RKO
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By Hassan Sohail*
India’s BMD capability has evolved after many years of clandestine research and development. Since July 1983, Indian scientists have been engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and components for the development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).
India’s other preference for augmenting its TMD potential is to buy these missiles from the friendly states. The Russian Federation and Israel have signed agreements with India, under which India has been receiving TMD components and technology from these states. The U.S has been forging a new strategic partnership with India, in order to contain its future adversaries in Asia. Therefore, instead of opposing India’s missile build-up, the U.S is supporting it.
Earlier this year, The Hindu reported V.K. Saraswat claiming that incoming ballistic missiles with a range of 2000km could be destroyed with the shield and this capability would be enhanced to meet missiles with a range of 5000km by 2016.
The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing a two-tier Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system that provides a multi-layered shield against ballistic missile attacks. The BMD system consists of a Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile and an Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception. The PAD intercepts missiles at altitudes between 50km-80km and the AAD missile destroys them at altitudes of 15km-30km.
India has also shown interest in the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defence system. Indo-Israeli relations improved considerably in the 1990s. Israel assumed the role of becoming the second biggest seller of weapons to India after Russia. However, India has acquired a number of weapons systems from Israel.
The Arrow missile system was jointly developed by Israel and the US. Arrow 2, an advanced version of Arrow, is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles, and can detect and track up to 14 missiles simultaneously at distances as far a 500 km away.
With an Indian BMD system, Pakistan would be forced to respond in some way in order to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent. Although it is difficult to gauge Pakistan’s response, it would depend on the type, size and shape of an Indian BMD.
There are a number of options that Pakistan could possibly pursue. Pakistan could either go for its own defence systems or build up its offensive forces to overwhelm India’s defences.
Pakistan’s ability to produce its own missile defence systems is extremely limited both from technological point of view as well as from an economic one. A less costly and more effective option for Pakistan could be a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy.
The simplest solution for Pakistan would be to go for a larger number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles. This would entail an increase in the number of missiles both Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV-ed) and single warheads. Pakistan would also have to increase its fissile material production in order to have more warheads.
The purpose of the numbers approach would be to saturate Indian defences. This would mean, for example, if India has the capability to intercept twenty-five missiles, Pakistan should have thirty.
Another option for Pakistan could be deployment. This could entail maintaining assembled form of missiles to reduce the reaction time. This could be taken a step further to the level of actually deploying the assembled missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. Pakistan can also go for a triad of nuclear forces. At present, Pakistan has land- and air-based nuclear forces but no sea-based one.
In the short term, a mix of qualitative and quantitative improvements in Pakistan’s offensive capabilities might be a more viable solution for Pakistan.
In the long term, Pakistan needs to acquire advance technologies, like perfecting cruise missile technology, reducing the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, to neutralise the effects of Indian missile defence systems. Moreover, Pakistan can also pursue a diplomatic course by suggesting an ABM treaty between India and Pakistan, or by negotiating a zero missile regime between the two countries.
* Hassan Sohail, Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
India's Hostile BMD Program And Pakistan’s Security Option - OpEd - Eurasia Review
India’s BMD capability has evolved after many years of clandestine research and development. Since July 1983, Indian scientists have been engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and components for the development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).
India’s other preference for augmenting its TMD potential is to buy these missiles from the friendly states. The Russian Federation and Israel have signed agreements with India, under which India has been receiving TMD components and technology from these states. The U.S has been forging a new strategic partnership with India, in order to contain its future adversaries in Asia. Therefore, instead of opposing India’s missile build-up, the U.S is supporting it.
Earlier this year, The Hindu reported V.K. Saraswat claiming that incoming ballistic missiles with a range of 2000km could be destroyed with the shield and this capability would be enhanced to meet missiles with a range of 5000km by 2016.
The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing a two-tier Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system that provides a multi-layered shield against ballistic missile attacks. The BMD system consists of a Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile and an Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception. The PAD intercepts missiles at altitudes between 50km-80km and the AAD missile destroys them at altitudes of 15km-30km.
India has also shown interest in the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defence system. Indo-Israeli relations improved considerably in the 1990s. Israel assumed the role of becoming the second biggest seller of weapons to India after Russia. However, India has acquired a number of weapons systems from Israel.
The Arrow missile system was jointly developed by Israel and the US. Arrow 2, an advanced version of Arrow, is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles, and can detect and track up to 14 missiles simultaneously at distances as far a 500 km away.
With an Indian BMD system, Pakistan would be forced to respond in some way in order to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent. Although it is difficult to gauge Pakistan’s response, it would depend on the type, size and shape of an Indian BMD.
There are a number of options that Pakistan could possibly pursue. Pakistan could either go for its own defence systems or build up its offensive forces to overwhelm India’s defences.
Pakistan’s ability to produce its own missile defence systems is extremely limited both from technological point of view as well as from an economic one. A less costly and more effective option for Pakistan could be a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy.
The simplest solution for Pakistan would be to go for a larger number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles. This would entail an increase in the number of missiles both Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV-ed) and single warheads. Pakistan would also have to increase its fissile material production in order to have more warheads.
The purpose of the numbers approach would be to saturate Indian defences. This would mean, for example, if India has the capability to intercept twenty-five missiles, Pakistan should have thirty.
Another option for Pakistan could be deployment. This could entail maintaining assembled form of missiles to reduce the reaction time. This could be taken a step further to the level of actually deploying the assembled missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. Pakistan can also go for a triad of nuclear forces. At present, Pakistan has land- and air-based nuclear forces but no sea-based one.
In the short term, a mix of qualitative and quantitative improvements in Pakistan’s offensive capabilities might be a more viable solution for Pakistan.
In the long term, Pakistan needs to acquire advance technologies, like perfecting cruise missile technology, reducing the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, to neutralise the effects of Indian missile defence systems. Moreover, Pakistan can also pursue a diplomatic course by suggesting an ABM treaty between India and Pakistan, or by negotiating a zero missile regime between the two countries.
* Hassan Sohail, Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
India's Hostile BMD Program And Pakistan’s Security Option - OpEd - Eurasia Review
