Genesis of the successful F-16 fighter

[Manticore]

Genesis of the successful F-16 fighter/attack aircraft lies in reaction
to severe deficiencies in US fighter design revealed by the Vietnam
War.
Following the success of the small, highly maneuverable F-86 day
fighter in the Korean War, US fighter design changed to emphasize
maximum speed, altitude, and radar capability at the expense of
maneuverability, pilot vision, and other attributes needed for close
combat. This trend reached its extremity in the McDonnell Douglas F-4
Phantom, which was the principal fighter for both the US Air Force and
Navy during the latter part of the Vietnam War.

The F-4 was originally designed as an interceptor for defense of the
fleet against air attack - a mission neither it nor any other jet has
ever executed, because no US fleet has come under air attack since the
beginning of the jet age. Be that as it may, the F-4 interceptor was
designed to meet the fleet defense mission by using rapid climb to high
altitude, high supersonic speed, and radar-guided missiles to shoot
down threat aircraft at long distance.

Used as a fighter rather than as an interceptor in Vietnam, the F-4 was
severely miscast. Against very inferior North Vietnamese pilots flying
small, highly maneuverable MiG-21s, the air-to-air kill ratio sometimes
dropped as low as 2 to 1, where it had been 13 to 1 in Korea. As the
Vietnam War drew to a close, it was generally agreed that the F-4 had
prohibitive deficiencies including:

LARGENESS. F-4 pilots to frequently found themselves fighting at
separation distances at which they could not see the smaller MiG-21s,
but the MiG-21 pilots could see them.
POOR PILOT VISION. In order to minimize high-speed drag, the F-4, and
all combat aircraft before the F-14, does not have a bubble canopy. It
is designed for a pilot to look straight ahead. Vision down and to the
sides is poor; vision to the rear is nonexistent.
MANEUVERABILITY. While the F-4 can pull 7G in turns, which was
acceptable for that time, it can only do so by rapidly bleeding off
energy (losing speed and/or altitude).
TRANSIENT PERFORMANCE. Ability of the F-4 to change its maneuver (that
is, to roll rapidly while pulling high Gs) was poor.
COST. The large F-4 was an expensive aircraft to procure and maintain.
This meant that, compared to the MiG-21, fewer aircraft could be bought
with a given budget.
NO GUN. The F-4 was designed without a gun, and was thus not capable of
very close combat.
COMBAT PERSISTENCE. While the ferry range of the F-4 was acceptable,
its ability to engage in sustained hard maneuvering without running out
of fuel was a significant problem.
These various sacrifices were rationalized by the belief that visual
dogfighting was obsolete, and that in the supersonic age, air combat
would be fought beyond visual range (BVR) using radar-guided missiles.
This concept failed in Vietnam for two reasons: First, radar could
detect and track aircraft but not identify them. Operating beyond
visual range created an unacceptable risk of shooting down one's own
aircraft. Pilots were therefore required to close to visually identify
the target before shooting; this eliminated the theoretical range
advantage of radar-guided missiles. Second, the performance of the
Sparrow radar-guided missile in Vietnam was poor, generally yielding
less than 10% kill per shot.

Dissatisfaction with these deficiencies led to the US Air Force F-15
and US Navy F-14 designs. On this page we discuss only the Air Force
programs.

The original F-15 had excellent pilot vision, including being able to
see 360 degrees in the horizontal plane. It had strong high-speed
maneuverability and a 20mm cannon. In addition to rectifying some of
the F-4's deficiencies, it could fly higher and faster than the F-4,
and had dramatically better climb and acceleration.

It also had a powerful radar with advanced look-down shoot-down
capability, and relied on the Sparrow missile as its principal weapon.

Nevertheless, an informal but influential group called the "Fighter
Mafia" objected to the F-15 as moving in the wrong direction. (The most
prominent Fighter Mafia spokesmen were systems analyst Pierre Sprey,
test pilot Charles E. Meyers, and legendary fighter pilot John Boyd.)

The F-15, the Fighter Mafia objected, was even larger and more
expensive than the F-4. Much of that money went into creating high
maximum speed (Mach 2.5) and altitude (65,000 feet) and to serving as a
launcher, under BVR conditions which couldn't be used in real combat,.
for the Sparrow missile which didn't work While recognizing that the
F-15 had phenomenal supersonic climb and maneuverability (it could
sustain 6Gs at Mach 1.6), at such speeds it could not fight because its
turn radius was so large that it could not keep the enemy in sight.

