arp2041
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It would surprise many Indians to know that it is neither Kanya Kumari nor Assam, which constitute the southern and eastern frontiers of the Indian Union, but the Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Sharing territorial waters with Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia, and closer to SE Asia than peninsular India, their unique location throws up challenges as well as opportunities. They could be lucrative objects of desire for any country, which may harbour ambitions of dominating the Bay of Bengal. At the same time, they form a springboard from where India can reach out and project power, exert influence or strike bonds of friendship in our eastern neighbourhood. A glance at history reveals some little known but interesting junctures in history when India came close to losing these precious assets.
It took the Japanese a mere four months after their attack on Pearl Harbour, to sweep through SE Asia and occupy Port Blair in March 1942. The Andaman & Nicobar Islands were to be the springboard for their invasion of India. In fact, these islands were the first part of India to be liberated from British rule when Netaji Subhash Bose visited Port Blair and hoisted the tricolour on 30 December 1943. Of course, this was a temporary reprieve because the British re-occupied the islands after the Japanese surrender in 1945.
In 1947, the British Chiefs of Staff had decided that since the A&N islands constituted a strategic oceanic vantage point from where the Royal Navy could dominate the Bay of Bengal, they must be retained as a Crown possession. Pakistan too had staked a strong claim to these islands on the grounds that they would provide a vital connecting link between its eastern and western wings. Fortunately, Mountbatten was able to persuade Attlee to overrule both Jinnah and the Chiefs of Staff, and let India have these islands. Just before the outbreak of Indo-Pak hostilities in 1965, the former PAF Chief Air Mshl Asghar Khan, sent to Jakarta for seeking support, was asked by Indonesian Admiral Martadinata, "Don’t you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? A look at the map shows that these islands are between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there? In any case, the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches …" However the Indo-Pak conflict ended before the Indonesians could make a serious intervention. India is indeed fortunate to own these unique Bay of Bengal islands, located strategically at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, which have, in the past been coveted by Japan, Britain, Pakistan and Indonesia. Should the waters around the islands yield oil and gas, we will be "twice blessed".
Regrettably we have, so far, not shown any great vision, initiative or imagination in their development. In the sixty-four years since independence they could have become thriving tourist havens, or shipping hubs providing trans-shipment, repair and bunkering facilities to merchant vessels. In any case, by now we should have also built them up as security bulwarks for safeguarding our national interests and projecting strategic influence eastwards. Regrettably, we have been half-hearted in our approach and neglected the A&N in most aspects. Well-intentioned, but short-sighted environmentalist have lobbied to obtain Supreme Court directives placing stringent curbs on usage of land as well as local building material like wood and sand; effectively stalling all development activity. There are 576 islands, islets and rocks of assorted sizes in the A&N group; a vast majority of them uninhabited. If we persist in our neglectful attitude, a repeat of Kargil is not beyond the realm of possibility – perpetrated by non-state actors if not by a neighbour.
The first armed forces presence was seen in the islands when the Indian Navy (IN) established a 150 man naval garrison after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The outpost was upgraded to a Fortress Command in 1976, with the other two Services making token contributions. Commendable wisdom was shown by the post-Kargil Group of Ministers Report in recommending the establishment of a Joint tri-Service Command in the A&N Islands. Not to be outdone, the IN demonstrated singular magnanimity in offering its Fortress Command headed by a 3-star Admiral as the crucible for India’s experiment in Jointmanship. India’s first-ever full-fledged Joint Command was constituted in the A&N Islands by a Government of India directive on 8th October 2001. Under an inspired set of visionary Chiefs, the Indian Armed Forces took a great leap of faith when they decided to place all forces located in the A&N Islands, as well as the Indian Coast Guard, under the command of the newly created C-in-C Andaman & Nicobar (CINCAN), who was to report to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).
