SinoChallenger
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Expect a Chinese attack by June/July
It is time the ministry of defence got cracking in building up the Indian Army's military capability toface the Chinese threat, warns Colonel Anil Athale (retd).
Last year when this author wrote about a Kargil- style foray by China in the near future, the idea was more in the realm of speculation. But the events of the last few months seem to move the likelihood from the speculative to the possible.
But it seems that New Delhi is in deep slumber or has no time to pay attention to such 'minor' issues like national security when all attention is focused on the upcoming assembly election in Uttar Pradesh.
It is, however, unfair to blame the government; even the Opposition is equally busy in its perennial game of one 'UP-manship' and has never effectively taken up the issue of defence preparedness in Parliament.
The media is frivolous as ever and is chasing TRPs; unfortunately there are no TRPs to be gained on defence issues.
This is an attempt by a student of history to give a wake-up call.
What makes matters even worse than 'normal' in Delhi today is the inefficiency that has crept in all decision-making due to the 'Diarchy' that prevails in Delhi.
For those unfamiliar with the term -- this was the system in British India when the rulers of the princely states had all the trappings of power but the British resident exercised the real power.
In its second avatar, the United Progressive Alliance resembles that model with real power in the hands of the Gandhi dynasty while the prime minister has all the trappings of power.
What this has done is the pivotal position of the Prime Minister's Office and its job of co-ordination and enforcement of the will of the government on the State machinery is severely compromised.
In case of vital decisions on security issues, this can lead to disasters.
The portents indeed are ominous. On December 14, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Parliament that his government does not share the view that China plans to attack India.
Exactly half a century ago, another Indian prime minister stuck to a similar view, until November 21, 1962.
Broadcasting to the nation that day, that prime minister lamented that in this hour of peril, our heart goes to the people of Assam!
As Jawaharlal Nehru spoke to the nation, the civil administration in Tezpur had begun to burn documents and currency in the government treasury, prison doors were thrown open, and everyone made a beeline to get across the Brahmaputra by whatever means.
The stage was being set for surrendering all territory north of the Brahmaputra to the Chinese.
To the people of my generation, the memories of that day give goose pimples even today. The unfortunate similarities do not end there.
Just a year before that, in 1961, the then defence minister V K Krishna Menon had a scrap in public with the highly esteemed army chief, who resigned and then took back his resignation on the prime minister's advice.
The prime minister then went on to humiliate the general in Parliament. As a consequence, the morale of the army was badly affected.
As someone who has studied that conflict, including the famed Henderson Brooks Report, one can say without any contradiction that 'loss of morale' was the single biggest cause of our debacle in 1962.
It is incredible that exactly after half a century we have a similar confrontation between the army chief and the defence ministry bureaucracy.
One of the horror stories of the 1962 conflict with China was the way India made a frenzied effort to arm the soldiers with modern weapons. The insistence on 'indigenous' production of arms and inability of the local R&D/factories starved Indian soldiers of tools of war.
So, what do we do?
Brand new rifles (the 7.62 SLR) were airdropped at Dirang Zong, of course without ammunition! As if the soldiers are robots who can instantly master new weapons and begin using it!
Our army's modernisation is stuck in red tape of the deepest hue.
Import of the critical lightweight howitzer, so important to provide artillery support to infantry in the mountains, is stuck in the courts/CBI clearances and what not.
Anyone familiar with the armed forces remembers the phrase often used by superiors while giving orders, 'I do not care whether you beg, borrow or steal! I want this done!'
It is time to remind the defence minister that the country expects him to deliver security and efficiency.
His primary job is to ensure honour and safety of the country, and not his honour, that must come last, always and every time (a sort of modified version of the Chetwood pledge that all newly commissioned officers take).
It appears that China is carefully choreographing incidents with India. First, there were several instances of Chinese troops crossing the border, marking their presence. We have dismissed these as 'minor' incidents.
Then there was the verbal spat and exchange of notes over the Indian foray into oil exploration in Vietnam waters. The new year saw ill-treatment of an Indian diplomat. Earlier, there were cases of Indian diamond merchants being imprisoned in China. All these could well be dismissed as minor incidents that involve local officials.
If similar incidents were to take place on the India-Pakistan border, they are not to be taken seriously because in Pakistan nobody is in control of the armed forces or civilian officials.
