sudhir007
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 6, 2009
- Messages
- 4,728
- Reaction score
- 1
India - Rising Power, Growing Responsibilities - Building India
he Indian Navy has been very fortunate to have had visionary leaders. From a minor littoral force of hand-me-down frigates, sloops and craft at independence, the Navy has now emerged as the fifth largest naval power. However in view of the daunting challenges we face we need to do a lot more and ensure this is actualised in an operationally viable time frame. A brilliant and very well informed article on the Force Structuring needs of the Indian Navy. This article conducts a top level gap analysis between requirements and possessions and recommends an action plan to transform the Indian Navy into a force of the future. The writer addresses the major slippages in delivery schedules by our DPSUs and response options that ensure that the Indian Navy does not get into a situation of too little too late. Building the 2020 Navy may require some prompt and focused course corrections and re-alignment with the forecast operational scenario of 2022 and beyond.
This article is published with the kind permission of "Defence and Security Alert (DSA) Magazine" New Delhi-India
The Indian Navy has been very fortunate to have had visionary leaders. From a minor littoral force of hand-me-down frigates, sloops and craft at independence, the Navy has now emerged as the fifth largest naval power. This journey has been neither smooth nor easy. The tenacity of purpose and the overall corporate conviction that the charted path of force development would be mainly through indigenous capacity has not wavered, is a clear testimony to the navys sound leadership and rank and file consensus on its identity and self belief.
The Indian Navy has long prided itself to be a builders Navy. It has been the pioneering service promoting indigenous industry to deliver it the finest ships in the region. Integrating cutting edge weapons, sensors and sophisticated communications with advanced propulsion and power packages from diverse sources to make state-of-the-art ships designed by the Navy is a splendid achievement and the Indian Navy can be justly proud of this heritage. However, doggedly pursuing an indigenous only agenda at the cost of major time over runs is risky.
Though self reliance must indeed be the final objective but that does not mean that every item of a system is sourced only from indigenous vendors. Self reliance, in todays context, means a mixture of global buy and localised buy or make decisions that synergise the competitive advantage of each participating vendor for the common benefit of reduced costs, faster deliveries and most importantly, superior quality and system performance.
The modernisation challenge
Much has been debated about modernisation and transformation of the Indian Navy. It is therefore important to develop a common understanding of modernisation. A model that has been developed by the writer suggests that modernisation can be visualised as a three tier activity as summarised in Figure above. The Navy has to clearly balance the three tier options in the light of the complexities and procedural requirements of the Defence Procurement Procedure.
Ships and submarines
Naval force level requirements, expressed as a capability statement, has been defined in terms of a Bottom Up-Top Down capability centric perspective plan that defines the platforms that the Indian Navy would require to fulfil its missions until 2022 and the associated organisation that would support it. The Indian Coast Guard has also drawn up a plan envisaging tripling force levels in a decade. Not surprisingly the foremost mission is to combine forces to win decisively in war and ensure adherence to the constabulary and custom laws of the state. However, conflicts are not always won by force alone but paradoxically force level disparities set the stage for conflict.
The Indian Navy has long prided itself to be a builders Navy. It has been the pioneering service promoting indigenous industry to deliver it the finest ships in the region. Integrating cutting edge weapons, sensors and sophisticated communications with advanced propulsion and power packages from diverse sources to make state-of-the-art ships designed by the Navy is a splendid achievement and the Indian Navy can be justly proud of this heritage. However, doggedly pursuing an indigenous only agenda at the cost of major time overruns is risky
The challenge for force level planning experts has always remained the uncertainties of the future strategic environment; the technological advances that could change the nature of warfare at sea; and, its consequent implications on structure and composition. First, there is no agreement on what the next war might look like, although China by all accounts would definitely constitute the main opposition to Indian interests in the region. Secondly, out of area contingencies in support of national policy and protection of Indian interest and assets - rapidly diversifying and distributed across the world - is a new phenomenon posing additional challenges to force planning. Thirdly, the perennial debate between the submarine arm and the surface Navy on whether the future lies in submarines or aircraft carriers has to be addressed. Within submarines also, the merits of conventional versus nuclear-powered submarines are still debated and within the aircraft carrier constituency the size and type are always a source of controversy. Finally, sub-regional conflicts that may arise out of 26/11 scenarios and boundary disputes cannot be wished away. Hence, conceptualising a force for the future is truly a challenge since acquisition decisions taken and commitments made cannot be easily reversed.
Force levels have essentially two components viz. force structuring and force composition. In all force structuring decisions the key element is of budgetary provisions and indigenous capability.
Basic principles of force structuring have remained steadfast over the last 60 years. The abiding constants have been the need for a two Carrier Battle Group (CBG), Local Naval Defence (LND) forces for the major naval bases, a well defined submarine force, shore-based long range anti-submarine and patrol aircraft and ship-borne integral aircraft / helicopters. This would mean a surface fleet of three aircraft carriers, about 40-42 frigates and destroyers, four afloat support ships, 80-100 minor LND forces and about 24 submarines. Estimates on requirements of nuclear submarines vary. In addition, force projection would require commensurate amphibious ships of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD) supported with island hopping Landing Craft.
The Navy and increasingly the Coast Guard, true to its character of being a builders force, has sourced these platforms to the extent feasible from Indian shipbuilders which have so far been predominantly DPSUs. This is a fatal mistake. If force levels and systems cannot be procured in some reasonable time frame the Navy must find wisdom in its own advice to its Captains - Swallow your pride, take a tug, save the ships side. Whether the time has come to swallow pride and source from outside only a capability gap analysis will reveal. Deliveries are faster, quality is superior and costs are lesser. The three Talwar Class frigates, under procurement from Yantar Shipyard, Russia at a total cost of Rs 5,400 crore have been made available at only about 40 per cent of the cost of the three P 17s being built at MDL for Rs 8,800 crore and with equal if not better capability. These three ships would be inducted in five years whilst domestic shipyards, on their own, may possibly deliver them over not less than 10-13 years. That capacity building is more important than local sourcing is evident from the fact that even Russia is procuring the Mistral Class Landing Ship Docks (LPD) and building additional ships in technical partnership with France.
So far as force composition is concerned a faithful balance needs to be struck between littoral and open seas requirements within the likely budgetary support that may be anticipated. This is not a difficult task. Allowing for an 8 per cent growth in GDP, an allocation of about 1.8 per cent towards defence expenditure of which about 17 per cent would be the Navys share and finally a mix of 60 per cent towards capital and balance 40 per cent towards revenue will give a fair idea of the anticipated budgetary support. However, creating the balance is a very tricky issue and to have it perfect is a tall order for any force planner. Augmentation in force levels and technology to hedge against all forms of conflict in open sea and provide the teeth to aggressive diplomacy is a given. Nevertheless, the first requirement would be to secure the maritime frontiers at the coastline and in the islands and offshore structure holdings of India. This would require that Indian maritime forces are not only modern but are also of contemporary relevance to the Indian state. Lofty declarations of power projection may be music to a sailors ear but coastal surveillance and protection from wanton acts of violence is the citizens first priority.
For a three carrier navy in service by 2022 it is logical that the supporting ships - 24 frigates and destroyers - should be available by then. In addition, six to eight destroyers and frigates are required in any operational environment for Convoy protection operations and littoral warfare requirements. Considering even 30 per cent of these forces are under refit / maintenance the total requirement works out to 40-42 destroyers and frigates. Against this requirement about six frigates and five destroyers would have reached the end of their already much extended service life by 2022. Five frigates and three destroyers are under construction which would enter service by 2016. Seven frigates and four destroyers have been approved by DAC for induction by 2022. The net accretion would, therefore, be only seven frigates and two destroyers which would at best provide a force level of 29 frigates and destroyers. Therefore, the navy would still require another 11-13 frigates and destroyers provided the existing orders are delivered on time. The net deficiency that needs corrective action now is for a capability gap of about 4-5 destroyers and 7-8 frigates. In addition, about 6-8 corvettes would be required for Local Naval Defence (LND) functions. Considering that the DPSU shipyards are already fully booked to capacity the gap of 11-13 destroyers and frigates and 6-8 corvettes must be bridged by Indian Private Sector Shipyards as a Buy and Make Indian project with some strategic imports. One option would be to build another 8 frigates of the proven Talwar Class in India as a collaborative venture between an Indian Shipyard and Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad.
