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Indian interests and perspectives in Afghanistan
Posted on 2014-01-17 16:59:34
Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri
India is not an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan but often uses the term “extended neighbourhood” to signify its relevance and interest in that country. Its historical links as a neighbour go back to ancient times and during the British Raj. After Partition of the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan did not recognize Pakistan’s admission to the UN. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Afghan governments and India supported the issue of Pukhtunistan.
The memory of five-year Taliban rule in Afghanistan rankles with India when Islamabad-Kabul relations were good and the former had recognized the then Taliban regime. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan is dependent upon Pakistan for exports and imports. Since the mid-1990s, India pursued anti-Taliban and pro-Northern Alliance (NA) policy. The NA leaders were treated as state guests whenever they visited India and many of them were educated and trained there.
Afghanistan is the 5th highest donor in Afghanistan and has invested nearly $2 billion in Afghanistan on many development and reconstruction projects, including highways, dams, and roads and educational projects. India has built Delaram-Zaranj Highway to bring Afghanistan-Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. By investing $100 million in building Chahbahar Port it has built a road to connect the port to Afghan border, with Delaram-Zaranj Highway. It has invested over $136 million in construction of Ring Road Highway in Helmand province invested over $136 million will connect Chahbahar with Kabul. Work is underway to link Chahbahar by railway line with Hajipak in Afghanistan. The road/rail connectivity will allow landlocked Afghanistan an alternative outlet and thus reduce dependence on Pakistan and other countries.
Like USA and China, India is also seeking access to energy-rich Central Asia and Caspian Sea region and envisions a Chahbahar-Kabul connectivity. It is laying transmission lines and providing Uzbek electricity to Kabul. In addition, hydroelectric Salma Dam, new parliament building and Indira Gandhi hospital and Habibia College in Kabul are emblems of Indian help. In terms of agriculture and mining it is extending substantial help.
As a manifestation of “soft power,” India has implemented more than hundred Afghan-owned small development projects, including free medical care and clinics across the country. Its medical missions in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif provide free treatment.
In the field of education, India provides 2000 scholarships to Afghans annually for schooling and training in Indian institutions and teachers and professors in English and other languages. Many of its TV plays and programs and songs are eagerly watched and many of the Farsi songs betray Indian tunes. Cultural cooperation has created pro-India sentiments, especially among the Darri-speaking population. Most of its political leaders and parliamentarians have been educated in the Indian universities and admire the Indian democracy political diversity.
On October 4, 2011, New Delhi and Kabul signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) to bolster their relations. It is involved in training Afghan military and police and other administrative organizations like intelligence agency, RAW, which rejuvenated the KHAD by renaming it RAAM and also helping setting up Central Directorate of Intelligence. The Indian military is assisting in training ANA much to the consternation of neighbouring Pakistan.
The Indian military with the blessing of Iran provided military hardware, repair of Soviet- built Mi-17 and Mi-35 attack helicopters and training facilities to Northern Alliance soldiers to battle the Taliban. India’s military provided intimate guidance and support to NA forces when they launched attacks in October 2001.
Earlier under SPA, India has trained Afghan military and police officers in India and extended some transport helicopters to Afghanistan. President Karzai made his third visit to India n December 2013. He went with a “wish list” of heavy weapons and military equipment for India. The latter is so far reluctant to honour the request and has only assured training of military and provision of and non-lethal supplies. This is because of the sensitivities of Pakistan, and apprehensions over getting overly involved in Afghanistan. Besides, most of the heavy weapons are supplied by Russia.
President Karzai’s motives in seeking military aid from India is to open options with the US; by making trips he also wants to pressurize Pakistan to force Afghan Taliban to start negotiations with the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC).
As long as Indian military footprint is not in Afghanistan, Pakistan may not object to the training of Afghan military personnel in India.
Afghanistan’s vast reserves of iron, copper, cobalt and gold have invited Indian companies to exploit nearly one trillion dollars worth of minerals. This, of course, going to take time and resources and awaits stiff competition from China and others.
The Karzai government has relied on to marginalize the Afghan Pashtoons and include Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks in all government departments, including security forces and to bring non-Pashtoons on the centre stage. The NA members are beholden to India for support during the Taliban rule and since 2001.
India has not confined its activities to Afghanistan alone but is busy making inroads in Central Asian Republics (CARs) and has made appreciable progress. The Indian military is interacting with Tajikistan security forces and is providing funding for upgrading of air bases and has constructed a military hospital and logistic depot.
With Tajikistan India inked an agreement in 2007-- enabling its air force to establish itself at Ayani airbase near Dushanbe and Farkhor airbase close to northern Afghanistan border. By parking Mi-17 attack helicopters at Ayani base and also leasing issian jets, already stationed at the base, it has a squadron of MiG 31 jet fighter bombers at Farkhor base. The two airbases have given an option to IAF to strike Pakistan from the rear, if and when needed.
Besides the Indian Embassy in Kabul, India has opened consulates in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat. Nearly 70 training camps have been allegedly working along Pakistan’s western border where Tajiks, Uzbeks, Chechnyans, Arabs and dissidents from FATA and Baluchistan are being funded, trained, equipped and launched into selected regions of Pakistan. The bulk of RAW assets are however deployed in Afghanistan.
