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The 2014 Middle East: A Transformed Security Setting Scenario
Background
It is June 2014. In the past eighteen months there have been major crisis developments in the
Middle East. The Arab Spring has led to a dramatically transformed security setting that is still
unfolding in 2014. From Tunisia to Syria, anti-Western Islamist regimes have come to power.
Specifically, what is described as a “Crescent of Instability” extends from Egypt into Palestine,
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the successor states of Syria. The withdrawal of remaining U.S.
combat troops has led to growing Iranian and Turkish influence in Iraq. Islamist parties now hold
a dominant position in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Gaza, and Turkey. Al Qaeda and its affiliates as
well as the Muslim Brotherhood have gained footholds in several countries in the region.
Although they remain sharply at odds on Syria, Turkey and Iran are aligned against Israel and
the United States. Egypt has withdrawn from its peace agreement with Israel and is now formally
allied with Iran. Although violence continues, Syria has fractured into essentially three entities
based, respectively, on the Alawite, Sunni, and Kurdish populations.
A major part of the unfolding crisis setting is focused on Syria, originally created by France after
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. By 2014 the remnants of the
Bashar regime have formed a new Alawite state in the Levantine highlands overlooking the
Mediterranean Sea called Alawistan in control of the Syrian coastal area extending from the
border with Turkey to the border with Lebanon. The Syrian territory that remains under Alawite
control includes Damascus and Aleppo. With its concentration of Alawite population (about 11.2
percent of Syria’s total), Alawistan has close ties with Iran and with Hezbollah operating in
Lebanon. Russia continues to use the Syrian port of Tartus as a naval resupply facility. Moscow
has had longstanding ties to the Assad family extending back for several decades and has
provided refuge for members of Assad’s family fleeing Syria, as well as weapons to Alawistan.
However, the largest Syrian population (70 percent) is concentrated in a new state, Sunnistan,
that includes about three-quarters of Syria’s territory. The conflict that removed Assad was
waged primarily by Sunnis against the ruling Alawite minority. In 2014 tensions remain high
between Alawistan and Sunnistan and between Turkey and Alawistan. Saudi Arabia, having
worked to undermine Alawite rule throughout Syria, is now actively supporting Sunnistan and
continuing its efforts to arm rebels still fighting in Alawistan. Saudi Arabia seeks to undermine
the Iran-Alawistan relationship. Saudi Arabia has long seen itself as a protector of Syria’s Sunni
majority. This continues in the fragmented Syria of 2014.
The third major element of post-Assad Syria is the Kurds (about 9 percent of Syria’s total
population), located in northeast Syria adjacent to Turkey. With the fracturing of Syria, Iran is
reinforcing its ties with Alawistan. Iran, having failed to prevent Assad’s fall, is now Alawistan’s
chief ally. Turkey, which has battled Kurdish separatists on its own territory for several decades,
now faces a Kurdish state in Syria that is fomenting terrorist operations in Turkey in support of
Turkish Kurd separatists. Relations with the Assad regime had deteriorated in recent years,
culminating in Syria shooting down a Turkish jet in June 2012, followed by mortar and artillery
exchanges between Syria and Turkey in October 2012, with fatalities on both sides of the
Turkish-Syrian border. By 2012 at least 100,000 refugees had fled to Turkey from Syria,
although some are now returning to Sunnistan. From time to time, especially in the 1980s and
1990s, Syria supported Kurdish separatism in Turkey and in particular the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK). In post-Assad Syria, there remains a major transborder Kurdish problem for
Turkey, with the Kurdish Syrian state seeking to carve out a territory that includes Kurds living
in Turkey. Alawistan supports Kurdish territorial claims against Turkey, adding to the escalating
crisis tensions between Alawistan and Turkey.
With the collapse of the Assad regime despite Iranian support, Tehran has pursued a strategy that
appears to be paying off: (1) accelerating Iran’s nuclear weapons program; and (2) solidifying
Iranian links with the Alawite region of Syria and with Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as
alignment with Egypt. Iran has also been supporting radical Shiite elements in Iraq, where
Iranian influence is growing with the end of a U.S. military presence there. Tehran is also
supporting Islamist groups operating in the Persian Gulf states (the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain) as well as Saudi Arabia and Sunnistan. The collapse of the Bashar
al-Assad regime led to a debate in Tehran about the wisdom of having made such a large
investment in Damascus in support of Assad that proved to be a failure. According to one
faction, a preferred alternative would have been a greater investment in Iran’s own military
forces, including nuclear weapons.
