There was no reformist candidate to begin with.
Of course there were reformist candidates in the election. Even two of them, Abdolnasser Hemmati and Mohsen Mehralizadeh. Actually it was moderates which were missing from this presidential race, not reformists.
Hemmati is a member of the Executives of Construction Party of Iran or Hezb-e Kārgozārān-e Sāzandegi-ye Irān, a reformist political party (considerd as the right wing of reformism) and member to the reformist umbrella organization Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front (Shorā-ye Hamāhangi-ye Jebhe-ye Eslāhāt) presided over by Mohammad Khatami.
The reformist affiliation of the ECPI party is confirmed explicitly by both English and Farsi versions of Wikipedia:
en.wikipedia.org
fa.wikipedia.org
As for Mehralizadeh, not only was he Vice-President to Khatami during the latter's second term, but he's of course a reformist politician as well, and a member to the reformist Way of the People Party (Hezb-e Rāh-e Mellat).
Again, both English and Farsi versions of Wikipedia confirm Mehralizadeh's reformist orientation:
en.wikipedia.org
fa.wikipedia.org
And here's an article from the BBC highlighting the reformist nature of Mehralizadeh's political party, the WPP:
https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-47401491
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The current president is not a reformist and never was a reformist to begin with
He is part of what is called the moderate faction in Iran. Moderates and reformists have been in a political coalition ever since 2009 the "Green movement" fitna (which was backed by moderate foreman Hashemi Rafsanjani), and even more so since the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, where reformists directly supported Rohani's candidacy instead of fielding a candidate of their own. Also, reformists participated in both administrations of Rohani. Rohani's Vice-President Jahangiri is reformist, and so are several of his ministers and vice-ministers.
Politically speaking, and especially as far as foreign policy is concerned, the positions of the reformist and moderate factions have experienced a strong rapprochement over the past two decades, and both factions adhere to liberal ideology.
as a matter of fact if you look at his history before he start the moderate nonsense he was a principalist. And is. Still members of the majority of the principal group and organizations.
Wonder why people dont get tired of calling him moderate while he is not.
What they used to be is one matter, what they are now is another. The views of a politician can evolve and even operate a 180 degree change.
As a matter of fact, the current reformist faction did not exist during the first decade of the Islamic Republic either. Practically all its founding members (individuals such as Hajjarian, Tajzadeh, Mousavi, Khatami, Nabavi, Ebtekar, Mohajerani, Khalkhali, Makhmalbaf, Ganji and so on and so forth) originate from what was known as the radical left faction of the Islamic Revolution.
Now, in practically every single aspect, the orientation of contemporary reformists contrasts with the positions they used to hold when they were members of the Islamic radical left back in the day:
- Foreign policy. The Islamic left used to be the most staunchly anti-imperialist faction of all. Students who took over the US spy den or "embassy" in Tehran were led by Islamic left activists and current reformists, like for example Ma'sumeh Ebtekar. Today however, reformist discourse is advocating "normalization" of the Islamic Republic's posture within the US-dominated international system, in other words reduction of tensions with the west ("tanesh zodāyi") and abandonment of Iran's Resistance policies against the US and Isra"el". The contrast between their foreign political views then and now couldn't be any starker.
- Social-cultural policy. Whereas reformists nowadays favor cultural and societal liberalism, with activists such as Tajzadeh openly stating that they oppose mandatory hejab for women in public, in the early days of the Islamic Revolution, some of those who would later adhere to reformism, were going as far as pressing thumbtacks into the foreheads of women sporting lighter types of hejab.
- Domestic politics, so-called "human rights", etc. Khalkhali, considered as the prototypical "hanging judge" by the anti-IR opposition, was yet another member of the radical Islamic left turned reformist. Current reformists used to adopt the toughest stance against the anti-IR opposition in the first decade of the Revolution whereas today, their discourse aligns on foreign-based media and strikes an apologist tone towards oppositionists.
- Economic policy. Reformists such as the former minister of Industries Behzad Nabavi went from a properly socialist and completely state-interventionist approach to liberal, free market-oriented ones.
In short, those known as the reformists today, transitioned from a totally anti-liberal, economically socialist, vehemently anti-imperialist perspective at the beginning of the Revolution when they were forming the Islamic radical left, to a thoroughly liberal, economically capitalist and western-apologetic one.
So I don't see what's wrong with designating Rohani and his team as moderates. Firstly, this is the actual name of the political faction they belong to. And secondly, much like contemporary reformists, those who constitute the moderate camp also experienced a major shift in their political outlook over the years and are no longer the conservatives nor the revolutionaries they may have been.
