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Mosharraf Zaidi
- Tuesday, November 10, 2015 - From Print Edition
Tomorrow will mark the midway point since the 2013 general election. A lot has happened in the two and a half years that have passed since election day. Although neither the provincial nor the national assemblies have been the principal drivers of any of the big events or stories of the last two and a half years, they have been major informants of many.
When the election took place, there were three big agenda items that awaited the incoming MNAs and MPAs. First, there was national security, particularly the terrorism of the TTP and its affiliates, but also the threat posed by other violent actors in other parts of the country (Balochistan and Karachi in particular). Second, there was electricity generation, and the broader impact of loadshedding on the economy. Third, there was the question of institutional equilibrium, civ-mil-jud relations, and political stability writ large – the May 11, 2013 election was the first time a civ-civ handover of power was taking upon full completion of elected assemblies’ term.
There have been several major events that have shaped the nature of the country’s response to these three agenda items over the last two and a half years. The first was the change in guard at the GHQ of the military, where General Raheel Sharif was chosen to become chief of army staff, after six eventful years of the General Kayani era.
Gen Sharif has proven to be a resolute and decisive wartime general – he enjoys almost universal admiration for his leadership of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Yet he has also demonstrated remarkable panache for shaping a narrative that enables the Pakistani military to engage across a range of public policy issues without the burden of responsibility for them – this is particularly true in the realm of foreign policy. Despite this, civil-military relations seem to be better today than in several years, although many critics feel this is more a product of the prime minister’s flexibility than the COAS’ adaptability.
The second was the retirement of the former CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry in December of 2013. His retirement marked a closure of an era of dramatic judicial activism and an unpredictable institutional dynamic in the governance equation. The fact that his replacement was a remarkably measured judge invested in the constitution above and beyond his personal whims made the transition all the more important.
In March of 2014, despite this transition, the Supreme Court ruled that federal and provincial governments were in violation of the constitution for not having conducted local government elections for over nine years. In its judgement, it directed provincial governments to conduct elections for local governments. This is why local government elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were conducted, and why Sindh and Punjab are being conducted (Balochistan had already had LG elections).
The quality of the ‘local governments’ to which people are being elected can be judged from the fact that the rules of business for KP’s local governments were finalised several months after the actual elections. If ever there was a case of incongruent institutional dynamics causing a short-circuiting of both procedural and productive Pakistani democracy, the local government elections for these three provinces are it.
In June of 2014, violent clashes between the Punjab police and members of Tahirul Qadri’s Pakistan Awami Tehreek resulted in at least 14 deaths. The incident triggered a consolidation of opponents of the prime minister to assemble in Islamabad on August 14, 2014. The dual-headed protests produced an unprecedented stalemate in national politics.
Parliament, though not a protagonist or antagonist in the story, became the central actor at one point, and was the instrument that was perhaps most responsible for enabling the prime minister to win enough legitimacy to thwart the ‘dharnas’ that many in the PML-N believed at one stage might take down their government.
The two defining national security events of the last two and a half years were the attack on Jinnah Airport in Karachi in June 2014 and the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The first triggered Operation Zarb-e-Azb, while the second ‘nationalised’ the operation through the adoption of the National Action Plan to counter terror. The only constitutional amendment these assemblies have adopted came in January 2015 as a part of this plan, to institute military courts for two years.
Several other notable national security events have also taken place. In Karachi, the Rangers have now been in action for over two years, with a significant impact on both the ambient magnitude of political violence in the megacity. Baloch nationalism has sounded less aggressive and more conciliatory in the last six months than it has in the last decade.
The space for sectarian hatred was dealt a blow with the death of LeJ leader Malik Ishaq. All of these events have taken place with marginal parliamentary participation. Sectarian unity, however, was dealt a huge jolt of energy in April 2015 when parliament voted against entering the GCC conflict with Yemen. No other foreign policy issue has as large a footprint of parliament as the decision to not send Pakistani troops into that conflict.
With roughly thirty months left, parliament can proudly point to at least three occasions in which its role was central to the direction the country took over the past thirty months. First, in the second half of 2014 parliament stood firmly behind parliament itself, even though the dharna, and favourable television coverage of that circus seemed to have been in the ascendancy. Second, the Yemen vote was a decisive statement of clarity about the diversity and pluralism that define Pakistan, at least at the level of the two main sects represented within the country. Third, the nature of the debate that led to the 21st Amendment was historic, with many federalists and democrats echoing their serious concerns with military courts, whilst signing on reluctantly.