Despite formidable domestic economic problems resulting in a sharp decline in the value of the
Iranian currency, the rial, and the rising cost of basic staples, Iran has both accelerated and
expanded its nuclear weapons program and pursued a close relationship with Alawistan as well
as other anti-Western regimes that have emerged from the Arab Spring, especially Egypt because
of its strategic importance. In addition to Egypt, Alawistan is also important to Iran’s eastern
Mediterranean ambitions as well as Iran’s ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah remains an
instrument of deterrence and coercion for Tehran against Israel, while Egypt gives Iran
additional leverage against Israel. Without Hezbollah Iran would be deprived of a key element of
its strategy to deter an Israeli strike against Iran. Tehran views Hezbollah as a valued ally in
threatening punishing retaliation against Israel. (Recall, for example, the short-range Iranian-
supplied rockets launched by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006. Since that time more advanced
and more numerous rockets have been supplied by Iran to Hezbollah.) However, Israel has begun
deployment of the Iron Dome defense system against short-range rockets, together with a more
robust missile defense against Iranian missiles that includes the Arrow system as well as U.S.
Aegis BMD ships capable of contributing to a layered missile defense for Israel.
Because Alawistan, together with Hezbollah, enhances Iran’s ability to confront Israel, Tehran
has not only salvaged what it could from the break-up of Syria following the defeat of Bashar al-
Assad and the continuing Syrian civil war, but has also emerged in a stronger overall position as
a result of its increasing alignment with Egypt. Egyptian President Morsi has made several visits
to Tehran. Iran has moved quickly to consolidate its security relationship with Cairo, including
signing a defense treaty in 2013 just before abrogating the Camp David Accords with Israel.
Therefore, the Syrian regime’s collapse, together with the Arab Spring in general, has produced a
host of crisis problems, especially for the United States and for Israel. Contrary to earlier
expectations that Iran would be weakened by the disintegration of Syria, by June 2014 the
breakup of Syria has had the effect of: (1) speeding up Iran’s emergence as a nuclear weapons
state despite Tehran’s ongoing formidable domestic economic problems; (2) strengthening Iran’s
links with the successor regime in Alawistan; (3) heightening tensions between Israel and its
neighbors; (4) creating new security challenges and problems for Turkey along its border with
Syria bringing Turkey into confrontation with Iran; and (5) greatly weakening and complicating
the overall position of the United States in the Middle East.
In January 2014 Iran announced that it had begun deployment of a nuclear weapons capability.
Authoritative Western intelligence sources believe that Iran has built several nuclear warheads,
together with missiles capable of reaching Israel and parts of Europe. Analysts point out that Iran
may already be able to launch short-range missiles from ships off the U.S. and European coasts.
After setting back its nuclear program by an estimated fifteen months in early 2011, Iran had
recovered from the STUXNET cyber-attacks and then had gone on to enrich sufficient weapons-
grade uranium for several nuclear warheads. The United States and Israel are believed to be
working on other cyber efforts to interfere with Iran’s nuclear program and to conduct cyber war.
Elsewhere in the region nuclear proliferation is increasing. The lesson of the fall of Qaddafi is
that Western intervention is less likely if the regime possesses WMD, including nuclear
weapons. Qaddafi was overthrown after he had given up such weapons. This consideration,
together with Iran’s new nuclear status, is leading other states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Turkey, to acquire their own nuclear capabilities.
Emboldened by its nuclear status, Iran is moving rapidly to consolidate and expand its position
both in Alawistan and elsewhere in the Middle East. The immediate effect of Iran’s nuclear
weapons status is a growing belief in Tehran that Iran can act with greater boldness both in the
Gulf and in the eastern Mediterranean, namely the former Syria and Lebanon as well as in
support of post-Mubarak Egypt. Egypt shares with Iran and other post-Arab Spring states a
common goal to remove the United States as a factor in Middle East international politics. With
extensive Iranian support, Hezbollah is attempting to destabilize Sunnistan. Although aligned
with Iran against Israel, Turkey and Iran remain sharply at odds not only on Alawistan, but on
other issues as well. For example, Turkey and Iran are competing for influence in northern Iraq.
