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Non-signature of 'foundational agreement' denies India cutting-edge kit
Over the last decade India has made the US its biggest arms suppliers, spending $14-15 billion (Rs 93,000-100,000 crore) on American weaponry. Yet many US platforms bought have turned out to be less than cutting-edge, after New Delhi’s unwillingness to sign what Washington labels a “foundational agreement” --- the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) --- has forced the replacement of closely-guarded radio, communications security and navigation kits with lower-grade, commercially-available equipment.
One example is the C-130J Super Hercules Special Forces plane, in which the Indian Air Force (IAF) will transport commandos to small landing strips in enemy territory, which would have been pre-secured by a ground team. Such operations need secure communications between the aircraft and the team on the runway, so that the C-130J is not enticed into a trap. America tightly controls the radios used for this, denying it to countries that have not signed CISMOA. So far India has opted for less secure, costlier, commercially available radio kits, rather than signing CISMOA.
Similarly, the Indian Navy’s Boeing P-8I maritime aircraft is amongst the world’s most effective submarine hunters. But detecting and pinpointing an enemy submarine is only the first step; attacking it requires the P-8I to communicate with naval forces nearby, and with shore-based naval facilities. Since these voice and data channels --- called Data Link-11 and Link-16 --- are guarded under CISMOA, the P-8I has been equipped with older communication links that could be intercepted. The absence of these links also prevents the P-8I from generating a Common Tactical Picture with friendly regional navies, who operate over CISMOA-protected links.
There are other such cases. In a conflict with China, the absence of Link-16 would prevent IAF fighters from generating a Common Air Picture, even if friendly air forces were eager to inform on the activities of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Non-signature of CISMOA also denies the military precision Global Positioning System (GPS) gear, and state-of-the-art guidance for the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) that will soon equip IAF fighters.
During Business Standard’s visit in June to the Chinook CH-47F helicopter line in Philadelphia, we learnt that India’s 15 Chinooks would not have navigation and radio equipment of the same sophistication as the US Army choppers being built alongside.
US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, in Delhi in April, argued that American weapon systems were capable even without CISMOA-controlled equipment. But he conceded that India was missing out, saying: “I want to emphasize there’s a lot we can do without the foundational agreements; but there’s much more we can do with them.”
Carter was part-vindicated on August 29, when Washington and New Delhi signed a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) -- the first of the three foundational agreements. Yet that still leaves two: CISMOA, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Information and Services Cooperation (BECA), which lays down protocols for digital mapping and survey.
CISMOA negotiations have sputtered on sporadically since 2005. On New Delhi’s request, Washington has agreed to rename the agreement COMCASA --- or Communications Compatibility And Security Agreement --- to allow India a country-specific agreement, different from what the US Department of Defense (DoD, or Pentagon) has signed with dozens of other countries. A similar logic was employed in the LEMOA, which was given an India-specific name to differentiate it from the Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs) that US has signed with many other countries.
Even so, merely renaming the agreement would not make it acceptable to Indian public opinion, since the standard CISMOA draft --- the basis of COMCASA negotiations --- is inherently more intrusive than LEMOA. A senior Pentagon official who participated in CISMOA negotiations with India confessed: “When we sat down with the MoD in Delhi and the CISMOA experts explained the draft, even we were taken aback by the intrusiveness. We looked at each other and rolled our eyes [indicating], ‘this is not going to happen’.”
To assess the key hurdles, Business Standard has scrutinised the text of the CISMOA that the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Ministry of National Defence (MND) signed with the US DoD on October 27, 2008. That text requires Korea to provide US personnel access to Korean military bases; reserves for US personnel the right to install, maintain and inspect CISMOA-controlled equipment; bans the transfer of CISMOA-controlled equipment to any third party; bans its indigenous production; and stipulates stringent safeguards for securing, storing and accounting for COMSEC (communications security) equipment obtained from the US.
Paragraph V of the agreement requires ROK to pay the full cost of reconfiguring its communication systems to be interoperable with US military systems, and for testing the Korean systems, whenever required.
Paragraph IX of the agreement stipulates: “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will be installed and maintained only by authorized US personnel… When authorized by the US, qualified ROK personnel may remove and/or replace US COMSEC equipment previously installed by US personnel.”
Paragraph X mandates that “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will not be subject to any cooperative development, co-production, co-assembly or production licensing agreements.”
To be sure, New Delhi will be able to arm-twist Washington into framing a less restrictive COMCASA agreement. The Pentagon has repeatedly offered to address Indian concerns, asking New Delhi to identify objectionable clauses in the standard CISMOA draft. However, New Delhi has not conveyed its Red Lines yet, apparently because the defence ministry has little clarity on its own position.
US officials point out that New Delhi had no qualms signing highly restrictive safeguard agreements for the protective technologies installed on the prime minister’s Boeing Business Jet, which are similar to the ones that protect the US president’s aircraft, Air Force One. Says one official: “India displayed a clear understanding of the need to protect those technologies; because VVIP lives depend on that. Why is there a different standard for safeguarding technologies critical for protecting soldiers, sailors and airmen? That is the logic of CISMOA and COMCASA.”
Ben Schwartz of the US-India Business Council downplays concerns about the increased access to Indian bases that COMCASA requires, terming it “trivial and about as much of a threat to national sovereignty as granting a multinational telecommunications company a license to operate in India.” He argues that both types of activities take place entirely under the laws of the Government of India.”
However, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar is more cautious on moving ahead with COMCASA and BECA. After signing LEMOA in Washington last month, he told the media: “After 12-13 years we have managed to get the logistics agreement in place… So let me get this in the public domain properly; explain to the people; then we will definitely go into the other aspects.”