At the end of the five-year term of these assemblies, those accolades will not be sufficient to convince voters that promises were kept. This has larger implications for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N than it does for any other politician or political party. That is the cost of enjoying power.
Having survived the dharna, and having been blessed with a neutered PPP, a toothless MQM, a voterless Jamaat-e-Islami, and a humbled PTI, the prime minister would be deeply mistaken to think that he and his party enjoy a seamless path to securing power once again in 2018. As he enters the second half of the tenure of the assembly that elected him to office, the PM faces three grave risks.
The first is vanity. The PM enjoys a temporary political high not because he and the PML-N are exceptionally good at governing, but because Imran Khan and the PTI are exceptionally bad at challenging government. Sycophancy, which is the central nervous system in the PML-N, is a toxin that has repeatedly caused rude awakenings for the PM. The victories in both NA-122 and the first round of LG elections point to a deep dysfunction inside the PML-N machine. But does anyone dare to tell the PM?
The second is GHQ luck. The PM was lucky to happen upon a COAS who not only eschewed intervention at the climax of the dharna in late August last year, but also turned out to be a counter-insurgency maestro. Can anyone accurately predict that his replacement next year will be a clone? Only the most vain would make that bet.
The third is incompetence. If you try to run Pakistan like a 19th century factory, you will get a profile that looks like a 19th century factory, not a 21st century juggernaut. The megawatts that the PM needs to add to the national grid, and the GDP growth that the PM needs to create jobs for young voters cannot be delivered through the dysfunctional governance mechanisms and processes currently in place. Assistant commissioners and joint secretaries can do a lot for this country, but they can’t make up for the lack of conviction to reform at the top of the hill. The burden for that rests squarely with the prime minister and his cabinet.
Mosharraf Zaidi - Official Web site for Mosharraf ZaidiMosharraf Zaidi | Official Web site for Mosharraf Zaidi
- Tuesday, November 10, 2015 - From Print Edition
Tomorrow will mark the midway point since the 2013 general election. A lot has happened in the two and a half years that have passed since election day. Although neither the provincial nor the national assemblies have been the principal drivers of any of the big events or stories of the last two and a half years, they have been major informants of many.
When the election took place, there were three big agenda items that awaited the incoming MNAs and MPAs. First, there was national security, particularly the terrorism of the TTP and its affiliates, but also the threat posed by other violent actors in other parts of the country (Balochistan and Karachi in particular). Second, there was electricity generation, and the broader impact of loadshedding on the economy. Third, there was the question of institutional equilibrium, civ-mil-jud relations, and political stability writ large – the May 11, 2013 election was the first time a civ-civ handover of power was taking upon full completion of elected assemblies’ term.
There have been several major events that have shaped the nature of the country’s response to these three agenda items over the last two and a half years. The first was the change in guard at the GHQ of the military, where General Raheel Sharif was chosen to become chief of army staff, after six eventful years of the General Kayani era.
Gen Sharif has proven to be a resolute and decisive wartime general – he enjoys almost universal admiration for his leadership of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Yet he has also demonstrated remarkable panache for shaping a narrative that enables the Pakistani military to engage across a range of public policy issues without the burden of responsibility for them – this is particularly true in the realm of foreign policy. Despite this, civil-military relations seem to be better today than in several years, although many critics feel this is more a product of the prime minister’s flexibility than the COAS’ adaptability.
The second was the retirement of the former CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry in December of 2013. His retirement marked a closure of an era of dramatic judicial activism and an unpredictable institutional dynamic in the governance equation. The fact that his replacement was a remarkably measured judge invested in the constitution above and beyond his personal whims made the transition all the more important.
In March of 2014, despite this transition, the Supreme Court ruled that federal and provincial governments were in violation of the constitution for not having conducted local government elections for over nine years. In its judgement, it directed provincial governments to conduct elections for local governments. This is why local government elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were conducted, and why Sindh and Punjab are being conducted (Balochistan had already had LG elections).
