Hell hound
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neither will because of our and your nukes.
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Does Pakistan have any war time planning ?
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ebrahym
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India will also have to keep us engaged for a long time .......... of course you can sustain a long war but keeping us engage on a level we bleed everything is not gonna be Easy for India
bro i m getting a feeling that u r completely over thinking
u c i respect u that u have such great intentions for our country even when u r living calmly in Norway but lets just say that severage, pipeline and bombshelters are a little ........... u know overthinking
in a war we will have complete supplylines from china and Saudia its upto us to keep the routes open
plus dont think we are sleeping in our barracks ...............what we need to prepare for us a long period war
Paksanity
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There is negligible chance of open war now. It suits neither of the countries. War has moved into following spheres.
1. Economic war
2. Diplomatic war
3. Information (media) war
4. Insurgency, turmoil and low intensity war on social, ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions
We Pakistanis better start focusing on these areas before it's too late.
1. Economic war
2. Diplomatic war
3. Information (media) war
4. Insurgency, turmoil and low intensity war on social, ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions
We Pakistanis better start focusing on these areas before it's too late.
dadeechi
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Very true. Pakistan has revised its Nuclear doctrine from being the last resort option to being the first option. Pakistan is going to start the next war in Kashmir with a nuclear bang.
Win Pak-India nuke war?
Pervez Hoodbhoy — Updated Oct 31, 2015 09:33am
The writer teaches physics in Islamabad and Lahore
That Pakistan may first use nuclear weapons in a future war with India was announced last week by Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry. Coming just two days before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Oct 22 visit to Washington, this could be considered a reiteration of the army’s well-known stance. But, significantly it came from the Foreign Office rather than GHQ or Strategic Plans Division. Coming from both ends of the power spectrum, this confirms that Pakistan has drastically shifted its nuclear posture.
In the late 1980s, Pakistan had viewed nuclear weapons very differently; they were the last-ditch means to deter a possible nuclear attack by India. But Pakistan now says it intends to use low-yield nuclear bombs, also called tactical nuclear weapons, to forestall the possible advance of Indian troops into Pakistan under India’s ‘Cold Start’ operational doctrine.
Floated by Gen Deepak Kapoor in 2010, Cold Start calls for cutting Pakistan into “salami slices” as punishment for hosting yet another Mumbai-style terrorist attack inside India. It assumes that this limited action would not provoke a nuclear exchange. India strenuously denies that such a doctrine is official or that it has been made operational.
This denial cut no ice across the border. In 2011 a successful test of the Nasr “shoot and scoot” short-ranged missile was announced by ISPR, the Pakistan military’s official voice. Ensconced inside a multiple-barrelled mobile launcher the four 60-kilometre-range missiles are said to be tipped with nuclear warheads each roughly one-tenth the size of a Hiroshima-sized weapon. Pakistan says these tactical weapons will not destabilise the current balance or pose significant command and control problems, a claim that many believe as incorrect.
At the end both India and Pakistan would win, having taught the other a terrible lesson.
Pakistan is not the first country tempted by nuclear force multipliers. Nor, as claimed by ISPR, is making small warheads a significant technical feat. In fact in the 1950s the Americans had developed even smaller ones with sub-kiloton yields, and placed them on the Davy Crockett recoilless guns deployed at forward positions along the Turkey-USSR border. The nuclear shell, with a blast yield that would be dialled as required, could be fired by just two infantrymen. This was a tempting alternative to artillery but the Americans were eventually unnerved by the prospect of two soldiers setting off a nuclear war on their own initiative. The weapon was withdrawn and decommissioned after a few years.
Wars are fought to be won, not to be lost. So how will Pakistan’s new weapons help us win a war? This fundamental question is never even touched. But let us assume their use in a post Mumbai-II scenario. For every (small) mushroom cloud on Pakistani territory, roughly a dozen or more Indian main battle tanks and armoured vehicles would be destroyed. After many mushrooms, the invasion would stop dead in its tracks and a few thousand Indian troops would be killed. Pakistan would decisively win a battle.
But then what? With the nuclear threshold crossed for the first time since 1945, India would face one of two options: to fight on or flee. Which it will choose is impossible to predict because much will depend upon the extant political and military circumstances, as well as the personalities of the military and political leaders then in office.
Official Indian policy calls for massive retaliation. In 2013, reacting officially to Pakistan, Shyam Saran, the head of the National Security Advisory Board (the apex body concerned with security matters) declared that, “India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective”.
Simply stated: whether struck by a micro-nuke or mini-nuke or city-buster, and whether on its own soil or outside its borders, India says it will consider itself under nuclear attack and react accordingly.