But China is NOT Pakistan -- the People's Liberation Army, the media (including the Internet) are all under tight party/government control in China.
India would be making a grave error of judgment if it considers these incidents as non serious. There seems to be a design behind these orchestrated events, especially the forays by the PLA.
It is time India woke up. Luckily, we do have some time.
At the moment the Himalayan passes are frozen and no military operations are possible.
The likely threat will only emerge in June/July 2012. It must be made clear that one is not talking of an all-out war.
What we must accept is a short, sharp, attack by the Chinese, more in the nature of a slap!
To those who claim that Indo-Chinese trade is too big -- one needs to remind them that as a proportion of overall Chinese trade with the world, it is of very little consequence!
It is time the ministry of defence cleaned up its act got cracking in building up the Indian Army's military capability to face the Chinese threat.
The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US-Pakistan divorce has the potential to destabilise the region.
Next year will mark 50 years since China taught a military lesson to India. Will history repeat itself after 50 years?
One is referring here to the Indian decision to explore for oil in cooperation with Vietnam despite Chinese objections. There is no doubt that legally India is right and the Chinese demand absurd.
At another level it can also be seen as a clear 'tit for tat' snub to China that has ignored Indian objections to its projects in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. Unfortunately, such issues are seldom decided on legality and it is the national power projection capability that is the deciding factor and not some articles of a UN convention.
What Admiral Prakash seems to suggest is that the South China Sea is not an appropriate theatre for India to flex its naval muscle.
The sudden burst of clarity from our foreign minister is rather curious. This tough stand comes against the backdrop of a rather tepid response to the Chinese intrusions in Ladakh, recently acknowledged by the defence minister himself.
These episodes brings back the memories of 49 years ago and the disastrous 'forward policy' that India launched to counter Chinese pinpricks and occupation of Aksai Chin.
A full two years before the Chinese attack in 1962, the Indian Army's Western Command based in Shimla had run a two-day exercise 'Sheel' on October 15 and 16, 1960.
The conclusion was that in the prevailing situation where the Indians were heavily outnumbered in Ladakh, it would be advisable to avoid a clash with the Chinese till such time as we built up our strength.
But the government of the day, under the influence of General B M Kaul and Jawharlal Nehru's belief that Chinese would never attack India, pushed on with the 'forward policy' of establishing militarily unviable posts to establish 'legal' claim to Aksai Chin.
When the Chinese began to react violently to these moves, a hare-brained scheme was proposed to open a new front in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.
The two areas are a good 1,000 kilometres apart and India was in no position to launch an offensive action across the McMohan line. But such was the hold of wishful thinking and un-professional soldiers over Delhi that we went on with this madness.
The rest is history and India suffered a terrible blow in the Tawang sector.
The situation of Indian forces is far better in Arunachal Pradesh today -- that is an undeniable fact. But on the other hand, with Chinese forces now present in strength in the Pakistan-administered of Gilgit and Hunza, we may well face a two-pronged threat in a future conflict in Ladakh.
However, all these moves and counter-moves raise a larger question of Chinese intentions. Is it that China wishes to announce its arrival as a 'military superpower' by engendering a conflict with India?
The precedent is the way China used the 2008 Olympics to signal its arrival as an economic superpower (India achieved the exact opposite with its shabby conduct and scams associated with the Commonwealth Games
).
Is China looking to provoke India militarily in Ladakh so as to provide a 'casus belli' to launch a Kargil-type adventure against India?
From a purely Chinese perspective, it does look an attractive option. In 1962, due to American pressure, Pakistan was restrained from interfering.
However, with US-Pakistan relations at an all time low, this is unlikely. What is more likely is that Pakistan will activate its proxies within Kashmir to make things as difficult as possible for India.
The 'two front' scenario that many in India have talked about may actually fructify.
With India's military modernisation in limbo for several years, China certainly has the capability to launch a limited foray in Ladakh.
In combination with Pakistan it could carry out a limited offensive in the direction of Leh. India has only a defensive option.
This will achieve several Chinese objectives:
- Assure Pakistan that it can rely on China against India. By keeping India occupied, it will also facilitate the Pakistani foray into Afghanistan in the wake of the American withdrawal.
- Warn the US that it will defend its interests militarily.
- Downsize India in the eyes of South East Asian nations.
