indo-china relation

[pm modi]

Unlike the Cold War standoff, one
cannot argue that its
rapprochement with India will
affect China’s relationship with
Pakistan because of the gravity
of China’s interests in Pakistan.
DESIGN: ERUM SHAIKH
China and Pakistan historically
have enjoyed long
standing, versatile and cordial
relations. From the very
beginning, in 1955, when the
then Prime Minister Chaudary
Muhammad Ali and his
Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai
consolidated their support on
mutual understanding, the
relationship between the two
countries have
remained ‘tested by adversity’.
Pakistan was a key ally for China
throughout the Cold War period
in coping with India and the
Soviet Union until the
Gorbachev and Beijing reached
and acceded to certain demands.
However, many advantages were
also accrued to Pakistan as a
result of its alliance with a more
culturally diverse, communist
country like China. It furthered
Pakistan’s security, rendered
Pakistan weaponry in the 1965
war with India and China
adopted a pro-Pakistan stance
on the Kashmir dispute.
However with the dawn of the
current century, China’s relations
with India and Russia have
undergone a dramatic shift in
strategic partnership from
enmity to entente. In the case of
Pakistan and India, the uncertain
triangle of China-Pakistan-India
has historically been constructed
around the lines that the dilution
of China’s relations with one
country provides an impetus to
China’s improvement in
relations with other country. This
current paradigm shift therefore
gives rise to an
important question;
What impact will the ongoing
Sino-India rapprochements have
on the Sino-Pakistan relations?
Will it lead to a weakening of
Sino-Pakistan entente?
The answer I believe is no.
This is because there are
essentially three underlying
factors that continue to uphold
the Sino-Pak cordiale despite
China’s evolving economic
relations with India and
concurrent partnership with
Russia.
The first rationale for China’s
continued friendship with
Pakistan lies in Beijing’s
economic focus and its utmost
priority of economic growth.
During the Cold War, Pakistan
was an important strategic
partner for China in coping with
India while at the moment China
sees Pakistan in terms of its
economic interests. China
currently is the world’s second-
largest consumer of oil. Apart
from the significance of
Pakistan’s strategic location, the
Gwadar port situated in
Balochistan has reinvented
Pakistan’s regional
significance as an energy
corridor for China. China’s
enthusiasm about the Gwadar
port and its immense
technical assistance to Pakistan is
one such example of this
economic co-operation between
the two countries.
For China, the economic incentive
for its heavy investment in the
construction of this port lies not
simply in all ‘weathered
friendship’ dynamics between
Islamabad and Beijing but in the
strategic value attached to the
Gwadar port, which for China is
no lesser than that of the
Karakoram highway.
This port provides China with the
closest access point to the
Persian Gulf and also renders an
access route to the Arabian Sea’s
warm water to many of the
central Asian
landlocked republics including
the Chinese Xinjiang. Currently,
China receives a majority of its oil
supplies from the Middle East,
but through this port Pakistan
does not only provide China an
alternate transport route linking
from Pakistan instead of Iran and
Sudan, but at the same time
Pakistan has become crucial
to China’s bid for regional
influence.
Secondly, China at the moment is
highly sensitive about the
growing role of the United States
in the region and the US leaning
towards India in the Asian
continent. To counter this, China
perceives Pakistan as its best, if
not its last, bet in terms of the
diplomatic support which
Pakistan historically has rendered
to China. Whether it be the
facilitation of the United States
Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger’s visit to China through
the diplomatic support of
Pakistan in 1971, or the question
of China’s right over Tibet and
Taiwan, Pakistan has always
advocated full diplomatic support
in favour of China.
Importantly as well, was
Pakistan’s valuable support for
China to gain seat in the United
Nations.
Thirdly, China’s interest in a
stronger Pakistan parallels its
own interests. It tantamount to
China, that the situation in
Pakistan and Afghanistan does
not get further exacerbated. For
Beijing one way is to be aligned
with Pakistan and cooperate in
order to mitigate the outcome.
Although China has its own
reservations with US presence
and its heightened activities in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, it
certainly does not want the US to
fail in Afghanistan. A failure of
such magnitude could eventually
drive radical elements into
Chinese territory and with
radicalisation of the region also
acts as a trigger for extremism
and separatist activities within
Xinjiang, where separatist
activities are already at peak.
A weaker Pakistan under the
influence of the Taliban, or any
other extremist group, for China
acts as facilitator
between various entities
operating in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and insurgent elements
in its own region of Xinjiang.
Thus, a progressive and strong
Pakistan also benefits China
because it mitigates the violent
outcome in terms of the criminal
elements operating in
the Uyghur region of China.
Therefore, it is China’s own
domestic interests that make its
role in the ******* struggle is of
great importance and its support
for a strong, independent
Pakistan is crucial for its own
geo-strategic needs.
On the Afghan front, China is
vigilant of maintaining good
relations with Kabul without
offending the Pashtuns elements
in the Taliban itself.
Thus, China today being a major
power sees the world through
the prism of its global interests.
Unlike the Cold War standoff, one
cannot argue that
its rapprochement with India will
affect China’s relationship with
Pakistan because of the gravity
of China’s interests in Pakistan.