Similarly, whilst the National Nuclear Doctrine advocates no first use, it is anchored on a capacity to respond punitively through a second strike capability. The second strike capability is universally vested in the nuclear propelled and nuclear armed submarine force. As per media reports only four nuclear submarines may be on order and this itself may take us upto 2022 to induct. Calculations by many experts suggest that the delivery capacity should be at least a minimum of 4 missiles per value target and two per force target. It is not in the scope of this article to derive the Megaton requirements but by most professional estimations the total riposte capacity should be at least ½ that of initial strike capability. Together, this would translate to a requirement of about 60 suitable weapons. This would require 10 nuclear armed operationally deployed submarines or a force level of 14 submarines. This capability needs to be developed rapidly to redraw the deterrent diagram with Pakistan and China so that conventional options remain the predominant choice in dealing with SLOC disruptions and other sovereignty encroachments. There is, therefore, a gap of about 8-10 nuclear submarines to retain a credible second strike capability.
Again, credible nuclear deterrence is firmly provided by ship borne Anti Ballistic Missile Defence systems. The recent success of the Advanced Air Defence Missile programme of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) augurs well for the Navy. Future Indian Destroyers, quite like the Arliegh Burke, Kongo or KDX-III all of which have the Aegis System, should be equipped with the indigenous Advanced Air Defence System. At a minimum, this would require a Ballistic Missile Defence Fleet of 6 Destroyers.
The P75 project for the indigenous construction of DCNS designed Scorpene submarines required that first delivery commences in 2012 and the balance five submarines delivered at one-year intervals to complete by December 2017. Now, the first Scorpene will only be ready in August 2015 and MDL will deliver the balance five by May 2019. The cost overrun is about Rs 4,700 crore. For the second line of submarines, Project P75I, the RFI was issued in September 2010 and the global firms that have responded to it are Russian Rosoboronexport, French DCNS / Armaris, German HDW, Kockums and Spanish Navantia. The initial plan (September 2010) required that three submarines would be made by MDL, one by Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) and Larsen & Toubro and Pipavav Shipyard were to compete for building the balance two submarines. Under the new plan (February 2011) India would order two submarines from a collaborating foreign shipyard and the other four will be built indigenously under transfer of technology with three constructed at MDL and the fourth built at HSL. The point is that the total requirement of the Navys submarine fleet is 24. Of this only 6 have been ordered, so far, after more than 8 years of approval of the 30 Year submarine construction Plan which entailed construction of 24 submarines until 2030. Ordering another 6 has already taken more than three years and the production is distributed over three shipyards which, to say the least, is a completely uneconomical model of submarine construction. It would appear that greater economy and efficiency would be obtained had the entire balance of 18 submarines been ordered in one tranche rather than go through this process in small increments of six each every six-seven years. This would require the Navy to freeze the staff requirements for all 18 submarines and then perhaps distributing it in three shipyards may make some sort of economical sense.
However, the key consideration and the divisive issue that dominates the discussion on categorisation / nomination is of timely induction. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been quite scathing in his comments on the tardiness of the Defence Public Sector Shipyards in delivering on time and cost the ships that the Navy had ordered. It is not as if only the DPSUs are to be blamed for these delays but the malignance is systemic. Cognisance must also be taken of the continued revision of staff requirements to get the best and the latest; and, in the bargain getting too little too late.
World warship building schedules
To put matters in perspective the Table below compares the world standard for warship production of sophisticated warships
Expenditure towards acquisition and maintenance
In this time, China and our other competitors would march ahead and garner the resources and corner the markets of the world whilst our ships and submarines continue to be built at an elephantine pace. Regrettably, neither China nor other competing nations will allow a strategic time out to India for sorting out its warship production schedules in order to build indigenous capabilities. Therefore, nominations to DPSU shipyards must no longer be automatic and a system of synergistic shipbuilding using the capacity in the private shipyard with the expertise in the DPSU shipyards need to be conceived to hasten the shipbuilding programmes. But, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers have been nominated, as late as October 2011, to build eight 800 Ton Landing Craft (Utility) at a budgeted cost of Rs 2,100 crore with the first LCU to be delivered after 35 months !! In comparison, M/s Fincantieri delivered two 27,500 ton Fleet Tankers in three years. Possibly, the requirements of LCUs are higher and the Navy could have ordered its entire requirement in one tranche on both DPSU and Private shipyards on a competitive basis to reduce costs and improve delivery schedules. On the other hand, a recent RFI for shallow water ASW craft has been categorised under the Buy Indian Route which is a heartening development for Indian shipbuilders.
The second concern is of budgetary support. For the record the five year expenditure on induction and maintenance of fleet and aviation assets is as follows:
Therefore, the Navy has averaged only about Rs 1,200 crore per year for aviation inductions and about Rs 6,200 crore for ship construction over the past few years. Going by public domain data the order book on warships and submarines is about Rs 2,25,000 crore to be inducted by 2022 or nearly Rs 22,500 crore per year. Aviation orders would be worth about Rs 18,000 crore for the ongoing programmes and another Rs 32,000 crore or nearly Rs 5,000 crore per year for new inductions to be achieved by 2022. The obvious conclusion is that unless budgets increase significantly and the capacity to absorb these allocations or the Navy designs and build much cheaper ships and aircraft, the induction targets will not be achievable.
As per media reports only four nuclear submarines may be on order and this itself may take us upto 2022 to induct. Calculations by many experts suggest that the delivery capacity should be at least a minimum of 4 missiles per value target and two per force target
Surveillance systems
Maritime Domain Awareness is a key requirement for successful operations. Sustained and uninterrupted surveillance is the key to maritime domain awareness. This can be achieved through a variety of systems. The first is of course space based satellite surveillance. The Indian Navy is on course to acquire its own communications and surveillance satellite capability with a 1,000 Nm footprint. The second category is airborne surveillance. In this category are the shore based options of Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Aerostats and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the ship based options of Airborne Early Warning Helicopters and aircraft and VTOL UAVs. A third way is through coastal and offshore surveillance systems consisting of a chain of Radar, AIS and Electro-Optics sensors with a sophisticated command and control software that enables generation of a single composite picture. This segment is with the Coast Guard. Since all of them have inherent advantages and disadvantages therefore an optimal fusion of these three systems is the way ahead. No clear advantage would accrue unless these systems are interconnected and networked to provide differentiated and specific actionable intelligence and presented as a single holistic and composite operational picture.
Surveillance systems for coastal security are under acquisition. A report stated An indigenously built coastal surveillance system would be deployed in 46 strategic western and eastern locations in the country from this November 2010 to check intrusions from sea and counter such threats, officials said today. Being developed by the Bangalorebased defence PSU Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), the system includes radars and electro-optic and meteorological sensors and would be mounted on lighthouses or towers. In this complex system, The cameras and radars are Israeli, admit BEL operators ... but we are working on developing them indigenously. It also states that this indigenous system would give complete operational picture of the sea up to 20 km deep into the sea. For phase two of the programme the options of better technology such as High Frequency Surface Wave Coastal surveillance Radars or even X Band over the Horizon Radars that provide detection and identification ranges in excess of 200 km with reaction time of more than 3 hours combined with Long Range Optronic Sensors of about 50 km range should be inducted.
Aviation
Technology provides the best solution if one is inclined to appreciate it. High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerials Systems (HALE) with highly sophisticated multifarious payloads supported with multi-spectral data fusion engines is the way forward for oceanic surveillance. The lower capital cost of acquisition, faster deliveries and the near equivalent operating cost must be the dominant consideration for rapid augmentation of surveillance capabilities. These informational inputs must again be dovetailed into a national maritime intelligence grid.
Integrating the HALE with Long Range Maritime (armed) Patrol aircraft would provide an efficiency dividend. The Navy has on order 12 Boeing P8I maritime patrol aircraft. Considering that the generally recognised area of interest of the Indian Navy extends from the East Coast of Africa to the South China Sea this force level is clearly inadequate particularly when nuclear submarines are the dominant threat of the future. These would be delivered by 2015. In addition, an RFI has been issued for another 6 Medium Range Maritime Aircraft and these may only be ordered in 2014-15 going by the normal time lines of procurement. So far as UAVs are concerned the Navys present force levels of 8 Searchers and 4 Herons is woefully inadequate to meet even a fraction of the surveillance requirement. The Navy has issued an RFI for Long Range High Altitude UAVs only in December 2010 and induction is therefore clearly a very distant proposition. It is also understood that the services are putting together a single proposal for their combined requirement of Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAVs, though no RFI has been issued as yet. Rotary Wing UAVs for shipborne applications are at the development stage at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and these may only be inducted no earlier than 2016-17. This is questionable acquisition since Vertical Take Off and Landing UAVs are available using multiple technologies such as Tilt Rotors and Ducted Fan also. Noting that there are now at least four major Indian companies with licences to manufacture UAVs and the total requirement may be in excess of a 100 systems the future induction of UAVs must be through the Buy and Make Indian procedure.
