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November 2, 2009 | 2128 GMT
VINCENZO PINTO/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in Rome Sept. 29
Summary
Various Pakistani opposition groups in the parliament announced that they would oppose the approval of a law that made it possible for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to take office. The moves represent part of a bid by the Pakistani military to remove Zardari from office in a seemingly constitutional manner, and signal a showdown ahead in Islamabad while the state is struggling to fight a jihadist insurgency.
Analysis
Pakistan’s government announced Nov. 2 that it would not be tabling the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The announcement came after an ally of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), issued a statement Nov. 2 that it will oppose the NRO in the parliament, and after MQM chief Altaf Hussain called on Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP to sacrifice for democratic stability in the country.
Other Pakistani opposition parties, most significantly the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), already have announced their opposition to the NRO, a highly controversial law promulgated by former President Pervez Musharraf in October 2007 to shore up his weakened hold on power as part of a deal with the PPP. The NRO granted amnesty to politicians accused of corruption and other criminal activity, including murder, making it possible for Zardari to seek office.
The opposition moves signal a showdown ahead in Islamabad, one which could well undermine the counterjihadist offensive currently under way in Pakistan.
While the NRO did not shore up Musharraf's hold on power, it did facilitate the return to power of the PPP leadership, most significantly Zardari. The current president assumed the mantle of the PPP after the December 2007 killing of his wife, former two-term Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, subsequently winning the presidency in September 2008. The PPP also won control of other key government positions, such as the office of prime minister and parliamentary speaker and the chairmanship of the Senate.
Despite these wins, Zardari has remained unpopular: He is widely perceived as using his office for personal gain. He also faces considerable opposition from within the national parliament; the government in the largest province, Punjab; the Pakistani judiciary; and the military. The military as an institution also has remained deeply opposed to Zardari, though it has continued to work with the president. This is due to the fact that the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate feel no good alternative to Zardari exists capable of leading Pakistan. (PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif is seen as unreliable given his past struggles with the army and his recent moves to emerge as the torchbearer for democracy.)
Making Zardari even less palatable to the opposition and security establishment are the expanded presidential powers he now enjoys. Musharraf altered the system such that the Pakistani president wields more power than the prime minister. One key power of the enhanced presidency is the ability to appoint high-level army officials. This power will come into play when current army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani retires in October 2010. (Pakistan's other four-star general, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Tariq Majid, is due to retire at the same time, and current ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha could retire as early as March 2010.) The Zardari government would like to use this opportunity to appoint generals of its own choice to these top military and intelligence posts, something the armed forces deem extremely unacceptable. The military thus would like to see Zardari's departure from office before that can happen.
Further complicating the situation is the aid package for Pakistan recently signed into law by U.S. President Barack Obama. The package calls for civilian supremacy over the military in Pakistan, and represents a bid by Washington to work with the Zardari government to rein in the Pakistani military. The Obama administration feels that unless the army is brought under civilian control, Washington cannot deal with the region's Taliban problem. This is because the Pakistani security establishment draws a distinction between "good" Taliban that fight in Afghanistan and "bad" Taliban that wage war in Pakistan. The Pakistani military, a historic partner of successive U.S. administrations, sees the alignment of the Obama administration with the Zardari government as further undermining its position at a time when the Pakistani military's power within the country already has weakened because of the rise of civilian forces and a raging Taliban insurgency.
Both this domestic situation and pressure from Washington have placed considerable limits on the military's ability to send Pakistan's government packing. Consequently, the establishment has sought to use its influence to help align forces against the president, forcing him out of office with a veneer of legality. The goal is thus not to unseat the current government, but to get rid of Zardari in such a way that looks like the byproduct of a constitutional process rather than of a coup -- a return to the times when the military dismissed four different governments between 1985 and 1999. Riling up the opposition against the NRO is thus a means of forcing the president into a corner.
Now that the government has decided against submitting the law for parliamentary review, the situation has become even more complex. It is likely that the NRO will now be brought before the Supreme Court. But even if the judiciary were to strike down the amnesty law, it will not automatically lead to the dismissal of the president.
It will, however, create a crisis of legitimacy for Zardari, making it difficult for him to continue as president. It is too early to predict the outcome of the moves to oust the president, especially since Zardari -- who has spent several years in jail in the past -- is not expected to quit without a fight. But it is not too early to predict that the current struggle bodes ill for U.S. objectives in the region and for Islamabad's own war against jihadists.
