turn Ersal into the first sovereign nucleus of an “Islamic State in Lebanon.” After a week of fierce battles, the Lebanese Army and police succeeded in repelling the attackers, but at the price of more than a dozen dead in its ranks, more than 80 others injured, and two dozen soldiers and policemen taken hostage.

The attack on Ersal provoked panic in Lebanon. It showed that the Islamic State’s plans for Lebanon were real—and imminent. A few weeks later, IS and JN launched a new attack from a few dozen kilometers to the south, in Brital, a Shi’a village close to the border. This time they were pushed back by Hezbollah, which, in turn, received support from nearby local villagers and residents who brought their household weapons to the battle. Twenty-two jihadists were killed.

Then, beginning on the evening of Oct. 24, IS and JN once again attacked army checkpoints in Tripoli, the predominantly Sunni capital city of the North, with a toll of 16 dead, including children, and over 150 others injured.

Given IS’s spectacular advances in Iraq since June, public fear was already on the rise at the end of the summer, especially among non-Sunni Lebanese. While recognizing that the national army should be their first line of defense, more and more people, from the average citizen to religious and political leaders, found it hard to ignore the fact that they are indeed relying on Hezbollah to defend their country’s territorial integrity.

Among Christians, this has caused a lot turmoil, as Geagea’s efforts to reassure the public that jihadists didn’t truly threaten Lebanon apparently failed to reduce the level of public anxiety. Even his own Lebanese Forces, whose members, after having loathed Hezbollah for years, now appear increasingly willing to admit that they are not that sad, after all, that Hezbollah exists and is well-armed.

Before the summer, rumors and reports were circulating about attempts to create Christian self-defense militias that would be armed by Hezbollah in many regions of the country, mainly in the northern Bekaa and in the South. After being widely criticized for nearly two years, the IRL’s intervention in Syria and its establishment of a defense buffer zone between Syria and Lebanon suddenly gained popularity. But after Ersal, it was none other than the Maronite patriarch himself, Beshara al-Rahi (who previously criticized the IRL’s fighting in Syria and refusal to disarm), who best summarized the views of most Christian Lebanese on the issue “If the Christians of Lebanon were asked today about their point of view on current events, they would all say that without Hezbollah, IS would have reached [the Christian coastal city of] Jounieh.”

Better Position

Indeed, Hezbollah’s image since the end of this summer has gained as much in prestige and confidence as its main Sunni political rival, the Future Current (FC), has lost—and continues to lose. From the time when the Syrian protests began in 2011 to the first appearance of jihadists among the rebels, Saad Hariri’s party had presented itself as a force for moderation and legality, and as the defender of the non-Sunni communities, especially the Christians. Unfortunately, the challenge has proved too ambitious. Some of the party’s MPs, having taken advantage of Hariri’s self-exile from Lebanon and inspired by their anti-Assad passions, expressed sympathy for the Sunni dissident sheikh, Ahmad al-Assir, throughout the year of 2012-13 and did not hesitate to support him when he and his men attacked the army’s checkpoints in Saida in June of last year, killing 16 soldiers. A year before, in May 2012, this zeal had led many FC MPs to press the government for the release of Shadi Mawlawi, a dangerous jihadist leader from the North, and then to enthusiastically participate in his joyous homecoming. Both actions all too clearly demonstrated to the public that an important component of the party privileged their Sunni identity above their loyalty to the Lebanese nation and its security and judicial institutions.

Moreover, since last summer and the battle for Ersal, the party has been embarrassed by a series of scandals. Khaled Daher, MP of the North, was caught red-handed cordially associating with known IS and JN leaders living in the Tripoli region. He was reported to have “coordinated” with Ahmad Mikati, who sent him video clips of Sunni members of the army who had just deserted to join IS/JN. Daher’s answer was that “the army was just looking for a pretext to murder Northerners.” Nor did it help when the minister of justice, Ashraf Rifi—a former police chief and FC protégé—intervened personally in October to help two jihadist leaders, Shadi Mawlawi and Ahmad Mikati, who had been surrounded by the Army after three days of urban warfare that resulted in thousands displaced from the fighting. Instead of reassuring the country’s various confessional groups, especially its own Christian allies, the party’s leadership remained silent throughout the crisis, effectively presenting the public with an image quite contrary to that which Hariri had intended. The FC now appears internally divided, radical-friendly, unwilling to defend state institutions and the rule of law, and ultimately unreliable in the face of a massive jihadist offensive against the nation.