The other area of interest is Seaplanes. This technology has been resurrected with several manufacturers across the world notably in Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. Seaplanes can provide much needed island support and offshore assets protection, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) Operations, Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, countering small arms and drugs trafficking, human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping etc. Unlike conventional helicopters and aircraft seaplanes can land at the location and enforce the will or the law of the country. It is worth noting that Iran already has a strong flying boat squadron of ten crafts. In India, whilst an RFI has been issued for induction of seaplanes the difficulty would be to avoid a single vendor situation. Assuming a Maintenance Reserve of 20 per cent, a Strike Off and Wastage Reserve for a 15 year period as 20 per cent and an assured ability to launch two simultaneous missions from the four coastal commands, 12 operational seaplanes and two training seaplanes would be required. These must be built in India and taken up as a Buy and Make Indian or as Buy Global acquisition. However, since the substance of the seaplanes are its engines it may not be possible to achieve 50 per cent indigenous content. Seaplanes also have civil applications and thus a national capability can be created in niche sector.
However, the key consideration and the divisive issue that dominates the discussion on categorisation / nomination is of timely induction. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been quite scathing in his comments on the tardiness of the Defence Public Sector Shipyards in delivering on time and cost the ships that the Navy had ordered
So far as integral aviation assets are concerned the key determinant must be the future of the Fleet Carrier. The present capability is to be able to work within a 200 Nm bubble and going into the future the bubble should grow to a sanitised space of about 350 Nm. For this the requirement would be for medium fighters of the Mig 29K profile or better. With a Combat Air Patrol of four fighters and a turn-around time of 90 minutes, detailed calculations aside, the minimum force level would be two and half fighter squadrons (40 aircraft). In addition, two squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of HALE Early Warning UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of communication and utility helicopters should be the minimum embarked Air Group for the future carrier to be considered a potent force.
Both the Sea king and the Chetak helicopters are due for replacement. A case for 16 Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) and an RFI for Chetak replacement is under process. Another RFP for 91 Naval Multi-Role Helicopters is awaiting approval. The requirements for these helicopters are in the range of 80-100 MRH and about 70-90 twin engine utility helicopters. The Navy could have consolidated its total requirement of MRH instead of inducting in a piecemeal manner. Both these inductions, had they been taken up as bulk acquisitions, could have been through the Buy and Make Indian Route and thus help develop a national competency in helicopter manufacturing. Be that as it may, the option clause (8 MRH) and the repeat order option (16 MRH) should be availed so that induction can reach 40 MRH without retendering. Similarly, Coast Guard requirements for utility helicopters can also be merged to make a very attractive proposition for foreign OEMs to establish manufacturing facilities in India. Even now, further inductions should be explored under the Buy and Make Indian category to help build an alternate to HAL for indigenous manufacture of helicopters. However, licenced production must be taboo and the business model should be developed by the Indian and foreign OEMs on the basis of co design, co-development and co-production as partners not as licenced producers. No OEM will ever transfer enough know-how to its licenced production partner for fear it may become its competitor and therefore Joint Ventures and profit sharing collaborations is the way to go in the future.
Weapons and sensors
Indigenous capability to make maritime radars exist but these do not match the technologies that are available worldwide. With only one monopolistic producer Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) there is little incentive to improve matters. Fortunately, with the Honble Raksha Mantris direction that in future acquisitions no more nomination would be permitted and given that there are at least 6 top class Indian companies granted licences and with collaborative arrangements with global technology leaders in place all future radar requirements should be through the Buy and Make Indian route. Regrettably, this has not completely succeeded with the Navy winning its case for Buy and Make Indian categorisation for two radar projects and the Indian Air Force going the DRDO / BEL way for their Mountain Radars. Time will tell which was the better decision.
So far as sonars are concerned the NSTL and NPOL combine have been able to bring in good technology in the form of the HUMSA sonars. But the technology pointer is towards software defined sonars and towed array sonars for which capacity does not exist. Here again there are several private players who can provide these solutions through a collaborative partnership with world leaders in this sector. Of course, the caveat must remain Buy and Make Indian.
Electronic warfare systems technology has also matured in India but these are nowhere near the performance threshold that already exists across the world. This is a sector that needs the combined effort of the DPSUs / DRDO and the private sector to achieve the next higher level of sophistication.
So far as weapons are concerned the Indian record is not good. To provide the right incentive for production of naval guns the Navy needs to freeze its basket of requirements. First for Force Protection Measures the 12.7 mm stabilised remote operable optro-electronic weapon should be the standard. Whilst the RFP has been issued, nominating the Ordnance Factory as the ToT partner is a retrograde step. This is well within the capacity of Indian private sector. The AK 630 should be the standard 30 mm CIWS for all ships and would be sourced from OFBs as licence production with growing indigenous content. For the mid-range the OTO Melara 76 mm Compact, sourced from BHEL as licenced production should be the standard fit for corvettes. For heavier calibre guns the Navy must decide on the 127 mm or the 100 mm to be the main gun and retrofit it for the destroyers and frigates. The weight of argument clearly favours the 127 mm, though installing this weapon on older platforms may be challenging. If accepted as a concept then the total requirement could be for about 30 systems by 2022 including retrofits and hence may be suitable for a Buy and Make Indian categorisation.
Recently the Navy has awarded the contract for 98 Heavy Weight torpedoes on Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) and will enter into industrial partnerships with Indian companies. However, the contract has been put on hold pending a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) inquiry into the procurement process. WASS had earlier received a contract for upgrades and life extension of 128 A244-S lightweight torpedo systems to Mod 3 WASS. It has been partnering with Bharat Dynamics Ltd. for production of the C303, an anti-torpedo counter-measures system since 2005. Indigenous development of the Advanced light weight Torpedo and the Varunastra is also at an advanced stage.
For Surface to Surface Missiles the Navy has frozen its choice on the BrahMos. For the Surface to Air missiles there exists a range of systems though the Barak and the Barak NG is without doubt the best weapon in the quiver. Air weapons and avionic systems, for the foreseeable future, would still need to be import dependent since there are not adequate order quantities.
Personnel
No force level acquisition programmes can be efficiently inducted unless the commensurate infrastructure for storage and maintenance, testing and training are also in place. Now that the broad equipment required for the next two decades have been identified commensurate build-up of infrastructure must also begin. In effect every induction programme must concurrently seek sanction for the associated infrastructure and the human resources. The Standing Committee of Defence Report mentions that the Navy has a deficiency of 1,439 officers (15 per cent), 7,183 sailors (15 per cent) and about 6,000 (15 per cent) civilians. Clearly, the manpower to man for the force levels envisaged for the future Navy, even allowing for lean manning, would need to be factored now so that by the time these acquisitions have entered service the trained and experienced manpower is also available.
Assuming the force levels that have been identified above are accepted then the total requirement of personnel would be as shown in the table below. A more detailed exercise could be carried out by the Navy but it would be appropriate to obtain the appropriate sanction, even if required at the Cabinet Committee on Security level, for the final HR requirements on a not exceeding basis. This would allow for better planning and focused skill development.
Therefore, whilst, as the top level analysis reveals, India has developed some capability in shipbuilding aeronautics, sensors and weapons it is not yet at the level where it could be termed Indian. Since the requirements are limited establishing a plant for serial production would not be viable unless there is clarity on the volumes and a commitment to stay with the programme by the Navy and there are also opportunities for exports. Simultaneously, associated infrastructure for stores, maintenance, test and calibration equipment and trained and qualified personnel must also be seamlessly addressed.
Recommendations
In sum, if the Navy is to realise its required force levels there is a clear case for greater participation of the private sector in the naval acquisition plans. Particularly, ships such as the Landing Platform Dock, Fleet Support Ships, Corvettes and Patrol vessels and interceptor craft should all be built only by private shipyards and thus release capacity for building (integrating) complex platforms such as destroyers and frigates at DPSU shipyards in co-ordination with private shipyards. The MDL and Pipavav teaming was a great move but it has got enmeshed in controversy. In the event that private sector is able to forge collaborations with technology leaders the scope can be enlarged.