VINCENZO PINTO/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in Rome Sept. 29
Summary
Various Pakistani opposition groups in the parliament announced that they would oppose the approval of a law that made it possible for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to take office. The moves represent part of a bid by the Pakistani military to remove Zardari from office in a seemingly constitutional manner, and signal a showdown ahead in Islamabad while the state is struggling to fight a jihadist insurgency.
Analysis
Pakistan’s government announced Nov. 2 that it would not be tabling the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The announcement came after an ally of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), issued a statement Nov. 2 that it will oppose the NRO in the parliament, and after MQM chief Altaf Hussain called on Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP to sacrifice for democratic stability in the country.
Other Pakistani opposition parties, most significantly the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), already have announced their opposition to the NRO, a highly controversial law promulgated by former President Pervez Musharraf in October 2007 to shore up his weakened hold on power as part of a deal with the PPP. The NRO granted amnesty to politicians accused of corruption and other criminal activity, including murder, making it possible for Zardari to seek office.
The opposition moves signal a showdown ahead in Islamabad, one which could well undermine the counterjihadist offensive currently under way in Pakistan.
While the NRO did not shore up Musharraf's hold on power, it did facilitate the return to power of the PPP leadership, most significantly Zardari. The current president assumed the mantle of the PPP after the December 2007 killing of his wife, former two-term Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, subsequently winning the presidency in September 2008. The PPP also won control of other key government positions, such as the office of prime minister and parliamentary speaker and the chairmanship of the Senate.
Despite these wins, Zardari has remained unpopular: He is widely perceived as using his office for personal gain. He also faces considerable opposition from within the national parliament; the government in the largest province, Punjab; the Pakistani judiciary; and the military. The military as an institution also has remained deeply opposed to Zardari, though it has continued to work with the president. This is due to the fact that the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate feel no good alternative to Zardari exists capable of leading Pakistan. (PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif is seen as unreliable given his past struggles with the army and his recent moves to emerge as the torchbearer for democracy.)
Making Zardari even less palatable to the opposition and security establishment are the expanded presidential powers he now enjoys. Musharraf altered the system such that the Pakistani president wields more power than the prime minister. One key power of the enhanced presidency is the ability to appoint high-level army officials. This power will come into play when current army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani retires in October 2010. (Pakistan's other four-star general, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Tariq Majid, is due to retire at the same time, and current ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha could retire as early as March 2010.) The Zardari government would like to use this opportunity to appoint generals of its own choice to these top military and intelligence posts, something the armed forces deem extremely unacceptable. The military thus would like to see Zardari's departure from office before that can happen.
Further complicating the situation is the aid package for Pakistan recently signed into law by U.S. President Barack Obama. The package calls for civilian supremacy over the military in Pakistan, and represents a bid by Washington to work with the Zardari government to rein in the Pakistani military. The Obama administration feels that unless the army is brought under civilian control, Washington cannot deal with the region's Taliban problem. This is because the Pakistani security establishment draws a distinction between "good" Taliban that fight in Afghanistan and "bad" Taliban that wage war in Pakistan. The Pakistani military, a historic partner of successive U.S. administrations, sees the alignment of the Obama administration with the Zardari government as further undermining its position at a time when the Pakistani military's power within the country already has weakened because of the rise of civilian forces and a raging Taliban insurgency.
Both this domestic situation and pressure from Washington have placed considerable limits on the military's ability to send Pakistan's government packing. Consequently, the establishment has sought to use its influence to help align forces against the president, forcing him out of office with a veneer of legality. The goal is thus not to unseat the current government, but to get rid of Zardari in such a way that looks like the byproduct of a constitutional process rather than of a coup -- a return to the times when the military dismissed four different governments between 1985 and 1999. Riling up the opposition against the NRO is thus a means of forcing the president into a corner.
Now that the government has decided against submitting the law for parliamentary review, the situation has become even more complex. It is likely that the NRO will now be brought before the Supreme Court. But even if the judiciary were to strike down the amnesty law, it will not automatically lead to the dismissal of the president.
It will, however, create a crisis of legitimacy for Zardari, making it difficult for him to continue as president. It is too early to predict the outcome of the moves to oust the president, especially since Zardari -- who has spent several years in jail in the past -- is not expected to quit without a fight. But it is not too early to predict that the current struggle bodes ill for U.S. objectives in the region and for Islamabad's own war against jihadists.
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