What the Air Force needed, the Mafia argued, was a successor to the
WWII P-51 Mustang and the Korean War F-86 Saber: an all-new small
fighter that would be cheap enough to buy in large numbers. (The F-104
was not considered a predecessor aircraft because, while it had
excellent climb and acceleration, its wings were too small, leaving it
deficient in range and maneuverability.) The new fighter would have
revolutionary maneuverability, transient performance, acceleration, and
climb at the subsonic and transonic speeds at which air combat is
actually fought. It would have a gun and its primary armament would be
the infra-red guided Sidewinder missile that had proven highly
effective in Vietnam.

While Sidewinder's range was limited to about three miles, the Mafia
argued that air combat beyond that range was fantasy in any case. Some
members of the Mafia even suggested that the ideal small fighter would
have no radar at all, although this was a minority view.

In any case, the Air Force establishment wanted no part of a new small
fighter, with or without radar. It was regarded as a threat to the
F-15, which was USAF's highest priority program. But the Fighter Mafia
gained considerable resonance in Congress and within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. In 1971 Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
began a Lightweight Fighter (LWF) program to explore the concept.

The LWF was to be about 20,000 pounds, or half the weight of the F-15,
and was to stress low cost, small size, and very high performance at
speed below Mach 1.6 and altitude below 40,000 feet. Two competing
designs would be chosen for prototyping.

Industry recognized, correctly, that regardless of USAF hostility, LWF
variants had great potential for profitable foreign military sales,
including replacing the F-104. Single-engine designs were put forward
by Boeing, General Dynamics, LTV, Northrop, and Rockwell. Northrop also
proposed on a twin-engine design, in effect using Air Force money to
develop a replacement for its F-5 export fighter.

The Boeing and General Dynamics designs were the clear leaders from the
beginning, with the Northrop twin-engine design clearly the weakest of
the six.

But midway through this stage of the competition, some potential
foreign buyers expressed concern over buying a new single-engine
fighter. The previous single-engine supersonic export fighter, the
F-104, had a troublesome safety record that some buyers were
disinclined to repeat.

USAF, therefore, decided that one of the two down-selectees had to have
two engines. Since the last-place Northrop design was the only
twin-engine contender, it became a down-selection winner by default.

When the General Dynamics design was chosen the other selectee on
merit, Boeing was no doubt a bit miffed that its loss was caused by
USAF changing the rules in mid-competition. But it did not protest the
decision.

Of the two surviving designs, now designated the General Dynamics YF-16
and the Northrop YF-17., the YF-17 was a relatively conventional
design, to some extent an outgrowth of the F-5, while the YF-16 was an
all-new design incorporating highly innovative technologies that in
many respects reached beyond those of the more expensive F-15. These
included -

