Indian army 'backed out' of Pakistan attack

[SSGPA1]

This is a very good article from an Indian Journalist:

By Siddharth Srivastava

NEW DELHI - Reluctance for battle by an ill-prepared army could have resulted in India not launching an attack on Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pakistan-linked terror attack in the Indian city of Mumbai on November 26 in which nearly 200 people died.

High-level government sources have told Asia Times Online that army commanders impressed on the political leadership in New Delhi that an inadequate and obsolete arsenal at their disposal mitigated against an all-out war.

The navy and air force, however, had given the government the go-ahead about their preparedness to carry out an attack and repulse any retaliation from Pakistan.

Over the past few weeks, it has become increasingly apparent from top officials in the know that the closed-door meetings of top military commanders and political leaders discussed the poor state of the armory (both ammunition and artillery), and that this tilted the balance in favor of not striking at Pakistan.

According to senior officials, following the attack on Mumbai by 10 militants linked to Pakistan, India's top leadership looked at two options closely - war and hot pursuit.

Largely for the reasons cited above, the notion of an all-out war was rejected. Hot pursuit, however, remains very much on the table.

The government sources say that a framework for covert operations is being put in place, although India will continue to deny such actions. Crack naval, air and army forces backed by federal intelligence agencies will be involved. The target areas will be Pakistan-administered Kashmir and areas along the Punjab, such as Multan, where some of the Mumbai attackers are believed to have been recruited.

The coastal belt from the southern port city of Karachi to Gwadar in Balochistan province will also be under active Indian surveillance.

Thumbs down to war
Following the Mumbai attack, New Delhi's inclination was to launch a quick strike against Pakistan to impress domestic opinion, and then be prepared for a short war, given the pressures that would be exercised by international powers for a ceasefire to prevent nuclear war breaking out.

The expectation of New Delhi was that the war would go beyond the traditional skirmishes involving artillery fire that take place at the Kashmir border, essentially to check infiltration by militants, or the brief but bloody exchanges at Kargil in 1999.

It was in this context that the army made it apparent that it was not equipped to fight such a war, given the military's presence along the eastern Chinese borders, and that India was at risk of ceding territory should an instant ceasefire be brokered with Pakistan.

This would have been highly embarrassing, not to mention political suicide for the Congress-led government in an election year. So instead, New Delhi restricted itself to a strident diplomatic offensive that continues to date, and the option of hot pursuit.

The air force, on the other hand, was confident that it was prepared to take on the first retaliatory action by Pakistan, expected at forward air force bases along India's borders in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Indian-administered Kashmir. The role of the navy in the operations was not clearly defined, but it was to cover from the Arabian Sea.

Not ready to fight
Various experts, former generals and independent reports have voiced concern over the past few years about the state of preparedness of the Indian army.

For example, the Bofors gun scandal of the 1980s stymied the army's artillery modernization plan, with no induction of powerful guns since the 1986 purchase of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-caliber howitzers. The army has been trying to introduce 400 such guns from abroad and another 1,100 manufactured domestically, without success.

The latest report by the independent Comptroller and Auditor General said the state's production of 23mm ammunition for Shilka anti-aircraft cannons and 30mm guns mounted on infantry combat vehicles lacked quality. Further, supply was nearly 35% short of requirements.

India's huge tank fleet is in bad shape due to a shortage of Russian spare parts, while indigenous efforts, such as the main battle tank Arjun, have failed.

Signs of trouble emerged during the Kargil war when it was revealed that India's defense forces were dealing with acute shortages in every sphere.

In remarks that underscored the problems, the then-army chief, V P Malik, said his forces would make do with whatever was in hand, given the fears of a full-scale war that was eventually avoided due to pressure by America, then under president Bill Clinton.

The Kargil review committee report noted, "The heavy involvement of the army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression."

Although there have been attempts to hasten India's overall defense modernization program, estimated at over US$50 billion over the next five years, gaping holes need to be plugged, including corruption and massive delays in the defense procurement processes.

