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From the Newspaper | Munir Akram | 11 hours ago THE speech made by the chairman of Indias National Security Advisory Board and former foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, at Indias Subu Centre on April 24 should be required reading for those Pakistanis who believe that relations with India can be normalised through trade and people-to-people exchanges even if security issues remain unresolved. Shyam Saran a friend and respected adversary has been
consistent and candid in his view that Indo-Pakistan relations will
remain adversarial for the foreseeable future and the realistic aim
should be to construct ways to manage their rivalry. The Subu speech was designed to refute foreign and Indian critics
who have asserted that Indias nuclear programme is driven by
prestige and its quest for great power status whereas Pakistans
programme has strategic clarity deterrence against India and
has been better managed. Some of the events cited by Saran, in fact, confirm, rather than
refute, the critics. Thus, prime minister Nehru did say when
inaugurating Indias civilian programme that its nuclear capability
could be also used for Indias protection. But this was in the early
1950s, when India faced no threat from Pakistan, China or
elsewhere. Mr Nehrus assertion was inspired by pride rather than strategic requirement. Likewise, Indias 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion was not in
response to Chinas 1964 explosion and the American deployment
of the Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh war. If
it was indeed such a response, the explosion shouldnt have been
described as peaceful. If anyone should have felt the compulsion
to acquire nuclear deterrence at the time, it was Pakistan which had been recently dismembered by Indias military aggression. Similarly, in 1998, India justified its nuclear explosions by asserting
that it was threatened by China, despite significant improvement in
Sino-Indian relations preceding the explosions. In fact, the Bharatiya
Janata Party had declared it would conduct the explosions if elected.
The timing of the tests, as Saran admits, was dictated by the
impending adoption of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which India had so far championed. Such hypocrisy has been the hallmark of Indias nuclear narrative.
The plutonium for its 1974 and 1998 tests was diverted from its
civilian nuclear facilities. After 1974 India continued to claim its
explosion was peaceful and advocated global nuclear
disarmament, even as it rejected initiatives to denuclearise South
Asia and developed nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Saran has argued that Pakistans programme was helped by China.
In fact, India has been the principal beneficiary of external
assistance. Its plutonium came from the reactor provided by Canada
without IAEA safeguards and uranium supplied by the US and
France; its early missiles utilised the US Apache and other missile
technologies; its current missiles are based on prototypes and technologies acquired from Russia and the US (ostensibly for its
space programme). After its 1998 nuclear tests, Indias nuclear doctrine was hastily put
together, in a draft form. It mimicked the US-Soviet doctrines of
seeking a triad of land, air and sea nuclear deployments. Such a vast programme was not needed for Pakistan-India
deterrence. The demonstration of their respective nuclear
capabilities was sufficient for the purpose. Indeed, in a 2001 joint
communiqué, Pakistan and India declared that a stable deterrence
existed between them. However, India rejected Pakistans call for a strategic restraint
regime in South Asia. It proceeded, even if in a haphazard manner,
to develop and deploy its nuclear triad. As in the past, Pakistan is
being compelled to respond and preserve stable deterrence. India has been enabled by the US and others to pursue its nuclear
ambitions in the belief that Indias capabilities can serve to contain
an increasingly powerful China. They will rue this strategic
miscalculation at some future date. Indias capabilities are unlikely to overly trouble China for the
foreseeable future. India will pursue its own priorities, principal
among which is to neutralise Pakistans military and political power
and influence in the region. Shyam Sarans speech sought to build the case for the continued
discrimination and greater restrictions against Pakistan in the
nuclear and missile arenas. To this end, he repeated the familiar
allegations about Pakistans proliferation and the fantasy of a
terrorist takeover of its nuclear weapons. Indias non-proliferation record is not unblemished. Its chemical
weapons assistance to Saddams Iraq and others is an open secret.
And, as some analysts have pointed out, Pakistans strategic assets
are more tightly controlled by the military, as in other nuclear
weapon states, than Indias civilian, in reality bureaucratic, control. While Indias capabilities hardly serve as credible deterrence against
China, they do pose a serious threat to Pakistan. Declarations of non
first-use of nuclear weapons are convenient for a larger
conventional power and are never credible. Nato rejected such
assurances from the Soviet Union. What counts is capabilities not
intentions. The danger is that India may believe that its nuclear triad, together
with the acquisition of anti-ballistic missile systems and advanced
conventional weapons, will enable it to pursue a conventional war
against Pakistan. The Cold Start strategy has not been disavowed.