FLY BY WIRE. From the outset, the YF-16 had no direct connection
between the pilot's controls and the aircraft's control surfaces.
Instead, the stick and rudder controls were connected to
quadruple-redundant computers, which then told the elevators, ailerons,
and rudder what to do. This had several large advantages over previous
systems. It was quicker responding, automatically correcting for gusts
and thermals with no effort from the pilot. It could be programmed to
compensate for aerodynamic problems and fly like an ideal airplane.
Most importantly, it enabled, with full safety, a highly efficient
unstable design.
NEGATIVE STABILITY. All previous aircraft designs had been
aerodynamically stable. That is, the center of gravity was well in
front of the center of lift and the center of pressure (drag).
To illustrate the difference between stable and unstable designs, take
a shirt cardboard and, holding it by the leading edge, pull it rapidly
through the air. It will stretch out behind your hand in a stable
manner. This is a stable design Now take it by the trailing edge push
forward from there. It will immediately flip up or down uncontrollably.
That is an unstable design.
The downside of aerodynamic stability is that the aircraft is
nose-heavy and always trying to nose down. The elevator must therefore
push the tail down to level the airplane. But in addition to rotating
the airplane from nose-down to level, the elevator is exerting negative
lift; that is, it is pushing the airplane down. In order to counteract
this negative lift, the wing needs to be made larger to create more
positive lift. This increases both weight and drag, decreasing aircraft
performance. In pitch-up situations including hard turns which are the
bread and butter of aerial combat, this negative effect is greatly
magnified.
The YF-16 became the world's first aircraft to be aerodynamically
unstable by design. With its rearward center of gravity, its natural
tendency is to nose up rather than down. So level flight is created by
the elevator pushing the tail up rather than down, and therefore
pushing the entire aircraft up. With the elevator working with the wing
rather than against it, wing area, weight, and drag are reduced. The
airplane was constantly on the verge of flipping up or down totally out
of control,. and this tendency was being constantly caught and
corrected by the fly-by-wire control system so quickly that neither the
pilot nor an outside observer could know anything was happening. If the
control system were to fail, the aircraft would instantly disintegrate;
however, this has never happened.
HIGH G LOADS. Previous fighters were designed to take 7Gs, mainly
because it was believed that the human pilot, even with a G-suit, could
not handle more. The YF-16 seatback was reclined 30 degrees, rather
than the usual 13 degrees. This was to increase the ability of the
pilot to achieve 9Gs by reducing the vertical distance between head and
heart. Additionally, the traditional center control stick was replaced
by a stick on the right side, with an armrest to relieve the pilot of
the need to support his arm when it weighed nine times normal.
PILOT VISION. In addition to allowing full-circle horizontal vision and
unprecedented vision over the sides, the YF-16 canopy was designed
without bows in the forward hemisphere.
GROWTH PREVENTION. Traditionally, room for growth has been considered
an asset. Fighter aircraft have averaged weight gain of about one pound
per day as new capabilities are added, cost increases, and performance
declines. The F-15, for example, was designed with about 15 cubic feet
of empty space to allow for future installation of additional
equipment.. In a radical departure, the YF-16 was intentionally
designed with very little empty space, (about two cubic feet)., with
the explicit intention of preventing growth. One member of the House
Armed Services Committee actually wrote to the Secretary of the Air
Force asking that the F-16's empty space be filled with Styrofoam to
insure that "gold-plated junk" was not added to the design.
COMBAT RADIUS AND PERSISTENCE. General Dynamics chose a single turbofan
engine, essentially the same engine as one of the two that powered the
F-15. Use of a single engine helped minimize weight and drag; use of a
turbofan rather than a pure jet engine gave high fuel efficiency.
Additionally, the YF-16 designers used a "blended body" design in which
the wing gradually thickened at the root and blended into the body
contours without the usual visible joint. The space thus created was
filled with fuel. With such a high fuel fraction and a fuel-efficient
engine, the YF-16 was able to break the presumption that small aircraft
were necessarily short-ranged.
RADAR INTEGRATION. Because the YF-16 carried no radar-guided missiles,
it could only fight within visual range. Moreover, the small weight and
space available limited the range of its radar. Nevertheless, it was
given a technologically advanced small radar, with excellent look-down
capability. Most importantly, the radar was integrated with the visual
combat mode. That is, the radar projected an image of the target
aircraft onto the Head Up Display so that, by looking at that image,
the pilot was looking exactly where the target would become visible as
he approached it.
The competing Northrop YF-17 design was somewhat larger than the YF-16,
and used two smaller pure jet engines. At the price of reduced range
and persistence, the YF-17 avoided the main problem of the YF-16's
turbofan: the inertia of the large fan required too long - in some
cases six seconds - to spool up from idle to full power. In other
respects, the YF-17 progressed better than expected, given its initial
last place position.

Northrop argued that its twin-engine design added an essential safety
factor, citing its experience with the small twin-engine F-5 fighter as
an example. USAF did not find this persuasive, in part because a two
engine plane with one engine out is useless in combat, and the
probability of an engine failure was nominally twice as high with two
engines as with one. The higher performance, better transient
maneuverability, longer range, and lower cost of the YF-16 carried the
day, and in 1976 the F-16 was chosen over the F-17.

USAF was then in the uncomfortable position of having a lightweight
fighter design that could outmaneuver and outrange its pride and joy,
the F-15 air superiority fighter. In real-world combat conditions,
which meant Mach 1.2 or below, the F-16s held a significant edge over
the F-15. To some extent this problem was solved by designating the
F-16 as a "swing fighter" to do both air-to-air and air-to-ground,
while the F-15 was to continue its aristocratic mission of pure
air-to-air.

