tushar
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While the first formal Minute of Defence Cooperation between India and the United States was signed in 1995, it was only after 2001 that any real interaction between the two militaries began. All three wings, the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, have carried out many joint exercises of increasing complexity. Defence procurement has also stepped up with purchases of a US Landing Ship, now INS Jalashva, and C130J and P8I maritime aircraft. Reports suggest that acquisitions of C17 aircraft for the Air Force and howitzers for the Army are under finalisation.
Difficulties persisting for several years over concluding the End User Verification Agreement (EUVA) were also resolved. Acquisitions that have been completed or almost done total $9 billion no small achievement over just five years, given the history of the relationship.
Several Indian companies, including those involved in defence research and development, have been removed from the list of those those under US sanctions. In 2005, a fresh 10-year agreement of cooperation in the defence sector was concluded between the two countries. So, the relationship is in good shape, should be the obvious conclusion. If only things were so simple.
However, cooperation between the militaries is now threatening to plateau. Two, seemingly ordinary agreements, important to the American system but of little value to us, remain in the doghouse. These relate to communications security and logistics support (CISMOA and LSA). The former will enable a higher level of operational interoperability between ships and aircraft of the two countries and the latter, allow for book adjustments of costs incurred on ship/aircraft movements, fuel, rations and port charges.
Our position seems to be that we do not really need to get into the communications sphere, as we are happy with how things are; as for logistics, the context is unequal, as more US platforms will visit India than ours will go to the US. A better way of looking at these agreements is to get them out of the way if that satisfies the Americans, so long as there are no serious negatives. Keeping the issue alive is a needless irritant in the cooperation. The fear that these may be seen to be putting us in the American camp is so naïve that it is laughable.
Defence cooperation has come some distance but the way ahead is not clear. Joint exercises and other personal interactions can take us only thus far. Acquisition of high-technology military hardware is important but can be sustained at the existing level of interface. So, should the engagement remain at this level, or is there need to take it further? This is the question that needs to be answered.
For more substance to be given to the relationship, a larger overview of national interest is needed. If a multipolar Asia is what India wants and a unipolar continent is what China seeks, then the US becomes a very important factor in our calculus. Its interests in Asia are enormous and it cannot let China assume a hegemonic role. Without using the US, it is not possible for India to secure the Asia that it wants.
On another plane, none of its global aspirations can be met without the proactive support of the US seats in the Security Council, on the high table of world trade, in groups controlling nuclear technology or in several other multilateral forums, fall in this category. The real question is whether a close engagement impacts adversely our relations with other countries for example, Russia, Iran and Myanmar, even China, our core interests in South Asia and, indeed our concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. These cannot be easily brushed aside but close scrutiny will show that while all these are manageable by us, the larger canvas is not.
In sum, close relations with the US are critical to Indias rise, first as an Asian power and then as a global player of consequence. If this is true, then defence cooperation between the two countries must be taken a few notches further. Its contours can be four-fold.
One, the existing military interfaces and acquisitions should be progressed apace, even if an American company does not get the contract for 126 aircraft for the Air Force, as seems likely; there will be more military procurements on line.
Two, both countries should be in sync on Indias interests in the Indian Ocean region and act in a manner that will sustain them; a permanent Chinese naval presence, possible only through base facilities in littorals, acts to the detriment of this position.
Three, maritime forces of both countries must act together in the campaign against piracy in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, India must be prepared to render military assistance in out of area contingencies; on its part, the US must take punitive measures against acts of terrorism against India originating, even sponsored, from Pakistan.
We are at a crossroads. If we take the right road, defence cooperation will gather momentum and to our advantage. If not, it will soon run out of steam, to our detriment.
Premvir Das: Indo-US engagement at the crossroads
Difficulties persisting for several years over concluding the End User Verification Agreement (EUVA) were also resolved. Acquisitions that have been completed or almost done total $9 billion no small achievement over just five years, given the history of the relationship.
Several Indian companies, including those involved in defence research and development, have been removed from the list of those those under US sanctions. In 2005, a fresh 10-year agreement of cooperation in the defence sector was concluded between the two countries. So, the relationship is in good shape, should be the obvious conclusion. If only things were so simple.
However, cooperation between the militaries is now threatening to plateau. Two, seemingly ordinary agreements, important to the American system but of little value to us, remain in the doghouse. These relate to communications security and logistics support (CISMOA and LSA). The former will enable a higher level of operational interoperability between ships and aircraft of the two countries and the latter, allow for book adjustments of costs incurred on ship/aircraft movements, fuel, rations and port charges.
Our position seems to be that we do not really need to get into the communications sphere, as we are happy with how things are; as for logistics, the context is unequal, as more US platforms will visit India than ours will go to the US. A better way of looking at these agreements is to get them out of the way if that satisfies the Americans, so long as there are no serious negatives. Keeping the issue alive is a needless irritant in the cooperation. The fear that these may be seen to be putting us in the American camp is so naïve that it is laughable.
Defence cooperation has come some distance but the way ahead is not clear. Joint exercises and other personal interactions can take us only thus far. Acquisition of high-technology military hardware is important but can be sustained at the existing level of interface. So, should the engagement remain at this level, or is there need to take it further? This is the question that needs to be answered.
For more substance to be given to the relationship, a larger overview of national interest is needed. If a multipolar Asia is what India wants and a unipolar continent is what China seeks, then the US becomes a very important factor in our calculus. Its interests in Asia are enormous and it cannot let China assume a hegemonic role. Without using the US, it is not possible for India to secure the Asia that it wants.
On another plane, none of its global aspirations can be met without the proactive support of the US seats in the Security Council, on the high table of world trade, in groups controlling nuclear technology or in several other multilateral forums, fall in this category. The real question is whether a close engagement impacts adversely our relations with other countries for example, Russia, Iran and Myanmar, even China, our core interests in South Asia and, indeed our concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. These cannot be easily brushed aside but close scrutiny will show that while all these are manageable by us, the larger canvas is not.
In sum, close relations with the US are critical to Indias rise, first as an Asian power and then as a global player of consequence. If this is true, then defence cooperation between the two countries must be taken a few notches further. Its contours can be four-fold.
One, the existing military interfaces and acquisitions should be progressed apace, even if an American company does not get the contract for 126 aircraft for the Air Force, as seems likely; there will be more military procurements on line.
Two, both countries should be in sync on Indias interests in the Indian Ocean region and act in a manner that will sustain them; a permanent Chinese naval presence, possible only through base facilities in littorals, acts to the detriment of this position.
Three, maritime forces of both countries must act together in the campaign against piracy in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, India must be prepared to render military assistance in out of area contingencies; on its part, the US must take punitive measures against acts of terrorism against India originating, even sponsored, from Pakistan.
We are at a crossroads. If we take the right road, defence cooperation will gather momentum and to our advantage. If not, it will soon run out of steam, to our detriment.
Premvir Das: Indo-US engagement at the crossroads