- Encourage India's smaller neighbours to resist Indian pre-eminence.
The security situation in the region is in state of flux.
The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US-Pakistan divorce has potential to destabilise the region.
China appears to be positioning itself to be more assertive in South Asia.
It is noteworthy that even in 1962, the Chinese very cleverly coordinated their offensive against India with the Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The timing may well be decided by the events in Afghanistan next year.
What appears to be happening now are the preliminary moves to create a 'casus belli' for future action. Indian moves in Vietnam cannot be seen in isolation from the American moves for military containment of China, a long-term American goal.
On the economic front, the US, and to some extent India, seem to favour a policy of engaging with China. This works well in case of the US since it enjoys military superiority, but in case of militarily 'anemic' India, this is an invitation for disaster.
Like during the Nehru era, diplomacy not backed by force is bound to boomerang on us.
The biggest constraining factor for the Chinese, however, is the attitude of the Americans. In all likelihood, a military foray by China will bring India closer to the US, an outcome that may go against long-term Chinese interests.
This author had interacted with the Chinese in 2006. Even at that time, the Chinese were obsessed with finding out the extent of Indo-US cooperation.
China may well have come to the conclusion that irrespective of what it does, India is getting closer to the US, thus removing the restraint on military action.
China may also well bank on the pro-China/non-aligned lobby in India to prevent such an outcome.
But whichever scenario may materialise, the need for India to urgently modernise its military and remain vigilant is paramount. Unless we wish to suffer another 1962 and confess that we were living in a make-believe world!
One interesting possibility is that even without overt US help, India holds its own and gives China a bloody nose like the Vietnamese did in 1979.
In that eventuality, the Chinese would emerge a loser on all counts. But China may well be banking on the current political disarray in India as well as the effect on the Indian armed forces of a prolonged neglect of modernisation of weapons, especially the artillery.
Colonel (Dr) Anil Athale (retd) is coordinator of the Pune-based think-tank Inpad. He is a former joint director and head of the War Studies division at the defence ministry and co-author of the official history of the India-China conflict of 1962.
Expect a Chinese attack by June/July - Rediff.com News
Good thing our heavy transport for MBT airlift is almost ready.
It is time the ministry of defence got cracking in building up the Indian Army's military capability toface the Chinese threat, warns Colonel Anil Athale (retd).
Last year when this author wrote about a Kargil- style foray by China in the near future, the idea was more in the realm of speculation. But the events of the last few months seem to move the likelihood from the speculative to the possible.
But it seems that New Delhi is in deep slumber or has no time to pay attention to such 'minor' issues like national security when all attention is focused on the upcoming assembly election in Uttar Pradesh.
It is, however, unfair to blame the government; even the Opposition is equally busy in its perennial game of one 'UP-manship' and has never effectively taken up the issue of defence preparedness in Parliament.
The media is frivolous as ever and is chasing TRPs; unfortunately there are no TRPs to be gained on defence issues.
This is an attempt by a student of history to give a wake-up call.
What makes matters even worse than 'normal' in Delhi today is the inefficiency that has crept in all decision-making due to the 'Diarchy' that prevails in Delhi.
For those unfamiliar with the term -- this was the system in British India when the rulers of the princely states had all the trappings of power but the British resident exercised the real power.
In its second avatar, the United Progressive Alliance resembles that model with real power in the hands of the Gandhi dynasty while the prime minister has all the trappings of power.
What this has done is the pivotal position of the Prime Minister's Office and its job of co-ordination and enforcement of the will of the government on the State machinery is severely compromised.
In case of vital decisions on security issues, this can lead to disasters.
The portents indeed are ominous. On December 14, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Parliament that his government does not share the view that China plans to attack India.
Exactly half a century ago, another Indian prime minister stuck to a similar view, until November 21, 1962.
Broadcasting to the nation that day, that prime minister lamented that in this hour of peril, our heart goes to the people of Assam!
As Jawaharlal Nehru spoke to the nation, the civil administration in Tezpur had begun to burn documents and currency in the government treasury, prison doors were thrown open, and everyone made a beeline to get across the Brahmaputra by whatever means.
The stage was being set for surrendering all territory north of the Brahmaputra to the Chinese.
To the people of my generation, the memories of that day give goose pimples even today. The unfortunate similarities do not end there.