Turkey, as well as Saudi Arabia, helped to topple the Assad regime, which was strongly backed
by Iran. In response, Tehran and the Assad regime supported Kurdish militant groups operating
in Turkey. Turkey sees an opening in Sunnistan to outflank the Syrian Kurds who are now
fomenting Kurdish separatism in Turkey.
Along with Iran, Egypt has developed close ties with Alawistan. Egypt views Alawistan as an
important part of the relationship with Iran. Iran and Egypt share an interest in using Alawistan
to put political-military pressure on Israel. However, to repeat, Turkey remains in conflict with
Alawistan. Furthermore, Hezbollah, supported by Iran, has mounted increasingly intense attacks
with short-range rockets in 2014 against targets in Israel from its bases in Lebanon. Fearing an
Israeli strike into Lebanon and even Alawistan, Iran may have moved one or more nuclear
warheads into Alawistan, which also has a large stockpile of chemical weapons.
Assad’s Syrian chemical weapons stockpile included nerve agents as well as skin-blistering
mustard gas. The arsenal contained hundreds of tons of sarin, a lethal nerve agent, as well as
large stocks of VX, an even more deadly and persistent nerve agent. The Syrian inventory held
aerial bombs filled mostly with sarin gas, together with as many as 200 chemical warheads for
Scud-B and Scud-C missiles and thousands of chemical bombs and artillery shells. Syria also
had surface-to-air and naval cruise missiles capable of delivering chemical warheads. With the
breakup of Syria, chemical weapons are in the hands of each of the successor states. In late 2012
United States intelligence sources indicated that they believed Syrian chemical weapons had
fallen into terrorist hands. It is confirmed that both Hezbollah and al Qaeda now possess such
capabilities as a result of the disintegration of Syria. About two thirds of the total Syrian
chemical weapons capability is in Alawistan. Alawistan also possesses chemical weapons
production facilities that were built in the 1970s. Therefore, Alawistan is believed to be
producing additional chemical weapons. Beyond its indigenous chemical weapons production
capability, Syria is known to have received chemical weapons that were removed from Iraq prior
to the U.S. invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Alawistan’s official position on chemical weapons, reflecting Syria’s stance, is that such
weapons will not be used except against an invader. As a result, Alawistan maintains a “first use”
doctrine that could be implemented in the case of an invasion of Alawistan. Alawistan states that
it is prepared to retaliate with chemical weapons in a response to an attack against its territory.
In addition to withdrawing from the 1979 Camp David Accords in 2013, Egypt sees Alawistan as
an ally against Israel. Recall that in the 1960s Egypt and Syria were linked in the United Arab
Republic. By 2014 post-Mubarak Egypt has established a close relationship with both Sunnistan
and Alawistan. Furthermore, Egypt has opened the Suez Canal to Iranian navy ships and other
shipping from Iran to resupply its Mediterranean allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and
Hamas in Gaza and Alawistan. This places growing pressure on Israel as a result of Iranian naval
threats to sea lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean and the vast seabed oil and natural gas reserves
coming on line off Israel’s coast. These resources are now threatened by Iran as well as
Hezbollah, with disputes between Lebanon and Israel about offshore claims.
By 2014 Egyptian control of the Sinai has become increasingly tenuous leading to the
“Somalization” of the peninsula, which has become a haven for terrorists and a base for pirates.
The pipeline supplying Israel with Egyptian natural gas was repeatedly sabotaged until all
shipments from Egypt ceased. The Sinai has also become a route for weapons transferred by Iran
to Hamas in Gaza. In an effort to reestablish control over the Sinai, Egypt has begun to move
major military units into the Sinai, while abandoning the demilitarization agreements that were
part of the now defunct Egypt-Israel peace treaty. This has aroused increasing anxiety in Israel
with growing support for an Israeli military strike into the Sinai. Iran has stated that in the event
of a war between Egypt and Israel, Tehran will support Egypt with nuclear weapons if necessary.
In other words, Iran has threatened Israel with nuclear escalation in the event of hostilities
between Israel and Egypt.