This danger is magnified by the endorsement of Indias ambitions
by the US and its allies. There is no assurance that a limited war is possible between
nuclear-armed states. Rapid escalation is likely. There is no
assurance that while Kashmir and other Pakistan-India disputes
fester, there will be no war in the future. It is thus in the vital interest of both countries, and their people, to
construct a regime for mutual strategic restraint, nuclear and
conventional, and to resolve their outstanding disputes, first and
foremost, Kashmir. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who authorised Pakistans nuclear tests
after Indias in 1998, and negotiated the Lahore Declaration, will be
required to address Indias nuclear threat again in his third term in
office. The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN. Copyright © DAWN.COM 2013 View Regular Theme SUNDAY 26TH MAY 2013 Print Email
consistent and candid in his view that Indo-Pakistan relations will
remain adversarial for the foreseeable future and the realistic aim
should be to construct ways to manage their rivalry. The Subu speech was designed to refute foreign and Indian critics
who have asserted that Indias nuclear programme is driven by
prestige and its quest for great power status whereas Pakistans
programme has strategic clarity deterrence against India and
has been better managed. Some of the events cited by Saran, in fact, confirm, rather than
refute, the critics. Thus, prime minister Nehru did say when
inaugurating Indias civilian programme that its nuclear capability
could be also used for Indias protection. But this was in the early
1950s, when India faced no threat from Pakistan, China or
elsewhere. Mr Nehrus assertion was inspired by pride rather than strategic requirement. Likewise, Indias 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion was not in
response to Chinas 1964 explosion and the American deployment
of the Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh war. If
it was indeed such a response, the explosion shouldnt have been
described as peaceful. If anyone should have felt the compulsion
to acquire nuclear deterrence at the time, it was Pakistan which had been recently dismembered by Indias military aggression. Similarly, in 1998, India justified its nuclear explosions by asserting
that it was threatened by China, despite significant improvement in
Sino-Indian relations preceding the explosions. In fact, the Bharatiya
Janata Party had declared it would conduct the explosions if elected.
The timing of the tests, as Saran admits, was dictated by the
impending adoption of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which India had so far championed. Such hypocrisy has been the hallmark of Indias nuclear narrative.
The plutonium for its 1974 and 1998 tests was diverted from its
civilian nuclear facilities. After 1974 India continued to claim its
explosion was peaceful and advocated global nuclear
disarmament, even as it rejected initiatives to denuclearise South
Asia and developed nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Saran has argued that Pakistans programme was helped by China.
In fact, India has been the principal beneficiary of external
assistance. Its plutonium came from the reactor provided by Canada
without IAEA safeguards and uranium supplied by the US and
France; its early missiles utilised the US Apache and other missile
technologies; its current missiles are based on prototypes and technologies acquired from Russia and the US (ostensibly for its
space programme). After its 1998 nuclear tests, Indias nuclear doctrine was hastily put
together, in a draft form. It mimicked the US-Soviet doctrines of
seeking a triad of land, air and sea nuclear deployments. Such a vast programme was not needed for Pakistan-India
deterrence. The demonstration of their respective nuclear
capabilities was sufficient for the purpose. Indeed, in a 2001 joint
communiqué, Pakistan and India declared that a stable deterrence
existed between them. However, India rejected Pakistans call for a strategic restraint
regime in South Asia. It proceeded, even if in a haphazard manner,
to develop and deploy its nuclear triad. As in the past, Pakistan is
being compelled to respond and preserve stable deterrence. India has been enabled by the US and others to pursue its nuclear
ambitions in the belief that Indias capabilities can serve to contain
an increasingly powerful China. They will rue this strategic
miscalculation at some future date. Indias capabilities are unlikely to overly trouble China for the
foreseeable future. India will pursue its own priorities, principal
among which is to neutralise Pakistans military and political power
and influence in the region. Shyam Sarans speech sought to build the case for the continued
discrimination and greater restrictions against Pakistan in the
nuclear and missile arenas. To this end, he repeated the familiar
allegations about Pakistans proliferation and the fantasy of a
terrorist takeover of its nuclear weapons. Indias non-proliferation record is not unblemished. Its chemical
weapons assistance to Saddams Iraq and others is an open secret.
And, as some analysts have pointed out, Pakistans strategic assets
are more tightly controlled by the military, as in other nuclear
weapon states, than Indias civilian, in reality bureaucratic, control. While Indias capabilities hardly serve as credible deterrence against
China, they do pose a serious threat to Pakistan. Declarations of non
first-use of nuclear weapons are convenient for a larger
conventional power and are never credible. Nato rejected such
assurances from the Soviet Union. What counts is capabilities not
intentions. The danger is that India may believe that its nuclear triad, together
with the acquisition of anti-ballistic missile systems and advanced
conventional weapons, will enable it to pursue a conventional war
against Pakistan. The Cold Start strategy has not been disavowed.
This danger is magnified by the endorsement of Indias ambitions
by the US and its allies. There is no assurance that a limited war is possible between
nuclear-armed states. Rapid escalation is likely. There is no
assurance that while Kashmir and other Pakistan-India disputes
fester, there will be no war in the future. It is thus in the vital interest of both countries, and their people, to
construct a regime for mutual strategic restraint, nuclear and
conventional, and to resolve their outstanding disputes, first and
foremost, Kashmir. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who authorised Pakistans nuclear tests
after Indias in 1998, and negotiated the Lahore Declaration, will be
required to address Indias nuclear threat again in his third term in
office. The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN. Copyright © DAWN.COM 2013 View Regular Theme SUNDAY 26TH MAY 2013 Print Email
