Is Iran About to Test a Nuclear Bomb In North Korea?

[Fighter488]

Is Iran About to Test a Nuclear Bomb In North Korea?​

By Reza Kahlili

On December 24, a research report from the South Korean Foreign Ministry Institute indicated that North Korea would carry out another nuclear bomb test after the beginning of the year. -- South Korean media reported earlier this month that the North was digging a tunnel in preparation for such a nuclear test.

At the same time, reports from inside Iran indicate that a team of Iranian nuclear scientists have been sent to North Korea and that the two governments have agreed on a joint nuclear test in North Korea with a substantial financial reward for the Kim Jong-Il government.

It is no secret that Iran and North Korea are collaborating in a ballistic missile program. The North Koreans provided Iran with the technology and know-how to build the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which is a copy of the Nodong-1 missile. The Shahb- 3 missile has a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) covering all of the U.S. military bases in the Middle East and the entire country of Israel.

Most alarming, recent WikiLeaks releases reveal that Iran obtained a cache of advanced missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads (based on a Russian design) from North Korea. Now, for the first time, Iran has the capability to target every capital in Western Europe.

Not only are these two governments continuing to collaborate on the missile projects, they are also conspiring on Iran’s nuclear bomb development. This relationship has not only led to sharing data on previous nuclear tests by North Korea, but played a part in Iran’s capability to build the more advanced P2 centrifuges that produce 2.5 times more enriched uranium than the first generation P1 model.


The recent revelations about North Korea’s uranium enrichment plant also raise the possibility that North Korea is enriching uranium on Iran's behalf. Iran has always maintained that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes; that it is their right to produce nuclear fuel for their nuclear power plants.

In order to avoid a possible military reaction by the West, Iran is working covertly with North Korea until such a time they are capable of weaponizing their ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

Iran continues their nuclear bomb project on multiple fronts despite four sets of sanctions by the U.N. They continue to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility (which currently has enough enriched uranium stockpiled for three nuclear bombs) while they continue to openly enrich uranium to the 20% level. It is important to note that from this level, it is comparatively easy to reach the 93% needed to create an atomic bomb. Sources inside Iran reported several months ago that Iran has successfully mastered the enrichment of uranium to a weapon-grade level.

Iran is also increasing yellowcake production at the Gchine uranium mine. The mine currently has a design capacity of 21 tons of yellowcake per year; about half that amount is needed to produce the 55 pounds of 93% enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb.

They have a nuclear fuel facility in Isfahan capable of producing ten tons of nuclear fuel annually, and sufficient plutonium for two nuclear weapons a year.

The Arak heavy water plant — built in violation of the nonproliferation treaty — is near its completion, though the West had assumed this would not happen until 2015. This facility will be capable of producing significant amounts of bomb-grade plutonium. With the assistance of the Russians in going live, once the Bushehr nuclear power plant is fully operational, it will be able to produce more than 661 pounds of near-weapons-grade plutonium — enough to make 60 nuclear bombs within the first year or two.

The upcoming nuclear bomb test in North Korea is yet another indication that time is running out.

Soon we will wake up to the shocking realization that Iran has nuclear bombs and that both Iran and North Korea have nuclear warhead delivery systems.

It is a shame that we failed to stop North Korea from developing its nuclear capability, but it is not too late to stop Iran!

Maybe the North Korean leaders are not suicidal. Maybe they are only looking to intimidate South Korea, the U.S. and other allies in the region. Maybe they are trying to gain stature and stronger negotiating powers. However, the Iranian leaders have long talked about the destruction of Israel and its master -- America.

It is not only irresponsible and cowardly for our politicians to allow such a messianic regime, which supports worldwide terrorism, to acquire nuclear bombs; it holds dire consequences for the rest of the world.

Nuclear bombs in the hands of jihadists should be the final red line that the free world will not back away from!

Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for an ex-CIA spy who requires anonymity for safety reason. “A Time to Betray,” his book about his double life as a CIA agent in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, was published by Simon & Schuster in 2010.


FoxNews.com - Is Iran About to Test a Nuclear Bomb In North Korea?


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On IRAN, Isrealis are running out of Ideas now.
Fighter

 

[Fighter488]

Israelis also saying this:
Iran nuclear weapon is further off, Israel says - Telegraph

Fighter

 

[Kompromat]

Murdoch Media at best !

 

[naumananjum]

""" Nuclear bombs in the hands of jihadists should be the final red line that the free world will not back away from!"""
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there is much difference between Ak47 and nuclear technology....!!!!

 

[Fighter488]

More desperation.
Fighter

Report Strengthens Suspicions That Stuxnet Sabotaged Iran’s Nuclear Plant

By Kim Zetter December 27, 2010 | 1:08 pm | Categories: Stuxnet

A new report appears to add fuel to suspicions that the Stuxnet superworm was responsible for sabotaging centrifuges at a uranium-enrichment plant in Iran.

The report, released Thursday by the Institute for Science and International Security, or ISIS, indicates that commands in the Stuxnet code intended to increase the frequency of devices targeted by the malware exactly match several frequencies at which rotors in centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant are designed to operate optimally or are at risk of breaking down and flying apart.

The frequencies of the Natanz rotors were apparently not a secret and were disclosed to ISIS in mid-2008 — the earliest samples of Stuxnet code found so far date back to June 2009, a year after ISIS learned about the frequencies. They were disclosed to ISIS by “an official from a government that closely tracks Iran’s centrifuge program.”

