How to get Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in Afghanistan

[Rafi]

Editor's Note: Michael O’Hanlon specializes in national security and defense policy and is senior author of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Index projects. You can read more from him on the Global Public Square.

By Michael O'Hanlon – Special to CNN
The strong words of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen that the Haqqani network remains a “veritable arm of the ISI,” Pakistan's main intelligence agency, have plunged U.S.-Pakistan relations to their lowest point since before 9/11. Taken literally, Mullen's words would almost require designation of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism – and transnational terrorism that targets American citizens at that. The Haqqanis are one of our main problems today in Afghanistan and carried out recent attacks in Kabul, including the September assault on the U.S. embassy. Calling them a "veritable arm of the ISI" strongly suggests that top Pakistani intelligence operatives have controlled the group and used it for their own purposes.

Mullen’s words went too far, as best we can tell. While ISI operatives undoubtedly have had contacts with the Haqqani network, and while Pakistan’s army has let the Haqqani clan operate within its North Waziristan region for too long with impunity, that is not the same thing as Pakistan deliberately using the group to kill Americans and key Afghans like former President Rabbani. Nuances are important because Mullen’s diagnosis, taken literally, would seem inconsistent with any pretense that the United States and Pakistan share common goals in Afghanistan or can work together in pursuit of common objectives. If this is indeed the situation, it is hard to see the U.S. Congress approving future aid packages for Pakistan. It is also hard to believe that Pakistan would continue to allow American forces to use its territory for logistics support of the Afghanistan mission or keep tolerating our drone attacks against the Haqqanis and al Qaeda.

The second big challenge is, naturally, Pakistan. As long as Islamabad views itself as the ultimate power broker in Afghanistan and keeps alive insurgent groups like the Haqqanis either as a hedge against NATO failing to achieve its task or (more ominously) as a way of using proxies to dominate Afghanistan in the future itself, it will be very hard to ensure that the insurgency weakens with time. Figuring out a way to give Islamabad adequate incentives to rethink its tolerance for these groups, which remains excessive, even if Mullen overstated the problem somewhat , is a central challenge of American policy. Of course any such effort must be coordinated with Afghanistan, but Kabul need not be given veto rights, as we have our own legitimate national interests in scaling back the violence and achieving greater stability. Put differently, Afghan leaders too need to know that they cannot feud with Pakistan unnecessarily and indefinitely if the price of that feud is to be paid partly in American blood.

So the following kinds of ideas should be put on the table in negotiations involving the three countries:
– Afghanistan and Pakistan should pursue an accord to accept the Durand line, the de facto border between their two countries, indefinitely. Ironically, it is Kabul that refuses to do so now. If no permanent agreement on a permanent border is yet within reach, a 50-year or 100-year postponement of the issue might be wise.
– Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut down its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan sees these as likely outposts for Indian intelligence operatives. Its fears are probably unwarranted, but the consulates are not worth the resulting strain on the relationship and can be closed as part of a deal.-
– Kabul should at least listen to Islamabad’s interests and advice in choosing governors for its eastern provinces and districts in the future. Indeed, if a peace deal with elements of the Taliban or Haqqani network ever becomes feasible, some reconciled insurgent leaders might even share in such positions, under certain conditions about disarmament and about accepting the Afghan constitution as well as the continued presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil for the foreseeable future.

How to get Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in Afghanistan – Global Public Square - CNN.com Blogs

 

[karan.1970]

A slightly different point of view from the same site

Zakaria: Calling out Pakistan

By Fareed Zakaria, CNN
In his last official statement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen chose to publicly highlight the connections between the Pakistani military and the Haqqani network, one of the most deadly terror groups operating in Afghanistan. What Adm. Mullen said in public this week is something many U.S. government officials have felt privately for years. The question is: Why did Mullen feel it was necessary to speak publicly now?


For many years, the U.S. military has been understanding of the Pakistani military. Both sides have seen one another as professionals. And Pakistan has long appealed to the U.S. as comrades in arms.