Probably the F-16's greatest asset during development was its
unpopularity with the USAF establishment. Knowing that their airplane
was in constant threat of cancellation, the General Dynamics designers
were inspired to do everything possible and then some to maintain
performance and prevent cost growth. For example, while the F-15 was
about 25% titanium, titanium in the F-16 was limited to 2%. As another
example, a fixed engine inlet was used to hold down cost, even though a
variable inlet would have given better performance above Mach 1.5.

The F-16 has been, by any standard, a success. USAF has used it heavily
and successfully for air-to-ground in the 1991 Gulf war and all
subsequent conflicts. The Israeli Air Force has also had great success
with it.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is worthwhile to look back from the
current (2003) vantage point to see how the original concept has faired

FLY BY WIRE has been a clear success. It is now used in essentially all
military fixed wing aircraft and on many commercial aircraft.
NEGATIVE STABILITY, or at least reduced positive stability, has worked
without a failure - no F-16s have disintegrated in air from control
system failure - and is coming into increasing use.
HIGH G LOADS. The 9G standard pioneered by the F-16 is now universal
for new fighter designs, although it is achieved more by pilot training
than by hardware. Benefit of the 30-degree reclining seat back has not
been clearly established, and many pilots find it increases the
difficult of checking their six o'clock position while in hard
maneuvers. So more recent designs have not copied the F-16 seat.
Similarly, the side stick has worked well but has not proven as
essential as its designers originally expected. One enduring
controversy is whether control systems should, as is the case with the
F-16 be programmed to unconditionally limit the aircraft to 9gs, or
whether higher loads should be permitted in emergencies. One eminent
General Dynamics test pilot, a "super pilot" who in his fifties was
still able to sustain 9Gs for 45 seconds, published an article on the
subject in "Code One", the General Dynamics house organ, arguing that
there was not enough useful benefit in being able to exceed 9 Gs to
justify the strain on the airframe, particularly since few pilots could
retain functionality above 9Gs. Tragically and ironically, this pilot
was killed when his plane, pulling 9Gs in a hard maneuver, was unable
to pull up enough to avoid the impacting the ground. This outstanding
pilot might have been able to function with a brief application of 10,
11, or even 12Gs. Could that have saved him and his aircraft? Could it
save others in the future?
PILOT VISION. Pilots like the F-16 canopy without front bows for its
quietness as well as its vision. One drawback is that in order to avoid
optical distortion in the bowless design, the conventional use of thick
polycarbonate on the front to protect against birdstrike, and thinner
polycarbonate for the rest of the canopy, cannot be used. Because the
F-16 canopy uses thick polycarbonate throughout, it is not possible to
eject by using the seat to puncture through the canopy. The canopy must
first be blown off by small rockets, prolonging the ejection sequence
slightly. On balance, the F-16 canopy concept is considered successful
and it is continued in the F-22. On the other hand, neither Joint
Strike Fighter candidate used full-circle vision, much less a bowless
canopy.
GROWTH PREVENTION. The original concept of a small day ait-to-air
fighter was lost before the first production aircraft. The fuselage was
extended so that the single-seat versions became as long as the
two-seat version, and air-to-ground capability was added. As its life
progressed, the F-16 became progressively larger and heavier as more
capability, including the AMRAAM radar-guided missile, chaff and flare
dispensers, and more hard points were added. Still, weight gain has
been only about half the traditional pound per day, so the
determination of the original designers has not been in vain.
COMBAT RADIUS AND PERSISTENCE. The F-16 blended body has worked well,
but has not been emulated in most newer designs.
RADAR INTEGRATION. Integration of radar with visual systems has been
fully successful and is now standard fighter design.
Variants
In January 1972, the Lightweight Fighter Program solicited design
specifications from several American manufacturers. Participants were
told to tailor their specifications toward the goal of developing a
true air superiority lightweight fighter. General Dynamics and Northrop
were asked to build prototypes, which could be evaluated with no
promise of a follow-on production contract. These were to be strictly
technology demonstrators. The two contractors were given creative
freedom to build their own vision of a lightweight air superiority
fighter, with only a limited number of specified performance goals.
Northrop produced the twin-engine YF-17, using breakthrough aerodynamic
technologies and two high-thrust engines. General Dynamics countered
with the compact YF-16, built around a single F100 engine.

