Illegal Bangladeshi migrants not behind Assam violence, says Chief Minister

[BanglaBhoot]

Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi said Muslims are outnumbering Hindus in Assam not because of the increase in illegal migration from Bangladesh but because Muslims are illiterate and bear more children.

Speaking to Karan Thapar on Devil's Advocate, the Chief Minister took full responsibility for the communal riots and said that there were multiple reasons behind it.

Here is an excerpt from the interview:

Speaking on Devil's Advocate with Karan Thapar, the Assam Chief Minister said that his desire to be a part of the Presidential race stemmed from his desire to assert his rights as a citizen of India and as a tribal.

Below is an edited transcript of the interview:

Karan Thapar: Hello and welcome to a special Devil's Advocate from Guwahati, an interview with the Chief Minister of Assam Tarun Gogoi.

Chief Minister let's start with the recent troubles in your state. Why is Assam so prone to ethnic and communal violence? Is it the demography, is it the geography, is it politics or is it just lack of economic development?

Tarun Gogoi: Of course it is true that Assam is prone to all these clashes. I have seen 1960, 1972, 1983, all along and of course it is a complex state. And of course the reason is socio, economics, sometimes politics also; and economics may be one of the reasons.

Karan Thapar: You are suggesting that there are multiple reasons. The BJP however, says, and many of you opposition leaders in the state say, that the real reason is unrestrained illegal immigration from Bangladesh. You strongly deny that, in which case how do you account for the fact that between 1991 and 2001 the two censuses for which we have accurate data, the Muslim population of districts like Kokrajar, Dubri, Balbata, Narbari, have phenomenally increased?

Tarun Gogoi: You are absolutely right, the Muslim population has increased. But if you look at 2001 census the population growth of Assam is less than national average, almost 3 per cent. Then in 2011 also, in that provision also, growth of the population of Assam is less than national average. So, it is a clear indication that illegal migration has declined.

Karan Thapar: Well, has it because may have grown at a lower rate than the nation as a whole but within Assam the Muslim population in these districts has grown much faster then the Hindu one. Let me quote some of the figures - Kokrajhar, 19 per cent Muslim increased, 5 per cent Hindu, Dhubri, 29 per cent Muslim increased, 5 per cent Hindu, Bongaigaon, 31 per cent Muslim increased, 2 per cent Hindu. Clearly this phenomenal Muslim increase can't be for natural reasons; it is to be because of immigration.

Tarun Gogoi:You see this is because of low literacy. Most of the Muslims are illiterate. Every family has six, seven, eight, nine, 10 members. Literacy is very low, it is because of illiteracy.

Karan Thapar: You seriously are saying that Muslims because they are illiterate are creating more children than Hindus.

Tarun Gogoi: Ya.

Karan Thapar: You really mean that?

Tarun Gogoi: Yes, because of illiteracy. For example, empowerment of women is also done for birth control.

Karan Thapar: This is a very controversial answer Chief Minister. People would say this is tantamount to saying that the illiterate breed more.

Tarun Gogoi: Yes. I believe it 100 per cent. Kerala has the same; the Muslim population growth is higher. Assam is highest, second highest is West Bengal.

Karan Thapar: And in every case you are saying illiteracy is the explanation, not as I'm suggesting illegal immigration from Bangladesh?

Tarun Gogoi: No, immigration has been there. Same case in the tea garden tribes, the birth rate is higher if you compare to Assamese people.

Karan Thapar: Let me quote to you what Hagarama Mohirali, head of the border territorial council has just said, "There are over two lakh illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Bodo districts. You question that?

Tarun Gogoi: I do question. There are no two lakh migrants, I can challenge.

Karan Thapar: What are you estimates for illegal Bangladeshi immigrants?

Tarun Gogoi: I can tell you that even till today the pending cases in the tribunal are less than three lakh. Anybody can register a case. I tell you AGB can into power as you know, total case registered about 4.5 lakh. Out of them many have been disposed off also.

Karan Thapar: So, what is the figure that you believe is the figure for the illegal Bangladeshi immigrants?

Tarun Gogoi: It is very difficult but as it is today the pending case in the tribunal but among them also all are not…

Karan Thapar: So, you are absolutely certain that Mr Mohilari's facts of the two lakh figures alone in the Bodo district is wrong?

Tarun Gogoi: No, no, he has never said it.

Karan Thapar: He said it, he said it clearly to ‘The Indian Express' on August 6.

Tarun Gogoi: He might have said. I tell you, he told that in the camps there are five lakhs or something.

Karan Thapar: Let's not get caught in the figure, the figure might be disputable. The point that I am making is that you strongly and vehemently continue to dispute that illegal Muslim immigration from Bangladesh is a fundamental cause of the troubles we have just seen in Assam.

Tarun Gogoi: I don't disputed it, it's a fact.

Karan Thapar: It's a fact?

Tarun Gogoi: No, no, not the fact that..

Karan Thapar: The fact that migrant wasn't the problem?

Tarun Gogoi: Yeah.

Karan Thapar: Alright, I'll accept that but I'll point out to you one thing that there are many in India who believe that the key problem in Assam is basically illegal immigration. You are saying that is the wrong understanding of the state.

Tarun Gogoi: You see outside Assam, even inside Assam, there is a wrong perception of Assam. A perception is that Assam is not a safe place, there is a lot of insurgency.

Karan Thapar: This is another wrong perception?

Tarun Gogoi: Yes and these are another wrong perceptions.

Karan Thapar: Alright, then let's then come to what the analysts say is a second explanation for the troubles that you have in Assam. They say the very character of the Bodoland itself, an area where the Bodos because they are the single largest community have power but all the non-Bodos including the Muslims are probably greater in number and they feel unrepresented and they feel left out. And that is the fundamental cause of the bitterness that keeps erupting in violence since the creation of Bodoland.

Tarun Gogoi: Before that also there were clashes.

Karan Thapar: But the Bodoland has made it worst.

Tarun Gogoi: No, no, here earlier when there was no power they were watched. Before 1996 that time…

Karan Thapar: But I quote it to you that Bodos represent something like 20 per cent of the population of the Bodo Territorial Administrative Area, they comprise 30 out of 46 seats on the BTC, which is 65 per cent. Twenty per cent population, 65 per cent seats.

Tarun Gogoi: See, there is a case in the Sixth Schedule, there is about 35 per cent population. It is a true that Bodos are minority, Bodos are minority in the Bodoland, Bodoland Territorial Council.

Karan Thapar: As a result of which the rest of the population feels left out, they almost feel disfranchised. That is why you have this bitterness which keeps erupting periodically.

Tarun Gogoi: BTC, yes they are reservation but for the MLAs there is no reservation.