India's defense expenditure has dipped below 2% of gross domestic product for the first time in decades, despite experts pegging 3% as adequate.

Other defense arms are in dire need of enhancement. Fighter jet squadrons are much below required strength, while the bidding process for medium fighter planes has only just begun and may take a few years to complete.

Meanwhile, the prospects of an India-Pakistan conflict are not over. India's army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, said last week that Pakistan had redeployed troops from its Afghan border to the western frontier with India. "The Indian army has factored this in its planning," Kapoor said.

Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA21Df02.html

 

[SherdiL!]

sad for indians eww !

 

[Ghareeb_Da_Baal]

Yeah................ but its coming. if not now then later eventually it is bound to happen. Oh well......................................

 

[Moscow]

isnt is better there is no war why does everyone here want war i dont understand.

 

[Ghareeb_Da_Baal]

I agree there should be no war.............. but inevitable will always happen....sooner or later.

 

[SSGPA1]

This is a reality check for all war mongers ... people read Jane's and other refense magazines then come to this site and make tall claims ... quite frankly both countries are not prepared for any war.

Even if one is willing to attack, the economic condition doesn't allow that ... this is not the good ol days where empires were made and loot was a source of income.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Hot pursuit, however, remains very much on the table.

If war is 'off the table' then so is 'hot pursuit'. Pakistan has clearly indicated that even a limited incursion will be taken as an act of war, and answered with a full scale escalation from our side.

The talk of 'hot pursuit being on the table' is merely to assuage wounded ego's amongst the warmongers in India. Military action of any sort is 'off the table', unless India is prepared for the horrendous consequences of such belligerence and hostility.

 

[Prodigy17]

hey guys, indian army is in real trouble........... here is what i found about the white elephant other than posted in the thread.............



The Indian Army: Basic Questions, Human Capital, Infrastructure, Miscellaneous
Res ipsa loquitur


The official figure for the shortage of officers in the Indian army is 24.1%, a shortfall of 11238 officers against an authorization of 46615.


Imagine the impact on the army budget, if all the deficiencies in the officer cadre were to be suddenly made up. The current revenue to capital expenditure ratio of 75:25 would go awry due to the increased salaries and subsequently, the amount budgeted for pensions would assume gargantuan proportions. It would also be a nightmare for the HR managers of the army, the bloating at the base of the steep pyramidical structure would further curtail the avenues for promotion, and lead to greater dissatisfaction among officers. However, one area in which the HR managers would breathe a sigh of relief would be resignations and premature retirements from the army. Currently, there are restrictions imposed by the army on officers desirous of moving out, with barely one-third applicants allowed to move out last year and that too after waiting for nearly a year. With the number of applicants for release reportedly multiplying this year, a full-strength officer cadre would be topmost on the wish list of army HR top brass.


As per the ministry’s annual report, the total number of officers commissioned in the army last year was over 2000 (422 from NDA, 685 from IMA, 493 from OTA and 407 from technical entries). This is barely sufficient to meet the regular wastage rate and incapable of denting the shortfall.


However, the number of officers reported to be commissioned from IMA in June this year itself has been 625, the highest ever since its inception. This increased intake seems to be one of the measures undertaken by the government to make up the deficiencies; the other being the increase in minimum service for short service and women officers from 5 to 10 years, and further extendable to 14 years.


The shortage of officers in the three services, and most notably the army, has been highlighted in the parliament time and again. It is purportedly done to play up the tough conditions that the army men (and women) are working under and to showcase the career preferences of today’s youth. It eventually ends up, justifiably, asking for better pay and perks for the army men to redress this anomaly.


The ostensible reasons for this shortage and the remedial measures have been covered extensively in the popular media and need no repetition. Notwithstanding the sophistry proffered by the military and civilian bureaucracy, a novel approach is imperative to resolve this complex issue.