Adding to the transformed regional security setting, a “Gaullist” Turkey has emerged. Turkey
has experienced by 2014 impressive economic growth over the last decade that has nearly
doubled per capita income to $10,500. In 2013 Turkey embarked on an effort to become a
regional nuclear weapons state. Turkey remains a member of NATO and therefore under its
security umbrella in 2014 and in particular the Treaty’s Article 5 collective defense (an attack
upon one member is to be regarded as an attack on all). However, the military role in Turkish
politics has greatly diminished in recent years, thus removing the most important pro-Western
(and pro-U.S.) element that had long been a key part of the Turkish political structure. Instead,
we have seen the emergence of a more nationalist, self-confident, anti-Western Turkey that is
often aligned with Egypt and Iran even though Ankara is sharply at odds with Iran over Syria
and now Alawistan and remains prepared to take advantage of its NATO membership.
In sum, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt encourage radical Islamist elements in the region. They share an
interest in further isolating Israel and removing the United States as a force in the Middle East.
However, they find themselves on opposite sides on the important issue of Alawistan. Although
increasingly distancing itself from U.S. policy, Turkey nevertheless remains a NATO ally,
prepared if necessary to make use of its NATO membership in the case of crisis escalation with
Alawistan that brings Iran into conflict over Alawistan. Iran and Egypt view Alawistan as
crucially important in their ongoing conflict with Israel.
Elsewhere in the region there are adverse trends as well. There is uncertainty about the future of
Jordan as King Abdullah faces rising political pressure from Islamist groups seeking the ouster
of the Hashemite dynasty. Saudi Arabia faces an uncertain future. An estimated 175,000 Syrian
refugees have crossed the border into Jordan in recent years. Although the current regime
remains in power, Saudi Arabia is both a modern state and a country with a powerful religious
establishment seeking to return to fundamental Islamic values. In the 2014 Middle East, Saudi
Arabia seeks to undermine Alawistan and to weaken its relationship with Iran. There is an
intensifying regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is the overall security setting
within which the June 2014 crisis begins.
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Simulex/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/SIMULEX/pdfs/Simulex Scenario 2012.pdf
Background
It is June 2014. In the past eighteen months there have been major crisis developments in the
Middle East. The Arab Spring has led to a dramatically transformed security setting that is still
unfolding in 2014. From Tunisia to Syria, anti-Western Islamist regimes have come to power.
Specifically, what is described as a “Crescent of Instability” extends from Egypt into Palestine,
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the successor states of Syria. The withdrawal of remaining U.S.
combat troops has led to growing Iranian and Turkish influence in Iraq. Islamist parties now hold
a dominant position in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Gaza, and Turkey. Al Qaeda and its affiliates as
well as the Muslim Brotherhood have gained footholds in several countries in the region.
Although they remain sharply at odds on Syria, Turkey and Iran are aligned against Israel and
the United States. Egypt has withdrawn from its peace agreement with Israel and is now formally
allied with Iran. Although violence continues, Syria has fractured into essentially three entities
based, respectively, on the Alawite, Sunni, and Kurdish populations.
A major part of the unfolding crisis setting is focused on Syria, originally created by France after
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. By 2014 the remnants of the
Bashar regime have formed a new Alawite state in the Levantine highlands overlooking the
Mediterranean Sea called Alawistan in control of the Syrian coastal area extending from the
border with Turkey to the border with Lebanon. The Syrian territory that remains under Alawite
control includes Damascus and Aleppo. With its concentration of Alawite population (about 11.2
percent of Syria’s total), Alawistan has close ties with Iran and with Hezbollah operating in
Lebanon. Russia continues to use the Syrian port of Tartus as a naval resupply facility. Moscow
has had longstanding ties to the Assad family extending back for several decades and has
provided refuge for members of Assad’s family fleeing Syria, as well as weapons to Alawistan.
However, the largest Syrian population (70 percent) is concentrated in a new state, Sunnistan,
that includes about three-quarters of Syria’s territory. The conflict that removed Assad was
waged primarily by Sunnis against the ruling Alawite minority. In 2014 tensions remain high
between Alawistan and Sunnistan and between Turkey and Alawistan. Saudi Arabia, having
worked to undermine Alawite rule throughout Syria, is now actively supporting Sunnistan and
continuing its efforts to arm rebels still fighting in Alawistan. Saudi Arabia seeks to undermine
the Iran-Alawistan relationship. Saudi Arabia has long seen itself as a protector of Syria’s Sunni
majority. This continues in the fragmented Syria of 2014.