Karan Thapar: But BTC has local control. Let me quote to you what the President of the All Assam Minority Student Union Abdul Rahim Ahmed has said. He says, "Bodos engineered the recent trouble because they wants to push the Muslims out of the Bodoland, then they could push their numbers to 50 per cent and demand a separate state."

Tarun Gogoi: They have been demanding separate state but to this group they entered into an agreement, agreeing to have a Sixth Schedule.

Karan Thapar: That was in 2003, but since then it is alleged that they are trying to push Muslims out so that they can push their numbers up and demand a separate state.

Tarun Gogoi: I tell you how the incident took place, August 19, one Muslim or one Bodo fellow sustained injury, second day four Bodos were killed by the Muslims.

Karan Thapar: Quite right.

Tarun Gogoi: Then how would you say how did it triggered.

Karan Thapar: Chief Minister, by collapsing from the causes of the problem to how this specific instance happened and actually when it comes to this specific instance, people turn around and say that one of the problems was that you mishandled it. They say that you sided with the Bodos which are your allies in the government, as a result of which you were A – slow to respond and B – when you did respond, you didn't respond decisively.

Tarun Gogoi: No, these are wrong perceptions. Bodos are also accusing me that you are soft to the Muslims because you are looking for their votes. They are saying why did you not arrest those people who were responsible for killing four Bodos on the first day 19th.

Karan Thapar: Can I interrupt and tell you why people say that you were slow, because the first warning of trouble happened well before the July 19, well before July 6, they go back to May and June, when you had clashes over Eid gahas, when you had attacks on Muslims and Muslim property at that time. And your critics say that instead of heeding those warnings six to eight weeks earlier, you ignored them, you didn't take preventive steps.

Tarun Gogoi: No, such incidents do take place everywhere, not only in Bodoland, you see Karbi Anglong, North Cachar hill, other places also. Such minor incidents do take place. Then July 6, it was also not by the Bodos, it was by KLO.

Karan Thapar: But Chief Minister all these incidents happening should have been a sign to you that there was trouble beginning. Surely it was a warning to take preventive action.

Tarun Gogoi: That way there is warning every where in Assam.

Karan Thapar: And the people say the reason you didn't take preventive steps is because the Bodos are your allies, it is their support that is essential for you and therefore you said let me not take action, it will go against my government.

Tarun Gogoi: This is absolutely wrong, it is a false propaganda, I don't depend on them. I have 78 members out of 126.

Karan Thapar: But the Bodos are still part of your government.

Tarun Gogoi: Of course they are part of my government but I don't need their support. And if that was the case why did I arrest a Bodo MLA.

Karan Thapar: You may have arrested one single Bodo MLA, but look at what is happening to the 2,50,000 refugees living in camps. The vast majority of who are Muslim. Because the Bodos are creating obstruction in letting them go to their villages, they are now asked to prove if they are Indian citizens and fill up forms to show where they got their lands from. That is not only indefensible; it is a clear attempt to prevent the Muslims to go back. And once again your government is not preventing the Bodos from doing this.

Tarun Gogoi: No, we will prevent it also. We have already said those who are displaced, Indian citizens, from the Bodoland will be rehabilitated.

Karan Thapar: There is an interesting distinction you make because a moment ago when we began this interview, you said that illegal immigration from Bangladesh wasn't a problem and now you are asking people to prove their citizenship. Why because they are all Indians why should they prove it, because if there is no illegal immigration issue?

Tarun Gogoi: You see, for rehabilitation they have to give some proof, otherwise how do you rehabilitate them. He must have had a house, a paddy field…

Karan Thapar: But Chief Minister, these are people who had their villages burned, their houses destroyed, they found shelter in refugee camps. Now in their own state, they have to prove that they Indian to go back. They have to prove that they have land to go back. Why can't they just go back to the village they came from?

Tarun Gogoi: They are going, 240,000 have already have left…

Karan Thapar: But why are you creating the Bodos Territorial Council to lay down this condition before they can go back.

Tarun Gogoi: You see this is for their own safety because we want to take them into confidence.

Karan Thapar: So you are doing this for the safety of the Muslims not because you are under pressure from the Bodos.

Tarun Gogoi: No, because the land administration belongs to them.

Karan Thapar: Let me give you a final reason why people suspect that in fact you are siding with the Bodos and that is a very simple reason. The disarmament of the Bodos which was envisaged by the 2003 Bodo accord, nine years later still hasn't happened. And people can't understand because you have been Chief Minister right through that time. And once again they say the reason it has not happened is because Tarun Gogoi is soft and gentle towards the Bodos.

Tarun Gogoi: There is no question of being soft. We are having talks with them. Everybody has arms, even Assam.

Karan Thapar: So why have you not succeeded in removing these arms? Why have you not succeeded in disarming people?

Tarun Gogoi: I will tell you why… I'm not talking about Bodos, for example ULFA, KLF, so many groups have come forward to talk.

Karan Thapar: And they all have arms, so why haven't you failed to disarm people?

Tarun Gogoi: I will tell you why. Take the example of the government of India, Army is there… Counterinsurgencies they (Army) can do anything, why they have not done. It is not as easy as it appears to be. I will give you an example, lot of people don't know this, when they come for talks they don't disclose their correct picture of the arms they are having.

Karan Thapar: Which means they are hoodwinking the government.

Tarun Gogoi: To some extend. I will tell you. That was raised by Chidambaram, for one group, not for Bodos. I said suppose 80 per cent of the group surrenders and only 20 per cent remains. That means we have weakened 80 per cent.

Karan Thapar: But 20 per cent remained and that 20 per cent was used by the Bodos, in some instances, when they were butchering Muslims. Just look at the figures of the 96 people killed 70 were Muslims, of the 450,000 made homeless, a vast majority were Muslims.

Tarun Gogoi: Why Army has not been able to do it?

Karan Thapar: You have raised a fundamental question about the Army. Why is it that the Army was unable to more effectively control the situation, after all there was a four-day gap between your calling the Army and their deployment, and during that period the situation sharply deteriorated?

Tarun Gogoi: I will tell you why. I don't say Army alone, I'm also responsible. I'm head of a state definitely I'm also responsible. So there is responsibility of the Army, Assam Police, and CRPF, it is a combination of all; we call it a unified command.

Karan Thapar: So was there an absence of clear cut division in authority?

Tarun Gogoi: No, normally we have been in best of relation, that's why we have been able to survive, sustain. Our unified command structure is the best in the whole country.

Karan Thapar: But if it is the best in the whole country, then why was a four-day delay there.

Tarun Gogoi: Because of the change in the procedure.

Karan Thapar: Who changed the procedure?

Tarun Gogoi: Ministry of Home or Ministry of Defence.

Karan Thapar: So the responsibility for the delay lies with the Ministry of Defence.