U.S. officials like Admiral Mullen have been part of that close relationship. Mullen has visited Pakistan 27 times and has met frequently with General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff. The U.S. military has invested a great deal in this relationship and its leaders have been quite sympathetic to Pakistan’s argument that goes something like this:

“We are trying to take on these militants. We don’t have as much capacity as you might think. We have to enter remote parts of the country, which we have never gone into before. And, by the way, we have already launched significant military operations and taken casualties in the fight against militant groups. So, give us time and understand our situation.”

American officials have been relatively sympathetic to this view.

But there has always been an alternate view that the Pakistani military has created a Frankenstein’s monster out of these militant groups. Some of these groups have now turned on Pakistan. Others keep peace with Pakistan, but carry out brutal assaults in Afghanistan against Afghans, Indians and Westerners.

People who espouse the Frankenstein’s monster view maintain that the Pakistani military knows these groups have gotten out of hand, but remains extremely reluctant to cut the cord with them because it thinks they are a cheap, effective way to keep Afghanistan and India on edge and to promote Pakistan’s interests surreptitiously.

For many years, people like Mullen have been somewhat understanding of the Pakistani military’s point of view. America has pressed Pakistan to combat militant groups, but only privately. Over the last year, however, there have been three developments, which changed this.

First, there have been a series of incidents in which the United States and U.S. troops have been targeted in brutal attacks.

Second, there is increasing amounts of evidence that the groups launching these attacks had close connections with the Pakistani military. This does not mean these groups are run by the Pakistani military, but these are not just casual contacts either. The Pakistani military provides these groups with funding; it allows them to operate in safe havens; and it shares logistical information with them.

Third, suspicions were greatly raised when Osama bin Laden was discovered hiding just miles from a Pakistani military cantonment.

All of this has come together to make people like Adm. Mullen feel that they have been taken advantage of, that private pressure is not working and that it is time to put some public pressure on Pakistan. I don’t know if this public pressure will work. Such pressure can be construed as an American affront against Pakistan. That is the way it is being played in Pakistan now. It is important to note that the Pakistani military is able to turn on a nationalist media campaign whenever it feels threatened. It has an extensive network of people on the military’s payroll - or friendly to it - and those people in press and parliament have always denounced any kind of pressure on the Pakistani military as an attack on Pakistan itself.

This produces an obvious and predictable nationalist reaction.

The tragedy in all of this is that the United States is actually on the side of the Pakistani people. It is profoundly in the interests of Pakistan that it develops a stronger civil society, civilian government and democratic system. This civilian government needs to assert its supremacy and cuts the cords between the Pakistani security establishment and extreme jihadi groups.

It is deeply in the interest of the Pakistani people that Pakistan develops a healthy, civilian conception of its national interests rather than one that is entirely shaped by the military and intelligence services. It remains to be seen whether this will happen. The truth of the matter is, ironically, the U.S. is the country that is standing up for the interests of the Pakistani people. The Pakistani people would benefit by a reduction of surreptitious conflict and security tensions. Pakistan’s military needs to give up its obsession with geopolitical games, gaining “strategic depth” in Afghanistan and keeping India on the defensive through the use of militants. It is time for Pakistan’s leaders to focus on economic development.

 

[Rafi]

What is encouraging is there is a great amount of infighting in the US - due to the weakness of Obama, goes in our favor.

---------- Post added at 08:03 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:01 PM ----------

Editor's Note: Michael O’Hanlon specializes in national security and defense policy and is senior author of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Index projects. You can read more from him on the Global Public Square.

By Michael O'Hanlon – Special to CNN
The strong words of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen that the Haqqani network remains a “veritable arm of the ISI,” Pakistan's main intelligence agency, have plunged U.S.-Pakistan relations to their lowest point since before 9/11. Taken literally, Mullen's words would almost require designation of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism – and transnational terrorism that targets American citizens at that. The Haqqanis are one of our main problems today in Afghanistan and carried out recent attacks in Kabul, including the September assault on the U.S. embassy. Calling them a "veritable arm of the ISI" strongly suggests that top Pakistani intelligence operatives have controlled the group and used it for their own purposes.