The third major element of post-Assad Syria is the Kurds (about 9 percent of Syria’s total
population), located in northeast Syria adjacent to Turkey. With the fracturing of Syria, Iran is
reinforcing its ties with Alawistan. Iran, having failed to prevent Assad’s fall, is now Alawistan’s
chief ally. Turkey, which has battled Kurdish separatists on its own territory for several decades,
now faces a Kurdish state in Syria that is fomenting terrorist operations in Turkey in support of
Turkish Kurd separatists. Relations with the Assad regime had deteriorated in recent years,
culminating in Syria shooting down a Turkish jet in June 2012, followed by mortar and artillery
exchanges between Syria and Turkey in October 2012, with fatalities on both sides of the
Turkish-Syrian border. By 2012 at least 100,000 refugees had fled to Turkey from Syria,
although some are now returning to Sunnistan. From time to time, especially in the 1980s and
1990s, Syria supported Kurdish separatism in Turkey and in particular the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK). In post-Assad Syria, there remains a major transborder Kurdish problem for
Turkey, with the Kurdish Syrian state seeking to carve out a territory that includes Kurds living
in Turkey. Alawistan supports Kurdish territorial claims against Turkey, adding to the escalating
crisis tensions between Alawistan and Turkey.
With the collapse of the Assad regime despite Iranian support, Tehran has pursued a strategy that
appears to be paying off: (1) accelerating Iran’s nuclear weapons program; and (2) solidifying
Iranian links with the Alawite region of Syria and with Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as
alignment with Egypt. Iran has also been supporting radical Shiite elements in Iraq, where
Iranian influence is growing with the end of a U.S. military presence there. Tehran is also
supporting Islamist groups operating in the Persian Gulf states (the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain) as well as Saudi Arabia and Sunnistan. The collapse of the Bashar
al-Assad regime led to a debate in Tehran about the wisdom of having made such a large
investment in Damascus in support of Assad that proved to be a failure. According to one
faction, a preferred alternative would have been a greater investment in Iran’s own military
forces, including nuclear weapons.
Despite formidable domestic economic problems resulting in a sharp decline in the value of the
Iranian currency, the rial, and the rising cost of basic staples, Iran has both accelerated and
expanded its nuclear weapons program and pursued a close relationship with Alawistan as well
as other anti-Western regimes that have emerged from the Arab Spring, especially Egypt because
of its strategic importance. In addition to Egypt, Alawistan is also important to Iran’s eastern
Mediterranean ambitions as well as Iran’s ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah remains an
instrument of deterrence and coercion for Tehran against Israel, while Egypt gives Iran
additional leverage against Israel. Without Hezbollah Iran would be deprived of a key element of
its strategy to deter an Israeli strike against Iran. Tehran views Hezbollah as a valued ally in
threatening punishing retaliation against Israel. (Recall, for example, the short-range Iranian-
supplied rockets launched by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006. Since that time more advanced
and more numerous rockets have been supplied by Iran to Hezbollah.) However, Israel has begun
deployment of the Iron Dome defense system against short-range rockets, together with a more
robust missile defense against Iranian missiles that includes the Arrow system as well as U.S.
Aegis BMD ships capable of contributing to a layered missile defense for Israel.
Because Alawistan, together with Hezbollah, enhances Iran’s ability to confront Israel, Tehran
has not only salvaged what it could from the break-up of Syria following the defeat of Bashar al-
Assad and the continuing Syrian civil war, but has also emerged in a stronger overall position as
a result of its increasing alignment with Egypt. Egyptian President Morsi has made several visits
to Tehran. Iran has moved quickly to consolidate its security relationship with Cairo, including
signing a defense treaty in 2013 just before abrogating the Camp David Accords with Israel.