Tarun Gogoi: Because of change of procedure. The change of procedure has delayed the whole process.

Karan Thapar: But as a result of a change of procedure, which is clearly a bureaucratic thing, four days were lost, and lives were lost.

Tarun Gogoi: The Defence Minister himself admitted.

Karan Thapar: Did the Defence Minister also extend an apology to the people of Assam because as a result of a four-day delay, lives were lost, homes were lost, villages were burnet.

Tarun Gogoi: That time I had less force because the situation of Assam was improving.

Karan Thapar: And so they had withdrawn forces from Assam. Was that an irresponsible thing for them to do?

Tarun Gogoi: I'm not saying that, because there was a lot of pressure for the Naxalites and other left Left wing.

Karan Thapar: So they took their eye off Assam. They became a little complacent because you had three good years, and they took eye off the state.

Tarun Gogoi: No, they were in urgent need of CRPF.

Karan Thapar: But they forgot that Assam breaks into violence periodically every three, four years.

Tarun Gogoi: I was telling them this.

Karan Thapar: You were saying this to you and yet they overrode you, they overruled you.

Tarun Gogoi: They said it is not possible for them also, not that I didn't take it up. But I don't blame them.

Karan Thapar: You may not blame them but they disregarded the advice of a Chief Minister who has a eleven-year standing.

Tarun Gogoi: No, I didn't say disregard.

Karan Thapar: They didn't listen to you.

Tarun Gogoi: No, sometimes they can't accommodate, otherwise they are nice to me. They are very cooperative… Then to rush back it takes more then seven hours to come back, unless you keep a reserve force.

Karan Thapar: So, they made two mistakes, one they became complacent because there had been no trouble for three years, and they disregarded the advice of a Chief Minister, then they wasted time coming back. And all of this was compounded by the fact that they changed procedures, so bureaucratic delay also compounded the situation.

Tarun Gogoi: You see, this is change of circumstances…

Karan Thapar: My last question to you Chief Minister, you have been Chief Minister of Assam for 11 years, for most of that time you have been Home Minister yourself, you have been head of the unified command, you boost this is the best unified command of the country. How much of the responsibility for failing to effectively tackle the trouble lies with you, after all you had the power and the experience to anticipate that trouble would happen, you had the experience to speedup rehabilitation? Neither was done.

Tarun Gogoi: Today I'm not the head of the unified command.

Karan Thapar: But how much of the responsibility for the delay you take?

Tarun Gogoi: I take 100 per cent responsibility.

Karan Thapar: So things have gone wrong, the blame is yours.

Tarun Gogoi: Yes. As a Chief Minister I take 100 per cent responsibility.

Karan Thapar: So when the critics they, Tarun Gogoi is responsible, you say yes.

Tarun Gogoi: Yes.

Karan Thapar: Alright Chief Minister, those are brave words. Let's hope they don't go against you. A pleasure talking to you.

Illegal Bangladeshi migrants not behind Assam violence, says Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi - Politics - Politics News - ibnlive

 

[Sashan]

Karan Thapar: You are suggesting that there are multiple reasons. The BJP however, says, and many of you opposition leaders in the state say, that the real reason is unrestrained illegal immigration from Bangladesh. You strongly deny that, in which case how do you account for the fact that between 1991 and 2001 the two censuses for which we have accurate data, the Muslim population of districts like Kokrajar, Dubri, Balbata, Narbari, have phenomenally increased?

Tarun Gogoi: You are absolutely right, the Muslim population has increased. But if you look at 2001 census the population growth of Assam is less than national average, almost 3 per cent. Then in 2011 also, in that provision also, growth of the population of Assam is less than national average. So, it is a clear indication that illegal migration has declined.

Karan Thapar: Well, has it because may have grown at a lower rate than the nation as a whole but within Assam the Muslim population in these districts has grown much faster then the Hindu one. Let me quote some of the figures - Kokrajhar, 19 per cent Muslim increased, 5 per cent Hindu, Dhubri, 29 per cent Muslim increased, 5 per cent Hindu, Bongaigaon, 31 per cent Muslim increased, 2 per cent Hindu. Clearly this phenomenal Muslim increase can't be for natural reasons; it is to be because of immigration.

Tarun Gogoi:You see this is because of low literacy. Most of the Muslims are illiterate. Every family has six, seven, eight, nine, 10 members. Literacy is very low, it is because of illiteracy.

The 2 highlighted portions reflect the illegal immigration. Especially the second highlighted portion - what Tarun Gogoi claims that muslim families have 6 to 10 members to be the reason for 4 times to 6 times muslim population increase in various regions - it is his guesswork at play.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

The 2 highlighted portions reflect the illegal immigration. Especially the second highlighted portion - what Tarun Gogoi claims that muslim families have 6 to 10 members to be the reason for 4 times to 6 times muslim population increase in various regions - it is his guesswork at play.

No it is fact and analysis ......

 

[CaPtAiN_pLaNeT]

The muslim high growth rate is mainly due to the fact that many hindus emigrated from the region which have caused a low growth rate for them in 80s due to civil unrest in the region and muslim from other region of Assam migrated to muslim majority region to increase their community strength after nellie massacre and it is a known fact. But overall growth rate remained low then national average.

Another illegal migration myth busted.

 

[Sashan]

No it is fact and analysis ......

The fact is right but not the analysis. Karan Thapar quotes increases in muslim population in 1990s and 2000s. Gogoi's response is based on the national average for the overall growth in population vs Assam's average growth.

Muslim population growth at national level - Overall they have 10% more growth rate than the Hindus
1951 - 9.91% of total population
2001 - 13.43% of total population
2010 - 14.6% of total population
2030 - 15.9% of total population projected

Assam growth rate between 2001 and 2010 in regions quoted by Karan


Kokrajhar, 19 per cent Muslim increased, 5 per cent Hindu, Dhubri, 29 per cent Muslim increased, 5 per cent Hindu, Bongaigaon, 31 per cent Muslim increased, 2 per cent Hindu.


Summary -
Assam average growth lower than national average between 2001 and 2011
Muslim national average - 1.5% increase roughly leaving out 2011 but if you extrapolate for that 1 year - it is roughly 1.65%
Assam muslim average quoted in the regions by Karan - 19% - 31% increase

- as per his assessment muslims at national level have 1 or 2 babies while being illiterate(a common issue) while Assam muslims have 6 to 10 babies which will not fool most who can look at statistics closely.


The only conclusion is the illegal migrants make that difference while the hindu/christian and other religious population is decreasing which is alarming.