The newly declared Defence Production Policy is an excellent step in this direction though the finer details are yet to be firmed up. The Ministry of Heavy Industries, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Shipping and Transport should contest every nomination by the MoD of a Defence PSU for building warships, tanks or aircraft or electronic systems such as missiles and radars where the private sector has indicated willingness and intent to participate. Worldwide, these war machines and systems are built by the private sector competitively and there is no reason why that should not apply to India.
The Indian Navy is on course to acquire its own communications and surveillance satellite capability, with a 1,000 Nm footprint. The second category is airborne surveillance. In this category are the shore based options of Maritime Patrol aircraft, Aerostats and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the ship based options of Airborne Early Warning Helicopters and aircraft and VTOL UAVs
From the foregoing gap analysis, essential risk reduction towards maintaining a balanced force level to offset any regional imbalances and to maintain credible capability the following force structure initiatives need to be contemplated:
Over and above the P15A, P17 and P17A and P15B programmes which need to be accelerated additional acquisition of 4 destroyers and 8 frigates from foreign and Indian private sector shipyards under the Buy and Make Indian procedure is inescapable to achieve the three Carrier Battle Group force levels by 2022. At least the eight frigates could be the proven Talwar Class hull form - with minor changes in weapons and sensors - but built in India in collaboration with an Indian shipyard. The four destroyers, frozen on the P15B requirements, can be procured under the Buy Indian category. This way there would not be undue proliferation of several types of hull forms, weapons and sensors.
Begin the process of designing the generation after next Destroyer equipped with the DRDO Advanced Air Defence System. This force level would comprise 6 destroyers.
Induct additional 6-8 Anti-Submarine Warfare corvettes, over and above the P28 programme, for Escort and LND duties under the Buy and Make Indian categorisation.
Bring up the amphibious force levels by accelerating the LPD and the LCU programmes for deliveries by 2022.
Review the P75I programme and instead of piecemeal construction of 6 submarines in three different yards as is presently proposed the way forward is to go firm with 18 Air Independent Propulsion submarines ordered in one lot of a modular design with allowance for expansion and obsolescence and distributed between the three shipyards on a competitive basis with international delivery standards of the first delivery in three years and thereon one submarine inducted every 9 months. This programme should also be categorised as Buy and Make Indian.
Immediate acquisition of additional two nuclear submarines over the contracted two submarines from Russia as an effort to tide over the interlude of indigenous nuclear submarine construction which envisages a fleet of five nuclear submarines. This would bring up force levels to nine nuclear submarines, still inadequate, but ensuring that at least three submarines can be on station at any one time.
Begin the process of creating the staff requirements for the next Air Defence Ship. At a minimum the ship should be able to embark 2 and ½ squadrons of fighters, 2 squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of AEW / Surveillance UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of utility helicopters. This carrier should be in service no later than 2022 and procured through competitive bidding from an Indian shipyard.
Convince the Government / MoD to exercise the Option clause (50 per cent) and the Repeat order clauses (100 per cent) allowable under the DPP to bring up the order quantity to 40 MRH and negotiate a better price and delivery schedule. This would still leave more than 50 per cent of the total requirements unfulfilled. Future induction of these helicopters should be processed under the Buy and Make Indian Route to develop a national capability in helicopter manufacture.
Commence the process of identifying the alternate fighter to the Mig 29K, the Multi-Role Helicopters for the future Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, destroyers and the frigates and the heavy lift helicopter for the LPD.
Review the Staff Requirements of the Light Utility Helicopter to bring in contemporary technology of electro-optics, laser designators and UV scanners together with suitable armament and self-protection devices for low intensity operations. Now that there are a plethora of JV agreements between Indian private sector companies and foreign aviation majors such as Augusta Westland, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin the categorisation should be Buy and Make Indian.
Energise sophisticated long range coastal surveillance with state-of-the-art technologies using a mix of network of High Frequency Surface Wave Radars, X Band Over the Horizon Radars and coupled with sophisticated Visual / Infra Red / Laser Designated Optronic systems to enable 24x7 simultaneous staring surveillance of the Indian EEZ is mandated.
Build-up maritime air surveillance through extensive use of indigenous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in technology partnership with world leaders. Indian defence forces already operate 78 UAVs manufactured by a world leader with the Navy holding 12 UAVs only. A production base in India for the Unmanned Aerial System should be the next step. This may entail an investment of about Rs 12,000 crore over six years to bring up force levels to a fleet of about 40 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for continuous EEZ surveillance. This force would be coupled to the coastal surveillance chain of radars to present an integrated composite picture to the war room.
Seaplanes can provide much needed island and offshore assets access and support, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range VBSS operations, civil operations including anti-piracy, small arms and drugs trafficking operations, prevention of human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping and humanitarian assistance etc. Seaplanes would not only be an asset for the Indian Navy but also provide regional ocean safety of the SLOCs. This would be in keeping with Indias rising status as a responsible regional power.
Rapidly build-up a strong and efficient rapid reaction force of fast interceptor crafts using the most ultramodern propulsion and optical stabilisation technologies available across the world. With about 200 ports in India the requirement for effective surveillance and rapid reaction forces would be about 900 such boats at an investment of about Rs 8,100 crore but with a major benefit of securing Indian ports and harbours from catastrophes of the 26/11 kind forever. This should be again procured under the Buy and Make Indian category.
Position similar Fast Interceptor Craft in the Island territories. The requirement for these areas would be met by about 120 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Andaman and Nicobar island chain and about 90 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Lakshadweep island. This would require a total investment of about Rs 900 crore. The benefits would be enormous.
Create a sophisticated and networked Multi-Spectral Data Fusion Command and Control Engine that enables real time maritime domain awareness. This would be dovetailed with AIS, LRIT and other SIGINT technologies to analyse and plot cargo movements by source and destination. This would be expensive but it is completely within the capability of the Indian software giants to deliver in a few years time.
Obtain government approval for increasing the personnel strength to 12,500 officers, 80,000 sailors and 80,000 civilians by 2019 to man the future Navy.
In conclusion, naval acquisition plans would be best served by reviewing existing rationale for force structures and force composition so that the entire threat and vulnerability spectrum of barbaric / hybrid / state ignited maritime violence and resource and market accessibility are seamlessly addressed. Such an exercise would be more about Force Transformation as different from Force Modernisation within available resources that such reprioritisation of maritime threats require.
To operationalise the procurement plan naval and maritime capability building programmes must set its sight on the future operational missions that the Navy would need to fulfil in the future and thus derive the force structure and force composition of the future Navy. This requires the Navy to:
Coherently articulate a rationale for the overall force levels based on a well defined concept of operations.
Derive a convincing architecture for fleet structure and composition.
Calculate the aviation component large enough to support the concept of operations.
Dexterously manage the ongoing programme costs whilst seeking additional funding for new projects.
Build-up commensurate infrastructure through shared arrangements with industry to reduce costs. For example all refits should be undertaken by the shipyard / aircraft manufacturer / weapon / sensor supplier.
Link the manpower induction plan to force levels.
It would, of course, make better sense if all maritime force structure planning is centrally organised so that not only are duplication and overlaps definitely addressed between the competing maritime agencies but more importantly voids overlooked by the individual maritime agencies are determined and subsequently filled as a national exercise in ensuring comprehensive maritime security. For this both the Navy and the Coast Guard need to sit together and produce a blueprint for transforming maritime security.
In conclusion, building the 2020 Navy may require some prompt and focused course corrections and re-alignment with the forecast operational scenario of 2022 and beyond. Ultimately no matter what the force levels, force structure and force composition, IN must deliver on the simple objective of defeating barbaric, hybrid or state forces in the area of our maritime interest. The Indian Navy must also take early baby steps to provide safety of the SLOCs, at least in the North Indian Ocean as a regional commitment and affirmation of the Indian national responsibility as the NAVAREA Coordinator. To borrow from the Royal Navy - Indias Navy must clearly be seen as a Force for Good.