I considered myself singularly fortunate when I received orders to set up the A&N Command as its first CinC. I thought I was well equipped for the job. Having passed out of the tri-Service National Defence Academy in 1964 I had returned as its Commandant 33 years later. I had served for many years with the IAF, including a tenure with a ground-attack squadron. I was also a member of the Arun Singh Task Force which had deliberated on issues of Jointmanship. However, I had grossly under-estimated the challenges that I was to face.
Although the IN had transferred all its assets, including buildings, transport and personnel to the newly formed Command, it was a daunting task to step into the unknown realm of a "Joint Formation" with no precedents or SOPs for guidance. When officers from the other three Services began to trickle in, the biggest challenge was to break down mental barriers and to mould them into "Joint Staff Officers." New appointments were created, and responsibilities assigned, cutting across Service boundaries and knowledge domains. The idea was to prove that the colour of uniform did not define a staff officer’s capabilities.
Locally, everyone was willing to share the meagre assets available, and the navy’s pragmatic logistics system came in very handy. However, support from New Delhi was inconsistent, and we were frequently referred to the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) HQ. The latter being just a few days older than ANC, and totally preoccupied with their own survival, were of little help. In those difficult times, the "old boy net" worked wonders with all four Services, and of course NHQ was our "lender of last resort". It was interesting to see the diverse attitudes of the four Services towards the fledgling Command. Land, for example, was a scarce resource in Port Blair, and the IN having handed over all its assets to ANC, we had to look to others for creating additional facilities. While the Army’s response was prompt and positive, Air HQ expressed serious reservations about handing over any land. As a consequence, the Army too withdrew its offer.
A full account of the trials and tribulations of the ANC’s early days would be tedious for the reader. Suffice to say that when I departed Port Blair 15 months later I was a satisfied man. It had been a most uplifting and exhilarating experience to see the mental adaptability, ingenuity, creativity and initiative demonstrated by officers of all the four Services who suddenly found themselves in a strange and alien "Purple" environment. Each one of them went out of his way to learn the capabilities and limitations, as well as quirks and idiosyncrasies of the other Services, and to enthusiastically pull together as part of a harmonious team. They made Jointmanship work.
My most memorable moment in Port Blair was, undoubtedly, when the Chief Staff Officer (Technical) of ANC, an Air Commodore, walked into my office with grease marks on his uniform and face. Seeing my annoyed look, he confided, "Sir the submarine had reported high lub-oil temperature on the port compressor. I had gone down to the engine room to help out." This officer, who later rose to Air rank, was a fine example of all the attributes I have just mentioned. During a decade of its existence the ANC has, to my mind, been an unqualified success as an experiment, and has provided concrete proof that the concept of Jointmanship can work very successfully in the Indian environment. The cynics have been proved wrong, and there could have been no better confirmation than the performance of the ANC during the 2004 tsunami. Led by a dashing Lieutenant-General, the efficient machinery of the Joint Command undertook rescue and relief operations by sea, air and land with panache, when the civil administration was helpless and the islanders cried out for succour.
Ten years after it was planted, in Port Blair, the seed of Jointmanship is now a sturdy young sapling, whose shoots should have been transplanted; if not to a Theatre Command (for which we are not yet ready), then to a functional Training, Logistics or Doctrine Command. The ANC could also be an ideal location for a tri-Service Rapid Deployment Force to meet crisis situations at home and abroad. However, our system works slowly and it may be some time before any of these come to pass. In the mean time care needs to be taken that the sapling itself is not allowed to wither through neglect or indifference. It would indeed be a tragedy if India’s pioneering Joint formation were to be slowly but surely asphyxiated by short-sighted parochialism. While the Indian state is prepared to allocate enormous sums of money to defence, it lacks the political will to ensure that they are spent effectively. Our stubborn adherence to outdated concepts is leading to expenditure on forces that are inappropriate for modern day threats. The absence of Jointness in India, apart from creating wasteful overlap and duplication of capabilities, constitutes a severe strategic handicap which could give an adversary enormous advantage in combat.
