Trishul Blogspot counter blog.
Improving Warships' Situational Awareness For Coastal Security/Constabulary Operations
The ‘desi’ journalists never cease to indulge in yellow journalism and superstitious oversimplifications (when the problem in reality is far more deep-rooted), as evidenced by the contents of this report:
Livefist: Frigate INS Talwar Jinxed? Second Time A Skipper Has Been Stripped Of Position
Fact of the matter is that none of the Indian Navy’s (IN) principal surface combatants are presently equipped with passive infra-red search-and-track systems (IRST), which ought to be mandatory whenever any warship—large or small—undertakes incessant coastal security patrols. Such sensors effectively supplement both the on-board marine navigation radars as well as target detection/target engagement radars like the Garpun Bal-E. While the IN’s X-FAC-Ms along with those of the Indian Coast Guard Service (ICGS) are being progressively retrofitted with ELBIT Systems-supplied COMPASS gyro-stabilised multi-sensor optronic systems, the same does not hold true for the IN’s FFGs, DDGs, guided-missile corvettes, AOPVs and auxiliary vessels like fleet replenishment tankers and LST-Ls.
In fact, only the three Project 17 FFGs, plus the six 105-metre NOPVs now in delivery, are presently equipped with gyro-stabilised multi-sensor optronic systems—these being those co-developed by India’s VEM Technologies Pvt Ltd and the UK’s Vinten-Radamec and being used primarily for optronic fire-control in support of the OTOBreda 76/62 SRGM. The three Project 15A DDGs too will have them.
The obvious and only solution therefore is to retrofit the IN’s each existing DDGs, FFGs, guided-missile corvettes and NOPVs, as well as the ICGS’ OPVs and AOPVs with dual high-definition gyro-stabilised multi-sensor optronic systems, which will dramatically improve the all-weather situational awareness of the officers-on-watch on board such warships. Such solutions are already available from OEMs based in the US, Canada, France, Germany and Israel.
SAGEM’s EOMS-NG (electro-optical multifunction system–new generation) and Vampir-NG optronic panoramic surveillance system—presently being offered by SAGEM through its authorised Indian distributor Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Ltd, is a day/night, multifunction, gyrostabilised optronic system. It offers complete functionality over 360°, including infra-red surveillance, identification, tracking, laser rangefinding and fire-control system. Remote-controlled from two consoles operating in tandem from a warship’s close-in air-defence bridge, the EOMS-NG helps assess the warship’s immediate environment, controls self-defence weapons and enhances the safety of helicopter operations. The EOMS-NG’s operating concept, based on high-rate panoramic shots, gives it the observation capability equivalent to 100 fixed cameras.
Let us now proceed to the root-causes of the MRO/serviceability problems afflicting the IN’s operational fleet. That successive Govts of India between the early 1990s and November 2008 had no idea about what constituted coastal security becomes evident from the fact that, despite the 10 IED blasts that rocked Bombay on March 12, 1993, resulting in 257 killed or missing and 713 injured (and caused by 8 tonnes of RDX, detonators, gelatine, AK-56s and pistols plus their ammunition reloads and magazines, and hand-grenades that were ferried by sea to landing sites at Dighi and Srivardhan along Maharashtra’s coastline at between February 3 and 7, 1993), no attempt was made till early 2009 for securing the coastlines of Gujarat and Maharashtra through the establishment of a multi-sensor coastal surveillance system.
Provision of coastal security through persistent surveillance and target detection is a multi-asset and multi-layered assignment that is best achieved through a combination of shore-based, seaborne, airborne and space-based hardware which, only when employed in a combined and synchronised manner, will generate a comprehensive picture of what’s happening or who is going where and how into the sea (the so-called domain of maritime awareness or DMA), especially the Arabian Sea, which is spread over an area of 38.6 lakh sq km. While the Govt of India has, since November 2008, welcomed the IN’s desire for providing the leadership for coastal security roles and operations, it obviously continues to be oblivious of the cost in terms of conventional naval war preparedness. Why then is the IN condemning its warships and crew on an evidently self-defeating task? Primarily, for two reasons. Firstly, after the 26/11 terrorist attacks, everyone within the country’s civilian officialdom collectively pointed fingers at the IN, implying that since the medium of infiltration was through the sea, it had to be the IN’s failure. The Govt of India, though wiser than the popular perception, opportunistically decided to play along in order to prevent the criticisms coming its way. In fact, the political leadership’s incomprehension of India’s coastal borders and their vulnerabilities can be gauged by the fact that after OP Vijay/OP Safed Sagar in 1999, when the then NDA coalition government appointed a task force to suggest security measures for securing India’s frontiers, the focus was only on land. And the subsequent Group of Ministers’ report on India’s border management referred to coastal borders in only a cursory manner. Secondly, why the IN got sucked into the coastal security domain was partially its own fault. In 2010, when incidences of Somali piracy were making headlines every day, the IN’s Western Naval Command decided to initiate a month-long anti-piracy exercise as a matter of routine. This exercise, which generated tremendous deterrent value in the high seas, soon unintentionally morphed into a full-fledged operation. And once the Govt of India realised that the IN to do more effectively what the ICGS’ job ought to be, it simply washed its hands away, while the ICGS developed a dependency-on-the-IN syndrome.