Mullen’s words went too far, as best we can tell. While ISI operatives undoubtedly have had contacts with the Haqqani network, and while Pakistan’s army has let the Haqqani clan operate within its North Waziristan region for too long with impunity, that is not the same thing as Pakistan deliberately using the group to kill Americans and key Afghans like former President Rabbani. Nuances are important because Mullen’s diagnosis, taken literally, would seem inconsistent with any pretense that the United States and Pakistan share common goals in Afghanistan or can work together in pursuit of common objectives. If this is indeed the situation, it is hard to see the U.S. Congress approving future aid packages for Pakistan. It is also hard to believe that Pakistan would continue to allow American forces to use its territory for logistics support of the Afghanistan mission or keep tolerating our drone attacks against the Haqqanis and al Qaeda.

The second big challenge is, naturally, Pakistan. As long as Islamabad views itself as the ultimate power broker in Afghanistan and keeps alive insurgent groups like the Haqqanis either as a hedge against NATO failing to achieve its task or (more ominously) as a way of using proxies to dominate Afghanistan in the future itself, it will be very hard to ensure that the insurgency weakens with time. Figuring out a way to give Islamabad adequate incentives to rethink its tolerance for these groups, which remains excessive, even if Mullen overstated the problem somewhat , is a central challenge of American policy. Of course any such effort must be coordinated with Afghanistan, but Kabul need not be given veto rights, as we have our own legitimate national interests in scaling back the violence and achieving greater stability. Put differently, Afghan leaders too need to know that they cannot feud with Pakistan unnecessarily and indefinitely if the price of that feud is to be paid partly in American blood.

So the following kinds of ideas should be put on the table in negotiations involving the three countries:
– Afghanistan and Pakistan should pursue an accord to accept the Durand line, the de facto border between their two countries, indefinitely. Ironically, it is Kabul that refuses to do so now. If no permanent agreement on a permanent border is yet within reach, a 50-year or 100-year postponement of the issue might be wise.
– Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut down its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan sees these as likely outposts for Indian intelligence operatives. Its fears are probably unwarranted, but the consulates are not worth the resulting strain on the relationship and can be closed as part of a deal.-
– Kabul should at least listen to Islamabad’s interests and advice in choosing governors for its eastern provinces and districts in the future. Indeed, if a peace deal with elements of the Taliban or Haqqani network ever becomes feasible, some reconciled insurgent leaders might even share in such positions, under certain conditions about disarmament and about accepting the Afghan constitution as well as the continued presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil for the foreseeable future.

How to get Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in Afghanistan – Global Public Square - CNN.com Blogs

We have a different narrative, and this guy is going on all the top think-tanks.

– Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut down its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan sees these as likely outposts for Indian intelligence operatives. Its fears are probably unwarranted, but the consulates are not worth the resulting strain on the relationship and can be closed as part of a deal.-

– Kabul should at least listen to Islamabad’s interests and advice in choosing governors for its eastern provinces and districts in the future. Indeed, if a peace deal with elements of the Taliban or Haqqani network ever becomes feasible, some reconciled insurgent leaders might even share in such positions, under certain conditions about disarmament and about accepting the Afghan constitution as well as the continued presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil for the foreseeable future.

These two suggestions are essential for peace.

 

[cyphercide]

We have a different narrative, and this guy is going on all the top think-tanks.

– Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut down its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan sees these as likely outposts for Indian intelligence operatives. Its fears are probably unwarranted, but the consulates are not worth the resulting strain on the relationship and can be closed as part of a deal.-

– Kabul should at least listen to Islamabad’s interests and advice in choosing governors for its eastern provinces and districts in the future. Indeed, if a peace deal with elements of the Taliban or Haqqani network ever becomes feasible, some reconciled insurgent leaders might even share in such positions, under certain conditions about disarmament and about accepting the Afghan constitution as well as the continued presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil for the foreseeable future.

These two suggestions are essential for peace.

That's reasonable but what about our concerns that Afghanistan will be used as a future training ground for attacks on India.Not so outlandish considering it has happened before.

Also and this is just my take on the matter;

Contrary to what the Pakistani establishment thinks,I don't see the Americans leaving....ever. They still maintain bases in nations that they invaded earlier and I don't think that the script changes for Afghanistan.Not to mention in case of a total breakdown of US-Pakistan ties,Afghanistan will have to assume the role of the chief military base in the region.