The quality of the ‘local governments’ to which people are being elected can be judged from the fact that the rules of business for KP’s local governments were finalised several months after the actual elections. If ever there was a case of incongruent institutional dynamics causing a short-circuiting of both procedural and productive Pakistani democracy, the local government elections for these three provinces are it.
In June of 2014, violent clashes between the Punjab police and members of Tahirul Qadri’s Pakistan Awami Tehreek resulted in at least 14 deaths. The incident triggered a consolidation of opponents of the prime minister to assemble in Islamabad on August 14, 2014. The dual-headed protests produced an unprecedented stalemate in national politics.
Parliament, though not a protagonist or antagonist in the story, became the central actor at one point, and was the instrument that was perhaps most responsible for enabling the prime minister to win enough legitimacy to thwart the ‘dharnas’ that many in the PML-N believed at one stage might take down their government.
The two defining national security events of the last two and a half years were the attack on Jinnah Airport in Karachi in June 2014 and the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The first triggered Operation Zarb-e-Azb, while the second ‘nationalised’ the operation through the adoption of the National Action Plan to counter terror. The only constitutional amendment these assemblies have adopted came in January 2015 as a part of this plan, to institute military courts for two years.
Several other notable national security events have also taken place. In Karachi, the Rangers have now been in action for over two years, with a significant impact on both the ambient magnitude of political violence in the megacity. Baloch nationalism has sounded less aggressive and more conciliatory in the last six months than it has in the last decade.
The space for sectarian hatred was dealt a blow with the death of LeJ leader Malik Ishaq. All of these events have taken place with marginal parliamentary participation. Sectarian unity, however, was dealt a huge jolt of energy in April 2015 when parliament voted against entering the GCC conflict with Yemen. No other foreign policy issue has as large a footprint of parliament as the decision to not send Pakistani troops into that conflict.
With roughly thirty months left, parliament can proudly point to at least three occasions in which its role was central to the direction the country took over the past thirty months. First, in the second half of 2014 parliament stood firmly behind parliament itself, even though the dharna, and favourable television coverage of that circus seemed to have been in the ascendancy. Second, the Yemen vote was a decisive statement of clarity about the diversity and pluralism that define Pakistan, at least at the level of the two main sects represented within the country. Third, the nature of the debate that led to the 21st Amendment was historic, with many federalists and democrats echoing their serious concerns with military courts, whilst signing on reluctantly.
At the end of the five-year term of these assemblies, those accolades will not be sufficient to convince voters that promises were kept. This has larger implications for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N than it does for any other politician or political party. That is the cost of enjoying power.
Having survived the dharna, and having been blessed with a neutered PPP, a toothless MQM, a voterless Jamaat-e-Islami, and a humbled PTI, the prime minister would be deeply mistaken to think that he and his party enjoy a seamless path to securing power once again in 2018. As he enters the second half of the tenure of the assembly that elected him to office, the PM faces three grave risks.
The first is vanity. The PM enjoys a temporary political high not because he and the PML-N are exceptionally good at governing, but because Imran Khan and the PTI are exceptionally bad at challenging government. Sycophancy, which is the central nervous system in the PML-N, is a toxin that has repeatedly caused rude awakenings for the PM. The victories in both NA-122 and the first round of LG elections point to a deep dysfunction inside the PML-N machine. But does anyone dare to tell the PM?
The second is GHQ luck. The PM was lucky to happen upon a COAS who not only eschewed intervention at the climax of the dharna in late August last year, but also turned out to be a counter-insurgency maestro. Can anyone accurately predict that his replacement next year will be a clone? Only the most vain would make that bet.
The third is incompetence. If you try to run Pakistan like a 19th century factory, you will get a profile that looks like a 19th century factory, not a 21st century juggernaut. The megawatts that the PM needs to add to the national grid, and the GDP growth that the PM needs to create jobs for young voters cannot be delivered through the dysfunctional governance mechanisms and processes currently in place. Assistant commissioners and joint secretaries can do a lot for this country, but they can’t make up for the lack of conviction to reform at the top of the hill. The burden for that rests squarely with the prime minister and his cabinet.
Mosharraf Zaidi - Official Web site for Mosharraf ZaidiMosharraf Zaidi | Official Web site for Mosharraf Zaidi
If Pak exists)
