The International Spectator - Five reasons Israel is in trouble
Considering what has befallen the Arab World since early 2011, it would appear these are relatively tranquil times for Israel. The economy is pushing along at over three percent growth as Israeli technology firms continue to turn heads around the world and record numbers of tourists stream into the country. And amidst the seemingly aimless and perpetual drone of US-brokered peace negotiations and intra-Palestinian bickering, security is good – rocket attacks on Israel have declined significantly since Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012, with the attacks largely inconsequential when they do happen. If that weren’t enough, Israel’s enemies in the region – in both their Shi’ite and Sunni strands – are tearing themselves apart next door in Syria, in a battle both sides deem existential. Meanwhile in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been ejected from power and smashed under the brunt of a military that has long comforted Israeli anxieties.
Surely, shouldn’t even Israel’s congenital pessimists be happy with this immediate reality?
Yes, but the future beyond that looks increasingly troublesome. The longer the period in question, the more intractable and dangerous Israel’s challenges and risks seem.
Here are five reasons why Israel is in trouble.
1. The changing priorities of the United States
After a decade of expensive war and six years of economic recession and sluggish recovery, the United States is increasingly fatigued on the world stage and instead focused on domestic challenges. As the Obama Administration’s aborted strike on the Assad regime last September demonstrates, Congress has become increasingly suspicious of the use of military action and House members, from both sides of the aisle, are generally hesitant to consent to war and risk facing primary challenges from within their own parties. In large, this is a response to a strengthening isolationist bend amongst the public. According to a Pew survey published late last year, a majority of Americans believe their country’s influence is ‘waning’ and that the US should ‘mind its own business’ on the world stage and prioritise the economy – and especially welfare reform, income inequality and the public debt.
By implication, this means less intervention and a greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific at the expense of the Greater Middle East. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined in an essay, the ‘pivot’ to Asia is an integral and inevitable strategic shift in attempting to address America’s aforementioned economic priorities. The Asian middle-class, which is projected to constitute 64% of the world’s middle-class by 2030, is highlighted specifically as a strategic growth opportunity for American business. This shift towards the Pacific is further facilitated by growing American energy independence on the back of the shale revolution, which will lead to a decline in the Middle East’s importance to Washington, even if the oil-rich region maintains extraordinary influence on global energy prices. These economic realities and priorities are manifesting in tangible military and personnel shifts, such as the Pentagon rebalancing the US navy from a 60-40 deployment in favour of the Atlantic to a 50-50 balance between the Atlantic and Pacific.
For Israel, this marks its principal ally’s strategic shift and, thus, the gradual weakening of Israel’s traditional security umbrella. According to a study at the Tami Steinmetz Center For Peace Research in Tel Aviv University, 80% of Israelis think their country’s survival depends on the US, but a majority see separation between the two countries as inevitable because of diverging priorities. This disconnect between America’s primacy to Israel’s strategic security, on one hand, and America’s national interests shifting to the Asia-Pacific, on the other, is fundamentally irreversible. The United States will simply be less inclined to embrace aggressive policies in the Middle East or in assisting Israel militarily or politically as it has previously. Nor will Israel be able to replicate such a relationship with any actor instead of the United States, thereby pushing the Israelis to greater self-reliance. As former Carter adviser Zbigniew Brezinski claims, Israel will thereby become somewhat of a ‘geopolitically endangered species’ amidst American re-prioritisation and relative decline.
Rest of article can be found here.
Considering what has befallen the Arab World since early 2011, it would appear these are relatively tranquil times for Israel. The economy is pushing along at over three percent growth as Israeli technology firms continue to turn heads around the world and record numbers of tourists stream into the country. And amidst the seemingly aimless and perpetual drone of US-brokered peace negotiations and intra-Palestinian bickering, security is good – rocket attacks on Israel have declined significantly since Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012, with the attacks largely inconsequential when they do happen. If that weren’t enough, Israel’s enemies in the region – in both their Shi’ite and Sunni strands – are tearing themselves apart next door in Syria, in a battle both sides deem existential. Meanwhile in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been ejected from power and smashed under the brunt of a military that has long comforted Israeli anxieties.
Surely, shouldn’t even Israel’s congenital pessimists be happy with this immediate reality?
Yes, but the future beyond that looks increasingly troublesome. The longer the period in question, the more intractable and dangerous Israel’s challenges and risks seem.
Here are five reasons why Israel is in trouble.
1. The changing priorities of the United States
After a decade of expensive war and six years of economic recession and sluggish recovery, the United States is increasingly fatigued on the world stage and instead focused on domestic challenges. As the Obama Administration’s aborted strike on the Assad regime last September demonstrates, Congress has become increasingly suspicious of the use of military action and House members, from both sides of the aisle, are generally hesitant to consent to war and risk facing primary challenges from within their own parties. In large, this is a response to a strengthening isolationist bend amongst the public. According to a Pew survey published late last year, a majority of Americans believe their country’s influence is ‘waning’ and that the US should ‘mind its own business’ on the world stage and prioritise the economy – and especially welfare reform, income inequality and the public debt.
By implication, this means less intervention and a greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific at the expense of the Greater Middle East. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined in an essay, the ‘pivot’ to Asia is an integral and inevitable strategic shift in attempting to address America’s aforementioned economic priorities. The Asian middle-class, which is projected to constitute 64% of the world’s middle-class by 2030, is highlighted specifically as a strategic growth opportunity for American business. This shift towards the Pacific is further facilitated by growing American energy independence on the back of the shale revolution, which will lead to a decline in the Middle East’s importance to Washington, even if the oil-rich region maintains extraordinary influence on global energy prices. These economic realities and priorities are manifesting in tangible military and personnel shifts, such as the Pentagon rebalancing the US navy from a 60-40 deployment in favour of the Atlantic to a 50-50 balance between the Atlantic and Pacific.
For Israel, this marks its principal ally’s strategic shift and, thus, the gradual weakening of Israel’s traditional security umbrella. According to a study at the Tami Steinmetz Center For Peace Research in Tel Aviv University, 80% of Israelis think their country’s survival depends on the US, but a majority see separation between the two countries as inevitable because of diverging priorities. This disconnect between America’s primacy to Israel’s strategic security, on one hand, and America’s national interests shifting to the Asia-Pacific, on the other, is fundamentally irreversible. The United States will simply be less inclined to embrace aggressive policies in the Middle East or in assisting Israel militarily or politically as it has previously. Nor will Israel be able to replicate such a relationship with any actor instead of the United States, thereby pushing the Israelis to greater self-reliance. As former Carter adviser Zbigniew Brezinski claims, Israel will thereby become somewhat of a ‘geopolitically endangered species’ amidst American re-prioritisation and relative decline.
Rest of article can be found here.