And Gogoi being from Assam can almost be considered a traitor by Assamese people for both pointing at local muslim population for the growth and fooling the general Assam population. (while Congress overall is responsible and owe an explanation for the rest of the Indians)

 

[CaPtAiN_pLaNeT]

This is more detail break down demographics of the mentioned districts

Dhubri

Demographics

As of 2001 India census,[3] Dhubri had a population of 63,965. Males constitute 51% of the population and females 49%. Dhubri has an average literacy rate of 74%, higher than the national average of 59.5%: male literacy is 79% and, female literacy is 68%. In Dhubri, 11% of the population is under 6 years of age. With close to 75% of its population Muslims, it is one of the minority concentrated districts of India.

Kokrajhar

Demographics

As of 2001 India census,[3] Kokrajhar had a population of 31,152. Males constitute 52% of the population and females 48%. Kokrajhar has an average literacy rate of 79%, higher than the national average of 59.5%: male literacy is 84%, and female literacy is 74%. In Kokrajhar, 10% of the population is under 6 years of age.the district is having 3 sub divisions kokrajhar gosaigaon and basugaon.
[edit]

Bongaigaon
Demography

As of 2011 India census,[2] Bongaigaon district had a population of 732639 with 373590 males and 359049 females. Hinduism is the major religion in the district. Bongaigaon has an average literacy rate of 70.44%.with male literacy of 75.48% and female literacy of 65.18%.
The majority of the population of Bongaigaon is dominated by Bodos and Assamese followed by Bengalis, Marwaris.
Most of the residents are dominated farmers. Others are mostly in service.

As we can see for the 1st 2 district population is still low... so any inter state muslim migration naturally will increase the population and in the 3rd case it is also not also a big amount as bodos and assamese are majority there which is followed by bengalis and marwaris.

If illegal migration would have occurred then population of Assam was bound to increase but it did not happen.

Muslim population growth at national level - Overall they have 10% more growth rate than the Hindus
1951 - 9.91% of total population
2001 - 13.43% of total population
2010 - 14.6% of total population
2030 - 15.9% of total population projected


Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/bangla...olence-says-chief-minister.html#ixzz261rpt5IW

This is quite consistent considering their higher birth rate... no room for illegal migration. Illegal migration myth busted.

 

[Kesang]

Why the hell he will say anything wrong to his votebank?

 

[Sashan]

This is more detail break down demographics of the mentioned districts







As we can see for the 1st 2 district population is still low... so any inter state muslim migration naturally will increase the population and in the 3rd case it is also not also a big amount as bodos and assamese are majority there which is followed by bengalis and marwaris.

If illegal migration would have occurred then population of Assam was bound to increase but it did not happen.



This is quite consistent considering their higher birth rate... no room for illegal migration. Illegal migration myth busted.

What you are quoting is the total breakdown of the population and not the population growth between 2001 and 2011 for the 3 regions - What Karan has pointed out is the growth rate betwene 2001 and 2011 - two different arguments. And do read my summary about the comparison before claiming the myth to be busted.

Again my summary was wrong in showing national muslim average growth between 2001 and 2011 to be 4.5% while it was only 1.65% increase roughly. I am editing it but you see your claim is not right.

 

[CaPtAiN_pLaNeT]

What you are quoting is the total breakdown of the population and not the population growth between 2001 and 2011 for the 3 regions - What Karan has pointed out is the growth rate betwene 2001 and 2011 - two different arguments. And do read my summary about the comparison before claiming the myth to be busted.

There is absolutely no room for illegal migration from 2001-2011 ... as I said earlier it was inter state migration which has caused the increase but then again the 3 district has a low population so any small increase will increase the percentage of muslim.

Most importantly as I said earlier overall population growth rate remained below national average which means that no net increase happened ... if illegal migration of large scale would have happened it was bound to increase the population of assam.

The last part all these districts are backward and poor region even in Assam and it does not make sense for the Bangladeshis to migrate and settle there.

It is the muslims of Assam went there for settlement as they were encouraged to do so after nellie massacre.

Most importantly percentage of muslim remained around 30% for a while ... not much difference happened for decade. Illegal migration would have increased that further but it never happened. Just by citing 3 district's increase is nothing but a propaganda as this increase means in other region increase was low and in bodoland muslims were encouraged to come and settle down after nellie massacre which is a well known fact.

 

[CaPtAiN_pLaNeT]

The Myth of the Bangladeshi and Violence in Assam: Nilim Dutta


The Myth of the Bangladeshi and Violence in Assam: Nilim Dutta « Kafila

AUGUST 16, 2012
tags: Assam, Bangladeshi immigrants, Bodo-Muslim conflict, north-east India
by Shivam Vij
Guest post by NILIM DUTTA

Map credit: idsa.in

The recent spate of violence that began in the Kokrajhar district of Assam in the month of July 2012 and then spread to the adjoining districts of the Bodoland Territorial Council, primarily between the Bodos and the Muslim community of immigrant origin settled in these districts, has once again unleashed a vicious debate on the perils posed by alleged unrestricted illegal immigration from Bangladesh, this time even on the floor of the Lok Sabha.

The situation has been further complicated by a ‘protest’ in Mumbai against ‘violence on Muslims in Assam’ turning into a riot or by sundry attacks as ‘retaliation’ against people from North East elsewhere in India. Thanks to either shockingly uninformed or brazenly motivated opinions being aired around incessantly, much of it in the national electronic and print media, the dominant discourse that has evolved around the issue has created three distinct perceptions:

First, that illegal immigration of Bengali Muslim peasants from neighbouring Bangladesh into Assam has been continuing unabated, leading to skewed demographic profiles of Assam’s districts bordering Bangladesh and thereafter, turning several adjoining districts of Assam to Muslim majority.

Second, that these illegal Bengali Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh have rapaciously encroached upon and occupied land belonging to the native communities, thereby creating a volatile situation for potential violence and lethal clashes between illegal immigrants and natives.

Third, that the ethnic clash that began between the native Bodos (‘Hindu’ Bodos, as emphatically pointed out by the Election Commissioner Shri H. S. Brahma who hails from the community) and illegal Muslim immigrants settled in Kokrajhar was a result of aggression and attack by the latter on the Bodos, emboldened by their growing numerical strength, or in the least, was a spontaneous reaction of Bodos to the growing aggression of the immigrants and progressive usurpation of native land and resources by them.

The above perceptions are, however, far from accurate. In order to understand why, it would be important to carefully re-examine how they have emerged, the inherent flaws in the assumptions and what the reality actually is.

‘Migration’ rather than ‘illegal immigration’ is largely responsible for demographic transformation.

The migration of Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal into Assam has certainly transformed the demography of the latter, more noticeably in some districts, but to claim all of it happened due to illegal immigration from Bangladesh is not only historically incorrect, but wilful distortion of facts.

The claim of massive and continuing migration transforming the demographic profile of Assam is most commonly sought to be proven by citing the high decadal population growth rate of Assam since 1951, as per the Census of India which I have cited below in Table 1.

