t-birds
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The North Yemen Civil War is perhaps one of the lesser known conflicts in the West but its scale and complexity make it an interesting subject of study. I am specifically interested in the Egyptian participation in the war on the side of the Yemen Arab Republic and the reasons behind its failures and substantial loss of life (approximately 26,000 Egyptian dead). Author Kenneth Pollack's analysis of the conflict in his Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 highlights several triumphs and failures on part of the Egyptians.
Egyptian involvement in the civil war began in 1962 and would last until 1967 when Nasser was forced to withdraw troops on account of the Six-Day War with Israel. At the height of Egyptian involvement it had approximately 70,000 men in theater and, highlighting one strengths of the Egyptian effort, were adequately supplied via the logistics train. As one of Egypt's first and only "overseas" wars this was an impressive accomplishment (when the material could actually get to the men in the field after arriving in Yemeni ports). Another accomplishment of the Egyptian force was the Ramadan Offensive of 1963 that was able to capture several Royalist settlements and scatter Royalist forces to the North. However this "success" highlights one of the ultimate failures of the Egyptian war effort.
The Ramadan Offensive was a successful conventional military operation but the Egyptians were not facing conventional forces. They were never able to develop an effective COIN strategy and because of this the gains of the Ramadan Offensive were ultimately illusory. The Royalist forces may have been scattered but they were not killed in large numbers and were eventually able to formulate more effective strategies in dealing with the Egyptian forces.
Other Egyptian failures included poor performance of the lower ranking Egyptian officers, lack of coordination of Egyptian forces due to the mountainous nature of Yemeni terrain, and misunderstandings on how to effectively practice combined arms warfare. Eventually the Egyptians would resort to such drastic measures as chemical attacks against Royalists towns. Pollack describes the Egyptian failure as primarily tactical and not strategic.
Do you agree? Were these weaknesses in Egyptian forces in particular or in Arab forces as a whole at the time? Would a better understanding of COIN have changed the outcome of the conflict or would the weakness in lower ranking officers derailed even an effective COIN strategy?
Egyptian involvement in the civil war began in 1962 and would last until 1967 when Nasser was forced to withdraw troops on account of the Six-Day War with Israel. At the height of Egyptian involvement it had approximately 70,000 men in theater and, highlighting one strengths of the Egyptian effort, were adequately supplied via the logistics train. As one of Egypt's first and only "overseas" wars this was an impressive accomplishment (when the material could actually get to the men in the field after arriving in Yemeni ports). Another accomplishment of the Egyptian force was the Ramadan Offensive of 1963 that was able to capture several Royalist settlements and scatter Royalist forces to the North. However this "success" highlights one of the ultimate failures of the Egyptian war effort.
The Ramadan Offensive was a successful conventional military operation but the Egyptians were not facing conventional forces. They were never able to develop an effective COIN strategy and because of this the gains of the Ramadan Offensive were ultimately illusory. The Royalist forces may have been scattered but they were not killed in large numbers and were eventually able to formulate more effective strategies in dealing with the Egyptian forces.
Other Egyptian failures included poor performance of the lower ranking Egyptian officers, lack of coordination of Egyptian forces due to the mountainous nature of Yemeni terrain, and misunderstandings on how to effectively practice combined arms warfare. Eventually the Egyptians would resort to such drastic measures as chemical attacks against Royalists towns. Pollack describes the Egyptian failure as primarily tactical and not strategic.
Do you agree? Were these weaknesses in Egyptian forces in particular or in Arab forces as a whole at the time? Would a better understanding of COIN have changed the outcome of the conflict or would the weakness in lower ranking officers derailed even an effective COIN strategy?