Obviously, this huge shortage in the officer cadre did not occur overnight. It could have started either from a sudden increase in the authorised officer strength due to sudden expansion of the army or from a sharp reduction in the intake of officers. Most plausibly, it was a combination of the two, spread over a long period of time. But, it is bewildering that the crisis continued unabated and reached such calamitous proportions unnoticed.


What most people tend to overlook is an historical factoid which is germane to the problem. In the pre-independence era, plebeians joining as soldiers (as with clerks or subordinate officers in the civilian stream) were of a higher calibre than those joining today, as only the privileged elite could join as officers then. Most of the officers today would have, in all likelihood, joined as soldiers in that earlier era. With such an intelligent and professional subordinate cadre, the system worked smoothly in the pre-independence era. The legacy and the momentum kept it going for many years after the independence as well. When it was time to implement modern management practices and update the system, the political and military leadership was found wanting. A fair share of the incrimination needs to be apportioned to the complacency arising from the longueur between the 1971 victory and the Sri Lanka fiasco.


Besides, ‘officers’ in the Indian army parlance refers solely to the commissioned officers, not to the non-commissioned officers (NCO) and junior commissioned officers (JCO). The JCO is a rank unique to the sub-continental armies and a legacy of the British army; they were then called the Viceroy commissioned officers (VCO) and acted as a conduit between the British officers and Indian soldiers. There was no direct recruitment as a VCO. A recruit would become a VCO only by promotion and acted as a village or family elder. The units and regiments were clannish, more like an extended family or a village society, and the authority of the VCO flew largely from social, communal and filial obligations rather than from any official authority invested in him. The concept of the authority of the current JCO has not been redefined in the last 60 years, while the civil society, recruitment patterns and the organisational requirements have undergone a sea change.


At the first instance, it seems to be an issue extraneous to the debate on shortage of officers. However, it is nonplussing that with the shortages likely to stay and unlikely to be made up in the short term, the obvious answer to look within the organisation was never explored fully. The role and authority of the NCO in the US/ French/ Israeli armies should have been adapted for the JCO in the Indian army. This would have not only taken a lot of burden off the shoulders of the over-worked officers but would have also brought down the authorisation of officers in the long run, especially at junior levels.


There is another aspect of this shortage. When hostilities are imminent, a lot of peace time activities take a backseat and certain officers from non-fighting organisations viz., training schools, logistics establishments and administrative installations, are moved to the forward areas. As no war in the present scenario is likely to last more than a fortnight (even a localised conflict like Kargil was over in a couple of months), such temporary movement tends to offset the deficiencies in fighting units to some extent.


An interesting aside is the authorisation and posting of officers to units posted on UN assignments. They are almost double the standard authorisation and much greater than the actual number of officers posted with the units. Moreover, an army so hard pressed by internal and external factors has no qualms in being one of the highest providers of peacekeepers to the UN. The other competitors for this position are, hold your breath, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Is the Indian army in the same league? Where are the US, French, British and other modern armies of the world? Something is certainly amiss here. Despite the media projections, these UN assignments haven’t been unqualified successes for the Indian Army. The examples of Generals Jaitley and Raghavan easily come to mind in this regard.


Nevertheless, this press release raises hopes that the army has finally woken up to the impending challenges and the top brass is willing to learn and implement latest management principles and techniques.


A group of senior serving Indian Army officers has just completed a weeklong advanced management course to hone their organisational skills and - and profess to be satisfied with the experience. The premier Management Development Institute (MDI) in suburban Gurgaon conducted the advanced management course for the 15 officers, some of them of three-star rank.


‘The course involved latest macro-management techniques for application in warfare and in the management of various departments in the army to achieve their organizational goals more effectively,’ a defence ministry statement said.