Table 1

Percentage Decadal Variation in Population since 1951 in India and Assam

1951-61

1961-71

1971-81

1971-91

1991-01

01-2011

India
21.64

24.80

24.66

54.41

21.54

17.64

Assam
34.98

34.95

-

53.26

18.92

16.93

Dhubri
43.74

43.26

-

45.65

22.97

24.40

Dhemaji
75.21

103.42

-

107.50

19.45

20.30

Karbi Anglong
79.21

68.28

-

74.72

22.72

18.69

If we compare the decadal growth rate of population in Assam with that of India, particularly taking note of the historical background of large scale migration of Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal in the decades preceding Partition since the late 1800s during British colonial rule, the figures would look almost conclusive that such influx must have continued alarmingly, now as illegal immigration.

If the decadal growth rate of population in the Dhubri district of Assam (Table 1), which borders Bangladesh and also has the highest percentage of Muslim population (74.29%) among the 27 districts of Assam, is added to the comparison, it would appear to be among the most conclusive evidence of illegal immigration with growth rates much higher than that of Assam as a whole.

But are the above figures of decadal growth rates of population and their comparisons really irrefutable evidence of influx of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants into Assam?

It would be pertinent to point out right that this high population growth rate in Assam has declined since 1971 and has remained lower than that of India (Table 1), categorically refuting assumptions of continuing illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Through the Assam Accord of 1985, only those who have entered Assam later than 25 March 1971 are considered illegal immigrants. Isn’t this indication enough then, that the much of the influx occurred before 1971 and as such cannot be considered illegal immigration?

If we just look at the decadal growth rates of population in two other districts of Assam, Dhemaji and Karbi Anglong, we will see that their growth rates in comparison have been more than twice that of Assam and substantially higher than even the ‘Muslim’ majority ‘border’ district of Dhubri (Table 1). Yet, the Muslim population in Dhemaji and Karbi Anglong is minuscule. The Hindu population in these two districts is 95.94% and 82.39% Hindu respectively; Scheduled Tribes constitute 47.29% and 55.69% of their population respectively. Muslims constitute merely 1.84% and 2.22% respectively of their total populations, in spite of having consistent high decadal growth rates – Dhemaji touching 103.42% between 1961-71 and Karbi Anglong having a similar high of 79.21% between 1951-61. This should be testimony enough that there could be reasons apart from illegal immigration or having a Muslim population behind a high decadal growth rate of population.

The above categorically reveals that selective citing of census data claiming ‘abnormally high’ decadal growth rate of population cannot be conclusive evidence of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Furthermore, against Assam having just three districts bordering Bangladesh, Meghalaya has five, which have shown higher decadal growth rates of population than the districts of Assam yet have an insignificant Muslim population negating any suspicion that they could have been swamped by illegal Bangladeshis. This also negates the presumption that merely bordering Bangladesh would make a district vulnerable to illegal immigration.

What is the reality then?

The migration of Bengali Muslim peasants from erstwhile East Bengal began in the 1800s after the British annexed Assam in 1826, with the Treaty of Yandaboo after defeating the Burmese in the First Anglo Burmese War. ‘Malevolent’ colonial policies of the British in Bengal, such as the Permanent Settlement, had already wreaked Bengal’s economy and pauperized its artisans and peasantry. Severe exploitation under its zamindari system added to the woes of the peasantry. In the geographically contiguous province of Assam, population density was low, land was abundant and there was no zamindari system. It was just a matter of time before an impoverished and harassed Bengali Muslim peasantry began migrating in a trickle which became a deluge, encouraged by the British. It served their purpose to settle large numbers of Bengalis on vacant land to increase land revenue, as well as have readily available cheap labour in a labour-deficient province. Initially, the immigrants were welcomed by even the Assamese landed gentry for the cheap labour.

By the second decade of the 20th century, however, this incessant influx became a cause for alarm and a ‘Line System’ was introduced in the affected districts of Nagaon and Kamrup in 1920, restricting immigrants from settling beyond certain limits on land over which natives claimed rights. That is how vast tracts of land in the then undivided Nagaon, Kamrup and Goalpara districts came to be settled by immigrant Bengali Muslim peasants in the decades before Partition, and independence.

With each successive group of immigrants, and with restrictions imposed barring their indiscriminate spread, the quality of land they found to settle themselves on, became progressively degraded. Many were left to settle on marshy wastelands and the shifting sandbars of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries called chars or chaporis in the vast floodplains of the valley. This is where a substantial percentage of their descendents still live after nearly a century. At the mercy of annual floods, shifting of the chars regularly and incessant erosion of their lands by the Brahmaputra and its tributaries, a large percentage of the Muslim population of immigrant origin in these districts is rendered homeless regularly. To eke out a living, they often migrate to the towns and cities as construction labourers, vegetable vendors or rickshaw pullers, living in ghettoized shanty towns, raising the spectre of illegal Bangladeshis in minds of a hostile urban elite with little sympathy or insight into realities of life about the areas they have migrated from.

Table 2

Population in Percentage as per Religion and Language in Districts of Assam with Substantial Muslim Population as per Census of India 2001

Religion

Language

Decadal Growth Rate

Population Density per SqKm

Muslim

Hindu

Assamese

Bengali

Assam
30.92

64.89

48.80

27.54

18.92

397

Dhubri
74.29

24.73

70.07

24.15

22.97

941

Goalpara
53.71

38.21

46.25

32.78

23.03

451

Barpeta
59.36

40.19

47.00

44.67

19.62

521

Marigaon
47.58

52.21

66.37

28.21

21.35

500

Nagaon
50.99

47.79

60.22

31.23

22.26

583

Karimganj
52.30

46.69

00.42

85.84

21.87

557

Hailakandi
57.99

41.11

00.26

83.43

20.89

409

Cachar
36.13

67.37

00.63

74.63

18.89

382

Bongaigaon
38.52

59.17

42.61

38.78

22.09

355

Darrang
35.54

57.73

39.15

30.76

22.18

411

Thus, by the time of India’s Partition and independence, there was a substantial Bengali Muslim population of immigrant origin noticeably concentrated in areas of Nagaon, Kamrup and Goalpara districts. Owing to their socio-economic condition and cultural practices, it is entirely believable that their population growth rate have remained substantially higher and what is reflected in the decadal growth rate of Muslim population in these districts, or the ones curved out of them later, their numbers need not necessarily be owed to continuous illegal immigration from Bangladesh.

There is another compelling reason to view with scepticism the claim of illegal immigrants ‘hiding’ among their co-religionists in the Muslim majority districts in Assam as even at the time of independence, population density in these districts were considerably higher making competition for land and the meagre opportunities of livelihood inevitably more intense. Today, conflict and litigation among immigrants over land is rampant. Why would they encourage, let alone facilitate, continuous illegal immigration that would put their own economic survival at peril?