India’s apprehensions in Afghanistan centre around the fact that Taliban, once freed in post-2014 may be launched against Kashmir and Indian military installations like against Indian embassies twice before in 2011. In case they assume total power they will affect Indian access, aid projects, investment and block access to the Central Asian states as aid and trade corridor. India wants to open its market for export of Afghan goods and change the “narrative of despair into narrative of hope” and wants to integrate Afghanistan into the larger SAARC market.
India officially wants an “Afghan-led” and “Afghan-owned” peace process and a pluralist government but does not want a total control by the Taliban.
Pakistan’s anxieties for “strategic depth” are being diluted now but it has apprehensions of India supporting some Pakistani Taliban and Baloch militants against the Pakistani state.
But the Indian army, too, has some advantages for the Afghan forces. Its armed forces are especially trained in counterinsurgencies in Kashmir, Northeast and other parts of India and could provide useful training and experience to Afghan forces. However for any future peacekeeping role in Afghanistan it is not keen -- given the bitter experience faced by occupation forces [British, Soviet and the US] in that country.
Many things could change from now till end of 2014 and India could still support Northern Alliance and let the simmering regions of southwest out of its reach without overstepping its limits or losing goodwill. While with SAARC neighbours (Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives) it has an overweening presence and breeds love-hate relationship, with Afghanistan it could be different. Its biggest concern is the post- 2014 scenario is that that the ANSF is still not equipped and trained enough to confront the Taliban challenge on its own. Heavy scale of desertions, poor pay and discipline structure is evidence of this. Even the police force is not up to the mark and can come under the influence of powerful warlords. India is also unhappy over US-Afghan efforts to induce them to share power.
With no appetite to get sucked in the Afghan quagmire India has been inculcating fears in Washington that any early withdrawal would open the way for extremist Taliban to regain power and Pakistan to recover its influence in Afghanistan. It has been invoking the phantoms about the possibility of Russia-China, Afghanistan-under- Taliban, Pakistan-Iran-some-Central Asian states bloc coming into being with drastic ramifications for US strategic and economic interests in the region. Likewise, it is hobnobbing with Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for a possible grouping in case an anti-Indian regime comes to power in Kabul.
The proposed energy corridor from Kashgar, China to Gwadar is viewed with suspicion as it sees China as a competitor. This may be similarly viewed by the US.
(The writer is Adviser, Centre for Policy Studies, COMSATS, Islamabad)
Indian interests and perspectives in Afghanistan
Posted on 2014-01-17 16:59:34
Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri
India is not an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan but often uses the term “extended neighbourhood” to signify its relevance and interest in that country. Its historical links as a neighbour go back to ancient times and during the British Raj. After Partition of the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan did not recognize Pakistan’s admission to the UN. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Afghan governments and India supported the issue of Pukhtunistan.
The memory of five-year Taliban rule in Afghanistan rankles with India when Islamabad-Kabul relations were good and the former had recognized the then Taliban regime. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan is dependent upon Pakistan for exports and imports. Since the mid-1990s, India pursued anti-Taliban and pro-Northern Alliance (NA) policy. The NA leaders were treated as state guests whenever they visited India and many of them were educated and trained there.
Afghanistan is the 5th highest donor in Afghanistan and has invested nearly $2 billion in Afghanistan on many development and reconstruction projects, including highways, dams, and roads and educational projects. India has built Delaram-Zaranj Highway to bring Afghanistan-Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. By investing $100 million in building Chahbahar Port it has built a road to connect the port to Afghan border, with Delaram-Zaranj Highway. It has invested over $136 million in construction of Ring Road Highway in Helmand province invested over $136 million will connect Chahbahar with Kabul. Work is underway to link Chahbahar by railway line with Hajipak in Afghanistan. The road/rail connectivity will allow landlocked Afghanistan an alternative outlet and thus reduce dependence on Pakistan and other countries.
Like USA and China, India is also seeking access to energy-rich Central Asia and Caspian Sea region and envisions a Chahbahar-Kabul connectivity. It is laying transmission lines and providing Uzbek electricity to Kabul. In addition, hydroelectric Salma Dam, new parliament building and Indira Gandhi hospital and Habibia College in Kabul are emblems of Indian help. In terms of agriculture and mining it is extending substantial help.
As a manifestation of “soft power,” India has implemented more than hundred Afghan-owned small development projects, including free medical care and clinics across the country. Its medical missions in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif provide free treatment.
In the field of education, India provides 2000 scholarships to Afghans annually for schooling and training in Indian institutions and teachers and professors in English and other languages. Many of its TV plays and programs and songs are eagerly watched and many of the Farsi songs betray Indian tunes. Cultural cooperation has created pro-India sentiments, especially among the Darri-speaking population. Most of its political leaders and parliamentarians have been educated in the Indian universities and admire the Indian democracy political diversity.