Organisation reform and restructuring is sine qua non to rejuvenating the army. The parliamentary standing committee for defence in its 11th report suggested ‘constitution of a high level empowered committee for restructuring of Armed Forces in order to have optimum use of limited resources and to suggest trimming the force size with corresponding increase in the use of sophisticated technology’. The committee lamented in its 15th report that the suggestion


…has been totally ignored by the Ministry. The Committee further notes that the recommendation of the Committee to examine the relevance of involvement of the Defence Forces in non-defence activities has been left unanswered. Therefore, the Committee wishes to reiterate their earlier recommendation and desire that the Ministry should give a serious thought to the recommendation in order to use the scarce resource in a well-planned manner and desire to have a detailed reply in this regard.


This high level empowered committee to study and suggest reforms for the army, with time bound recommendations, is the need of the hour. The shedding of the organisational flab, rationalisation of the rank structure, reduction in shortage of officers and enhanced attractiveness of an army career will ensue from this path breaking exercise. Implementing these reforms will lead into a tumultuous and fractious period of flux for the army. The organisation will have to very carefully manage this transition; the will to complete this monumental assignment amidst organisational inertia and against deeply embedded interests will have to be displayed by the political, bureaucratic and military top brass. The cost of delay or failure will be too heavy for the nation to bear.


http://indianeconomy.org/2007/06/27/...army-part-4-5/

 

[Prodigy17]

A Dangerous Imbalance
Harsh V. Pant


A callous State, an indifferent Society and disgruntled Soldiers. The discontent over the Pay Commission recommendations is just one of the manifestations of unprecedented turmoil and dissatisfaction in the armed forces ......


The discord between the armed services and the Indian government over the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations took a new turn recently when the Army and the Navy decided to defy the government and delay the implementation of the revised salaries till the pay anomalies are sorted out. This happened even as the government was trying to assert its authority with the defense minister categorically informing the three service chiefs that the armed forces cannot unilaterally decide not to implement the decision of the union cabinet. The government is within its right to see the sending out of unclassified signals by the Navy and the Army as a breach of discipline with some serious broader implications.

Though it might be tempting to view the present turmoil in civil-military relations primarily as a dispute over some technicalities in the Pay Commission recommendations, something much more substantial is at stake here. The Navy chief let the cat out of the bag when he suggested that the real issue in the dispute is the command and control relationship between the officers of the armed forces and their civilian counterparts. More than ever, the balance between the Indian state, the Indian society and the nation’s military institutions is out of kilter. This can have grave ramifications if the equilibrium is not promptly restored because only nations which are successful in evolving a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations succeed in their search for security while those who fail merely end up squandering their limited resources and put at risk their national security.


A state makes a sacred contract with its soldiers that while they will lay down their lives when called upon to do so, the nation will take good care of their and their family's needs to the extent its resources would permit. This contract underpins the very survival of a nation as when its territorial integrity and political independence are under threat, the nation looks upon the only instrument that can protect it - its armed forces. While all governments have to look for a considered bargain between their commitments and power and between power and resources, a responsible government will always be aware of the serious implications of not spending adequate resources on defence.


The debate as it has been made out to be in some quarters between defense and development is a spurious one. Unless adequate provisions are made for defense, no state will be able to pursue its developmental agenda. This is much more important for a country like India that faces a unique security environment with two of its 'adversaries' straddling it on two sides of its borders and problems on all sides of its periphery. Force remains the ultima ratio in international relations. Politics among nations is conducted in the brooding shadow of violence. Either a state remains able and willing to use force to preserve and enhance its interests or it is forced to live at the mercy of its militarily powerful counterparts.


The Indian society, meanwhile, remains apathetic on defence issues. It makes Kargil into a television spectacle, an opportunity for journalists to try to show off their temporary bravery by going to the frontlines for a few hours and getting the excitement of covering a war from the inside.


And then when it is all over, when the soldiers have been interred into their graves, the society moves on to new and more exciting spectacles -- to our movies, song and dance reality shows and saas-bahoo sagas, oblivious to the everyday struggles of the nation’s soldiers on the frontlines.