Just a year before that, in 1961, the then defence minister V K Krishna Menon had a scrap in public with the highly esteemed army chief, who resigned and then took back his resignation on the prime minister's advice.
The prime minister then went on to humiliate the general in Parliament. As a consequence, the morale of the army was badly affected.
As someone who has studied that conflict, including the famed Henderson Brooks Report, one can say without any contradiction that 'loss of morale' was the single biggest cause of our debacle in 1962.
It is incredible that exactly after half a century we have a similar confrontation between the army chief and the defence ministry bureaucracy.
One of the horror stories of the 1962 conflict with China was the way India made a frenzied effort to arm the soldiers with modern weapons. The insistence on 'indigenous' production of arms and inability of the local R&D/factories starved Indian soldiers of tools of war.
So, what do we do?
Brand new rifles (the 7.62 SLR) were airdropped at Dirang Zong, of course without ammunition! As if the soldiers are robots who can instantly master new weapons and begin using it!
Our army's modernisation is stuck in red tape of the deepest hue.
Import of the critical lightweight howitzer, so important to provide artillery support to infantry in the mountains, is stuck in the courts/CBI clearances and what not.
Anyone familiar with the armed forces remembers the phrase often used by superiors while giving orders, 'I do not care whether you beg, borrow or steal! I want this done!'
It is time to remind the defence minister that the country expects him to deliver security and efficiency.
His primary job is to ensure honour and safety of the country, and not his honour, that must come last, always and every time (a sort of modified version of the Chetwood pledge that all newly commissioned officers take).
It appears that China is carefully choreographing incidents with India. First, there were several instances of Chinese troops crossing the border, marking their presence. We have dismissed these as 'minor' incidents.
Then there was the verbal spat and exchange of notes over the Indian foray into oil exploration in Vietnam waters. The new year saw ill-treatment of an Indian diplomat. Earlier, there were cases of Indian diamond merchants being imprisoned in China. All these could well be dismissed as minor incidents that involve local officials.
If similar incidents were to take place on the India-Pakistan border, they are not to be taken seriously because in Pakistan nobody is in control of the armed forces or civilian officials.
But China is NOT Pakistan -- the People's Liberation Army, the media (including the Internet) are all under tight party/government control in China.
India would be making a grave error of judgment if it considers these incidents as non serious. There seems to be a design behind these orchestrated events, especially the forays by the PLA.
It is time India woke up. Luckily, we do have some time.
At the moment the Himalayan passes are frozen and no military operations are possible.
The likely threat will only emerge in June/July 2012. It must be made clear that one is not talking of an all-out war.
What we must accept is a short, sharp, attack by the Chinese, more in the nature of a slap!
To those who claim that Indo-Chinese trade is too big -- one needs to remind them that as a proportion of overall Chinese trade with the world, it is of very little consequence!
It is time the ministry of defence cleaned up its act got cracking in building up the Indian Army's military capability to face the Chinese threat.
The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US-Pakistan divorce has the potential to destabilise the region.
Next year will mark 50 years since China taught a military lesson to India. Will history repeat itself after 50 years?
One is referring here to the Indian decision to explore for oil in cooperation with Vietnam despite Chinese objections. There is no doubt that legally India is right and the Chinese demand absurd.
At another level it can also be seen as a clear 'tit for tat' snub to China that has ignored Indian objections to its projects in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. Unfortunately, such issues are seldom decided on legality and it is the national power projection capability that is the deciding factor and not some articles of a UN convention.
What Admiral Prakash seems to suggest is that the South China Sea is not an appropriate theatre for India to flex its naval muscle.
The sudden burst of clarity from our foreign minister is rather curious. This tough stand comes against the backdrop of a rather tepid response to the Chinese intrusions in Ladakh, recently acknowledged by the defence minister himself.
These episodes brings back the memories of 49 years ago and the disastrous 'forward policy' that India launched to counter Chinese pinpricks and occupation of Aksai Chin.
A full two years before the Chinese attack in 1962, the Indian Army's Western Command based in Shimla had run a two-day exercise 'Sheel' on October 15 and 16, 1960.
The conclusion was that in the prevailing situation where the Indians were heavily outnumbered in Ladakh, it would be advisable to avoid a clash with the Chinese till such time as we built up our strength.
