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Date Posted: 28-Nov-2008
Jane's Defence Weekly
Indian forces criticised for lack of co-ordinated response in Mumbai
Rahul Bedi JDW Correspondent - Mumbai
Key Points
A terrorist attack on Mumbai has left more than 140 people dead and taken more than 48 hours to resolve
India's special forces have been criticised for a lack of co-ordination in their response to the attack
As Mumbai reeled from an assault by unknown gunmen on 27 November, Indian officials and special forces (SF) personnel were being criticised for contributing to the crisis through their slow and unco-ordinated response to the attacks.
The attack, which left over 140 people dead and some 300 others injured, was among the worst terrorist atrocities ever experienced in India and, while the death toll remained lower than that suffered during the Mumbai bombings of 2006, this latest attack was unprecedented in terms of planning, execution, audacity and ruthlessness, say sources.
The attack was perpetrated by between 15 and 20 fedayeen, or suicide gunmen, who seized two of India's best-known hotels along with 60 to 80 hostages, as well as the nearby house of a Jewish rabbi, holding all three buildings for nearly 48 hours. Late on 28 November the gunmen were still holding out in at least two locations.
Security sources said the gunmen had executed their mission with military precision.
Arriving in well-equipped dinghies launched by a 'mother ship' some 8 km from Mumbai's coastline, the gunmen split up into teams, moving swiftly through crowded streets and giving the security forces no opportunity to effectively engage them.
One of the dinghies used, equipped with satellite communications, mobile telephones and GPS, has been recovered at Mumbai's Sasson dock.
"The terrorists were well orientated and determined to succeed in their goal of targeting Mumbai's most visible symbols patronised by the rich and famous and by Westerners," a senior security official said.
Previous strikes in Mumbai, almost exclusively serial bombings, had largely targeted the poor in cramped trains and deprived neighbourhoods and these did not necessarily ensure global media attention, he added.
"By attacking Mumbai's high-value targets, the gunmen have ensured attention and could easily scare investment away from India at a time when overseas money is scarce," said political analyst Dorab Sopariwala.
Armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and grenades, the gunmen burst into south Mumbai's business and entertainment district, firing indiscriminately into crowds.
They attacked 10 locations, opening fire initially at the Leopold Café before moving on to attack two nearby luxury hotels - the Taj Mahal Palace and the Trident Oberoi - as well as the Chatarpati Shivaji railway station: one of the world's busiest. Two hospitals were also targeted.
A 48-hour siege then ensued, with the terrorists holding some 80 hotel residents and guests, many of them foreigners, hostage.
Leading the assault under Operation 'Black Tornado' was the Special Action Group (SAG) of the National Security Guard (NSG), manned exclusively by the army and trained for deployment on anti-terrorist and anti-hijacking missions.
The NSG's other wing, the Special Protection Group, is for VIP security and draws its manpower from state police forces and the paramilitary.
The SAG is among the best trained and equipped of all India's SF units, using MP5 machine guns and Galil and Dragnov sniper rifles as their principal weapons.
They also carry specialised ordnance in addition to optical and acoustic sensors with the capability to identify and pinpoint objects and people in confined places.
To confuse matters, however, the SAG was assisted during the Mumbai operation by Marine Commandoes, the Indian Navy's SF, quick reaction teams (QRTs) from the local army command, the paramilitary Rapid Reaction Force and various provincial police commando teams.
"There were far too many command-and-control centres, with each one trying to better the other, causing confusion," a senior security official told Jane's .
Senior army SF personnel also said the NSG exhibited an overall lack of professionalism and could have planned and executed the operation better.
"There appears to have been a lack of detailed, precise planning and even the operations involving over 300 commandoes took nearly 48 hours to achieve," a former three-star SF officer said.
SF units were also unable to make effective use of their force multiplication equipment, such as sensors.
"There is no robust national security decision-making apparatus and when [India] is forced into ordering an operation of this kind its reaction is confused and bureaucratic, resulting in costly hold-ups," said former Brigadier Arun Sahgal of the United Services Institute in Delhi.
"It would be wrong to say that the NSG moved into the operational areas in Mumbai late," NSG chief J K Dutt said in response to criticism that it had taken the agency a precious eight to 10 hours to deploy.
He added that the decision to send the NSG was taken in Delhi (by the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) as soon as it became clear that the situation would require the intervention of a commando force.
Dutt said he was also considering the deployment of anti-materiel rifles, which would be flown in from the Kashmir region. Indeed, these weapons were used late on 28 November.
On the delays in the operation, Dutt said that they had to ensure that each and every room in both besieged hotels was cleared before they move onto the next tier. "This proved time consuming," he said.
However, critics in India's national media said that operationally the NSG had been found wanting.
They said no advance reconnaissance team had been dispatched to Mumbai to create a bridge between the forces on the ground and SF, of which 300 arrived in two batches.
Nor did they possess detailed plans of the besieged areas and wasted time in-fighting with the army, local police and paramilitary units, the critics alleged.
"The NSG needs to severely hone its responses, as situations like these are going to recur," the senior SF officer said.
The identity of the attackers remained unknown, although a source has told Jane's that they have been traced to the disputed Kashmir region.