The concentration of Muslims in the areas where the Bengali Muslim immigrants have traditionally settled, underscores the reality that they are mostly likely to be the descendants of those immigrants, and hence legitimate Indian citizens, and not illegal immigrants who have allegedly continued to arrive till now. This will be further evident if we look at the percentage of Assamese language speakers in these areas as revealed by the census data as cited in Table 2.

At the time of Partition, a substantial Bengali Muslim immigrant population chose to stay back in Assam as Indian citizens. Having decided their future, there was a conscious effort on their part to progressively assimilate into the culture and soil of their adopted home, beginning with adopting the Assamese language, the primary marker. Over successive generations, having been educated in Assamese-medium schools, most have genuinely adopted Assamese as their language and this is reflected in the census data. For instance, Dhubri with a Muslim population of 74.29% has 70.07% Assamese speakers. This is in stark contrast to the Barak valley districts like Karimganj and Hailakandi where Bengali has remained the predominant linguistic identity among both Hindus and Muslims. During the same period, many native tribal communities which once used to enumerate as ‘Assamese’ in successive censuses took to distinguish their ethnic and linguistic identity apart from the Assamese and started enumerating themselves as per their mother tongue.

It is thus simplistic to assume that rampant illegal Bangladeshi immigration continues even today by taking note of census figures selectively without having the intimate insights into the complex historical processes at work leading to the demographic transformation that is underway.

*

Immigrants and natives in Assam have lived in close proximity for over a century and even though there would be occasional friction, even over land, these would usually be local and rarely spread out to become ethnic or communal bloodbath unless fuelled by design, using certain diabolic political narratives pitting natives against immigrants and perpetrated as premeditated acts of violence.

Much before ‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrants’ were conjured up as the diabolic ‘other’ conspiring to ‘overwhelm the natives’, it was the Bengali Hindu immigrants in Assam who faced the hostility of the native Assamese. The conflict wasn’t over land but the perception, real or imagined, that the Bengali Hindu middle class conspired to retain their hegemony over the native Assamese by keeping the nascent Assamese middle class deprived of the opportunities in government jobs and economic benefits that would have otherwise been the entitlements of natives. The worst spate of Bengali-Assamese violence erupted in 1960 and regardless of whatever rhetoric it may have been couched in, it was a result of mobilisation around a narrative constructed by the Assamese middle class.

It was also the Assamese middle-class elite which dominated Assam’s politics for nearly three decades after independence, reaping the benefits and privileges that naturally came with it. But that began to change towards the 1970s, as apparent from the political instability that gripped successive governments in Dispur. An alternative was perhaps beginning to emerge which was left-of-centre and to which a large section of the state’s tribal natives and immigrants of East Bengal origin, the latest entrants to the ‘Axomiya’ fold, now began to align themselves. (I use the native word ‘Axomiya’ to refer to the those whose mother tongue is the Assamese language.) It was the left which won the first Guwahati Municipal Corporation elections in 1974, setting off alarm bells. It wasn’t long after when the signs of what became the Assam Movement began to emerge. Very few would remember that the movement began as a mobilisation against not ‘illegal immigrants’ from Bangladesh but against ‘outsiders’. Even more surprisingly, in its initial days, the All Assam Students Union (henceforth AASU) and the state administration seemed to be in fine coordination supporting each other in evicting illegal encroachers. Two of the movement’s earliest victims were not illegal immigrants but a pair of Bodo brothers who were gunned down by the police while trying to flee a mob led by the local AASU unit which came to ‘evict’ them from Phulung Chapori in North Guwahati, not far from where IIT Guwahati has come up, ironically, as fulfilment of one of the demands of the Assam Accord that brought the Assam Agitation to a closure in 1985.

The Assam Movement

It was, however, soon apparent to the ideologues and political masterminds behind the movement that targeting any native tribals was likely to boomerang, while targeting of immigrant communities who have a large population outside Assam and wielded substantial political clout in Delhi, was likely to yield unpredictable challenges. It was then that the Assam Movement clearly transformed into a movement against the ‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrants’ who were poised to reduce the natives to a minority within 20 years, as the rhetoric claimed.

In perhaps the most incisive analysis of the Assam Movement, Prof. Monirul Hussain in his seminal work, The Assam Movement: Class, Ideology, Identity (1994) has convincingly explained that while the expulsion of illegal Bangldeshi immigrants was the ostensible ‘visible’ motive of the movement, its real covert motive was to polarize the constituents of the new political alignment that was emerging as an alternative to the ones which represented the Assamese middle-class elite.

This was progressively accomplished effectively by first creating a powerful narrative which demonised ‘Bangladeshi immigrants’ by conjuring them up as being part of a diabolic design to reduce the native Assamese to a minority, and then dispossessing them of their rights and property. It was cleverly alluded to that the community of immigrant Muslims of East Bengal origin who had by now been living in Assam legitimately for decades, and were certainly not illegal immigrants, was colluding with their co-religionists from across the border in furthering this nefarious design. A section of the vernacular media, representing and owned by the same Assamese middle class elite, played an immensely partisan role in strengthening and spreading this flawed perception, playing to the gallery.

Not everyone was convinced, but those who raised inconvenient questions were sought to be stifled by violence. The myth of how ‘democratic’ the movement was would be swiftly dispelled by the sheer number of violent incidents that mark the period of the Assam Agitation from 1979 to 1985. One of the most visible and horrific incidents precipitated by this narrative of demonising immigrants was the Nellie massacre of 18 February 1983 in the undivided Nagaon district. More than 2,000 Muslims of immigrant origin were massacred to death, most of them women and children. Even though the massacre was sought to be passed off as a spontaneous act of violence by the exasperated native Tiwa community, that they were cunningly instigated and it was a premeditated act is beyond reasonable doubt. None came to be indicted for the horrific act.


India Today’s cover on the Nellie massacre

Thus, a seemingly irreparable breach in communal relations between natives and immigrants opened up, making it nearly impossible to reach an agreement on anything related to ‘illegal immigration’. The immigrant Muslim community came to perceive any move to do so with suspicion and as attempts to strip them of citizenship and rights. The alternative political alignment that was emerging was forever obliterated. The covert goal of the Assam Agitation was achieved. The new political formation that swept into power as a result of the Assam Accord with a groundswell of support represented the same old Assamese middle-class elite and the cabinet that was formed was even less representative of the various constituent communities of the composite Assamese identity. It would disappoint Assam’s electorate within just a decade and a half, paving the way for the old Congress to return to power for three successive terms, the latest of which is still unfolding.