Therefore, the Syrian regime’s collapse, together with the Arab Spring in general, has produced a
host of crisis problems, especially for the United States and for Israel. Contrary to earlier
expectations that Iran would be weakened by the disintegration of Syria, by June 2014 the
breakup of Syria has had the effect of: (1) speeding up Iran’s emergence as a nuclear weapons
state despite Tehran’s ongoing formidable domestic economic problems; (2) strengthening Iran’s
links with the successor regime in Alawistan; (3) heightening tensions between Israel and its
neighbors; (4) creating new security challenges and problems for Turkey along its border with
Syria bringing Turkey into confrontation with Iran; and (5) greatly weakening and complicating
the overall position of the United States in the Middle East.
In January 2014 Iran announced that it had begun deployment of a nuclear weapons capability.
Authoritative Western intelligence sources believe that Iran has built several nuclear warheads,
together with missiles capable of reaching Israel and parts of Europe. Analysts point out that Iran
may already be able to launch short-range missiles from ships off the U.S. and European coasts.
After setting back its nuclear program by an estimated fifteen months in early 2011, Iran had
recovered from the STUXNET cyber-attacks and then had gone on to enrich sufficient weapons-
grade uranium for several nuclear warheads. The United States and Israel are believed to be
working on other cyber efforts to interfere with Iran’s nuclear program and to conduct cyber war.
Elsewhere in the region nuclear proliferation is increasing. The lesson of the fall of Qaddafi is
that Western intervention is less likely if the regime possesses WMD, including nuclear
weapons. Qaddafi was overthrown after he had given up such weapons. This consideration,
together with Iran’s new nuclear status, is leading other states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Turkey, to acquire their own nuclear capabilities.
Emboldened by its nuclear status, Iran is moving rapidly to consolidate and expand its position
both in Alawistan and elsewhere in the Middle East. The immediate effect of Iran’s nuclear
weapons status is a growing belief in Tehran that Iran can act with greater boldness both in the
Gulf and in the eastern Mediterranean, namely the former Syria and Lebanon as well as in
support of post-Mubarak Egypt. Egypt shares with Iran and other post-Arab Spring states a
common goal to remove the United States as a factor in Middle East international politics. With
extensive Iranian support, Hezbollah is attempting to destabilize Sunnistan. Although aligned
with Iran against Israel, Turkey and Iran remain sharply at odds not only on Alawistan, but on
other issues as well. For example, Turkey and Iran are competing for influence in northern Iraq.
Turkey, as well as Saudi Arabia, helped to topple the Assad regime, which was strongly backed
by Iran. In response, Tehran and the Assad regime supported Kurdish militant groups operating
in Turkey. Turkey sees an opening in Sunnistan to outflank the Syrian Kurds who are now
fomenting Kurdish separatism in Turkey.
Along with Iran, Egypt has developed close ties with Alawistan. Egypt views Alawistan as an
important part of the relationship with Iran. Iran and Egypt share an interest in using Alawistan
to put political-military pressure on Israel. However, to repeat, Turkey remains in conflict with
Alawistan. Furthermore, Hezbollah, supported by Iran, has mounted increasingly intense attacks
with short-range rockets in 2014 against targets in Israel from its bases in Lebanon. Fearing an
Israeli strike into Lebanon and even Alawistan, Iran may have moved one or more nuclear
warheads into Alawistan, which also has a large stockpile of chemical weapons.
Assad’s Syrian chemical weapons stockpile included nerve agents as well as skin-blistering
mustard gas. The arsenal contained hundreds of tons of sarin, a lethal nerve agent, as well as
large stocks of VX, an even more deadly and persistent nerve agent. The Syrian inventory held
aerial bombs filled mostly with sarin gas, together with as many as 200 chemical warheads for
Scud-B and Scud-C missiles and thousands of chemical bombs and artillery shells. Syria also
had surface-to-air and naval cruise missiles capable of delivering chemical warheads. With the
breakup of Syria, chemical weapons are in the hands of each of the successor states. In late 2012
United States intelligence sources indicated that they believed Syrian chemical weapons had
fallen into terrorist hands. It is confirmed that both Hezbollah and al Qaeda now possess such
capabilities as a result of the disintegration of Syria. About two thirds of the total Syrian
chemical weapons capability is in Alawistan. Alawistan also possesses chemical weapons
production facilities that were built in the 1970s. Therefore, Alawistan is believed to be
producing additional chemical weapons. Beyond its indigenous chemical weapons production
capability, Syria is known to have received chemical weapons that were removed from Iraq prior
to the U.S. invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Alawistan’s official position on chemical weapons, reflecting Syria’s stance, is that such
weapons will not be used except against an invader. As a result, Alawistan maintains a “first use”
doctrine that could be implemented in the case of an invasion of Alawistan. Alawistan states that
it is prepared to retaliate with chemical weapons in a response to an attack against its territory.