Date Posted: 28-Nov-2008
Jane's Defence Weekly
Indian forces criticised for lack of co-ordinated response in Mumbai
Rahul Bedi JDW Correspondent - Mumbai
Key Points
A terrorist attack on Mumbai has left more than 140 people dead and taken more than 48 hours to resolve
India's special forces have been criticised for a lack of co-ordination in their response to the attack
As Mumbai reeled from an assault by unknown gunmen on 27 November, Indian officials and special forces (SF) personnel were being criticised for contributing to the crisis through their slow and unco-ordinated response to the attacks.
The attack, which left over 140 people dead and some 300 others injured, was among the worst terrorist atrocities ever experienced in India and, while the death toll remained lower than that suffered during the Mumbai bombings of 2006, this latest attack was unprecedented in terms of planning, execution, audacity and ruthlessness, say sources.
The attack was perpetrated by between 15 and 20 fedayeen, or suicide gunmen, who seized two of India's best-known hotels along with 60 to 80 hostages, as well as the nearby house of a Jewish rabbi, holding all three buildings for nearly 48 hours. Late on 28 November the gunmen were still holding out in at least two locations.
Security sources said the gunmen had executed their mission with military precision.
Arriving in well-equipped dinghies launched by a 'mother ship' some 8 km from Mumbai's coastline, the gunmen split up into teams, moving swiftly through crowded streets and giving the security forces no opportunity to effectively engage them.
One of the dinghies used, equipped with satellite communications, mobile telephones and GPS, has been recovered at Mumbai's Sasson dock.
"The terrorists were well orientated and determined to succeed in their goal of targeting Mumbai's most visible symbols patronised by the rich and famous and by Westerners," a senior security official said.
Previous strikes in Mumbai, almost exclusively serial bombings, had largely targeted the poor in cramped trains and deprived neighbourhoods and these did not necessarily ensure global media attention, he added.
"By attacking Mumbai's high-value targets, the gunmen have ensured attention and could easily scare investment away from India at a time when overseas money is scarce," said political analyst Dorab Sopariwala.
Armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and grenades, the gunmen burst into south Mumbai's business and entertainment district, firing indiscriminately into crowds.
They attacked 10 locations, opening fire initially at the Leopold Café before moving on to attack two nearby luxury hotels - the Taj Mahal Palace and the Trident Oberoi - as well as the Chatarpati Shivaji railway station: one of the world's busiest. Two hospitals were also targeted.
A 48-hour siege then ensued, with the terrorists holding some 80 hotel residents and guests, many of them foreigners, hostage.
Leading the assault under Operation 'Black Tornado' was the Special Action Group (SAG) of the National Security Guard (NSG), manned exclusively by the army and trained for deployment on anti-terrorist and anti-hijacking missions.
The NSG's other wing, the Special Protection Group, is for VIP security and draws its manpower from state police forces and the paramilitary.
The SAG is among the best trained and equipped of all India's SF units, using MP5 machine guns and Galil and Dragnov sniper rifles as their principal weapons.
They also carry specialised ordnance in addition to optical and acoustic sensors with the capability to identify and pinpoint objects and people in confined places.
To confuse matters, however, the SAG was assisted during the Mumbai operation by Marine Commandoes, the Indian Navy's SF, quick reaction teams (QRTs) from the local army command, the paramilitary Rapid Reaction Force and various provincial police commando teams.
"There were far too many command-and-control centres, with each one trying to better the other, causing confusion," a senior security official told Jane's .
Senior army SF personnel also said the NSG exhibited an overall lack of professionalism and could have planned and executed the operation better.
"There appears to have been a lack of detailed, precise planning and even the operations involving over 300 commandoes took nearly 48 hours to achieve," a former three-star SF officer said.
SF units were also unable to make effective use of their force multiplication equipment, such as sensors.
"There is no robust national security decision-making apparatus and when [India] is forced into ordering an operation of this kind its reaction is confused and bureaucratic, resulting in costly hold-ups," said former Brigadier Arun Sahgal of the United Services Institute in Delhi.
"It would be wrong to say that the NSG moved into the operational areas in Mumbai late," NSG chief J K Dutt said in response to criticism that it had taken the agency a precious eight to 10 hours to deploy.
He added that the decision to send the NSG was taken in Delhi (by the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) as soon as it became clear that the situation would require the intervention of a commando force.
Dutt said he was also considering the deployment of anti-materiel rifles, which would be flown in from the Kashmir region. Indeed, these weapons were used late on 28 November.
On the delays in the operation, Dutt said that they had to ensure that each and every room in both besieged hotels was cleared before they move onto the next tier. "This proved time consuming," he said.
However, critics in India's national media said that operationally the NSG had been found wanting.
They said no advance reconnaissance team had been dispatched to Mumbai to create a bridge between the forces on the ground and SF, of which 300 arrived in two batches.
Nor did they possess detailed plans of the besieged areas and wasted time in-fighting with the army, local police and paramilitary units, the critics alleged.
"The NSG needs to severely hone its responses, as situations like these are going to recur," the senior SF officer said.
The identity of the attackers remained unknown, although a source has told Jane's that they have been traced to the disputed Kashmir region.