This is plain stupid. It violates the principle of proportionate retaliation and pushes aside the barriers to hell. But could the NSAB be bluffing? It may be that if push comes to shove, India will not actually launch its large nuclear weapons. The sensible instinct of self-preservation might somehow prevail, and the subcontinent live to see another morning.
More likely is that in the heat of the moment, reckless passions will rage and caution will take a backseat. A tit-for-tat exchange could continue until every single weapon, small and large, is used up on either side. It is difficult to imagine how any war termination mechanism could work even if, by some miracle, the nuclear command and control centres remain intact. At the end both India and Pakistan would win, having taught the other a terrible lesson. But neither would remain habitable.
The subcontinent’s military and political leaders are not the first to believe that a nuclear war can remain limited, and perhaps even won. President Reagan puzzled over the possibility of Armageddon, uncertain whether or not God was commanding him to destroy earth or to leave it in His hands. Allen Dulles, the first CIA director, had repeatedly railed against the stupidity of those Americans, “who draw an ‘artificial’ distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and cannot realise that atomic bombs should be treated like bullets”.
Tactical nukes will not make Pakistan more secure. This dangerous programme should be immediately abandoned. Nukes may win a battle for us but at the cost of losing Pakistan. Instead our security lies in ensuring that Pakistan’s territory is not used for launching terror attacks upon our neighbours. We must explicitly renounce the use of covert war to liberate Kashmir — a fact hidden from none and recently admitted to by Gen Musharraf.
As for India: your security depends upon adopting a less belligerent attitude towards Pakistan, stopping a menacing military build-up that is spooking all your neighbours, and realising that respect is earned through economic rather than military strength.
These are tall orders for both countries. Any optimism is currently unwarranted.
The writer teaches physics in Islamabad and Lahore.
Published in Dawn, October 31st, 2015
http://www.dawn.com/news/1216449
I promise. I will not reveal them to anyone.
You missed the Nuclear war.
The Pink Flamingo on the Subcontinent: Nuclear War between India and Pakistan
David Barno and [URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/nora-bensahel/']Nora Bensahel[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']November 3, 2015
A “[URL='http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/black-swans-and-pink-flamingos-five-principles-for-force-design/']pink flamingo” is the term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe predictable but ignored events that can yield disastrous results. Hoffman argues that these situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to “black swans” — the unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
The tense nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous pink flamingo in today’s world.
The Indian subcontinent — home to both India and Pakistan — remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility.
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the [URL='http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1999.stm']Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today.
Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called [URL='http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf']Cold Start, a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armored assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
The problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have [URL='http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-india-pakistan-ready-use-nuclear-weapons-13284']stated that they may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start and help to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons program — and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheads — more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
It is not simply the pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range [URL='http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/McCausland.pdf']tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons — on its own soil if necessary — to counter Cold Start’s plan for sudden Indian armored thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers, and increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other [URL='http://fpif.org/threshold-nuclear-war-pakistan-india-keeps-dropping/']destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralized control of the weapons — a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current arms race.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the United States and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.
The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill [URL='http://tribune.com.pk/story/834475/modi-likely-to-use-military-force-if-terror-attack-traced-to-pakistan-former-us-diplomat/']agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states — last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures between the two sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for the future. Neither nation’s military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold.
The United States should also reach out to current (and former) civil and military [URL='http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/new-publication-the-unfinished-crisis-1/']decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis. Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their well-researched estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored invasion. And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the U.S. government’s recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.[/URL]
[URL='http://warontherocks.com/author/david-barno/']
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions, and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global problem. There are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war between two of the world’s most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.
Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University. Both also serve as Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council. Their column appears in War on the Rocks every other Tuesday.
http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-pink-flamingo-on-the-subcontinent-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/
[/URL][/URL][/URL][/URL][/URL][/URL][/URL][/URL][/URL]
Signalian
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Let me assure that MO(military Operations) directorate in GHQ is not sleeping.
For every military formation available to PA, plans are already laid for their deployment even as of now. Every Corps, every division, every brigade, every battalion, every independent company and other attached paramilitary formations commanders already know responsibilities of their troops and equipment.
In every case, there is a defensive and offensive plan, depends as the scenario changes.
Regarding IA,there is a very good speculation about the capabilities of IA formations across the border. These are based on their troop strength, equipment, supply and other factors. Spies report movement and in war time every single formation of enemy specially reserve formations are kept under eye and reported, lest they appear suddenly in a battlefield outside their reach and upset PA commanders plans.