Immediately after 26/11, the Govt of India rushed matters by making the IN the lead provider of coastal security (the IN up till then had only been responsible for providing maritime security and coastal defence) and prematurely fixed the areas of responsibilities (AOR) for the ICGS and the various State Marine Police agencies without first appreciating their respective capacities and capabilities. The area stretching from the shore out to 3nm into the sea was made the responsibility of the Marine Police agencies, while the area from 3nm out to 12nm (territorial waters) was entrusted to the ICGS, while the area beyond the 12nm limit out into the high seas became the IN’s AOR. Now, as per international norms and conventions, the area stretching out from a country’s baseline right to a distance of 24nm is known as the contiguous zone within which a country’s fiscal and health laws apply. 200nm ahead of the baseline lies the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Unfortunately, prior to 26/11, conceptualisation of India’s various maritime borders was never understood or taken seriously. Consequently, when the state-level Marine Police agencies were brought into the loop for providing coastal security, they never understood what all this meant, since they had all been under the assumption that India’s borders ended at the shorelines. Additionally, several of these state-level agencies grasped rather lately that coastal security was a pan-India issue and that despite territorial/jurisdictional reservations, eventually all the maritime agencies operating out of India’s coastal states will have to follow one unitary national directive.
Another major problem was the unavailability of trained manpower to man the various coastal police stations of the Marine Police agencies. And wherever some human resources were available, they loathed their offshore patrolling taskings since they were not trained in seamanship. Such personnel soon discovered that cruising on the sea on board high-speed interceptor craft was quite different from cruising cruising on a lake or river. Thus far, 340 FICs (Motomarine SA-built Hellraiser and Invader) have been approved for import. These are being licence-assembled in India by the MoD-owned GSL and GRSE, with the latter being contracted for the supply of an initial 78 FICs for those marine police agencies straddling the Bay of Bengal. The 12-tonne FIC—called Hellraiser—is built of glass-reinforced plastic (GRP), costs Rs25 million per unit, and is capable of a top speed of 38 Knots (70 kph). The boat is 13 metres long and has an endurance of 75nm with 25% reserve fuel capacity. It can carry four crew members along with a patrolling party of 16 persons. The boat is fitted with two inboard main engines of 500HP each with waterjet propulsion. These boats have been designed and constructed for deployment in Indian territorial waters for day and night surveillance and investigation of suspected vessels in and around harbour, anchorage and along the sea coast. The boats are highly seaworthy and unsinkable type having 10% reserve buoyancy even when filled with water. An on-board radar provides the boat’s commander with automatic, real-time updates of maritime activity received from navigation, positional, and position-tracking sensors such as AIS, automatic radar plotting aids, and full-motion optronic sensors so as to afford greater clarity in the tactical picture and thus improve decision-making. The live data is shared amongst the nodes in the network via an intelligent router, thus allowing critical and prioritised information to be broadcasted on the best line connectivity available over up to four different channels using HF, VHF, UHF, SATCOM or WIFI.
The Invader 5.4-tonne FIC can attain speeds of 40 Knots, is 9.60 metres long, and has an endurance of 75nm with 25% reserve fuel capacity. The boat can carry four crew members along with a patrolling party of 10 persons and comes fully equipped with life-saving, fire-fighting and communications facilities. The boat is fitted with two outboard Motors of 275HP each for propulsion and manoeuvring. The wheel house is fitted with anti-ballistic panels for protection of the patrolling crew to withstand firing from an AK-47 assault rifle at 10-metre range. Deliveries of the Invader and Hellraiser FICs have so far taken place for the marine police agencies of Maharashtra (28 ordered), Goa (five ordered), West Bengal (18 ordered), Tamil Nadu (44 ordered), Gujarat, Kerala, and the Andaman & Nicobar Administration (eight delivered). Maharashtra, meanwhile, is procuring an additional 29 patrol boats costing Rs1.5 billion from Mumbai-based Marine Frontiers Pvt Ltd. The night patrolling capabilities of the Hellraiser and Invader families of FICs are severely limited in view of the non-availability of dedicated COTS-based navigational radars (like those from FURUNO). In addition, the non-availability of night vision binoculars/goggles on-board also affected their efficacy for dark-hour patrols. In addition, both the ICGS and various marine police agencies also lacks vital equipment such as hand-held GPS receivers, night-vision binoculars, SAR transponders, and emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRB).