In a country like Lebanon, where everything lost by one side is won by the other, Hezbollah’s leadership thus has every reason to feel good about its current standing. The Western press should hence be careful that its antipathy for the group does not obscure the reality of its power and popularity. It is seductive to think that Hezbollah is being bled to death in a literal sense in Syria and in a political sense in Lebanon, but that’s simply wishful thinking.


About the Author
Aurélie Daher received a PhD in political science from Sciences Po, Paris. She held a postdoctoral fellow position at the University of Oxford from 2010-2011 and a postdoctoral research associate position at Princeton University from 2012-2013. Her work focuses on Hezbollah, the Shiites, and Lebanese politics. A book based on her doctoral dissertation will be published in February 2014 under the title Hezbollah, Mobilization and Power (Hezbollah, mobilisation et pouvoir, Paris, PUF, Collection "Proche-Orient", 482 p.)

ISIS Improves Hezbollah’s Standing « LobeLog
 
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People led by the shias really honour their people, always master of themselves even under heavy stress and provocations by satanic zionist Al Qaeda troops

I know that Israel, JEW USA or asians would be crazy in the boots of the people attacked by zionist Al Qaeda
 
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Toward a New Israel-Hezbollah War?

February 3rd, 2015

by Aurélie Daher


Reacting to the January 28 Hezbollah attack that killed two Israeli soldiers and injured seven more, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened retaliation, declaring, “Whoever tries to challenge Israel on its borders will find out that we are ready to react with force… Those who play with fire get burned.”

Aside from the fact that the attack took place in what Lebanese consider their own territory, which remains under Israeli occupation, Hezbollah’s action has to be understood as a tit-for-tat response to the Israeli bombing 10 days earlier in Syria that killed six members of the Lebanese group and one Iranian general. The key question now is whether Israel really wants and can lead a new large-scale war against its northern adversary.

For now, a nervous calm prevails. But if there is war, it will be Israel’s decision.

The Rules of the Game

In May 2000, after 22 years of an Israeli occupation that featured harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrests, expulsions, deportations, torture, and other abuses, Hezbollah’s resistance was vindicated when Israeli troops abruptly packed their bags and withdrew from Lebanon in four days. Their departure set off delirious celebrations in the region and an explosion in the popularity of the militant group.

Israeli troops did not, however, evacuate a small area of a few square kilometers known as the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shuba bluff where the borders of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel converge. Occupied by Israel since the 1967 war, the area is considered Syrian by Tel Aviv and the United Nations and thus falls outside UN Security Council Resolution 425, which requires Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory.

Bolstered by title deeds and other documents regarding ownership of the Shebaa Farms, the Lebanese government and Hezbollah—as well as the Syrian government itself—have long insisted that this small area is Lebanese. For Hezbollah, the task of liberating all of Lebanese territory from Israel is thus not yet complete, and it thus views an attack on the Israeli army in the area as legitimate.

Despite the departure from most of southern Lebanon by Tel Aviv’s forces, Hezbollah has organized ambushes against Israeli patrols and planted anti-tank mines on their routes with the regularity of Swiss clockwork since the early 2000s. For its part, Israel would sometimes carry out attacks of its own, but each time neither of the belligerents wanted to escalate.

Moreover, the April Accords between Hezbollah and Tel Aviv that ended Israel’s 1996 Grapes of Wrath campaign stipulated that the two belligerents should confine themselves to making war in occupied Lebanese territory. As long as Israel refrained from carrying out attacks in civilian and liberated zones in Lebanon, Hezbollah would refrain from bombing Israeli territory. In general, both sides have respected this understanding.

But in July 2006, after claiming that Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in Israeli territory—Hezbollah, backed by the Lebanese army and the UN peacekeeping force (UNIFIL), insisted that the site was Lebanese—the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert launched a major offensive. For 33 days and nights, Israel rained down shells and bombs—an estimated 40,000-100,000, many of them cluster munitions—across large swathes of Lebanon. Lacking an air force, Hezbollah necessarily limited its action to shelling northern Israel mainly with Katusha rockets at the rate of 150-250 rockets a day—far short, for example, of the 2,000 shells that Israel fired on the single village of Aytarun in a single day. In total, Hezbollah fired nearly 4,000 rockets extending up to 60 miles into Israel, effectively establishing its ability to thoroughly disrupt normal life there, if not pose a very real threat to the region. In all, the death toll in Lebanon reached 1,200 people, about a third of whom were younger than 12 years old, while 4,500 more were injured, and an estimated 200,000 people lost their homes. Hezbollah claimed losses of only 150 of its fighters, while about 120 Israeli soldiers were killed in the fighting.