Shunned by the larger society and ignored by the state, Indian armed forces today are witnessing unprecedented dissatisfaction. The discontent over the Pay Commission recommendations is just one of the manifestations of this disenchantment. The armed forces feel they have never got their due from various Pay commissions over the years but the government in its wisdom decided to keep the armed forces away from any representation in the latest Pay Commission. The dominance of bureaucrats meant that while the interests of the bureaucrats and officialdom were well-recognized, the armed services once again ended up getting a raw deal. The discontent is so serious that some of the best and brightest in our services have refused to go for the Higher Command Courses and more and more are seeking an early retirement or taking to the private sector. Such turmoil within the ranks of any nation’s armed services should be a cause for concern but in the case of India that aspires to join the ranks of world’s major global powers this is a recipe for disaster.

There is a broader issue here about the Indian military’s growing disdain for their civilian masters and about their knowledge of defense issues. The Indian political class, in general, lacks any substantive understanding of the role of force in the pursuit of national interests and projecting national values. Moreover, no independent civilian expertise on defense issues is present in India. One can find students writing their PhD theses on Mongolia’s foreign policy or domestic politics in Belize for instance but hardly any research is encouraged on defense-related issues in Indian Universities. As a result, one finds ex-servicemen monopolizing the discourse on national security and defense issues. They should certainly have an important voice on these matters but it should not be the only voice.


Yet it is not entirely clear if the top leadership of the armed forces is really up to the task of harmonizing the growing imbalance in civil-military relations. With their recent defiance, the military chiefs have merely tried to cover their flanks given the invidiousness within their rank and file against the Pay Commission recommendations. While the Indian armed forces have often complained of the politico-bureaucratic nexus thwarting the rights of the defense services, the behavior of the top leadership of the armed services is in danger of being perceived as increasingly petty and bureaucratic itself.


Blaming the government for all the ills afflicting the defense sector seems to be becoming the default position within the ranks of the military and taking this too far can be dangerous for the liberal democratic ethos of this nation. The state is responsible for the allocation of resources among important societal values of which military security is but one. Moreover, the Indian armed forces need fundamental reforms, a restructuring that enables them to operate with utmost efficiency in a rapidly evolving domestic and global context. And the onus is on leadership of the armed forces to give the Indian defense policy a new direction, a trajectory that does justice to India’s rising stature in the global inter-state hierarchy.


The military exists to serve the state but a military that lacks societal prestige and the attention of the state will not only endanger the security of the state but will also pose a challenge to the liberal societal values that we so love to espouse. It has become imperative now to get the balance right between the Indian state, society and its military institutions if India is to avoid the high costs that will inevitably follow if the present turmoil persists.


Harsh V. Pant teaches at King’s College London


http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp...me=harsh&sid=1


Gents, looks like there is serious discontent in indian armed forces particularly army. Military is turning against politicians and the discord has reached serious proportions. The case of indian army refusing to enter into war is a case in point. it could have been done as an indirect measure to convey the message that we are neglected and dissatisfied with the state of affairs.

 

[BATMAN]

Coast Guard 70 percent short of requirements
Panaji (IANS): Admitting that the Indian Coast Guard was a staggering 70 percent short of its requirements, Defence Minister A.K. Antony said on Wednesday that the rapid modernizing of the country's maritime forces was his ministry's top priority.

"Earlier, we could say the coast was safe. But it is no longer the case now. We had neglected the coastline. We have to be more prepared now," he said.

He was addressing a press conference after the induction ceremony of the India's largest Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV) built by the Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), a public sector undertaking specializing in building maritime vessels and related technology.

According to Antony, strengthening the Indian Navy, the Indian Coast Guard and the coastal police apparatus was high on the government's agenda.

The chinks in India's maritime defences have been blamed for the ease with which 10 Pakistani terrorists used the sea route to land in Mumbai Nov 26 and unleash a carnage that lasted for over 60 hours and which claimed the lives of more than 170 people, including 26 foreigners and injured more than 300.