A far bigger challenge has been the creation and operationalisation of a hierarchical, multi-agency coastal security ensemble as part of the IN’s visionary DMA—something that required all stakeholders to cooperate with one another and evolve an over-arching set of standard operating procedures (SOP) and rules of engagement (ROE)—all under a centralised command-and-control structure overseen by the IN. This has proven to be the most complicated challenge to overcome, since both the IN and ICGS never really had interacted with state-level and Central civil agencies like harbour/port authorities, Marine Police, Customs and Immigration agencies, and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI). Even though the IN, to its credit, had created several Joint Operations Centres (JOC) by late 2009 and had driven home the point that these JOCs were coordinating and not command centres, a high degree of agency mistrust and turf-protection mindsets continue to prevail, thereby preventing the JOCs from being fully functional and subverting such well-meaning multi-pronged initiatives. As a compromise, the IN has thus far succeeded in establishing telephone hotlines between all concerned agencies as an interim solution, and has also convinced the Union Home Secretary to prevail over his state-level counterparts who, in turn, have taken some tangible steps towards coaxing the various state-level agencies to send their representatives to their workstations within the JOCs.
In addition to these, the IN has, post-26/11, initiated the ‘Sagar Kavach’ series of exercises (at a rate of two exercises per year per coastal state) aimed at sensitising all stakeholders towards the concept of coastal security. This task too has proven to be difficult to implement, since non-IN and non-ICGS agencies did not participate with the same degree of enthusiasm until the IN invited the Chief Secretaries of the concerned coastal states to chair the debriefing sessions after the conduct of each such exercise. Bottomline: no amount of sensitisation will produce tangible results unless each stakeholder is made accountable for its part.
Consequently, the IN is now paying the price for such ill-conceived initiatives by being compelled to play policing or constabulary roles, which were previously tertiary, as one of its primary tasks. Instead of insisting that provision of maritime defence/security should be its only task, the IN has accepted the additional responsibility of providing coastal security, a move that has serious national security implications since it diminishes the IN’s conventional warfighting capabilities. For instance, out of the 365 days between August 2010 and August 2011, all principal surface combatants of the IN’s Western Naval Command were involved in patrolling for almost 280 days, causing needless wear-and-tear of frontline operational warships. Prior to 26/11, such warships of the Western Naval Command and Eastern Naval Command used to participate in fortnight-long exercises twice a year, with enough time in-between for recoup, recovery, review of warfighting doctrines and tactics, and embarking on naval diplomacy. Now, with the heightened focus on coastal security, the damage wrought to the IN is three-fold: DDGs costing Rs.3,500 crore and FFGs costing Rs.2,500 crore are being used for chasing pirates, thereby taking a toll on the service lives of such warships since they have limitations on serviceable engine-hours when used at low-speeds; a defensive mindset is overwhelming the IN’s rank-and-file, which in turn serves to diminish the IN’s sea deterrence capacity; and dilution of its primary role is coming at the cost of exercising with friendly navies. Though an instrument can be used for multiple purposes, it is best used only when it is used for the role that it was designed for. Otherwise, it operates a lower efficiencies and at higher costs. And this is exactly what’s happening with the IN’s frontline surface combatants. Military capabilities come at an extremely high premium. But if the Govt of India feels that the armed forces will not be called upon to perform their primary roles (i.e. conventional warfighting), then it should disband the armed forces and save the premium. After all, why spend Rs.1,000 on a job that can be done with Rs.100? Better invest that money elsewhere.
The Way Forward
And yet, despite lavish spending on hardware procurements by the MoD and Union MHA, today, it can hardly be said that India’s 7,516km-long coastline is secure, if not impregnable. While India is not as vulnerable today as she was in November 2008, improvement has only been marginal and the country still needs a lot of luck. After all, provision of comprehensive coastal security is not like a polythene bag inside which one can put India, with all the bad people remaining outside. Ideally, instead of the IN, the ICGS should have been designated as the nodal agency for coordinating with all other civilian stakeholders. But that was not to be. Now, the IN needs to hand over to the ICGS at the earliest the task of providing coastal security. In reality, the IN should have no locus standi within India’s territorial waters. Instead, only the ICGS and the various Marine Police agencies of the coastal states should be made responsible for providing coastal security.
(to be concluded)
TRISHUL: Improving Warships' Situational Awareness For Coastal Security/Constabulary Operations