In addition to withdrawing from the 1979 Camp David Accords in 2013, Egypt sees Alawistan as
an ally against Israel. Recall that in the 1960s Egypt and Syria were linked in the United Arab
Republic. By 2014 post-Mubarak Egypt has established a close relationship with both Sunnistan
and Alawistan. Furthermore, Egypt has opened the Suez Canal to Iranian navy ships and other
shipping from Iran to resupply its Mediterranean allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and
Hamas in Gaza and Alawistan. This places growing pressure on Israel as a result of Iranian naval
threats to sea lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean and the vast seabed oil and natural gas reserves
coming on line off Israel’s coast. These resources are now threatened by Iran as well as
Hezbollah, with disputes between Lebanon and Israel about offshore claims.
By 2014 Egyptian control of the Sinai has become increasingly tenuous leading to the
“Somalization” of the peninsula, which has become a haven for terrorists and a base for pirates.
The pipeline supplying Israel with Egyptian natural gas was repeatedly sabotaged until all
shipments from Egypt ceased. The Sinai has also become a route for weapons transferred by Iran
to Hamas in Gaza. In an effort to reestablish control over the Sinai, Egypt has begun to move
major military units into the Sinai, while abandoning the demilitarization agreements that were
part of the now defunct Egypt-Israel peace treaty. This has aroused increasing anxiety in Israel
with growing support for an Israeli military strike into the Sinai. Iran has stated that in the event
of a war between Egypt and Israel, Tehran will support Egypt with nuclear weapons if necessary.
In other words, Iran has threatened Israel with nuclear escalation in the event of hostilities
between Israel and Egypt.
Adding to the transformed regional security setting, a “Gaullist” Turkey has emerged. Turkey
has experienced by 2014 impressive economic growth over the last decade that has nearly
doubled per capita income to $10,500. In 2013 Turkey embarked on an effort to become a
regional nuclear weapons state. Turkey remains a member of NATO and therefore under its
security umbrella in 2014 and in particular the Treaty’s Article 5 collective defense (an attack
upon one member is to be regarded as an attack on all). However, the military role in Turkish
politics has greatly diminished in recent years, thus removing the most important pro-Western
(and pro-U.S.) element that had long been a key part of the Turkish political structure. Instead,
we have seen the emergence of a more nationalist, self-confident, anti-Western Turkey that is
often aligned with Egypt and Iran even though Ankara is sharply at odds with Iran over Syria
and now Alawistan and remains prepared to take advantage of its NATO membership.
In sum, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt encourage radical Islamist elements in the region. They share an
interest in further isolating Israel and removing the United States as a force in the Middle East.
However, they find themselves on opposite sides on the important issue of Alawistan. Although
increasingly distancing itself from U.S. policy, Turkey nevertheless remains a NATO ally,
prepared if necessary to make use of its NATO membership in the case of crisis escalation with
Alawistan that brings Iran into conflict over Alawistan. Iran and Egypt view Alawistan as
crucially important in their ongoing conflict with Israel.
Elsewhere in the region there are adverse trends as well. There is uncertainty about the future of
Jordan as King Abdullah faces rising political pressure from Islamist groups seeking the ouster
of the Hashemite dynasty. Saudi Arabia faces an uncertain future. An estimated 175,000 Syrian
refugees have crossed the border into Jordan in recent years. Although the current regime
remains in power, Saudi Arabia is both a modern state and a country with a powerful religious
establishment seeking to return to fundamental Islamic values. In the 2014 Middle East, Saudi
Arabia seeks to undermine Alawistan and to weaken its relationship with Iran. There is an
intensifying regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is the overall security setting
within which the June 2014 crisis begins.
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Simulex/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/SIMULEX/pdfs/Simulex Scenario 2012.pdf