*

The recent violence in Kokrajhar needs to be seen in the light of such history. Perceived as ‘Bangladeshis’, Muslims of immigrant origin find little solidarity, let alone anyone to defend them.

To understand the recent violence that saw Bodos pitted against Bengali speakers, it would be pertinent to point out that the Adivasis have faced similar ethnic violence in Kokrajhar since the 1990s. They weren’t illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh but descendents of those exiled by the British for the uprising in 1855 that history refers to as the Santhal Rebellion. Neither did they rapaciously usurp land on which the Bodos had claims nor were their numbers growing so fast so as to pose a threat to the numerical significance of the Bodos. Why, then, were they victims of repeated spates of ethnic violence, because of which some 32,613 families are living in relief camps for 20 years now? Wouldn’t it then be reasonable to look for the roots of conflict elsewhere and not within the simplistic explanation of ‘illegal immigrants versus natives’ sought to be perpetuated by the political dispensations whose designs are served by such a narrative?

Remains of a house burnt by rioters in Kokrajhar. Photo credit: Press Trust of India.

It has already been explained earlier how there is a constant stream of landless migrants, Muslims from char areas, to towns and cities to eke out a living. It wouldn’t be surprising to find a sizable percentage of such internally displaced persons encroaching on community land, reserved forests etc. But they are not alone in this. For instance, many Assamese Hindus displaced by constant erosion in the Palashbari area just west of Guwahati relocated to Rani nearby, a ‘tribal belt’ and settled on forest land. The point that needs to be underscored is that no widespread and meticulous cadastral surveys have been carried out expressly to assess, first, the scale of ‘native’ land being usurped by illegal immigrants and, second, what is the scale of ‘native’ land passing on to the hands of ‘immigrants’ by legitimate transfers to claim, with any certainty, as to how and in what scale natives are being dispossessed of their land.

It would thus be reasonable to carefully examine the claim that the violence was a result of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrants’ rapaciously encroaching upon land belonging to the native communities, inevitably inviting spontaneous retaliation by exasperated natives.

In Kokrajhar the decadal growth rate of population between 1991-01 and 2001-11 have just been 14.49% and 5.19% respectively. Its population density stood at 266 and 280 for the same periods, among the lowest in Assam. It would be hard to accept from these figures that any cataclysmic demographic pressure on land has evolved at all.

It would also be important to remember that the fairly long proximity to each other have enabled immigrants and natives in Assam to evolve strategies for interaction and coexistence, even amidst occasional friction; any breach in their communal relations is rarely spontaneous.

Some are seeing the Kokrakhar violence as part of an attempt to revive the Bodo movement. Embedded in a narrative of victimhood, the idea perhaps is to ward-off growing challenges to the political base of a narrow section of the Bodo political elite. The consequent rallying of political forces along ethnic lines is what exactly was intended to be achieved. Speculation is also rife that this was abetted by elements inimical to Assam’s Chief Minister Shri Tarun Gogoi from within his own party in order to subvert him by creating an impression that he is losing his grip on the law and order situation of the state.

As per the Census of India 2001, Hindus constituted 65.60%, Muslims 20.36% and Christians 13.72% of Kokrajhar’s population. A large number of the Bodos would be Hindus, but some would be Christians too. The Adivasis would be overwhelmingly Christian and the Muslims would be of immigrant origin. The data on language from the Census further reveals that Bodos constituted 32.37%, Bengalis 21.06%, Assamese 20.28% and Santhalis 16.70% of Kokrajhar’s population, if we look at the ethnic break up linguistically. In 2001, there certainly aren’t any alarming indicators of natives about to be marginalised by illegal immigrants, and certainly not by illegal ‘Bengali Muslim’ immigrants from Bangladesh. The decadal growth rate of Kokrajhar between 2001 and 2011 has been among the lowest, at just 5.19%. This low population growth is also substantiated by the increase in population density by just 5.26%, from 266 to 280 persons per square kilometre. Thus, between 2001 and 2011 there couldn’t have been any alarming change in demography of the district. To cut a long story short, it appears extremely unlikely that rapacious ‘invasion’ of illegal immigrants could be a reason for widespread violent native-immigrant conflict here. We have to look for the real reasons elsewhere.

*

In the period since the formation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) and its first elections on 13 May 2005, its political landscape has been overwhelmingly dominated by the Bodo political formation led by Hagrama Mohilary and his Bodoland People’s Front (henceforth BPF) [formerly the Bodoland People’s Progressive Front (Hagrama)]. In the 2006 elections to the 12th Assam Legislative Assembly, Mohilary’s BPF won in 11 of the 12 constituencies within the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District area and lent critical support to the Congress to enable it to form government for the second consecutive term, bagging two cabinet positions in the bargain. In the 2010 BTC elections, Mohilary succeeded to retain the predominance of his political formation. But that doesn’t mean that there weren’t constant challenges, particularly from all the other factions of Bodo polity he sought to marginalise, the rivalry on occasions leading to violence and bloodshed as well.


Bodo leader Hagrama Mohilary and Assam chief minister Tarun Gogoi addressing a rally in Guwahati in 2008. Photo credit: assamtimes.com

Those who follow developments in Bodo politics would be intimately aware of how brutal and bloody factional rivalries have been with many noted Bodo moderate leaders being wiped out over the years in fratricidal wars, be it between the erstwhile Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) [which Mohilary headed before signing a peace accord which brought him into democratic politics] and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) or later, between BPF and the BPPF and their respective allied formations. Prolongued insurgency, availability of illegal sophisticated weapons and impunity have progressively lowered the threshold for armed violence in these areas. Violence has become deeply embedded in the politics of the region and it need not at all be between immigrants and natives or between Bodos and non-Bodos.


Image from Hagrama Mohilary’s Facebook page

With a significant non-Bodo electorate in BTC areas, the jockeying for greater influence by Bodo political factions saw a revival, initially as rhetoric, the demand for a separate Bodoland in the run up to the 2011 elections to the Assam Legislative Assembly. With anti-incumbency and other factors expected to erode some of Congress’ strength in numbers of seats won, Mohilary expected to have a more influential role in Dispur.


A Hagrama Molihary-led rally in Delhi in 2010 demanding a separate Bodoland state

As it turned out, surprising all predictions, the Congress won the elections with a landslide majority to form government in Assam for the third successive term. Any need for support from Mohilary was rendered irrelevant. Gogoi wisely continued with the alliance, though the BPF’s share in the cabinet portfolio was reduced to just one. With internal BTC elections as well as Assembly elections not around the corner for years to come, not only Mohilary but also others who hoped their political fortunes to improve were inevitably feeling restive. A progressive incitement of the violence may just have been part of a strategy to attempt to precipitate a political situation that, it was hoped, would help change the status quo. It will need careful probing of the situation of the months preceding the violence to have a clearer understanding of the way it was sought to be unfolded.