Pointing to the incessant delay in the procurement of defence related equipment, Anthony said the government was looking at the active participation of the private sector in manufacturing a whole range of equipment if the Indian armed forces were to be modernized and better armed within a short time span.

"Our procedure for defence procurement is time consuming. Apart from our PSUs (public sector undertakings), the private sector should also start production of defence related products," Antony said, adding that the new Defence Procurement Policy-2008 had a definite thrust towards private sector participation.

Antony said that if India was to be really secure in the present environment, it had to be 100 percent self reliant in defence production.

"We cannot depend completely on another country, even a friendly one, in times of crisis," he added.

The Indian Coast Guard mans a crucial corridor 12 to 200 nautical miles off the country's 7,500 km-long coast.

 

[SSGPA1]

Wow ... Not even one comment posted by Indian members ...

 

[Jihad]

I laugh at certain Indians and their warmongering attitudes, I laugh at their pathetic ways of trying to undermine Pakistans sovereignty and integrity, and I laugh at the way they call themselves a world power and a peaceful nation.

 

[XYON]

isnt is better there is no war why does everyone here want war i dont understand.

Get your facts straight COMRADE!

The WAR MONGERING and CHEST THUMPING was initiated by India in shape of shouting surgical strikes etc. When we responded in kind to greet such a stupid action with a massive all-out response, Indians all of a sudden chickened out and did not want a war and all hell broke loose for the poor and ill-equipped Bharat Rakshaks!!

The WAR will not be started by Pakistan, for sure! But we do not believe in an eye for an eye rather arms and legs for the eye! This has been our strategic defense philosophy for quite sometime now!

 

[All-Green]

I guess Indian Army is showing more patience and restraint than the Government---maybe because the government will sit back and relax while the Army will suffer severe losses in a conflict which can be defined as a pointless image stunt---at best.

India can get smooth cooperation out of Pakistan if it asks nicely---Indian is good with diplomacy in the world arena but when it comes to dealing with Pakistan they start needless bashing of Pakistan through both state and media which results in a state of conflict.
If India really wants to attain a stature of a major power, it should give Pakistan its due status as the key neighboring state, rather than a renegade punk who needs to taught a lesson.

This war, if started would have been for naught---except to satisfy some tremendous egos---with a tragic consequence for the people of both countries of course.

No matter what the technological advantages India enjoys in certain aspects---the cost of WAR and its effects shall be too heavy a burden to sustain their populace---coupled with the fact that Pakistan has shown restraint even when deliberate recon missions were carried out by IAF, a WAR shall really help the terrorists and not India and least of all Pakistan.

Our military stance is not at all hawkish but purely a strong effort to put some sense into our counterparts who are not thinking clearly and abusing Pakistan as a nation

 

[Chanakyaa]

isnt is better there is no war why does everyone here want war i dont understand.

Very Correct. IMO I like the Progress of India ( in IT , BioTech and Space ) , More than India defeating any country in War. Wheather we win or loose Human Lives are Lost and most probable thay NEVER had to do ANYTHING with WAR which is often a WAR of Pride and Supremacy rather for Peace.

Get your facts straight COMRADE!

The WAR MONGERING and CHEST THUMPING was initiated by India in shape of shouting surgical strikes etc. When we responded in kind to greet such a stupid action with a massive all-out response, Indians all of a sudden chickened out and did not want a war and all hell broke loose for the poor and ill-equipped Bharat Rakshaks!!

The WAR will not be started by Pakistan, for sure! But we do not believe in an eye for an eye rather arms and legs for the eye! This has been our strategic defense philosophy for quite sometime now!

I Guess This Forum Did Exist before 26/11 isnt it ?

But Just make a look , Its True that the Forum is Flooded with Comments making assumptions of baseless and childish remarks of "Wars" ( in Dates Before 26/11 ), Indo-pak , Sino-India.. or whatever.

But Still , Defence.Pk is a Great Forum. Really Admins You must be heartliy praised to allow all of us to place their open comments.