Every retired army officer is enlisted in CORO (Corps Of Reserve Officers) while retired JCO/NCO/Sepoys are also called for active duty in case of war . CORO officers and other retired ranks are given desk jobs while active duty personnel are taken away from desk jobs and sent for combat. This is how PA total strength of 1 million soldiers comes into play.
India primary targets are HIT, POF, PAC ,Airfields, Dams, Bridges, ammunition and fuel supply depots, missile and armament facilities, GHQ, JSHQ, AHQ, NHQ, Naval Docks and ships related facilities and other military targets. These all are guarded my military and even though HIT/POF/PAC are close to border through Kashmir, a relocation is a good idea.
universities, hospitals, business and industry of whole Pakistan can be run over by IA but not a target.
National Guard along with National Cadet Corps and Civil Defence is allocated tasks of building bomb shelters and providing rescue, relief and security in cities in war time. NCC may not exist anymore but NG and CD exists
Military and Government, yes.
Responsibility of Civil defence,Federal and Provincial Government.
Military has facilities both fixed and mobile for access to clean water. there are dams and reservoirs built to cater needs of civilians.
Political decision to be taken by Government. Military has fuel to conduct war and the supply of ammunition and fuel increases every day.
Military uses portable generators already. Civilian Government also has its own portable generators for usage.
In important buildings, both military and government, there are back ups available.
There are para military units like Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts which are used to enhance regular formation numbers in case of war. The problem is that they lack heavy weapons like artillery, mortars and dedicated support elements like Signals, sappers etc.
To raise even a single brigade which can fight without support of a certain level from Division or Corps, it takes alot of resources.
For independent infantry brigade, It must have
3 X fighting battalions( 2500 men related number of offroad vehicles,trucks, mortars, LMG, ATGM launchers etc)
1 X artillery battery (100 men , 6 X 155mm guns, fire locating radar, related vehicles)
1 X air defence battery (100 men , 6-8 Stinger launchers, related vehicles)
1 X signal company (150 men, communication setup related equipment and vehicles)
1 X sappers company (150 men, military engineering equipment, demolition equipment, construction and building equipment, bridge laying equipment etc)
1 X Supply and transport company (150 men, lots and lots of trucks and other vehicles)
1 X Medical detachment
1 X MP(military police) section
1 X FIU(field intelligence unit) section
1 X ordnance Company
This is how there will be roughly 3500+ men under a formation which can fight effectively to a great extent and independently upto 70%, though it will at some stage require assistance from Corps HQ.
Compare this with 3 wings of G scouts and that will total (750 X 3) 2250 troops only armed with light weapons AK-47, LMG, maybe mortar and RR 106mm Guns.
So, increasing numbers is easy but making a formation an effective fighting force takes resources.
Israel is very short on man power, Pakistan is not. NCC is abolished.
Intake in PA, PN and PAF increases (double intake) and courses become shorter(6 months only) when war is imminent.
Pakistan has seen worst in past and survived, today its even stronger with vast reserves in ammo, fuel ,modernized weapons and troops following latest doctrines.
Talwar e Pakistan
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Yes; Pakistan is very well prepared and ready - it's just very secretive.
Dont know where you heard that from...
Pakistan has plans to build over 40 smart cities located in less compact regions.
Most likely yes.
Pakistan always has excessive stock; so this shouldn't be a problem.
Resources could easily be transported via Kashgar-Gwadar superhighway.
Not needed at all; those are for countries who cannot form a large volunteer force without conscription. Pakistan is blessed with a patriotic population willing to defend Pakistan at all costs.
There will never be a nuclear war.Very true. Pakistan has revised its Nuclear doctrine from being the last resort option to being the first option. Pakistan is going to start the next war in Kashmir with a nuclear bang.
Win Pak-India nuke war?
Pervez Hoodbhoy — Updated Oct 31, 2015 09:33am
The writer teaches physics in Islamabad and Lahore
That Pakistan may first use nuclear weapons in a future war with India was announced last week by Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry. Coming just two days before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Oct 22 visit to Washington, this could be considered a reiteration of the army’s well-known stance. But, significantly it came from the Foreign Office rather than GHQ or Strategic Plans Division. Coming from both ends of the power spectrum, this confirms that Pakistan has drastically shifted its nuclear posture.
In the late 1980s, Pakistan had viewed nuclear weapons very differently; they were the last-ditch means to deter a possible nuclear attack by India. But Pakistan now says it intends to use low-yield nuclear bombs, also called tactical nuclear weapons, to forestall the possible advance of Indian troops into Pakistan under India’s ‘Cold Start’ operational doctrine.