Jointmanship dawned in the US over 25 years ago, when a security-conscious and pro-active political establishment pushed the Goldwater-Nichols Act through the US Congress. The question we need to consider in all seriousness is this: are our armed forces unable to embrace Jointmanship because the national security establishment is trapped in a Rip van Winkle time-warp? And if so, are we going to wait till an adversary jolts us out of slumber?
:: Welcome to Purple Beret ::
It took the Japanese a mere four months after their attack on Pearl Harbour, to sweep through SE Asia and occupy Port Blair in March 1942. The Andaman & Nicobar Islands were to be the springboard for their invasion of India. In fact, these islands were the first part of India to be liberated from British rule when Netaji Subhash Bose visited Port Blair and hoisted the tricolour on 30 December 1943. Of course, this was a temporary reprieve because the British re-occupied the islands after the Japanese surrender in 1945.
In 1947, the British Chiefs of Staff had decided that since the A&N islands constituted a strategic oceanic vantage point from where the Royal Navy could dominate the Bay of Bengal, they must be retained as a Crown possession. Pakistan too had staked a strong claim to these islands on the grounds that they would provide a vital connecting link between its eastern and western wings. Fortunately, Mountbatten was able to persuade Attlee to overrule both Jinnah and the Chiefs of Staff, and let India have these islands. Just before the outbreak of Indo-Pak hostilities in 1965, the former PAF Chief Air Mshl Asghar Khan, sent to Jakarta for seeking support, was asked by Indonesian Admiral Martadinata, "Don’t you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? A look at the map shows that these islands are between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there? In any case, the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches …" However the Indo-Pak conflict ended before the Indonesians could make a serious intervention. India is indeed fortunate to own these unique Bay of Bengal islands, located strategically at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, which have, in the past been coveted by Japan, Britain, Pakistan and Indonesia. Should the waters around the islands yield oil and gas, we will be "twice blessed".
Regrettably we have, so far, not shown any great vision, initiative or imagination in their development. In the sixty-four years since independence they could have become thriving tourist havens, or shipping hubs providing trans-shipment, repair and bunkering facilities to merchant vessels. In any case, by now we should have also built them up as security bulwarks for safeguarding our national interests and projecting strategic influence eastwards. Regrettably, we have been half-hearted in our approach and neglected the A&N in most aspects. Well-intentioned, but short-sighted environmentalist have lobbied to obtain Supreme Court directives placing stringent curbs on usage of land as well as local building material like wood and sand; effectively stalling all development activity. There are 576 islands, islets and rocks of assorted sizes in the A&N group; a vast majority of them uninhabited. If we persist in our neglectful attitude, a repeat of Kargil is not beyond the realm of possibility – perpetrated by non-state actors if not by a neighbour.
The first armed forces presence was seen in the islands when the Indian Navy (IN) established a 150 man naval garrison after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The outpost was upgraded to a Fortress Command in 1976, with the other two Services making token contributions. Commendable wisdom was shown by the post-Kargil Group of Ministers Report in recommending the establishment of a Joint tri-Service Command in the A&N Islands. Not to be outdone, the IN demonstrated singular magnanimity in offering its Fortress Command headed by a 3-star Admiral as the crucible for India’s experiment in Jointmanship. India’s first-ever full-fledged Joint Command was constituted in the A&N Islands by a Government of India directive on 8th October 2001. Under an inspired set of visionary Chiefs, the Indian Armed Forces took a great leap of faith when they decided to place all forces located in the A&N Islands, as well as the Indian Coast Guard, under the command of the newly created C-in-C Andaman & Nicobar (CINCAN), who was to report to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).
I considered myself singularly fortunate when I received orders to set up the A&N Command as its first CinC. I thought I was well equipped for the job. Having passed out of the tri-Service National Defence Academy in 1964 I had returned as its Commandant 33 years later. I had served for many years with the IAF, including a tenure with a ground-attack squadron. I was also a member of the Arun Singh Task Force which had deliberated on issues of Jointmanship. However, I had grossly under-estimated the challenges that I was to face.