The most immediate instigation was the spate of attacks carried out against the Muslim community from around June 2012. Resentment against ex-militants was already brewing for some time because of rampant extortion and even kidnappings for ransom in the district and there have been allegations against the state administration for turning a blind eye. The select assassinations of immigrant Muslim slowly ratcheted up the tension. On 6 July 2012 unidentified assailants opened fire in a Muslim village, killing two and injuring three. Again on 19 July, two former office bearers of the All Assam Minorities Students Union (AAMSU) were fired upon and critically injured. On 20 July, the first day of the month of Ramzan, four former BLT militants riding on two bikes through a Muslim village called Joypore, on the outskirts of Kokrajhar, stumbled on to a crowd of Muslims congregating for namaz in the evening. Fearing that the crowd was about to attack, the four Bodo youths allegedly fired in the air with their automatic weapons to make good their escape. Already jittery by the spate of recent attacks, the Muslim villagers assumed this to be an attack and swarmed the youths and lynched them. By the time police arrived, they were all dead.

The next day, the bodies of the four Bodo youths, who were reported to be former BLT militants, were taken in a procession through Kokrajhar for cremation. All the local satellite news channels incessantly broadcasted the visuals. Was anything more needed to rouse the Bodos against Muslims in Kokrahar?

This has a chilling parallel to the bodies of the victims of the Godhra carnage being allowed to be brought back to Ahmedabad and paraded, that set the ground for the horrific 2002 Gujarat riots against Muslims. Retaliatory attacks against Muslims began that very night and at least four were gunned down. It didn’t take long from there for the situation to escalate. Precious time was lost in bringing the army to control the situation, as Ministry of Defence dithered over ‘procedural’ issues.

As rumours and violence spread, lakhs of Bodos and Muslims alike fled their villages and relocated in make-shift relief camps in schools and public buildings. Time was ripe for leaders of all hues to parachute in and start fishing in troubled waters by offering their own ‘explosive’ version of events that suited their political interests. What was undoubtedly a series of localised events, inextricably intertwined with local political undercurrents, thus became a ‘national security’ issue, thanks to the like of Lal Krishna Advani of the BJP, who turned it into an existential crisis for natives in the face of a relentless onslaught of Bangladeshis. And thanks largely to these flawed narratives of competitive victimhood, not only Assamese but anyone perceived to be from the North East are now facing violence directed against them in other parts of India.

*

In the cacophonous allegations and counter allegations that followed, it is being completely overlooked that the proliferation and availability of alarming stockpiles of small arms and light weapons across Assam have made precipitating crises like Kokrajhar immensely easy and has imperilled not only the lives of its people, but also the very political stability of the state.

That the Tarun Gogoi government and administration failed to anticipate the conflict brewing in Kokrajhar, and that once it began, failed to act decisively to quickly stamp it out, is representative of a complacency that could have been induced by a feeling of invulnerability bred by being in power for more than a decade. As it would be utopian to believe that political entities will abrogate violence as a means to accomplish what they can’t by democratic means, it is be important to at least make it as difficult for them to precipitate such situations. A decisive deterrent would be to actually make sure that such acts of violence do not go unpunished, dispelling any impression of impunity.

As for the people themselves, it would be worthwhile for them to discard communal and ethnic prejudices which are essential for harmonious co-existence. Assam never was a religiously or ethnically homogeneous entity and never will be.

(Nilim Dutta is executive director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Organisation, Guwahati.)

 

[Sashan]

There is absolutely no room for illegal migration from 2001-2011 ... as I said earlier it was inter state migration which has caused the increase but then again the 3 district has a low population so any small increase will increase the percentage of muslim.

Most importantly as I said earlier overall population growth rate remained below national average which means that no net increase happened ... if illegal migration of large scale would have happened it was bound to increase the population of assam.

The last part all these districts are backward and poor region even in Assam and it does not make sense for the Bangladeshis to migrate and settle there.

It is the muslims of Assam went there for settlement as they were encouraged to do so after nellie massacre.

Most importantly percentage of muslim remained around 30% for a while ... not much difference happened for decade. Illegal migration would have increased that further but it never happened. Just by citing 3 district's increase is nothing but a propaganda as this increase means in other region increase was low and in bodoland muslims were encouraged to come and settle down after nellie massacre which is a well known fact.

What you are quoting is redistribution of the muslim population. I would want to see the muslim growth rate in other districts before I respond. Unfortunately the Assam govt. site which has the census information is too slow for me to download. Will respond when time permits and when I am able to download. Else if you have that information please post here.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

it will be important for freedom of movement of West and East Bengals --- given that the people are ethnically the same and in fact, they are inseparable.

india supported the bengali revolution through arms and exploiting emotions; but now the revolution (an incomplete one) should be completed through non-violence.

 

[DarkPrince]

it will be important for freedom of movement of West and East Bengals --- given that the people are ethnically the same and in fact, they are inseparable.

india supported the bengali revolution through arms and exploiting emotions; but now the revolution (an incomplete one) should be completed through non-violence.

thnx but no thnx bro

WB doesnt have much of land

BD holds 2/3 of bengal

 

[Banglar Lathial]

What is this hue and cry about illegal immigrants from BD? Is there any proof?

1. Simple way to prove/disprove the (nonsensical) idea.

Do these imaginary immigrants send billions of dollar/euro/dinar/dirham/whatever in remittances annually? Why not if they do the same from every other country in the world that they go to?

Isn't it completely obvious this is just another one of those Indian media BS created to fool their ignorant illiterate public in running after their radical extremist Hindutva leaders.

I am asking again to any Bangladeshi who may read it. Have you ever met a single Bangladeshi who is eager/willing to immigrate to India of all places in the world? Anybody from anywhere in BD who immigrated to India? Not counting a certain demographic that serve as a strong vote bank for BAL.

 

[Sashan]

What you are quoting is redistribution of the muslim population. I would want to see the muslim growth rate in other districts before I respond. Unfortunately the Assam govt. site which has the census information is too slow for me to download. Will respond when time permits and when I am able to download. Else if you have that information please post here.

I was able to download the census of Assam. They have not provided demographic split for various districts and there are districts where the population growth is low and here is an interesting fact - Kokrajhar is one of the districts with lowest population growth - 5.19% - The same district where Bodos oppose the muslim migration and riots happened(the other district - Chirang is roughly 11.3%) - so the Bodos would have been happy if the redistribution of the muslim population is the reason(in this case, the muslim people moving away from the district for the past 10 years). But the reverse has happened. Isn't it an interesting finding?

http://online.assam.gov.in/document...tion+Totals+for+Assam+2011+Census?version=1.0