tushar
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Two years ago, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, routinely brushed off criticism of Pakistan's ISI. He had worked out an excellent relationship with General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan's inscrutable army chief. They were friends and they were singing from the same sheet of music. Sure, the Pakistani army would have a tough time of it, but they would get there.
Last week, Mullen berated Pakistan on TV for ISI's continued patronage of terror groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba that was undermining the war in Afghanistan. The conclusion we should draw is not the one that says, phew! Mullen finally saw the light. But that Pakistan will not change its strategic posture of opposing India and befriending terrorist groups, notwithstanding incentives or pressure.
Now that India is apparently flirting with the idea of talking to the Pakistani army, this should serve as a useful reminder for all who believe this will smell of roses.
The story 'floated' in The Times, London, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had been quietly talking to Kayani excited the imagination of many in India and overseas. It seemed to signal that India and Pakistan were serious about putting their differences behind them and getting on with life. Extrapolated from this is also the suggestion that the Afghanistan war could be brought to an honourable end if peace breaks out between India and Pakistan.
There should be no quibble about the virtues of India engaging the Pakistani army, because as we have made the point repeatedly in these columns, Islamabad is not quite the same without Rawalpindi. In July 2010, the India-Pakistan foreign ministers' dialogue was stopped in its tracks. An agreed agenda for discussion was upended followed by some avoidable bad-mouthing at a joint press conference. It was generally believed that the army pulled the rug from under the talks after India went public with the fact that the ISI had been fully involved in planning the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.
The importance of engaging the generals is acute. But the Indian government has an irrational distaste for the Pakistani army when it's not in power. On the other side, Kayani has been cold to overtures made to him by the Indian envoy in Islamabad. For a man who only sees heads of government and defence forces, what's a mere ambassador?
But let's say the Indians manage to credibly engage Kayani, by, say, Shivshankar Menon, national security adviser. What would they talk about? And how much of the dialogue should be under the radar?
Sir Creek comes to mind. After a joint survey of the creek there is now a general agreement on the broad issue. The problem is that the heart of the dispute - that is, where to draw the line on the creek - remains unresolved. Pakistan wants it on the eastern bank, India wants it midstream. An out-of-the-box solution could disconnect the resolution of the maritime boundary from the creek itself. This would see a 'seaward' solution which could result in the two countries demarcating their exclusive economic zone.
Resolution of where the line would run on the creek itself could entail some give-and-take of territory. Singh, who battles an overwhelming perception that he is ever ready to concede to Pakistan and the US, will find this difficult. Any back channel with the army risks being seen as a sell-out.
On the other side, Pakistan would want a deal on Siachen. This is their core concern, far outstripping Sir Creek or others. At the top levels, Pakistan is well aware that no solution to the Kashmir issue could entail a territorial concession. But a deal on Siachen where the Indian army could be persuaded to vacate the heights of the Saltoro range is irresistible to Pakistan. India cannot do this deal, no matter how you dress it up. No amount of satellite mapping and authentication on maps will help the Indian army retake the heights once they have been relinquished, and Pakistan knows this. The trek on the Indian side is far tougher than on theirs. And nobody should get conned by claims of Siachen being a wasteland. India needs it for strong strategic reasons.
This discussion, too, can never happen in the quiet, no matter who does it. Neither can a conversation on terrorism or Kashmir. Nobody wants to be surprised by another Sharm-el-Sheikh. On Kashmir, the Mumbai attacks put paid to any romance with 'irrelevant borders'. There are too many jihadists per sq km in Pakistan for India to feel comfortable with anything less than secure borders.
The prime minister's aim of 'normalising' relations with Pakistan is laudable, but given his present troubles, Singh doesn't have the political capital to do it. In fact, in the current atmosphere where his eagerness to deal with Pakistan is viewed with suspicion, back channel talks with the Pakistani army would be inviting trouble. Besides, as the three years of the Lambah-Aziz dialogue showed, Islamabad is master of the selective leak in the media, always a disruptive act in the India-Pakistan context.
There should not be a great distance between what they say privately and in the public eye. Instead, India should invite Kayani for standalone talks with the government here. In the India-Pakistan context, back channel talks cannot be counted as a confidence-building exercise.