Hezbollah’s leaders later conceded that they were surprised by the magnitude of Israel’s reaction. After the war, the organization effectively adopted a new rule, which it had actually observed for the most part before 2006. Hezbollah would not initiate any confrontation: “Israel initiates, Hezbollah may reply.” In fact, since 2006 Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity take place virtually every day in many forms—incursions by Israeli patrols, installations of surveillance platforms, abductions of civilians, sending balloons covered or filled with toxic powder or gas over Lebanese territory—and Hezbollah responds only rarely.

In early August 2010 for instance, Israeli army units entered Lebanese territory to cut down trees and install monitoring devices, ignoring UNIFIL’s efforts to push them back. When they continued their advance, the Lebanese army fired warning shots. Israeli tanks responded with shellfire. In the end, two Lebanese soldiers, one Lebanese journalist, and one Israeli officer were killed. Fifteen other Lebanese were injured. The incident elicited no response from Hezbollah beyond a warning that Israel should not do it again. This reaction caused immense satisfaction in Tel Aviv, including claims that Hezbollah “had lost its bite” and that the 2006 offensive had been vindicated.

However, when a Hezbollah fighter was killed in early September last year while defusing an Israeli surveillance device located in uncontested Lebanese territory, the group hit back several weeks later by installing an anti-tank weapon along the route regularly used by Israeli patrols in the Shebaa Farms area. Israel replied in turn by firing 30 shells into southern Lebanon. But, once again, the two sides decided to avoid further escalation.

Breaking the Rules

Israel’s January 18 attack on a group of Hezbollah fighters in Syrian territory is not only a test of Hezbollah’s will to respond. Although it took place outside the geographical boundaries of the conflict, it also represented a break in the rules of the game. Hezbollah could not not respond. It felt the need not only to challenge the Israeli narrative about Hezbollah having lost its bite but also to reassure its own constituency. Moreover, a general in Iran’s Pasdaran had just been assassinated, so this was also seen as a direct attack by Israel against Tehran (despite statements by Israeli officials that they didn’t know who was in the target group, assertions that the Lebanese do not consider credible). The fact that Hezbollah chose not to respond in or from Syria but rather in the Shebaa Farms constitutes a strong and very clear message that Hezbollah is “reframing” the confrontation by returning it to its traditional geographic setting, thus implying that, as far as the group’s leadership is concerned, the latest attack is nothing other than “business as usual” and there is no need to escalate.

The message became all the clearer last week when Hezbollah made it known to Israel via the UNIFIL channel that its leadership considered the matter “closed.” In a January 30 speech, the party’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, declared, “You tried us, don’t try us again. We don’t want war, but we’re not afraid of it. If we’re forced into war, we’ll know how to handle it and we’ll win.”

All of this has taken place against a background of media commentary that has emphasized the purported costs Hezbollah has suffered as a result of its intervention in Syria, suggesting that the real reason for its refusal to engage Israel more aggressively is its inability to fight on two fronts.

But the speculation that Hezbollah has indeed suffered serious casualties in Syria is not borne out by the on-the-ground reality. Since its initial intervention in spring 2013, Hezbollah has succeeded in each of the battles in which it was engaged. Its fighters’ experience and training are unquestionably superior to those of its foes. Indeed, the number of its dead after a year and a half in Syria is unlikely to exceed 200, and numerous reports from the field suggest a more than ample supply of Lebanese Shiite recruits, especially from the Bekaa Valley. A striking example of this state of affairs came last August when the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra launched a massive attack on the Ersal region. As the two radical Sunni groups moved beyond Ersal, particularly in and around the predominantly Shiite region, dozens of local residents took up arms and spontaneously joined Hezbollah’s call to repel the invaders.