Parrikar has his job cut out for him.
http://www.business-standard.com/ar...cismoa-now-called-comcasa-116090500698_1.html
Over the last decade India has made the US its biggest arms suppliers, spending $14-15 billion (Rs 93,000-100,000 crore) on American weaponry. Yet many US platforms bought have turned out to be less than cutting-edge, after New Delhi’s unwillingness to sign what Washington labels a “foundational agreement” --- the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) --- has forced the replacement of closely-guarded radio, communications security and navigation kits with lower-grade, commercially-available equipment.
One example is the C-130J Super Hercules Special Forces plane, in which the Indian Air Force (IAF) will transport commandos to small landing strips in enemy territory, which would have been pre-secured by a ground team. Such operations need secure communications between the aircraft and the team on the runway, so that the C-130J is not enticed into a trap. America tightly controls the radios used for this, denying it to countries that have not signed CISMOA. So far India has opted for less secure, costlier, commercially available radio kits, rather than signing CISMOA.
Similarly, the Indian Navy’s Boeing P-8I maritime aircraft is amongst the world’s most effective submarine hunters. But detecting and pinpointing an enemy submarine is only the first step; attacking it requires the P-8I to communicate with naval forces nearby, and with shore-based naval facilities. Since these voice and data channels --- called Data Link-11 and Link-16 --- are guarded under CISMOA, the P-8I has been equipped with older communication links that could be intercepted. The absence of these links also prevents the P-8I from generating a Common Tactical Picture with friendly regional navies, who operate over CISMOA-protected links.
There are other such cases. In a conflict with China, the absence of Link-16 would prevent IAF fighters from generating a Common Air Picture, even if friendly air forces were eager to inform on the activities of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Non-signature of CISMOA also denies the military precision Global Positioning System (GPS) gear, and state-of-the-art guidance for the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) that will soon equip IAF fighters.
During Business Standard’s visit in June to the Chinook CH-47F helicopter line in Philadelphia, we learnt that India’s 15 Chinooks would not have navigation and radio equipment of the same sophistication as the US Army choppers being built alongside.
US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, in Delhi in April, argued that American weapon systems were capable even without CISMOA-controlled equipment. But he conceded that India was missing out, saying: “I want to emphasize there’s a lot we can do without the foundational agreements; but there’s much more we can do with them.”
Carter was part-vindicated on August 29, when Washington and New Delhi signed a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) -- the first of the three foundational agreements. Yet that still leaves two: CISMOA, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Information and Services Cooperation (BECA), which lays down protocols for digital mapping and survey.
CISMOA negotiations have sputtered on sporadically since 2005. On New Delhi’s request, Washington has agreed to rename the agreement COMCASA --- or Communications Compatibility And Security Agreement --- to allow India a country-specific agreement, different from what the US Department of Defense (DoD, or Pentagon) has signed with dozens of other countries. A similar logic was employed in the LEMOA, which was given an India-specific name to differentiate it from the Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs) that US has signed with many other countries.
Even so, merely renaming the agreement would not make it acceptable to Indian public opinion, since the standard CISMOA draft --- the basis of COMCASA negotiations --- is inherently more intrusive than LEMOA. A senior Pentagon official who participated in CISMOA negotiations with India confessed: “When we sat down with the MoD in Delhi and the CISMOA experts explained the draft, even we were taken aback by the intrusiveness. We looked at each other and rolled our eyes [indicating], ‘this is not going to happen’.”
To assess the key hurdles, Business Standard has scrutinised the text of the CISMOA that the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Ministry of National Defence (MND) signed with the US DoD on October 27, 2008. That text requires Korea to provide US personnel access to Korean military bases; reserves for US personnel the right to install, maintain and inspect CISMOA-controlled equipment; bans the transfer of CISMOA-controlled equipment to any third party; bans its indigenous production; and stipulates stringent safeguards for securing, storing and accounting for COMSEC (communications security) equipment obtained from the US.
Paragraph V of the agreement requires ROK to pay the full cost of reconfiguring its communication systems to be interoperable with US military systems, and for testing the Korean systems, whenever required.
Paragraph IX of the agreement stipulates: “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will be installed and maintained only by authorized US personnel… When authorized by the US, qualified ROK personnel may remove and/or replace US COMSEC equipment previously installed by US personnel.”
Paragraph X mandates that “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will not be subject to any cooperative development, co-production, co-assembly or production licensing agreements.”
To be sure, New Delhi will be able to arm-twist Washington into framing a less restrictive COMCASA agreement. The Pentagon has repeatedly offered to address Indian concerns, asking New Delhi to identify objectionable clauses in the standard CISMOA draft. However, New Delhi has not conveyed its Red Lines yet, apparently because the defence ministry has little clarity on its own position.
US officials point out that New Delhi had no qualms signing highly restrictive safeguard agreements for the protective technologies installed on the prime minister’s Boeing Business Jet, which are similar to the ones that protect the US president’s aircraft, Air Force One. Says one official: “India displayed a clear understanding of the need to protect those technologies; because VVIP lives depend on that. Why is there a different standard for safeguarding technologies critical for protecting soldiers, sailors and airmen? That is the logic of CISMOA and COMCASA.”
Ben Schwartz of the US-India Business Council downplays concerns about the increased access to Indian bases that COMCASA requires, terming it “trivial and about as much of a threat to national sovereignty as granting a multinational telecommunications company a license to operate in India.” He argues that both types of activities take place entirely under the laws of the Government of India.”
However, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar is more cautious on moving ahead with COMCASA and BECA. After signing LEMOA in Washington last month, he told the media: “After 12-13 years we have managed to get the logistics agreement in place… So let me get this in the public domain properly; explain to the people; then we will definitely go into the other aspects.”
Parrikar has his job cut out for him.
http://www.business-standard.com/ar...cismoa-now-called-comcasa-116090500698_1.html
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