General, not the labyrinth - The Times of India
Last week, Mullen berated Pakistan on TV for ISI's continued patronage of terror groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba that was undermining the war in Afghanistan. The conclusion we should draw is not the one that says, phew! Mullen finally saw the light. But that Pakistan will not change its strategic posture of opposing India and befriending terrorist groups, notwithstanding incentives or pressure.
Now that India is apparently flirting with the idea of talking to the Pakistani army, this should serve as a useful reminder for all who believe this will smell of roses.
The story 'floated' in The Times, London, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had been quietly talking to Kayani excited the imagination of many in India and overseas. It seemed to signal that India and Pakistan were serious about putting their differences behind them and getting on with life. Extrapolated from this is also the suggestion that the Afghanistan war could be brought to an honourable end if peace breaks out between India and Pakistan.
There should be no quibble about the virtues of India engaging the Pakistani army, because as we have made the point repeatedly in these columns, Islamabad is not quite the same without Rawalpindi. In July 2010, the India-Pakistan foreign ministers' dialogue was stopped in its tracks. An agreed agenda for discussion was upended followed by some avoidable bad-mouthing at a joint press conference. It was generally believed that the army pulled the rug from under the talks after India went public with the fact that the ISI had been fully involved in planning the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.
The importance of engaging the generals is acute. But the Indian government has an irrational distaste for the Pakistani army when it's not in power. On the other side, Kayani has been cold to overtures made to him by the Indian envoy in Islamabad. For a man who only sees heads of government and defence forces, what's a mere ambassador?
But let's say the Indians manage to credibly engage Kayani, by, say, Shivshankar Menon, national security adviser. What would they talk about? And how much of the dialogue should be under the radar?
Sir Creek comes to mind. After a joint survey of the creek there is now a general agreement on the broad issue. The problem is that the heart of the dispute - that is, where to draw the line on the creek - remains unresolved. Pakistan wants it on the eastern bank, India wants it midstream. An out-of-the-box solution could disconnect the resolution of the maritime boundary from the creek itself. This would see a 'seaward' solution which could result in the two countries demarcating their exclusive economic zone.
Resolution of where the line would run on the creek itself could entail some give-and-take of territory. Singh, who battles an overwhelming perception that he is ever ready to concede to Pakistan and the US, will find this difficult. Any back channel with the army risks being seen as a sell-out.
On the other side, Pakistan would want a deal on Siachen. This is their core concern, far outstripping Sir Creek or others. At the top levels, Pakistan is well aware that no solution to the Kashmir issue could entail a territorial concession. But a deal on Siachen where the Indian army could be persuaded to vacate the heights of the Saltoro range is irresistible to Pakistan. India cannot do this deal, no matter how you dress it up. No amount of satellite mapping and authentication on maps will help the Indian army retake the heights once they have been relinquished, and Pakistan knows this. The trek on the Indian side is far tougher than on theirs. And nobody should get conned by claims of Siachen being a wasteland. India needs it for strong strategic reasons.
This discussion, too, can never happen in the quiet, no matter who does it. Neither can a conversation on terrorism or Kashmir. Nobody wants to be surprised by another Sharm-el-Sheikh. On Kashmir, the Mumbai attacks put paid to any romance with 'irrelevant borders'. There are too many jihadists per sq km in Pakistan for India to feel comfortable with anything less than secure borders.
The prime minister's aim of 'normalising' relations with Pakistan is laudable, but given his present troubles, Singh doesn't have the political capital to do it. In fact, in the current atmosphere where his eagerness to deal with Pakistan is viewed with suspicion, back channel talks with the Pakistani army would be inviting trouble. Besides, as the three years of the Lambah-Aziz dialogue showed, Islamabad is master of the selective leak in the media, always a disruptive act in the India-Pakistan context.
There should not be a great distance between what they say privately and in the public eye. Instead, India should invite Kayani for standalone talks with the government here. In the India-Pakistan context, back channel talks cannot be counted as a confidence-building exercise.
General, not the labyrinth - The Times of India