Although the IN had transferred all its assets, including buildings, transport and personnel to the newly formed Command, it was a daunting task to step into the unknown realm of a "Joint Formation" with no precedents or SOPs for guidance. When officers from the other three Services began to trickle in, the biggest challenge was to break down mental barriers and to mould them into "Joint Staff Officers." New appointments were created, and responsibilities assigned, cutting across Service boundaries and knowledge domains. The idea was to prove that the colour of uniform did not define a staff officer’s capabilities.
Locally, everyone was willing to share the meagre assets available, and the navy’s pragmatic logistics system came in very handy. However, support from New Delhi was inconsistent, and we were frequently referred to the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) HQ. The latter being just a few days older than ANC, and totally preoccupied with their own survival, were of little help. In those difficult times, the "old boy net" worked wonders with all four Services, and of course NHQ was our "lender of last resort". It was interesting to see the diverse attitudes of the four Services towards the fledgling Command. Land, for example, was a scarce resource in Port Blair, and the IN having handed over all its assets to ANC, we had to look to others for creating additional facilities. While the Army’s response was prompt and positive, Air HQ expressed serious reservations about handing over any land. As a consequence, the Army too withdrew its offer.
A full account of the trials and tribulations of the ANC’s early days would be tedious for the reader. Suffice to say that when I departed Port Blair 15 months later I was a satisfied man. It had been a most uplifting and exhilarating experience to see the mental adaptability, ingenuity, creativity and initiative demonstrated by officers of all the four Services who suddenly found themselves in a strange and alien "Purple" environment. Each one of them went out of his way to learn the capabilities and limitations, as well as quirks and idiosyncrasies of the other Services, and to enthusiastically pull together as part of a harmonious team. They made Jointmanship work.
My most memorable moment in Port Blair was, undoubtedly, when the Chief Staff Officer (Technical) of ANC, an Air Commodore, walked into my office with grease marks on his uniform and face. Seeing my annoyed look, he confided, "Sir the submarine had reported high lub-oil temperature on the port compressor. I had gone down to the engine room to help out." This officer, who later rose to Air rank, was a fine example of all the attributes I have just mentioned. During a decade of its existence the ANC has, to my mind, been an unqualified success as an experiment, and has provided concrete proof that the concept of Jointmanship can work very successfully in the Indian environment. The cynics have been proved wrong, and there could have been no better confirmation than the performance of the ANC during the 2004 tsunami. Led by a dashing Lieutenant-General, the efficient machinery of the Joint Command undertook rescue and relief operations by sea, air and land with panache, when the civil administration was helpless and the islanders cried out for succour.
Ten years after it was planted, in Port Blair, the seed of Jointmanship is now a sturdy young sapling, whose shoots should have been transplanted; if not to a Theatre Command (for which we are not yet ready), then to a functional Training, Logistics or Doctrine Command. The ANC could also be an ideal location for a tri-Service Rapid Deployment Force to meet crisis situations at home and abroad. However, our system works slowly and it may be some time before any of these come to pass. In the mean time care needs to be taken that the sapling itself is not allowed to wither through neglect or indifference. It would indeed be a tragedy if India’s pioneering Joint formation were to be slowly but surely asphyxiated by short-sighted parochialism. While the Indian state is prepared to allocate enormous sums of money to defence, it lacks the political will to ensure that they are spent effectively. Our stubborn adherence to outdated concepts is leading to expenditure on forces that are inappropriate for modern day threats. The absence of Jointness in India, apart from creating wasteful overlap and duplication of capabilities, constitutes a severe strategic handicap which could give an adversary enormous advantage in combat.
Jointmanship dawned in the US over 25 years ago, when a security-conscious and pro-active political establishment pushed the Goldwater-Nichols Act through the US Congress. The question we need to consider in all seriousness is this: are our armed forces unable to embrace Jointmanship because the national security establishment is trapped in a Rip van Winkle time-warp? And if so, are we going to wait till an adversary jolts us out of slumber?
:: Welcome to Purple Beret ::
since A&N can be our best hope in case a war broke against the Chinese.
).