Also, the fact that Hezbollah has not reduced its forces in Lebanon below a critical level has shown that the party’s leadership has been acutely conscious that Israel might try to take advantage of the group’s intervention in Syria to attack Lebanon. As in 2006, Hezbollah doesn’t need major battalions of fighters to confront the IDF: in the concluding days of that war, a force of about 5,000 men—if we are to believe UNIFIL observers and French military analysts—stymied the 40,000 Israeli soldiers who took part in the invasion. Moreover, Hezbollah is even better armed and equipped in 2015 than nine years ago, according to both Western and Israeli intelligence, with, among other things, longer-range missiles capable of hitting Israeli territory for the first time far beyond the Galilee. In other words, if Hezbollah prefers not to embark on a major new conflict with Israel, it is almost certainly not for fear of being destroyed.

Does Israel Want War?

The possibility of a large-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah—and thus against Lebanon—hence depends on Tel Aviv. Netanyahu is in the middle of an election campaign. His favorite campaign theme has been security and his ability to protect the Israeli people from Arab terrorism, beginning with the threat from the north, specifically Hezbollah. Indeed, a major offensive could theoretically provide Likud with a tremendous boost in the March 17 election, particularly in light of the damage Netanyahu has inflicted on relations with Washington over the past two weeks.

But the risk is not insignificant. Israel might have to manage a defeat or, at least, a less-than-satisfactory outcome. One has only to remember how Shimon Peres tried to turn the 1996 war to his political advantage: for almost three weeks that April, Israeli shells fell on Shiite areas of Lebanon as part of Grapes of Wrath. The result was 250 Lebanese civilians dead (more than 100 of them killed as they sought protection at an UNIFIL outpost at Qana), 127 wounded Israelis, and Peres’s defeat at Netanyahu’s hands in the election that followed.

But it is above all Ehud Olmert who, in the wake of the 2006 war, would learn to his dismay that war against Hezbollah is not necessarily a good idea. Israel went all out, not only to recover the two abducted Israeli soldiers but also to dismantle Hezbollah as a threat once and for all. After its missiles and air force failed to eliminate Hezbollah’s rocket fire into the Galilee, Israel launched its ground invasion with extremely disappointing results. It faced a Hezbollah protected by a complex defense of tunnels and reinforcements. The IDF suffered its biggest losses in men and material per day since the 1967 war. When a cease-fire was finally established, not only had Israel failed to recover its soldiers, but Hezbollah was still standing on its northern border, its leadership entirely intact. Olmert and his party fell sharply in the polls, and the commission that was charged with investigating the war’s failures elicited his admission that planning for the conflict had been four months in preparation, suggesting that the soldiers’ abduction was a mere pretext for launching the war. The chief of staff, Dan Haloutz, was forced to resign in disgrace.

Some Israeli hawks may well be pressing the government for war, arguing that the lessons of the 2006 conflict have been well learned and that mistakes will not be repeated. The question remains, however, what Israel’s war aims would be. Eliminate Hezbollah? But Hezbollah is a not insignificant component of the Lebanese Shiite community, the largest sectarian community in the country. Present virtually everywhere in Lebanon, its fighters are occupied with their work and daily life just like their fellow citizens. In war, as they demonstrated in 2006, they are agile guerrillas, transporting rocket-launchers into place on highly maneuverable light trucks when they’re not carrying them on their backs. And for every fighter killed in combat, two more are ready to take his place. Bombarding the Lebanese people and state institutions to try to isolate Hezbollah has obviously not worked in the past. Quite the contrary: the more Israel has resorted to that kind of collective punishment for Lebanese support of Hezbollah, the more the party’s popular support increases, particularly when Hezbollah’s clinics and hospitals treat the wounded without charge and its construction companies rebuild homes after the last bombing campaign. Intensive bombing by Israel’s air force and navy only reinforces the resentment against it.

With or without preparation, the Israeli army can’t achieve anything conclusive against Hezbollah. Even Netanyahu—perhaps especially Netanyahu in light of the bitter experience of his predecessors—knows that. Neither side has anything to gain from a new war.


About the Author

Aurélie Daher received a PhD in political science from Sciences Po, Paris. She held a postdoctoral fellow position at the University of Oxford from 2010-2011 and a postdoctoral research associate position at Princeton University from 2012-2013. Her work focuses on Hezbollah, the Shiites, and Lebanese politics. A book based on her doctoral dissertation will be published in February 2014 under the title Hezbollah, Mobilization and Power (Hezbollah, mobilisation et pouvoir, Paris, PUF, Collection "Proche-Orient", 482 p.)


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