Though self reliance must indeed be the final objective but that does not mean that every item of a system is sourced only from indigenous vendors. Self reliance, in todays context, means a mixture of global buy and localised buy or make decisions that synergise the competitive advantage of each participating vendor for the common benefit of reduced costs, faster deliveries and most importantly, superior quality and system performance
he Indian Navy has been very fortunate to have had visionary leaders. From a minor littoral force of hand-me-down frigates, sloops and craft at independence, the Navy has now emerged as the fifth largest naval power. However in view of the daunting challenges we face we need to do a lot more and ensure this is actualised in an operationally viable time frame. A brilliant and very well informed article on the Force Structuring needs of the Indian Navy. This article conducts a top level gap analysis between requirements and possessions and recommends an action plan to transform the Indian Navy into a force of the future. The writer addresses the major slippages in delivery schedules by our DPSUs and response options that ensure that the Indian Navy does not get into a situation of too little too late. Building the 2020 Navy may require some prompt and focused course corrections and re-alignment with the forecast operational scenario of 2022 and beyond.
This article is published with the kind permission of "Defence and Security Alert (DSA) Magazine" New Delhi-India
The Indian Navy has been very fortunate to have had visionary leaders. From a minor littoral force of hand-me-down frigates, sloops and craft at independence, the Navy has now emerged as the fifth largest naval power. This journey has been neither smooth nor easy. The tenacity of purpose and the overall corporate conviction that the charted path of force development would be mainly through indigenous capacity has not wavered, is a clear testimony to the navys sound leadership and rank and file consensus on its identity and self belief.
The Indian Navy has long prided itself to be a builders Navy. It has been the pioneering service promoting indigenous industry to deliver it the finest ships in the region. Integrating cutting edge weapons, sensors and sophisticated communications with advanced propulsion and power packages from diverse sources to make state-of-the-art ships designed by the Navy is a splendid achievement and the Indian Navy can be justly proud of this heritage. However, doggedly pursuing an indigenous only agenda at the cost of major time over runs is risky.
Though self reliance must indeed be the final objective but that does not mean that every item of a system is sourced only from indigenous vendors. Self reliance, in todays context, means a mixture of global buy and localised buy or make decisions that synergise the competitive advantage of each participating vendor for the common benefit of reduced costs, faster deliveries and most importantly, superior quality and system performance.
The modernisation challenge
Much has been debated about modernisation and transformation of the Indian Navy. It is therefore important to develop a common understanding of modernisation. A model that has been developed by the writer suggests that modernisation can be visualised as a three tier activity as summarised in Figure above. The Navy has to clearly balance the three tier options in the light of the complexities and procedural requirements of the Defence Procurement Procedure.
Ships and submarines
Naval force level requirements, expressed as a capability statement, has been defined in terms of a Bottom Up-Top Down capability centric perspective plan that defines the platforms that the Indian Navy would require to fulfil its missions until 2022 and the associated organisation that would support it. The Indian Coast Guard has also drawn up a plan envisaging tripling force levels in a decade. Not surprisingly the foremost mission is to combine forces to win decisively in war and ensure adherence to the constabulary and custom laws of the state. However, conflicts are not always won by force alone but paradoxically force level disparities set the stage for conflict.
The Indian Navy has long prided itself to be a builders Navy. It has been the pioneering service promoting indigenous industry to deliver it the finest ships in the region. Integrating cutting edge weapons, sensors and sophisticated communications with advanced propulsion and power packages from diverse sources to make state-of-the-art ships designed by the Navy is a splendid achievement and the Indian Navy can be justly proud of this heritage. However, doggedly pursuing an indigenous only agenda at the cost of major time overruns is risky
The challenge for force level planning experts has always remained the uncertainties of the future strategic environment; the technological advances that could change the nature of warfare at sea; and, its consequent implications on structure and composition. First, there is no agreement on what the next war might look like, although China by all accounts would definitely constitute the main opposition to Indian interests in the region. Secondly, out of area contingencies in support of national policy and protection of Indian interest and assets - rapidly diversifying and distributed across the world - is a new phenomenon posing additional challenges to force planning. Thirdly, the perennial debate between the submarine arm and the surface Navy on whether the future lies in submarines or aircraft carriers has to be addressed. Within submarines also, the merits of conventional versus nuclear-powered submarines are still debated and within the aircraft carrier constituency the size and type are always a source of controversy. Finally, sub-regional conflicts that may arise out of 26/11 scenarios and boundary disputes cannot be wished away. Hence, conceptualising a force for the future is truly a challenge since acquisition decisions taken and commitments made cannot be easily reversed.
Force levels have essentially two components viz. force structuring and force composition. In all force structuring decisions the key element is of budgetary provisions and indigenous capability.
Basic principles of force structuring have remained steadfast over the last 60 years. The abiding constants have been the need for a two Carrier Battle Group (CBG), Local Naval Defence (LND) forces for the major naval bases, a well defined submarine force, shore-based long range anti-submarine and patrol aircraft and ship-borne integral aircraft / helicopters. This would mean a surface fleet of three aircraft carriers, about 40-42 frigates and destroyers, four afloat support ships, 80-100 minor LND forces and about 24 submarines. Estimates on requirements of nuclear submarines vary. In addition, force projection would require commensurate amphibious ships of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD) supported with island hopping Landing Craft.
The Navy and increasingly the Coast Guard, true to its character of being a builders force, has sourced these platforms to the extent feasible from Indian shipbuilders which have so far been predominantly DPSUs. This is a fatal mistake. If force levels and systems cannot be procured in some reasonable time frame the Navy must find wisdom in its own advice to its Captains - Swallow your pride, take a tug, save the ships side. Whether the time has come to swallow pride and source from outside only a capability gap analysis will reveal. Deliveries are faster, quality is superior and costs are lesser. The three Talwar Class frigates, under procurement from Yantar Shipyard, Russia at a total cost of Rs 5,400 crore have been made available at only about 40 per cent of the cost of the three P 17s being built at MDL for Rs 8,800 crore and with equal if not better capability. These three ships would be inducted in five years whilst domestic shipyards, on their own, may possibly deliver them over not less than 10-13 years. That capacity building is more important than local sourcing is evident from the fact that even Russia is procuring the Mistral Class Landing Ship Docks (LPD) and building additional ships in technical partnership with France.
So far as force composition is concerned a faithful balance needs to be struck between littoral and open seas requirements within the likely budgetary support that may be anticipated. This is not a difficult task. Allowing for an 8 per cent growth in GDP, an allocation of about 1.8 per cent towards defence expenditure of which about 17 per cent would be the Navys share and finally a mix of 60 per cent towards capital and balance 40 per cent towards revenue will give a fair idea of the anticipated budgetary support. However, creating the balance is a very tricky issue and to have it perfect is a tall order for any force planner. Augmentation in force levels and technology to hedge against all forms of conflict in open sea and provide the teeth to aggressive diplomacy is a given. Nevertheless, the first requirement would be to secure the maritime frontiers at the coastline and in the islands and offshore structure holdings of India. This would require that Indian maritime forces are not only modern but are also of contemporary relevance to the Indian state. Lofty declarations of power projection may be music to a sailors ear but coastal surveillance and protection from wanton acts of violence is the citizens first priority.
For a three carrier navy in service by 2022 it is logical that the supporting ships - 24 frigates and destroyers - should be available by then. In addition, six to eight destroyers and frigates are required in any operational environment for Convoy protection operations and littoral warfare requirements. Considering even 30 per cent of these forces are under refit / maintenance the total requirement works out to 40-42 destroyers and frigates. Against this requirement about six frigates and five destroyers would have reached the end of their already much extended service life by 2022. Five frigates and three destroyers are under construction which would enter service by 2016. Seven frigates and four destroyers have been approved by DAC for induction by 2022. The net accretion would, therefore, be only seven frigates and two destroyers which would at best provide a force level of 29 frigates and destroyers. Therefore, the navy would still require another 11-13 frigates and destroyers provided the existing orders are delivered on time. The net deficiency that needs corrective action now is for a capability gap of about 4-5 destroyers and 7-8 frigates. In addition, about 6-8 corvettes would be required for Local Naval Defence (LND) functions. Considering that the DPSU shipyards are already fully booked to capacity the gap of 11-13 destroyers and frigates and 6-8 corvettes must be bridged by Indian Private Sector Shipyards as a Buy and Make Indian project with some strategic imports. One option would be to build another 8 frigates of the proven Talwar Class in India as a collaborative venture between an Indian Shipyard and Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad.