 

[Rafi]

That's reasonable but what about our concerns that Afghanistan will be used as a future training ground for attacks on India.Not so outlandish considering it has happened before.

Also and this is just my take on the matter;

Contrary to what the Pakistani establishment thinks,I don't see the Americans leaving....ever. They still maintain bases in nations that they invaded earlier and I don't think that the script changes for Afghanistan.Not to mention in case of a total breakdown of US-Pakistan ties,Afghanistan will have to assume the role of the chief military base in the region.

America is exhausted, remember they have been there for ten years, troops have done 2 tours or more, with the tremendous pressure it is putting on military families etc, 2014 is the date that America has given, that gave the Tab's a date, and the sure sign the Yanks have lost the war.

 

[cyphercide]

America is exhausted, remember they have been there for ten years, troops have done 2 tours or more, with the tremendous pressure it is putting on military families etc, 2014 is the date that America has given, that gave the Tab's a date, and the sure sign the Yanks have lost the war.

I am not claiming that the troop strength will be retained as before,Rather they will continue to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan.The reasons for pursuing such a course vary from maintaining a strategic presence in the region,hedging their bets on the ties with Pakistan,China's perceived interest in the mineral wealth of Afghanistan etc. I doubt that the Americans would pack up and leave without deriving any benefit from the invasion.All the above can be achieved by maintaining a puppet government in Afghanistan(which many claim the current scenario already is)

Pakistan understandably is miffed.Being an important ally in war on terrorism,they were expecting the Americans to "gift" the undisputed leadership mantle of Afghanistan when they do leave town.The question remains will the United States use Afghanistan as a bargaining chip against India and Pakistan? For now,they ain't leaving just yet.

US troops may stay in Afghanistan until 2024 - Telegraph

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

That's reasonable but what about our concerns that Afghanistan will be used as a future training ground for attacks on India.Not so outlandish considering it has happened before.

When was Afghanistan used as the primary 'training ground for attacks on India'? Your own military and government officials love to rant about 'launch pads and training camps in PAK'.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

A slightly different point of view from the same site

Zakaria: Calling out Pakistan

By Fareed Zakaria,

Zakaria's commentary yet again highlights his intellectual limitations (or dis-ingenuity, perhaps because of his Indian background) when it comes to discussing/analyzing Pakistan - in this article he offers little other than continuing to harp on the same old unsubstantiated conspiracy theories and paranoia to yet again offer biased and unsupported commentary on Pakistan.

 

[cyphercide]

When was Afghanistan used as the primary 'training ground for attacks on India'? Your own military and government officials love to rant about 'launch pads and training camps in PAK'.

"Primary" was your addition not mine.You can see the term that I employed was "future training ground for attacks on India".

To answer the remainder question;Excerpt from the Time article "The Key to Afghanistan: India-Pakistan Peace"

"In the civil war following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan backed the Taliban, a fundamentalist faction fostered in its own religious seminaries, to counter Indian influence in the rival Northern Alliance. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1994, Pakistan was one of only three nations to recognize their government. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan's clandestine services, then sent militants hardened in the Soviet war to Indian-administered Kashmir in order to wage a low-level insurgency. They used the Afghan mountains as training grounds and looked the other way when Osama bin Laden made the country a base for his terrorist network. Many Kashmiri militants were trained in his camps as part of the global jihad. As long as there was a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan believed, it could stand up to India, its more powerful neighbor to the east."

One of the bahzillion different articles floating around Mr. Administrator.It ain't a big secret and we certainly do know about it.

The Key to Afghanistan: India-Pakistan Peace - TIME

 

[American Pakistani]

How to get Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in Afghanistan.

Well the answere is simple, stop blaming, threatening & accusing Pakistan for your own mistakes, kick Indian @$$ from Afghanistan because Indians are there only to support terrorist organizations of BLA & TTP, start paying taxs for the convoys of NATO & stop all kind of aid. If you are serious in helping Pakistan, start trading with Pakistan, invest in Pakistan, help Pakistan just like China. Instead of giving aids to polititions if US had build schools, hospitals, universities helped Pakistan getting rid of jobs problems than today the situation would've been opposite, but US chooses to buy polititions.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"Primary" was your addition not mine.You can see the term that I employed was "future training ground for attacks on India".