When the Lightweight Fighter competition was completed early in 1975,
both the YF-16 and the YF-17 showed great promise. The two prototypes
performed so well, in fact, that both were selected for military
service. On 13 January 1975 the Air Force announced that the YF-16's
performance had made it the winner of its Air Combat Fighter (ACF)
competition. This marked a shift from the original intention to use the
two airplanes strictly as technology demonstrators. General Dynamics'
YF-16 had generally shown superior performance over its rival from
Northrop. At the same time, the shark-like fighter was judged to have
production costs lower than expected, both for initial procurement and
over the life cycle of the plane. At the same time, the YF-16 had
proved the usefulness not only of fly-by-wire flight controls, but also
such innovations as reclined seat backs and transparent head-up display
(HUD) panels to facilitate high-G maneuvering, and the use of high
profile, one-piece canopies to give pilots greater visibility. Thus,
the Air Force had its lightweight fighter, the F-16.

The original F-16 was designed as a lightweight air-to-air day fighter.
Air-to-ground responsibilities transformed the first production F-16s
into multirole fighters. The empty weight of the Block 10 F-16A is
15,600 pounds. The empty weight of the Block 50 is 19,200 pounds. The A
in F-16A refers to a Block 1 through 20 single-seat aircraft. The B in
F-16B refers to the two-seat version. The letters C and D were
substituted for A and B, respectively, beginning with Block 25. Block
is an important term in tracing the F-16's evolution. Basically, a
block is a numerical milestone. The block number increases whenever a
new production configuration for the F-16 is established. Not all F-16s
within a given block are the same. They fall into a number of block
subsets called miniblocks. These sub-block sets are denoted by capital
letters following the block number (Block 15S, for example). From Block
30/32 on, a major block designation ending in 0 signifies a General
Electric engine; one ending in 2 signifies a Pratt & Whitney engine.

The F-16A, a single-seat model, first flew in December 1976. The first
operational F-16A was delivered in January 1979 to the 388th Tactical
Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The F-16B, a two-seat model,
has tandem cockpits that are about the same size as the one in the A
model. Its bubble canopy extends to cover the second cockpit. To make
room for the second cockpit, the forward fuselage fuel tank and
avionics growth space were reduced. During training, the forward
cockpit is used by a student pilot with an instructor pilot in the rear
cockpit.

Block 1 and Block 5 F-16s were manufactured through 1981 for USAF and
for four European air forces. Most Blocks 1 and 5 aircraft were
upgraded to a Block 10 standard in a program called Pacer Loft in 1982.

Block 10 aircraft (312 total) were built through 1980. The differences
between these early F-16 versions are relatively minor.
Block 15 aircraft represent the most numerous version of the more than
3,600 F-16s manufactured to date. The transition from Block 10 to Block
15 resulted in two hardpoints added to the chin of the inlet. The
larger horizontal tails, which grew in area by about thirty percent are
the most noticeable difference between Block 15 and previous F-16
versions.
The F-16C and F-16D aircraft, which are the single- and two-place
counterparts to the F-16A/B, incorporate the latest cockpit control and
display technology. All F-16s delivered since November 1981 have
built-in structural and wiring provisions and systems architecture that
permit expansion of the multirole flexibility to perform precision
strike, night attack and beyond-visual-range interception missions. All
active units and many Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units
have converted to the F-16C/D, which is deployed in a number of Block
variants.