Similarly, whilst the National Nuclear Doctrine advocates no first use, it is anchored on a capacity to respond punitively through a second strike capability. The second strike capability is universally vested in the nuclear propelled and nuclear armed submarine force. As per media reports only four nuclear submarines may be on order and this itself may take us upto 2022 to induct. Calculations by many experts suggest that the delivery capacity should be at least a minimum of 4 missiles per value target and two per force target. It is not in the scope of this article to derive the Megaton requirements but by most professional estimations the total riposte capacity should be at least ½ that of initial strike capability. Together, this would translate to a requirement of about 60 suitable weapons. This would require 10 nuclear armed operationally deployed submarines or a force level of 14 submarines. This capability needs to be developed rapidly to redraw the deterrent diagram with Pakistan and China so that conventional options remain the predominant choice in dealing with SLOC disruptions and other sovereignty encroachments. There is, therefore, a gap of about 8-10 nuclear submarines to retain a credible second strike capability.
Again, credible nuclear deterrence is firmly provided by ship borne Anti Ballistic Missile Defence systems. The recent success of the Advanced Air Defence Missile programme of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) augurs well for the Navy. Future Indian Destroyers, quite like the Arliegh Burke, Kongo or KDX-III all of which have the Aegis System, should be equipped with the indigenous Advanced Air Defence System. At a minimum, this would require a Ballistic Missile Defence Fleet of 6 Destroyers.
The P75 project for the indigenous construction of DCNS designed Scorpene submarines required that first delivery commences in 2012 and the balance five submarines delivered at one-year intervals to complete by December 2017. Now, the first Scorpene will only be ready in August 2015 and MDL will deliver the balance five by May 2019. The cost overrun is about Rs 4,700 crore. For the second line of submarines, Project P75I, the RFI was issued in September 2010 and the global firms that have responded to it are Russian Rosoboronexport, French DCNS / Armaris, German HDW, Kockums and Spanish Navantia. The initial plan (September 2010) required that three submarines would be made by MDL, one by Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) and Larsen & Toubro and Pipavav Shipyard were to compete for building the balance two submarines. Under the new plan (February 2011) India would order two submarines from a collaborating foreign shipyard and the other four will be built indigenously under transfer of technology with three constructed at MDL and the fourth built at HSL. The point is that the total requirement of the Navys submarine fleet is 24. Of this only 6 have been ordered, so far, after more than 8 years of approval of the 30 Year submarine construction Plan which entailed construction of 24 submarines until 2030. Ordering another 6 has already taken more than three years and the production is distributed over three shipyards which, to say the least, is a completely uneconomical model of submarine construction. It would appear that greater economy and efficiency would be obtained had the entire balance of 18 submarines been ordered in one tranche rather than go through this process in small increments of six each every six-seven years. This would require the Navy to freeze the staff requirements for all 18 submarines and then perhaps distributing it in three shipyards may make some sort of economical sense.
However, the key consideration and the divisive issue that dominates the discussion on categorisation / nomination is of timely induction. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been quite scathing in his comments on the tardiness of the Defence Public Sector Shipyards in delivering on time and cost the ships that the Navy had ordered. It is not as if only the DPSUs are to be blamed for these delays but the malignance is systemic. Cognisance must also be taken of the continued revision of staff requirements to get the best and the latest; and, in the bargain getting too little too late.
World warship building schedules
To put matters in perspective the Table below compares the world standard for warship production of sophisticated warships
Expenditure towards acquisition and maintenance
In this time, China and our other competitors would march ahead and garner the resources and corner the markets of the world whilst our ships and submarines continue to be built at an elephantine pace. Regrettably, neither China nor other competing nations will allow a strategic time out to India for sorting out its warship production schedules in order to build indigenous capabilities. Therefore, nominations to DPSU shipyards must no longer be automatic and a system of synergistic shipbuilding using the capacity in the private shipyard with the expertise in the DPSU shipyards need to be conceived to hasten the shipbuilding programmes. But, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers have been nominated, as late as October 2011, to build eight 800 Ton Landing Craft (Utility) at a budgeted cost of Rs 2,100 crore with the first LCU to be delivered after 35 months !! In comparison, M/s Fincantieri delivered two 27,500 ton Fleet Tankers in three years. Possibly, the requirements of LCUs are higher and the Navy could have ordered its entire requirement in one tranche on both DPSU and Private shipyards on a competitive basis to reduce costs and improve delivery schedules. On the other hand, a recent RFI for shallow water ASW craft has been categorised under the Buy Indian Route which is a heartening development for Indian shipbuilders.
The second concern is of budgetary support. For the record the five year expenditure on induction and maintenance of fleet and aviation assets is as follows:
Therefore, the Navy has averaged only about Rs 1,200 crore per year for aviation inductions and about Rs 6,200 crore for ship construction over the past few years. Going by public domain data the order book on warships and submarines is about Rs 2,25,000 crore to be inducted by 2022 or nearly Rs 22,500 crore per year. Aviation orders would be worth about Rs 18,000 crore for the ongoing programmes and another Rs 32,000 crore or nearly Rs 5,000 crore per year for new inductions to be achieved by 2022. The obvious conclusion is that unless budgets increase significantly and the capacity to absorb these allocations or the Navy designs and build much cheaper ships and aircraft, the induction targets will not be achievable.
As per media reports only four nuclear submarines may be on order and this itself may take us upto 2022 to induct. Calculations by many experts suggest that the delivery capacity should be at least a minimum of 4 missiles per value target and two per force target
Surveillance systems
Maritime Domain Awareness is a key requirement for successful operations. Sustained and uninterrupted surveillance is the key to maritime domain awareness. This can be achieved through a variety of systems. The first is of course space based satellite surveillance. The Indian Navy is on course to acquire its own communications and surveillance satellite capability with a 1,000 Nm footprint. The second category is airborne surveillance. In this category are the shore based options of Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Aerostats and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the ship based options of Airborne Early Warning Helicopters and aircraft and VTOL UAVs. A third way is through coastal and offshore surveillance systems consisting of a chain of Radar, AIS and Electro-Optics sensors with a sophisticated command and control software that enables generation of a single composite picture. This segment is with the Coast Guard. Since all of them have inherent advantages and disadvantages therefore an optimal fusion of these three systems is the way ahead. No clear advantage would accrue unless these systems are interconnected and networked to provide differentiated and specific actionable intelligence and presented as a single holistic and composite operational picture.
Surveillance systems for coastal security are under acquisition. A report stated An indigenously built coastal surveillance system would be deployed in 46 strategic western and eastern locations in the country from this November 2010 to check intrusions from sea and counter such threats, officials said today. Being developed by the Bangalorebased defence PSU Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), the system includes radars and electro-optic and meteorological sensors and would be mounted on lighthouses or towers. In this complex system, The cameras and radars are Israeli, admit BEL operators ... but we are working on developing them indigenously. It also states that this indigenous system would give complete operational picture of the sea up to 20 km deep into the sea. For phase two of the programme the options of better technology such as High Frequency Surface Wave Coastal surveillance Radars or even X Band over the Horizon Radars that provide detection and identification ranges in excess of 200 km with reaction time of more than 3 hours combined with Long Range Optronic Sensors of about 50 km range should be inducted.
Aviation
Technology provides the best solution if one is inclined to appreciate it. High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerials Systems (HALE) with highly sophisticated multifarious payloads supported with multi-spectral data fusion engines is the way forward for oceanic surveillance. The lower capital cost of acquisition, faster deliveries and the near equivalent operating cost must be the dominant consideration for rapid augmentation of surveillance capabilities. These informational inputs must again be dovetailed into a national maritime intelligence grid.
Integrating the HALE with Long Range Maritime (armed) Patrol aircraft would provide an efficiency dividend. The Navy has on order 12 Boeing P8I maritime patrol aircraft. Considering that the generally recognised area of interest of the Indian Navy extends from the East Coast of Africa to the South China Sea this force level is clearly inadequate particularly when nuclear submarines are the dominant threat of the future. These would be delivered by 2015. In addition, an RFI has been issued for another 6 Medium Range Maritime Aircraft and these may only be ordered in 2014-15 going by the normal time lines of procurement. So far as UAVs are concerned the Navys present force levels of 8 Searchers and 4 Herons is woefully inadequate to meet even a fraction of the surveillance requirement. The Navy has issued an RFI for Long Range High Altitude UAVs only in December 2010 and induction is therefore clearly a very distant proposition. It is also understood that the services are putting together a single proposal for their combined requirement of Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAVs, though no RFI has been issued as yet. Rotary Wing UAVs for shipborne applications are at the development stage at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and these may only be inducted no earlier than 2016-17. This is questionable acquisition since Vertical Take Off and Landing UAVs are available using multiple technologies such as Tilt Rotors and Ducted Fan also. Noting that there are now at least four major Indian companies with licences to manufacture UAVs and the total requirement may be in excess of a 100 systems the future induction of UAVs must be through the Buy and Make Indian procedure.
