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As the initial shock of Admiral D K Joshi's sudden resignation wears off, the armed forces, and the nation, must applaud a rarity: a man who has held loyalty to service before himself and walked away from high office, following the dictates of conscience. Concerns about the putative 'line of succession' exist only in public imagination because there are clear-cut guidelines available to the government for ensuring a smooth and early succession to the navy's top job.
The dramatic changes in the navy's upper ranks are bound to unsettle its junior officers and sailors. The new chief's first major challenge, therefore, will be to restore the confidence of his service and the nation that the Indian Navy remains an efficient and combat-ready regional maritime force. He would be well advised to obtain a swift and authentic evaluation of how operations, maintenance and training are being conducted in the service and to ensure that shortcomings are speedily remedied.
From the freewheeling media speculation underway, we need to pick out three crucial issues for closer scrutiny and separate facts from fiction. The first relates to the succession of accidents that have badly dented the navy's shining image. Secondly, a widespread impression has taken root that our navy is operating 'old ships' and 'leaky submarines' that hazard their crews. Last, and most important, is the media commentary about the strained civil-military relationship that underpins the present crisis.
Of the 10 accidents cited, two, involving loss of life on board submarines, are indeed grave and warrant a thorough probe. The remaining eight were of a trivial nature — collisions, groundings and minor fires — that happen frequently in all active seagoing navies. With no common thread running through them, it was just an unfortunate happenstance that they occurred in rapid succession.
In any other country they may have rated passing mention, but India's intrusive visual media took it upon itself to project each incident as a disaster of Titanic proportions, subjecting it to shrill and ill-informed discussions. There can be little doubt that this sustained media focus panicked the MoD into pressuring the navy, with Sindhuratna's fire becoming the last straw that led to a despondent chief's resignation. The indecent haste with which the resignation was accepted clearly spoke of relief on Raisina Hill that a sacrificial lamb had presented itself.
Navies nurture their warships so they can squeeze the maximum life out of them. The USS Enterprise retired in 2012 after 52 years of service and our own INS Viraat will be 57 years old when she is decommissioned. By international standards, the Indian Navy is young. It has a large proportion of modern and newly constructed ships, with some approaching middle age and others nearing their stipulated retirement age. Aging ships are, however, 'modernised' and given a fresh lease of life. Moreover, 45 newly constructed warships will join the fleet in the coming decade.
New or old, no Indian Navy warship sails out unless it meets stringent safety and seaworthiness requirements, but accidents will happen at sea. Navies that have zero accidents are the ones that stay put in harbour. However, our Soviet-era vessels are quite old, and the accidents on two kilo-class submarines call into question, not only Russian workmanship, but also our own operating and maintenance procedures.
Since 2008, the navy's operational tempo has mounted steadily on account of overseas deployments, anti-piracy patrols, tactical exercises and coastal security commitments. If this has brought excessive strain on personnel as well as ships and machinery, something is bound to give. It is the responsibility of naval commanders to ensure that commitments remain commensurate with resources and unwarranted pressures are not imposed on men and machines, nor are any safety norms violated.
That brings us to the crucial issue of civil-military relations at the heart of which lies the deeply flawed policy of subordinating the armed forces, not to political control, but to the tyranny of a lethargic and uninformed bureaucracy. Under current rules, the chiefs carry the full burden of responsibility for their service, operational and administrative, but lack standing and authority within MoD.
On the other hand, the defence secretary is vested with authority for 'defence of India and for the three armed forces HQs', but has zero accountability — especially when things go wrong. In practical terms, every single decision regarding weapons, equipment, infrastructure and personnel impinging on the navy's operational efficiency needs the approval of a bureaucrat.
With ministers engrossed in electoral politics and bureaucrats lacking comprehension of complex military issues, critical cases are frequently cast into limbo for 5-10 years. It is the indifference of the politician, bureaucratic inefficiency and the civil-military divide that are stalling armed forces' modernisation and undermining national security, a $40-billion defence budget notwithstanding.
Like every other major democracy, India must integrate its service HQs with the MoD, and create a chief of defence staff for providing military advice to the government. This would require political sagacity as well as determination so that neither bureaucratic obduracy nor irrational suspicion of the military comes in the way of this long-overdue measure. In a truly integrated MoD the civil and military would accept joint responsibility for national security instead of engaging in futile blame games.