On October 4, 2011, New Delhi and Kabul signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) to bolster their relations. It is involved in training Afghan military and police and other administrative organizations like intelligence agency, RAW, which rejuvenated the KHAD by renaming it RAAM and also helping setting up Central Directorate of Intelligence. The Indian military is assisting in training ANA much to the consternation of neighbouring Pakistan.
The Indian military with the blessing of Iran provided military hardware, repair of Soviet- built Mi-17 and Mi-35 attack helicopters and training facilities to Northern Alliance soldiers to battle the Taliban. India’s military provided intimate guidance and support to NA forces when they launched attacks in October 2001.
Earlier under SPA, India has trained Afghan military and police officers in India and extended some transport helicopters to Afghanistan. President Karzai made his third visit to India n December 2013. He went with a “wish list” of heavy weapons and military equipment for India. The latter is so far reluctant to honour the request and has only assured training of military and provision of and non-lethal supplies. This is because of the sensitivities of Pakistan, and apprehensions over getting overly involved in Afghanistan. Besides, most of the heavy weapons are supplied by Russia.
President Karzai’s motives in seeking military aid from India is to open options with the US; by making trips he also wants to pressurize Pakistan to force Afghan Taliban to start negotiations with the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC).
As long as Indian military footprint is not in Afghanistan, Pakistan may not object to the training of Afghan military personnel in India.
Afghanistan’s vast reserves of iron, copper, cobalt and gold have invited Indian companies to exploit nearly one trillion dollars worth of minerals. This, of course, going to take time and resources and awaits stiff competition from China and others.
The Karzai government has relied on to marginalize the Afghan Pashtoons and include Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks in all government departments, including security forces and to bring non-Pashtoons on the centre stage. The NA members are beholden to India for support during the Taliban rule and since 2001.
India has not confined its activities to Afghanistan alone but is busy making inroads in Central Asian Republics (CARs) and has made appreciable progress. The Indian military is interacting with Tajikistan security forces and is providing funding for upgrading of air bases and has constructed a military hospital and logistic depot.
With Tajikistan India inked an agreement in 2007-- enabling its air force to establish itself at Ayani airbase near Dushanbe and Farkhor airbase close to northern Afghanistan border. By parking Mi-17 attack helicopters at Ayani base and also leasing issian jets, already stationed at the base, it has a squadron of MiG 31 jet fighter bombers at Farkhor base. The two airbases have given an option to IAF to strike Pakistan from the rear, if and when needed.
Besides the Indian Embassy in Kabul, India has opened consulates in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat. Nearly 70 training camps have been allegedly working along Pakistan’s western border where Tajiks, Uzbeks, Chechnyans, Arabs and dissidents from FATA and Baluchistan are being funded, trained, equipped and launched into selected regions of Pakistan. The bulk of RAW assets are however deployed in Afghanistan.
India’s apprehensions in Afghanistan centre around the fact that Taliban, once freed in post-2014 may be launched against Kashmir and Indian military installations like against Indian embassies twice before in 2011. In case they assume total power they will affect Indian access, aid projects, investment and block access to the Central Asian states as aid and trade corridor. India wants to open its market for export of Afghan goods and change the “narrative of despair into narrative of hope” and wants to integrate Afghanistan into the larger SAARC market.
India officially wants an “Afghan-led” and “Afghan-owned” peace process and a pluralist government but does not want a total control by the Taliban.
Pakistan’s anxieties for “strategic depth” are being diluted now but it has apprehensions of India supporting some Pakistani Taliban and Baloch militants against the Pakistani state.
But the Indian army, too, has some advantages for the Afghan forces. Its armed forces are especially trained in counterinsurgencies in Kashmir, Northeast and other parts of India and could provide useful training and experience to Afghan forces. However for any future peacekeeping role in Afghanistan it is not keen -- given the bitter experience faced by occupation forces [British, Soviet and the US] in that country.
Many things could change from now till end of 2014 and India could still support Northern Alliance and let the simmering regions of southwest out of its reach without overstepping its limits or losing goodwill. While with SAARC neighbours (Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives) it has an overweening presence and breeds love-hate relationship, with Afghanistan it could be different. Its biggest concern is the post- 2014 scenario is that that the ANSF is still not equipped and trained enough to confront the Taliban challenge on its own. Heavy scale of desertions, poor pay and discipline structure is evidence of this. Even the police force is not up to the mark and can come under the influence of powerful warlords. India is also unhappy over US-Afghan efforts to induce them to share power.
With no appetite to get sucked in the Afghan quagmire India has been inculcating fears in Washington that any early withdrawal would open the way for extremist Taliban to regain power and Pakistan to recover its influence in Afghanistan. It has been invoking the phantoms about the possibility of Russia-China, Afghanistan-under- Taliban, Pakistan-Iran-some-Central Asian states bloc coming into being with drastic ramifications for US strategic and economic interests in the region. Likewise, it is hobnobbing with Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for a possible grouping in case an anti-Indian regime comes to power in Kabul.
The proposed energy corridor from Kashgar, China to Gwadar is viewed with suspicion as it sees China as a competitor. This may be similarly viewed by the US.
(The writer is Adviser, Centre for Policy Studies, COMSATS, Islamabad)
Indian interests and perspectives in Afghanistan