The other area of interest is Seaplanes. This technology has been resurrected with several manufacturers across the world notably in Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. Seaplanes can provide much needed island support and offshore assets protection, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) Operations, Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, countering small arms and drugs trafficking, human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping etc. Unlike conventional helicopters and aircraft seaplanes can land at the location and enforce the will or the law of the country. It is worth noting that Iran already has a strong flying boat squadron of ten crafts. In India, whilst an RFI has been issued for induction of seaplanes the difficulty would be to avoid a single vendor situation. Assuming a Maintenance Reserve of 20 per cent, a Strike Off and Wastage Reserve for a 15 year period as 20 per cent and an assured ability to launch two simultaneous missions from the four coastal commands, 12 operational seaplanes and two training seaplanes would be required. These must be built in India and taken up as a Buy and Make Indian or as Buy Global acquisition. However, since the substance of the seaplanes are its engines it may not be possible to achieve 50 per cent indigenous content. Seaplanes also have civil applications and thus a national capability can be created in niche sector.
However, the key consideration and the divisive issue that dominates the discussion on categorisation / nomination is of timely induction. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been quite scathing in his comments on the tardiness of the Defence Public Sector Shipyards in delivering on time and cost the ships that the Navy had ordered
So far as integral aviation assets are concerned the key determinant must be the future of the Fleet Carrier. The present capability is to be able to work within a 200 Nm bubble and going into the future the bubble should grow to a sanitised space of about 350 Nm. For this the requirement would be for medium fighters of the Mig 29K profile or better. With a Combat Air Patrol of four fighters and a turn-around time of 90 minutes, detailed calculations aside, the minimum force level would be two and half fighter squadrons (40 aircraft). In addition, two squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of HALE Early Warning UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of communication and utility helicopters should be the minimum embarked Air Group for the future carrier to be considered a potent force.
Both the Sea king and the Chetak helicopters are due for replacement. A case for 16 Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) and an RFI for Chetak replacement is under process. Another RFP for 91 Naval Multi-Role Helicopters is awaiting approval. The requirements for these helicopters are in the range of 80-100 MRH and about 70-90 twin engine utility helicopters. The Navy could have consolidated its total requirement of MRH instead of inducting in a piecemeal manner. Both these inductions, had they been taken up as bulk acquisitions, could have been through the Buy and Make Indian Route and thus help develop a national competency in helicopter manufacturing. Be that as it may, the option clause (8 MRH) and the repeat order option (16 MRH) should be availed so that induction can reach 40 MRH without retendering. Similarly, Coast Guard requirements for utility helicopters can also be merged to make a very attractive proposition for foreign OEMs to establish manufacturing facilities in India. Even now, further inductions should be explored under the Buy and Make Indian category to help build an alternate to HAL for indigenous manufacture of helicopters. However, licenced production must be taboo and the business model should be developed by the Indian and foreign OEMs on the basis of co design, co-development and co-production as partners not as licenced producers. No OEM will ever transfer enough know-how to its licenced production partner for fear it may become its competitor and therefore Joint Ventures and profit sharing collaborations is the way to go in the future.
Weapons and sensors
Indigenous capability to make maritime radars exist but these do not match the technologies that are available worldwide. With only one monopolistic producer Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) there is little incentive to improve matters. Fortunately, with the Honble Raksha Mantris direction that in future acquisitions no more nomination would be permitted and given that there are at least 6 top class Indian companies granted licences and with collaborative arrangements with global technology leaders in place all future radar requirements should be through the Buy and Make Indian route. Regrettably, this has not completely succeeded with the Navy winning its case for Buy and Make Indian categorisation for two radar projects and the Indian Air Force going the DRDO / BEL way for their Mountain Radars. Time will tell which was the better decision.
So far as sonars are concerned the NSTL and NPOL combine have been able to bring in good technology in the form of the HUMSA sonars. But the technology pointer is towards software defined sonars and towed array sonars for which capacity does not exist. Here again there are several private players who can provide these solutions through a collaborative partnership with world leaders in this sector. Of course, the caveat must remain Buy and Make Indian.
Electronic warfare systems technology has also matured in India but these are nowhere near the performance threshold that already exists across the world. This is a sector that needs the combined effort of the DPSUs / DRDO and the private sector to achieve the next higher level of sophistication.
So far as weapons are concerned the Indian record is not good. To provide the right incentive for production of naval guns the Navy needs to freeze its basket of requirements. First for Force Protection Measures the 12.7 mm stabilised remote operable optro-electronic weapon should be the standard. Whilst the RFP has been issued, nominating the Ordnance Factory as the ToT partner is a retrograde step. This is well within the capacity of Indian private sector. The AK 630 should be the standard 30 mm CIWS for all ships and would be sourced from OFBs as licence production with growing indigenous content. For the mid-range the OTO Melara 76 mm Compact, sourced from BHEL as licenced production should be the standard fit for corvettes. For heavier calibre guns the Navy must decide on the 127 mm or the 100 mm to be the main gun and retrofit it for the destroyers and frigates. The weight of argument clearly favours the 127 mm, though installing this weapon on older platforms may be challenging. If accepted as a concept then the total requirement could be for about 30 systems by 2022 including retrofits and hence may be suitable for a Buy and Make Indian categorisation.
Recently the Navy has awarded the contract for 98 Heavy Weight torpedoes on Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) and will enter into industrial partnerships with Indian companies. However, the contract has been put on hold pending a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) inquiry into the procurement process. WASS had earlier received a contract for upgrades and life extension of 128 A244-S lightweight torpedo systems to Mod 3 WASS. It has been partnering with Bharat Dynamics Ltd. for production of the C303, an anti-torpedo counter-measures system since 2005. Indigenous development of the Advanced light weight Torpedo and the Varunastra is also at an advanced stage.
For Surface to Surface Missiles the Navy has frozen its choice on the BrahMos. For the Surface to Air missiles there exists a range of systems though the Barak and the Barak NG is without doubt the best weapon in the quiver. Air weapons and avionic systems, for the foreseeable future, would still need to be import dependent since there are not adequate order quantities.
Personnel
No force level acquisition programmes can be efficiently inducted unless the commensurate infrastructure for storage and maintenance, testing and training are also in place. Now that the broad equipment required for the next two decades have been identified commensurate build-up of infrastructure must also begin. In effect every induction programme must concurrently seek sanction for the associated infrastructure and the human resources. The Standing Committee of Defence Report mentions that the Navy has a deficiency of 1,439 officers (15 per cent), 7,183 sailors (15 per cent) and about 6,000 (15 per cent) civilians. Clearly, the manpower to man for the force levels envisaged for the future Navy, even allowing for lean manning, would need to be factored now so that by the time these acquisitions have entered service the trained and experienced manpower is also available.
Assuming the force levels that have been identified above are accepted then the total requirement of personnel would be as shown in the table below. A more detailed exercise could be carried out by the Navy but it would be appropriate to obtain the appropriate sanction, even if required at the Cabinet Committee on Security level, for the final HR requirements on a not exceeding basis. This would allow for better planning and focused skill development.
Therefore, whilst, as the top level analysis reveals, India has developed some capability in shipbuilding aeronautics, sensors and weapons it is not yet at the level where it could be termed Indian. Since the requirements are limited establishing a plant for serial production would not be viable unless there is clarity on the volumes and a commitment to stay with the programme by the Navy and there are also opportunities for exports. Simultaneously, associated infrastructure for stores, maintenance, test and calibration equipment and trained and qualified personnel must also be seamlessly addressed.
Recommendations
In sum, if the Navy is to realise its required force levels there is a clear case for greater participation of the private sector in the naval acquisition plans. Particularly, ships such as the Landing Platform Dock, Fleet Support Ships, Corvettes and Patrol vessels and interceptor craft should all be built only by private shipyards and thus release capacity for building (integrating) complex platforms such as destroyers and frigates at DPSU shipyards in co-ordination with private shipyards. The MDL and Pipavav teaming was a great move but it has got enmeshed in controversy. In the event that private sector is able to forge collaborations with technology leaders the scope can be enlarged.