Floated by Gen Deepak Kapoor in 2010, Cold Start calls for cutting Pakistan into “salami slices” as punishment for hosting yet another Mumbai-style terrorist attack inside India. It assumes that this limited action would not provoke a nuclear exchange. India strenuously denies that such a doctrine is official or that it has been made operational.
This denial cut no ice across the border. In 2011 a successful test of the Nasr “shoot and scoot” short-ranged missile was announced by ISPR, the Pakistan military’s official voice. Ensconced inside a multiple-barrelled mobile launcher the four 60-kilometre-range missiles are said to be tipped with nuclear warheads each roughly one-tenth the size of a Hiroshima-sized weapon. Pakistan says these tactical weapons will not destabilise the current balance or pose significant command and control problems, a claim that many believe as incorrect.
At the end both India and Pakistan would win, having taught the other a terrible lesson.
Pakistan is not the first country tempted by nuclear force multipliers. Nor, as claimed by ISPR, is making small warheads a significant technical feat. In fact in the 1950s the Americans had developed even smaller ones with sub-kiloton yields, and placed them on the Davy Crockett recoilless guns deployed at forward positions along the Turkey-USSR border. The nuclear shell, with a blast yield that would be dialled as required, could be fired by just two infantrymen. This was a tempting alternative to artillery but the Americans were eventually unnerved by the prospect of two soldiers setting off a nuclear war on their own initiative. The weapon was withdrawn and decommissioned after a few years.
Wars are fought to be won, not to be lost. So how will Pakistan’s new weapons help us win a war? This fundamental question is never even touched. But let us assume their use in a post Mumbai-II scenario. For every (small) mushroom cloud on Pakistani territory, roughly a dozen or more Indian main battle tanks and armoured vehicles would be destroyed. After many mushrooms, the invasion would stop dead in its tracks and a few thousand Indian troops would be killed. Pakistan would decisively win a battle.
But then what? With the nuclear threshold crossed for the first time since 1945, India would face one of two options: to fight on or flee. Which it will choose is impossible to predict because much will depend upon the extant political and military circumstances, as well as the personalities of the military and political leaders then in office.
Official Indian policy calls for massive retaliation. In 2013, reacting officially to Pakistan, Shyam Saran, the head of the National Security Advisory Board (the apex body concerned with security matters) declared that, “India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective”.
Simply stated: whether struck by a micro-nuke or mini-nuke or city-buster, and whether on its own soil or outside its borders, India says it will consider itself under nuclear attack and react accordingly.
This is plain stupid. It violates the principle of proportionate retaliation and pushes aside the barriers to hell. But could the NSAB be bluffing? It may be that if push comes to shove, India will not actually launch its large nuclear weapons. The sensible instinct of self-preservation might somehow prevail, and the subcontinent live to see another morning.
More likely is that in the heat of the moment, reckless passions will rage and caution will take a backseat. A tit-for-tat exchange could continue until every single weapon, small and large, is used up on either side. It is difficult to imagine how any war termination mechanism could work even if, by some miracle, the nuclear command and control centres remain intact. At the end both India and Pakistan would win, having taught the other a terrible lesson. But neither would remain habitable.
The subcontinent’s military and political leaders are not the first to believe that a nuclear war can remain limited, and perhaps even won. President Reagan puzzled over the possibility of Armageddon, uncertain whether or not God was commanding him to destroy earth or to leave it in His hands. Allen Dulles, the first CIA director, had repeatedly railed against the stupidity of those Americans, “who draw an ‘artificial’ distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and cannot realise that atomic bombs should be treated like bullets”.
Tactical nukes will not make Pakistan more secure. This dangerous programme should be immediately abandoned. Nukes may win a battle for us but at the cost of losing Pakistan. Instead our security lies in ensuring that Pakistan’s territory is not used for launching terror attacks upon our neighbours. We must explicitly renounce the use of covert war to liberate Kashmir — a fact hidden from none and recently admitted to by Gen Musharraf.
As for India: your security depends upon adopting a less belligerent attitude towards Pakistan, stopping a menacing military build-up that is spooking all your neighbours, and realising that respect is earned through economic rather than military strength.
These are tall orders for both countries. Any optimism is currently unwarranted.
The writer teaches physics in Islamabad and Lahore.
Published in Dawn, October 31st, 2015
http://www.dawn.com/news/1216449
I promise. I will not reveal them to anyone.
You missed the Nuclear war.