Block 25 added the ability to carry AMRAAM to the F-16 as well as
night/precision ground-attack capabilities, as well as an improved
radar, the Westinghouse (now Northrop-Grumman) AN/APG-68, with
increased range, better resolution, and more operating modes.
Block 30/32 added two new engines -- Block 30 designates a General
Electric F110-GE-100 engine, and Block 32 designates a Pratt & Whitney
F100-PW-220 engine. Block 30/32 can carry the AGM-45 Shrike and the
AGM-88A HARM, and like the Block 25, it can carry the AGM-65 Maverick.
Block 40/42 - F-16CG/DG - gained capabilities for navigation and
precision attack in all weather conditions and at night with the
LANTIRN pods and more extensive air-to-ground loads, including the
GBU-10, GBU-12, GBU-24 Paveway laser-guided bombs and the GBU-15. Block
40/42 production began in 1988 and ran through 1995. Currently, the
Block 40s are being upgraded with several Block 50 systems: ALR-56M
threat warning system, the ALE-47 advanced chaff/flare dispenser, an
improved performance battery, and Falcon UP structural upgrade.
Block 50/52 Equipped with a Northrop Grumman APG-68(V)7 radar and a
General Electric F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engine, the aircraft
are also capable of using the Lockheed Martin low-altitude navigation
and targeting for night (LANTIRN) system. Technology enhancements
include color multifunctional displays and programmable display
generator, a new Modular Mission Computer, a Digital Terrain System, a
new color video camera and color triple-deck video recorder to record
the pilot's head-up display view, and an upgraded data transfer unit.
In May 2000, the Air Force certitified Block 50/52 [aka Block 50 Plus]
F-16s to carry the CBU-103/104/105 Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser,
the AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon, the GBU-31/32 Joint Direct Attack
Munition, and the Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System. Beginning in
mid-2000, Lockheed-Martin began to deliver Block 50/52 variants
equipped with an on-board oxygen generation system (OBOGS) designed to
replace the obsolete, original LOX system.
Block 50D/52D Wild Weasel F-16CJ (CJ means block 50) comes in C-Model
(1 seat) and D-Model (2 seat) versions. It is best recognized for its
ability to carry the AGM-88 HARM and the AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting
System (HTS) in the suppression of enemy air defenses [SEAD] mission.
The HTS allows HARM to be employed in the range-known mode providing
longer range shots with greater target specificity. This specialized
version of the F-16, which can also carry the ALQ-119 Electronic
Jamming Pod for self protection, became the sole provider for Air Force
SEAD missions when the F-4G Wild Weasel was retired from the Air Force
inventory. The lethal SEAD mission now rests solely on the shoulders of
the F-16 Harm Targeting System. Although F-18s and EA-6Bs are HARM
capable, the F-16 provides the ability to use the HARM in its most
effective mode. The original concept called for teaming the F-15
Precision Direction Finding (PDF) and the F-16 HTS. Because this
teaming concept is no longer feasible, the current approach calls for
the improvement of the HTS capability. The improvement will come from
the Joint Emitter Targeting System (JETS), which facilitates the use of
HARM's most effective mode when launched from any JETS capable
aircraft.
Block 60 - In May 1998 the UAE announced selection of the Block 60 F-16
to be delivered between 2002-2004. The upgrade package consists of a
range of modern systems including conformal fuel tanks for greater
range, new cockpit displays, an internal sensor suite, a new mission
computer and other advanced features including a new agile beam radar.
The Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) for the USAF's
F-16C/D fleet provides significant avionics upgrades to Block 40 and 50
F-16s, ensuring their state-of-the-art capability well into the 21st
century. A key element of the upgrade is a common hardware and software
avionics configuration for these two blocks that will bring together
the Block 40/42 and 50/52 versions into a common configuration of core
avionics and software. The avionics changes consist of the following
systems: Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System
(MIDS), Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), commercial expanded
programmable display generator, color multifunction display set,
modular mission computer, mux loadable data entry display set and an
electronic horizontal situation display. This package contains a number
of systems being incorporated into European F-16s in the F-16A/B
Mid-Life Update program. The first aircraft upgraded under CCIP were
delivered to combat units in December 2001 (1).

The Air Force will soon be flying only Block 40/42 and Block 50/52
F-16s in its active-duty units. Block 25 and Block 30/32 will be
concentrated in Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
Service Life
The Falcon Up Structural Improvement Program program incorporates
several major structural modifications into one overall program,
affecting all USAF F-16s. Falcon Up will allow Block 25/30/32 aircraft
to meet a 6000 hour service life, and allow Block 40/42 aircraft to
meet an 8000 hour service life.
In view of the challenges inherent in operating F-16s to 8,000 flight
hours, together with the moderate risk involved in JSF integration, the
Department has established a program to earmark by FY 2000 some 200
older, Block 15 F-16 fighter aircraft in inactive storage for potential
reactivation. The purpose of this program is to provide a basis for
constituting two combat wings more quickly than would be possible
through new production. This force could offset aircraft withdrawn for
unanticipated structural repairs or compensate for delays in the JSF
program. Reactivating older F-16s is not a preferred course of action,
but represents a relatively low-cost hedge against such occurrences.

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