http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...to-military-conflict/articleshow/60263109.cms
Doklam: How India refused to play Chinese checkers, and won
HIGHLIGHTS
NEW DELHI: The Doklam crisis was one of the toughest foreign policy challenges for India in recent times.
The successful resolution of the over two-month-old stand-off on Bhutanese territory brought the two Asian powers back from the brink — if the standoff had tipped over into military conflict, it could have escalated beyond control.
The Doklam issue was common to the 2013 incident at Depsang and the 2014 one at Chumar in one respect — in all three, China sought to change the ground reality to use it for a new boundary claim.
The difference was that in Doklam, China was doing it on Bhutanese territory, but with an eye to reshape the boundary and the security matrix with India. For India too, it was a first of sorts, where troops were sent to a third country — to uphold Bhutan's territorial rights and India's security interests.
Having successfully stopped China's road-building efforts, India had three tasks — hold the line on the ground and prepare for a military retaliation by China; maintain Bhutan's interests and territorial integrity, and brave the inevitable Chinese pressure.
On the ground, India ramped up its military presence, prepared to sit there through monsoon and winter. Having learnt many bitter lessons from 1962, India also beefed up its presence on other parts of the LAC, fearing China might expand the theatre of conflict to a sector where India wasn't in such an advantageous position as it was in the Doklam-Chumbi Valley area.
Diplomatically, things were much more tough — China unleashed a verbal barrage and psychological warfare intended to get India to back off unilaterally.
It was a mind game Beijing has perfected with its 'Three Warfares Strategy' devised by its Central Military Commission in 2003 and refined in 2010, and involves a triad of media war, psychological war and legal war.
In recent years, China has tried it out successfully with Philippines which gave in to Chinese domination even after winning a historic victory over China at the UNCLOS tribunal.
The external affairs ministry started with a detailed statement on June 30, which should be read along with the Bhutanese statement of June 29.
Unusually, the government reached out to commentators and talking heads, requesting them to tone down the public rhetoric.
For the next two months, the Indian government was unusually quiet and restrained — not reacting to Chinese verbal abuse of Sushma Swaraj, Ajit Doval or threats that China could basically 'vaporise' India with its superior economy and military capabilities.
The state-owned Chinese media was allowed free rein against India, a tactic sources said they believed India would use — in the two previous instances, China has upbraided the Indian government for not "controlling the Indian media" where public anger ruled the waves.
The Chinese strategy of cowing India into submission would have been easier if India had responded in kind. India's silence coupled with its increasing military preparedness on the ground was evidence that India would not play the Chinese game.
Indian and Chinese officials began negotiations almost instantly both in Beijing and in New Delhi led by Doval, Jaishankar and Vijay Gokhale.
A short meeting in Astana and then in Hamburg between Modi and Xi yielded little, except a photo-op. However, foreign secretary Jaishankar coined an "Astana Consensus" where both leaders agreed to not let differences become disputes.
The initial conversations between officials too yielded nothing as an enraged China continued to hold out for an unconditional Indian withdrawal. But in early August, Sushma Swaraj gave an indication of where the negotiations were headed when she announced in Parliament that a simultaneous withdrawal by both sides would be acceptable to India.
In other words, India wanted China to go back to status quo ante, to a position before June 16, but without China changing ground realities by building roads in disputed territories.
"India always believes that peace and tranquility in the India-China border is an important pre-requisite for smooth development of our bilateral relation. We will continue to engage with the Chinese side through diplomatic channels to find a mutually acceptable solution on the basis of the Astana Consensus between our leaders," she said.
Both sides were careful to not arm their soldiers against each other; neither in Doklam nor in Pangong. So, where both sides engaged in a pub brawl, no shots were fired. That indicated strongly on both sides as no one wanted to take this battle to the next level.
While the standoff was on, the world was watching the region like a tense tennis match. India was clear that if it capitulated, it would lose all credibility in its neighbourhood and in the ASEAN region where India is positioning itself not only as a major player but as a net security provider.
China is generally seen as an aggressive bully in the region and India's skills as well as its commitment to its allies and neighbours on matters of sovereignty were put to test.
Doklam: How India refused to play Chinese checkers, and won
HIGHLIGHTS
- China had unleashed a verbal barrage and psychological warfare that was intended to get India to back off unilaterally.