As i say khatami was the only reformist president we had the rest were principalist or ex-principalist moderate.
And Khatami was member to the ex-radical Islamic left. One could refer to him as the prototypical ex-radical reformist.
While the major conservative and economically liberal party (Hezb-e Mo'talefeh-ye Eslāmi / Islamic Coalition Party) was active, in addition to other conservative groupings such as the Combatant Clergy Association (Jāme'e-ye Rohāniat-e Mobārez), the principlist current as such was born only in the mid- to late 2000's as a result of a reorganization of the conservative and revolutionary camps.
Also, reformists participated in both Rohani administrations. In fact, many of those whom Mir Hossein Mousavi intended to nominate, were actually integrated by Rohani into his cabinet.
On the ideological level, both reformist and moderate factions are furthermore united by their liberal political persuasions.
The problem between iran and ksa is the problem of 7 beggar can sleep on a mat and two king can't sleep in a country . it has very little to being shia or sunni. If both country were shia or both sunni they would have found something else.
Exactly, the antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia has absolutely nothing to do with any sectarian considerations (at least from the Iranian perspective). It is purely (geo-)political in nature.
But I wouldn't say it is a mere case of two regional powers unable to find a power-sharing compromise either.
Some other factors do play a role, such as the fact that Saudi Arabia is a key US ally and unlike other allies of Washington (such as Turkey for instance), Riyadh has been attributed a central albeit subordinate role in the general architecture of American hegemony, namely by helping institute the petrodollar system, one of the major pillars of the US regime's global domination, given how it enables the monopoly of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency.
Also compared to other US allies, the Saudi regime has historically been far more active in fulfilling a proxy role in the framework of Washington's regional interventions, through its financing of US-backed factions on the ground, of clerics and madrassa networks favorable to Riyadh and to NATO's geopolitical designs, etc.
Only two things may reduce this antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia in a significant manner: an cessation of anti-zionist and anti-imperialist Resistance by Islamic Iran and a normalization of Iran-US ties (something reformists and moderates in Iran are bent on achieving); or, an emancipation of Riyadh from American (and more recently, zionist) imperial overlordship.
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romanticism aside, you know exactly what I am talking about. sectarianism is a curse for the ummah and the shia sunni rivalry between Iran and ksA is also well known. so it's a perfectly legitimate & appropriate question to inquire if the new president is one of those shia hardliners who thinks a good sunni is a dead sunni or if he has a pan Islamic ideology where he considers all muslims as of one faith regardless of sect or fiqh & is willing to reach across the isle to build long lasting bonds.
This viewpoint is operating on an erroneous assumption: namely the notion that rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is (or has to be) sectarian in nature. At least from the Iranian perspective, this isn't the case at all.
As said, to Iran the issue with the Saudi regime is political, and political only. Please refer to my explanations just above.
Also, I'd be interested in knowing where you heard an Iranian official or high ranking activist direct verbal attacks against Sunni Muslims or express violent anti-Sunni thoughts of that kind. There is no political faction holding such views in Iran. On the contrary, all political groupings in the Islamic Republic have always stressed the need for unity between Shia and Sunni Muslim masses around common principles and goals.
But that does not mean every
regime in a Muslim country must necessarily be embraced irregardless of its policies, and particularly if it collaborates with zionist or western imperial powers. However, opposition to a government or regime is not the same as opposition to a religious community. Let us not confuse the two please.
In the same manner as Islamic Iran has no issues with Jewish people per se, but at the same time refuses to recognize the Isra"el"i regime as a legitimate state, Tehran's reservations about the regime in Riyadh are nowhere motivated by any sort of hostility towards Sunni Muslim people either, but are grounded in purely geostrategical considerations.
In fact, a certain Shia religious current known as the Shirazi clan, which is backed by western regimes and which attempts to promote antagonism between Shia and Sunni Muslims, has been silenced on Iranian soil by the Islamic Republic. An extensive campaign was launched by Iranian state media to denounce these elements (they're officially being labeled as British turbans), Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a fatwa prohibiting the cursing of figures revered by Sunni Muslims, the offices of satellite TV broadcasters pertaining to the Shirazi current were raided, several of their members were trialed, found guilty and jailed etc. Which is why they oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran just as much as they reject Sunni Islam (you should listen to the rabid way in which preachers belonging to this current, like the Kuwaiti Yasser al-Habib or the Afghan Allahyari, insult Supreme Leader Khamenei or Hezbollah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah for their refusal to attack Sunni Islam).