India must integrate its service HQs with Ministry of Defence - Economic Times
The dramatic changes in the navy's upper ranks are bound to unsettle its junior officers and sailors. The new chief's first major challenge, therefore, will be to restore the confidence of his service and the nation that the Indian Navy remains an efficient and combat-ready regional maritime force. He would be well advised to obtain a swift and authentic evaluation of how operations, maintenance and training are being conducted in the service and to ensure that shortcomings are speedily remedied.
From the freewheeling media speculation underway, we need to pick out three crucial issues for closer scrutiny and separate facts from fiction. The first relates to the succession of accidents that have badly dented the navy's shining image. Secondly, a widespread impression has taken root that our navy is operating 'old ships' and 'leaky submarines' that hazard their crews. Last, and most important, is the media commentary about the strained civil-military relationship that underpins the present crisis.
Of the 10 accidents cited, two, involving loss of life on board submarines, are indeed grave and warrant a thorough probe. The remaining eight were of a trivial nature — collisions, groundings and minor fires — that happen frequently in all active seagoing navies. With no common thread running through them, it was just an unfortunate happenstance that they occurred in rapid succession.
In any other country they may have rated passing mention, but India's intrusive visual media took it upon itself to project each incident as a disaster of Titanic proportions, subjecting it to shrill and ill-informed discussions. There can be little doubt that this sustained media focus panicked the MoD into pressuring the navy, with Sindhuratna's fire becoming the last straw that led to a despondent chief's resignation. The indecent haste with which the resignation was accepted clearly spoke of relief on Raisina Hill that a sacrificial lamb had presented itself.
Navies nurture their warships so they can squeeze the maximum life out of them. The USS Enterprise retired in 2012 after 52 years of service and our own INS Viraat will be 57 years old when she is decommissioned. By international standards, the Indian Navy is young. It has a large proportion of modern and newly constructed ships, with some approaching middle age and others nearing their stipulated retirement age. Aging ships are, however, 'modernised' and given a fresh lease of life. Moreover, 45 newly constructed warships will join the fleet in the coming decade.
New or old, no Indian Navy warship sails out unless it meets stringent safety and seaworthiness requirements, but accidents will happen at sea. Navies that have zero accidents are the ones that stay put in harbour. However, our Soviet-era vessels are quite old, and the accidents on two kilo-class submarines call into question, not only Russian workmanship, but also our own operating and maintenance procedures.
Since 2008, the navy's operational tempo has mounted steadily on account of overseas deployments, anti-piracy patrols, tactical exercises and coastal security commitments. If this has brought excessive strain on personnel as well as ships and machinery, something is bound to give. It is the responsibility of naval commanders to ensure that commitments remain commensurate with resources and unwarranted pressures are not imposed on men and machines, nor are any safety norms violated.
That brings us to the crucial issue of civil-military relations at the heart of which lies the deeply flawed policy of subordinating the armed forces, not to political control, but to the tyranny of a lethargic and uninformed bureaucracy. Under current rules, the chiefs carry the full burden of responsibility for their service, operational and administrative, but lack standing and authority within MoD.
On the other hand, the defence secretary is vested with authority for 'defence of India and for the three armed forces HQs', but has zero accountability — especially when things go wrong. In practical terms, every single decision regarding weapons, equipment, infrastructure and personnel impinging on the navy's operational efficiency needs the approval of a bureaucrat.
With ministers engrossed in electoral politics and bureaucrats lacking comprehension of complex military issues, critical cases are frequently cast into limbo for 5-10 years. It is the indifference of the politician, bureaucratic inefficiency and the civil-military divide that are stalling armed forces' modernisation and undermining national security, a $40-billion defence budget notwithstanding.
Like every other major democracy, India must integrate its service HQs with the MoD, and create a chief of defence staff for providing military advice to the government. This would require political sagacity as well as determination so that neither bureaucratic obduracy nor irrational suspicion of the military comes in the way of this long-overdue measure. In a truly integrated MoD the civil and military would accept joint responsibility for national security instead of engaging in futile blame games.
India must integrate its service HQs with Ministry of Defence - Economic Times