- Both India and China were careful to not arm their soldiers against each other.
- India’s skills as well as its commitment to its allies and neighbours on matters of sovereignty were put to test.
NEW DELHI: The Doklam crisis was one of the toughest foreign policy challenges for India in recent times.
The successful resolution of the over two-month-old stand-off on Bhutanese territory brought the two Asian powers back from the brink — if the standoff had tipped over into military conflict, it could have escalated beyond control.
The Doklam issue was common to the 2013 incident at Depsang and the 2014 one at Chumar in one respect — in all three, China sought to change the ground reality to use it for a new boundary claim.
The difference was that in Doklam, China was doing it on Bhutanese territory, but with an eye to reshape the boundary and the security matrix with India. For India too, it was a first of sorts, where troops were sent to a third country — to uphold Bhutan's territorial rights and India's security interests.
Having successfully stopped China's road-building efforts, India had three tasks — hold the line on the ground and prepare for a military retaliation by China; maintain Bhutan's interests and territorial integrity, and brave the inevitable Chinese pressure.
On the ground, India ramped up its military presence, prepared to sit there through monsoon and winter. Having learnt many bitter lessons from 1962, India also beefed up its presence on other parts of the LAC, fearing China might expand the theatre of conflict to a sector where India wasn't in such an advantageous position as it was in the Doklam-Chumbi Valley area.
Diplomatically, things were much more tough — China unleashed a verbal barrage and psychological warfare intended to get India to back off unilaterally.
It was a mind game Beijing has perfected with its 'Three Warfares Strategy' devised by its Central Military Commission in 2003 and refined in 2010, and involves a triad of media war, psychological war and legal war.
In recent years, China has tried it out successfully with Philippines which gave in to Chinese domination even after winning a historic victory over China at the UNCLOS tribunal.
The external affairs ministry started with a detailed statement on June 30, which should be read along with the Bhutanese statement of June 29.
Unusually, the government reached out to commentators and talking heads, requesting them to tone down the public rhetoric.
For the next two months, the Indian government was unusually quiet and restrained — not reacting to Chinese verbal abuse of Sushma Swaraj, Ajit Doval or threats that China could basically 'vaporise' India with its superior economy and military capabilities.
The state-owned Chinese media was allowed free rein against India, a tactic sources said they believed India would use — in the two previous instances, China has upbraided the Indian government for not "controlling the Indian media" where public anger ruled the waves.
The Chinese strategy of cowing India into submission would have been easier if India had responded in kind. India's silence coupled with its increasing military preparedness on the ground was evidence that India would not play the Chinese game.
Indian and Chinese officials began negotiations almost instantly both in Beijing and in New Delhi led by Doval, Jaishankar and Vijay Gokhale.
A short meeting in Astana and then in Hamburg between Modi and Xi yielded little, except a photo-op. However, foreign secretary Jaishankar coined an "Astana Consensus" where both leaders agreed to not let differences become disputes.
The initial conversations between officials too yielded nothing as an enraged China continued to hold out for an unconditional Indian withdrawal. But in early August, Sushma Swaraj gave an indication of where the negotiations were headed when she announced in Parliament that a simultaneous withdrawal by both sides would be acceptable to India.
In other words, India wanted China to go back to status quo ante, to a position before June 16, but without China changing ground realities by building roads in disputed territories.
"India always believes that peace and tranquility in the India-China border is an important pre-requisite for smooth development of our bilateral relation. We will continue to engage with the Chinese side through diplomatic channels to find a mutually acceptable solution on the basis of the Astana Consensus between our leaders," she said.
Both sides were careful to not arm their soldiers against each other; neither in Doklam nor in Pangong. So, where both sides engaged in a pub brawl, no shots were fired. That indicated strongly on both sides as no one wanted to take this battle to the next level.
While the standoff was on, the world was watching the region like a tense tennis match. India was clear that if it capitulated, it would lose all credibility in its neighbourhood and in the ASEAN region where India is positioning itself not only as a major player but as a net security provider.
China is generally seen as an aggressive bully in the region and India's skills as well as its commitment to its allies and neighbours on matters of sovereignty were put to test.