So why would they become 'future training grounds, since India's own leadership insists on ranting about 'launch pads and training camps in PAK'?

To answer the remainder question;Excerpt from the Time article "The Key to Afghanistan: India-Pakistan Peace"

"In the civil war following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan backed the Taliban, a fundamentalist faction fostered in its own religious seminaries, to counter Indian influence in the rival Northern Alliance. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1994, Pakistan was one of only three nations to recognize their government. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan's clandestine services, then sent militants hardened in the Soviet war to Indian-administered Kashmir in order to wage a low-level insurgency. They used the Afghan mountains as training grounds and looked the other way when Osama bin Laden made the country a base for his terrorist network. Many Kashmiri militants were trained in his camps as part of the global jihad. As long as there was a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan believed, it could stand up to India, its more powerful neighbor to the east."

One of the bahzillion different articles floating around Mr. Administrator.It ain't a big secret and we certainly do know about it.

The Key to Afghanistan: India-Pakistan Peace - TIME

A few militants may have indeed trained in camps in Afghanistan, but that would not explain the focus of the Indian military and Government in pointing to training camps in Pakistan and PAK, nor are the Afghan mountains that 'special' compared to the Hindukush or Himalayas when it comes to training.

You have not really made much of a case about Afghanistan being indispensable to Pakistan in terms of being utilized for training camps - if Pakistan wanted to train insurgents, there are plenty of places in Pakistan where it could be done.

 

[cyphercide]

So why would they become 'future training grounds, since India's own leadership insists on ranting about 'launch pads and training camps in PAK'?

A few militants may have indeed trained in camps in Afghanistan, but that would not explain the focus of the Indian military and Government in pointing to training camps in Pakistan and PAK, nor are the Afghan mountains that 'special' compared to the Hindukush or Himalayas when it comes to training.

You have not really made much of a case about Afghanistan being indispensable to Pakistan in terms of being utilized for training camps - if Pakistan wanted to train insurgents, there are plenty of places in Pakistan where it could be done.

Like I stated earlier,trying to pin Afghanistan as the "primary training grounds" was your attempt.Extremist camps get their funding and shelter from Pakistan regardless of whether they set shop in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.The Indian establishment knows about it all too well for years,the Americans and Afghans are sobering up to the fact of late.

Afghanistan is indeed no place special for Jihadi camps targeting India but it does afford Pakistan plausible deniability.After the heat of recent terror attacks came not only from India but significant investigations were carried out by the Americans as well,consequently forcing Pakistan to instigate it's own investigation proceedings.Something that the folks pulling on Jihadi strings don't want is American agencies sniffing close on their heels.Ergo,Afghanistan could provide for an excellent alibi for furthering agenda and implementation for anti-India groups.

 

[Vassnti]

We have a different narrative, and this guy is going on all the top think-tanks.

– Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut down its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan sees these as likely outposts for Indian intelligence operatives. Its fears are probably unwarranted, but the consulates are not worth the resulting strain on the relationship and can be closed as part of a deal.-

– Kabul should at least listen to Islamabad’s interests and advice in choosing governors for its eastern provinces and districts in the future. Indeed, if a peace deal with elements of the Taliban or Haqqani network ever becomes feasible, some reconciled insurgent leaders might even share in such positions, under certain conditions about disarmament and about accepting the Afghan constitution as well as the continued presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil for the foreseeable future.

These two suggestions are essential for peace.

And shows why it isnt going to happen unless policy makers in Pakisan wake up and smell the roses.

Where did people in Pakistan get the crazed idea that they have a right to tell Afghanistan how its going to run Afghansitan.

If some one from the US lobed into pakistan and started telling you where you could have embasies and which politicians you could elect there would be a outrage and protests on the street yet you think its fine to demand the same of some one else.

 

[VelocuR]

All US need is to shut down Fareed Zakaria fool show before Pakistan and US can progress in relations.