But the government of the day, under the influence of General B M Kaul and Jawharlal Nehru's belief that Chinese would never attack India, pushed on with the 'forward policy' of establishing militarily unviable posts to establish 'legal' claim to Aksai Chin.
When the Chinese began to react violently to these moves, a hare-brained scheme was proposed to open a new front in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.
The two areas are a good 1,000 kilometres apart and India was in no position to launch an offensive action across the McMohan line. But such was the hold of wishful thinking and un-professional soldiers over Delhi that we went on with this madness.
The rest is history and India suffered a terrible blow in the Tawang sector.
The situation of Indian forces is far better in Arunachal Pradesh today -- that is an undeniable fact. But on the other hand, with Chinese forces now present in strength in the Pakistan-administered of Gilgit and Hunza, we may well face a two-pronged threat in a future conflict in Ladakh.
However, all these moves and counter-moves raise a larger question of Chinese intentions. Is it that China wishes to announce its arrival as a 'military superpower' by engendering a conflict with India?
The precedent is the way China used the 2008 Olympics to signal its arrival as an economic superpower (India achieved the exact opposite with its shabby conduct and scams associated with the Commonwealth Games
).Is China looking to provoke India militarily in Ladakh so as to provide a 'casus belli' to launch a Kargil-type adventure against India?
From a purely Chinese perspective, it does look an attractive option. In 1962, due to American pressure, Pakistan was restrained from interfering.
However, with US-Pakistan relations at an all time low, this is unlikely. What is more likely is that Pakistan will activate its proxies within Kashmir to make things as difficult as possible for India.
The 'two front' scenario that many in India have talked about may actually fructify.
With India's military modernisation in limbo for several years, China certainly has the capability to launch a limited foray in Ladakh.
In combination with Pakistan it could carry out a limited offensive in the direction of Leh. India has only a defensive option.
This will achieve several Chinese objectives:
- Assure Pakistan that it can rely on China against India. By keeping India occupied, it will also facilitate the Pakistani foray into Afghanistan in the wake of the American withdrawal.
- Warn the US that it will defend its interests militarily.
- Downsize India in the eyes of South East Asian nations.
- Encourage India's smaller neighbours to resist Indian pre-eminence.
The security situation in the region is in state of flux.
The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US-Pakistan divorce has potential to destabilise the region.
China appears to be positioning itself to be more assertive in South Asia.
It is noteworthy that even in 1962, the Chinese very cleverly coordinated their offensive against India with the Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The timing may well be decided by the events in Afghanistan next year.
What appears to be happening now are the preliminary moves to create a 'casus belli' for future action. Indian moves in Vietnam cannot be seen in isolation from the American moves for military containment of China, a long-term American goal.
On the economic front, the US, and to some extent India, seem to favour a policy of engaging with China. This works well in case of the US since it enjoys military superiority, but in case of militarily 'anemic' India, this is an invitation for disaster.
Like during the Nehru era, diplomacy not backed by force is bound to boomerang on us.
The biggest constraining factor for the Chinese, however, is the attitude of the Americans. In all likelihood, a military foray by China will bring India closer to the US, an outcome that may go against long-term Chinese interests.
This author had interacted with the Chinese in 2006. Even at that time, the Chinese were obsessed with finding out the extent of Indo-US cooperation.
China may well have come to the conclusion that irrespective of what it does, India is getting closer to the US, thus removing the restraint on military action.
China may also well bank on the pro-China/non-aligned lobby in India to prevent such an outcome.
But whichever scenario may materialise, the need for India to urgently modernise its military and remain vigilant is paramount. Unless we wish to suffer another 1962 and confess that we were living in a make-believe world!
One interesting possibility is that even without overt US help, India holds its own and gives China a bloody nose like the Vietnamese did in 1979.
In that eventuality, the Chinese would emerge a loser on all counts. But China may well be banking on the current political disarray in India as well as the effect on the Indian armed forces of a prolonged neglect of modernisation of weapons, especially the artillery.
Colonel (Dr) Anil Athale (retd) is coordinator of the Pune-based think-tank Inpad. He is a former joint director and head of the War Studies division at the defence ministry and co-author of the official history of the India-China conflict of 1962.
Expect a Chinese attack by June/July - Rediff.com News
Good thing our heavy transport for MBT airlift is almost ready.