The unnamed government official told ISIS that the nominal frequency for the IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz was 1,064 Hz, but that Iran kept the actual frequency of the centrifuges lower to reduce breakage. According to another source, Iran often ran its centrifuges at 1,007 Hz.

The information would have been gold to someone looking to sabotage the centrifuges since, as ISIS notes, it provided both confirmation that Iran’s centrifuges were prone to an unusual amount of breakage and that they were subject to breakage at a specific frequency of rotation.

Stuxnet was discovered last June by a Belarus security firm, which found samples of the code on computers belonging to an unnamed client in Iran. The sophisticated code was designed to sabotage specific components used with an industrial control system made by the German firm Siemens, but only if these components were installed in a particular configuration. The unique configuration Stuxnet seeks is believed to exist at Natanz and possibly other unknown nuclear facilities in Iran.

After German researcher Ralph Langner first posited that Stuxnet’s target was Iran’s nuclear power plant at Bushehr, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged that Stuxnet affected personal computers belonging to workers at the plant, but he maintained that the plant’s operations were not affected by the malware. However, Ahmadinejad announced in November that unspecified malicious software sent by western enemies had affected Iran’s centrifuges at its Natanz plant and “succeeded in creating problems for a limited number of our centrifuges.” He did not mention Stuxnet by name.


It’s known that Iran decommissioned and replaced about a thousand IR-1 centrifuges at its Natanz plant between November 2009 and February 2010. It’s not known if this was due to Stuxnet or due to a manufacturing defect or some other cause, but the ISIS report increases plausibility that Stuxnet could have played a role in their demise.

According to an examination of Stuxnet by security firm Symantec, once the code infects a system, it searches for the presence of two kinds of frequency converters made by the Iranian firm Fararo Paya and the Finnish company Vacon, making it clear that the code has a precise target in its sights. Once it finds itself on the targeted system, depending on how many frequency converters from each company are present on that system, Stuxnet undertakes two courses of action to alter the speed of rotors being controlled by the converters. In one of these courses of action, Stuxnet begins with a nominal frequency of 1,064 Hz — which matches the known nominal frequency at Natanz but is above the 1,007 Hz at which Natanz is said to operate — then reduces the frequency for a short while before returning it back to 1,064 Hz.

In another attack sequence, Stuxnet instructs the speed to increase to 1,410 Hz, which is “very close to the maximum speed the spinning aluminum IR-1 rotor can withstand mechanically,” according to the ISIS report, which was written by ISIS president David Albright and colleagues.

“The rotor tube of the IR-1 centrifuge is made from high-strength aluminum and has a maximum tangential speed of about 440-450 meters per second, or 1,400-1,432 Hz, respectively,” according to ISIS. “As a result, if the frequency of the rotor increased to 1,410 Hz, the rotor would likely fly apart when the tangential speed of the rotor reached that level.”

ISIS doesn’t say how long the frequency needs to be at 1,410 Hz before the rotor reaches the tangential speed at which it would break apart, but within 15 minutes after instructing the frequency to increase, Stuxnet returns the frequency to its nominal 1,064 Hz level. Nothing else happens for 27 days, at which point a second attack sequence kicks in that reduces the frequency to 2 Hz, which lasts for 50 minutes before the frequency is restored to 1,064 Hz. Another 27 days pass, and the first attack sequence launches again, increasing the frequency to 1,410 Hz, followed 27 days later by a reduction to 2 Hz.

Stuxnet disguises all of this activity by sending commands to shut off warning and safety controls that would normally alert plant operators to the frequency changes.

ISIS notes that the Stuxnet commands don’t guarantee destruction of centrifuges. The length of the frequency changes may be designed simply to disrupt operations at the plant without breaking rotors outright, and the plant could conceivably have secondary control systems in place to protect centrifuges and that are not affected by Stuxnet’s malicious commands.

There are still a lot of unanswered questions about both Stuxnet and the Natanz facility.

ISIS notes that it could not confirm the brand of frequency converters used at Natanz in order to determine if they are the ones that Stuxnet targets. Iran is known to have obtained frequency converters from a variety of suppliers, including ones in Germany and in Turkey. The New York Times reported in January that a foreign intelligence operation had aimed at sabotaging “individual power units that Iran bought in Turkey” for its centrifuge program. The ISIS authors say these “power units” are believed to have been frequency converters Iran obtained from Turkey.

If Stuxnet was indeed aimed at Natanz, and if its goal was to quickly destroy all of the centrifuges at Natanz, ISIS notes that it failed at this task.

“But if the goal was to destroy a more-limited number of centrifuges and set back Iran’s progress in operating the FEP, while making detection difficult, it may have succeeded, at least temporarily,” according to the report.

The authors close their report with a warning to governments that using tools like Stuxnet “could open the door to future national security risks or adversely and unintentionally affect U.S. allies.”

“Countries hostile to the United States may feel justified in launching their own attacks against U.S. facilities, perhaps even using a modified Stuxnet code,” they write. “Such an attack could shut down large portions of national power grids or other critical infrastructure using malware designed to target critical components inside a major system, causing a national emergency.”

Photo: A security man stands next to an anti-aircraft gun as he scans Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz, 300 kilometers [186 miles] south of Tehran, Iran, in April 2007.
Hasan Sarbakhshian/AP
Report Strengthens Suspicions That Stuxnet Sabotaged Iran’s Nuclear Plant | Threat Level | Wired.com