The newly declared Defence Production Policy is an excellent step in this direction though the finer details are yet to be firmed up. The Ministry of Heavy Industries, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Shipping and Transport should contest every nomination by the MoD of a Defence PSU for building warships, tanks or aircraft or electronic systems such as missiles and radars where the private sector has indicated willingness and intent to participate. Worldwide, these war machines and systems are built by the private sector competitively and there is no reason why that should not apply to India.
The Indian Navy is on course to acquire its own communications and surveillance satellite capability, with a 1,000 Nm footprint. The second category is airborne surveillance. In this category are the shore based options of Maritime Patrol aircraft, Aerostats and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the ship based options of Airborne Early Warning Helicopters and aircraft and VTOL UAVs
From the foregoing gap analysis, essential risk reduction towards maintaining a balanced force level to offset any regional imbalances and to maintain credible capability the following force structure initiatives need to be contemplated:
Over and above the P15A, P17 and P17A and P15B programmes which need to be accelerated additional acquisition of 4 destroyers and 8 frigates from foreign and Indian private sector shipyards under the Buy and Make Indian procedure is inescapable to achieve the three Carrier Battle Group force levels by 2022. At least the eight frigates could be the proven Talwar Class hull form - with minor changes in weapons and sensors - but built in India in collaboration with an Indian shipyard. The four destroyers, frozen on the P15B requirements, can be procured under the Buy Indian category. This way there would not be undue proliferation of several types of hull forms, weapons and sensors.
Begin the process of designing the generation after next Destroyer equipped with the DRDO Advanced Air Defence System. This force level would comprise 6 destroyers.
Induct additional 6-8 Anti-Submarine Warfare corvettes, over and above the P28 programme, for Escort and LND duties under the Buy and Make Indian categorisation.
Bring up the amphibious force levels by accelerating the LPD and the LCU programmes for deliveries by 2022.
Review the P75I programme and instead of piecemeal construction of 6 submarines in three different yards as is presently proposed the way forward is to go firm with 18 Air Independent Propulsion submarines ordered in one lot of a modular design with allowance for expansion and obsolescence and distributed between the three shipyards on a competitive basis with international delivery standards of the first delivery in three years and thereon one submarine inducted every 9 months. This programme should also be categorised as Buy and Make Indian.
Immediate acquisition of additional two nuclear submarines over the contracted two submarines from Russia as an effort to tide over the interlude of indigenous nuclear submarine construction which envisages a fleet of five nuclear submarines. This would bring up force levels to nine nuclear submarines, still inadequate, but ensuring that at least three submarines can be on station at any one time.
Begin the process of creating the staff requirements for the next Air Defence Ship. At a minimum the ship should be able to embark 2 and ½ squadrons of fighters, 2 squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of AEW / Surveillance UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of utility helicopters. This carrier should be in service no later than 2022 and procured through competitive bidding from an Indian shipyard.
Convince the Government / MoD to exercise the Option clause (50 per cent) and the Repeat order clauses (100 per cent) allowable under the DPP to bring up the order quantity to 40 MRH and negotiate a better price and delivery schedule. This would still leave more than 50 per cent of the total requirements unfulfilled. Future induction of these helicopters should be processed under the Buy and Make Indian Route to develop a national capability in helicopter manufacture.
Commence the process of identifying the alternate fighter to the Mig 29K, the Multi-Role Helicopters for the future Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, destroyers and the frigates and the heavy lift helicopter for the LPD.
Review the Staff Requirements of the Light Utility Helicopter to bring in contemporary technology of electro-optics, laser designators and UV scanners together with suitable armament and self-protection devices for low intensity operations. Now that there are a plethora of JV agreements between Indian private sector companies and foreign aviation majors such as Augusta Westland, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin the categorisation should be Buy and Make Indian.
Energise sophisticated long range coastal surveillance with state-of-the-art technologies using a mix of network of High Frequency Surface Wave Radars, X Band Over the Horizon Radars and coupled with sophisticated Visual / Infra Red / Laser Designated Optronic systems to enable 24x7 simultaneous staring surveillance of the Indian EEZ is mandated.
Build-up maritime air surveillance through extensive use of indigenous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in technology partnership with world leaders. Indian defence forces already operate 78 UAVs manufactured by a world leader with the Navy holding 12 UAVs only. A production base in India for the Unmanned Aerial System should be the next step. This may entail an investment of about Rs 12,000 crore over six years to bring up force levels to a fleet of about 40 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for continuous EEZ surveillance. This force would be coupled to the coastal surveillance chain of radars to present an integrated composite picture to the war room.
Seaplanes can provide much needed island and offshore assets access and support, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range VBSS operations, civil operations including anti-piracy, small arms and drugs trafficking operations, prevention of human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping and humanitarian assistance etc. Seaplanes would not only be an asset for the Indian Navy but also provide regional ocean safety of the SLOCs. This would be in keeping with Indias rising status as a responsible regional power.
Rapidly build-up a strong and efficient rapid reaction force of fast interceptor crafts using the most ultramodern propulsion and optical stabilisation technologies available across the world. With about 200 ports in India the requirement for effective surveillance and rapid reaction forces would be about 900 such boats at an investment of about Rs 8,100 crore but with a major benefit of securing Indian ports and harbours from catastrophes of the 26/11 kind forever. This should be again procured under the Buy and Make Indian category.
Position similar Fast Interceptor Craft in the Island territories. The requirement for these areas would be met by about 120 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Andaman and Nicobar island chain and about 90 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Lakshadweep island. This would require a total investment of about Rs 900 crore. The benefits would be enormous.
Create a sophisticated and networked Multi-Spectral Data Fusion Command and Control Engine that enables real time maritime domain awareness. This would be dovetailed with AIS, LRIT and other SIGINT technologies to analyse and plot cargo movements by source and destination. This would be expensive but it is completely within the capability of the Indian software giants to deliver in a few years time.
Obtain government approval for increasing the personnel strength to 12,500 officers, 80,000 sailors and 80,000 civilians by 2019 to man the future Navy.
In conclusion, naval acquisition plans would be best served by reviewing existing rationale for force structures and force composition so that the entire threat and vulnerability spectrum of barbaric / hybrid / state ignited maritime violence and resource and market accessibility are seamlessly addressed. Such an exercise would be more about Force Transformation as different from Force Modernisation within available resources that such reprioritisation of maritime threats require.
To operationalise the procurement plan naval and maritime capability building programmes must set its sight on the future operational missions that the Navy would need to fulfil in the future and thus derive the force structure and force composition of the future Navy. This requires the Navy to:
Coherently articulate a rationale for the overall force levels based on a well defined concept of operations.
Derive a convincing architecture for fleet structure and composition.
Calculate the aviation component large enough to support the concept of operations.
Dexterously manage the ongoing programme costs whilst seeking additional funding for new projects.
Build-up commensurate infrastructure through shared arrangements with industry to reduce costs. For example all refits should be undertaken by the shipyard / aircraft manufacturer / weapon / sensor supplier.
Link the manpower induction plan to force levels.
It would, of course, make better sense if all maritime force structure planning is centrally organised so that not only are duplication and overlaps definitely addressed between the competing maritime agencies but more importantly voids overlooked by the individual maritime agencies are determined and subsequently filled as a national exercise in ensuring comprehensive maritime security. For this both the Navy and the Coast Guard need to sit together and produce a blueprint for transforming maritime security.
In conclusion, building the 2020 Navy may require some prompt and focused course corrections and re-alignment with the forecast operational scenario of 2022 and beyond. Ultimately no matter what the force levels, force structure and force composition, IN must deliver on the simple objective of defeating barbaric, hybrid or state forces in the area of our maritime interest. The Indian Navy must also take early baby steps to provide safety of the SLOCs, at least in the North Indian Ocean as a regional commitment and affirmation of the Indian national responsibility as the NAVAREA Coordinator. To borrow from the Royal Navy - Indias Navy must clearly be seen as a Force for Good.
Though self reliance must indeed be the final objective but that does not mean that every item of a system is sourced only from indigenous vendors. Self reliance, in todays context, means a mixture of global buy and localised buy or make decisions that synergise the competitive advantage of each participating vendor for the common benefit of reduced costs, faster deliveries and most importantly, superior quality and system performance
future talk again, they never grow up, but it is good that India spends more and more money to buy equipments. You are so rich, buy more.