The Pink Flamingo on the Subcontinent: Nuclear War between India and Pakistan
David Barno and Nora Bensahel
November 3, 2015
A “pink flamingo” is the term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe predictable but ignored events that can yield disastrous results. Hoffman argues that these situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to “black swans” — the unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown.
The tense nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous pink flamingo in today’s world.
The Indian subcontinent — home to both India and Pakistan — remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility.
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis.
These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today.
Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armored assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours.
The problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start and help to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons program — and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheads — more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time.
It is not simply the pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons — on its own soil if necessary — to counter Cold Start’s plan for sudden Indian armored thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers, and increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis.
Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralized control of the weapons — a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current arms race.
Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the United States and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.
The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states — last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.
There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures between the two sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for the future. Neither nation’s military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold.
The United States should also reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis. Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their well-researched estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored invasion. And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the U.S. government’s recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions, and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global problem. There are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war between two of the world’s most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.
Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University. Both also serve as Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council. Their column appears in War on the Rocks every other Tuesday.
http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-pink-flamingo-on-the-subcontinent-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/
Reason Pakistan says the 'N' word here and there is because we're in a vulnerable position currently. As most of our resources and focus is being spent on war on terrorism. Once our soldiers are on the right side of the border; you'll never hear the 'N' word from us every again.
No economy has ever been able to sustain a long period war(on papers); but in history they always managed to do so.
dadeechi
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Not True.
Pakistan was very weak during 1990s but never threatened India with nuclear war in those days.
Pakistan is now getting stronger and stronger by the day with CPEC, Upgrade in relations with China & Russia, membership to SCO etc.
On the military front also Pakistan is ahead of the game in may areas (Babur , Ra'ad etc.).
Yet the frequency with which India is being threatened with Nuclear war only increased with Pakistan getting stronger.
The more stronger Pakistan gets the more is the possibility of Nuclear war.
Note that Pakistan has more nuclear weapons than India.
John Reese
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Long Period only Sustain Large indian Deployment And this time There is No East Pakistan
India can create its Storm Trooping from afghan side Paratroopers And Strike Brigades
- India has Large No of Battalions Of Special forces
- Large Forces of paratroopers and Mountain Divisions
- Large Resource and Logistics
Talwar e Pakistan
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Pakistan wasn't weak at all during the 1990's
Like I said this is due to war on terror.
Numbers surged around 2004-2012 (peak of WoT)
Talwar e Pakistan
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Pakistan has its logistics, stock and reactiveness well set.
It is India; that if a war ever takes place, will face a logistic crisis.
India cannot even properly equip its army with helmets/vests; how will they cope with a full-on war?
Before India even gives the command to mobilize; Pakistan's military will be well prepared and dug in. Just like the past 2 standoffs.
Pakistan has a smaller; more flexible, experinced, equipped and motivated army.
Indian forces would run out ammunition within 20 days.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...-last-20-days-of-war/articleshow/40862131.cms
Also don't even dream about Afghanistan; every time Pakistan has been in a conflict with India; Pashtuns from both side of the border pledged to defend Pakistan. If Pakistan even smells a whiff of Indian activity in Afghanistan during the war - it'll give Pakistan the excuse to invade Afghanistan supported by a massive amount of local militias.
Why would we need a nuke for a small-scale incursion?
I'm impressed and proud that the small force of irregular Northern Light Infantry managed to face off against 30,000 Indian soldiers on top of mountain peaks during the winter with constant enemy artillery and aerial involvement. We still managed to inflict more damage than inflicted.
ebrahym
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we never had nukes back then
Xeric
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It's not just Pakistan, but every country is prepared for war. The questions you ask are reasonable but you wont get any answer to them as they are not in the public domain. Just so that you can sleep well at night, i must tell you that every 'new' plan that our enemies make against us, we are prepared for it and have a contingency plan to respond to it in a befitting manner.
As they say, jahan apki soch khaam hoti hai, wahan say hamari shoro.
Now how we do it, when we do it and by which means we do it is not an issue for you to lose your sleep over. Most of the questions that you have asked falls in the domain of civil defence, which in itself is quite an old subject.
Whereas i do agree with you that cities like Lahore should not be expanded towards the east, but then we sometimes do think from our head which lies between our legs and no over our shoulders. That's unfortunate.
As they say, jahan apki soch khaam hoti hai, wahan say hamari shoro.
Now how we do it, when we do it and by which means we do it is not an issue for you to lose your sleep over. Most of the questions that you have asked falls in the domain of civil defence, which in itself is quite an old subject.
Whereas i do agree with you that cities like Lahore should not be expanded towards the east, but then we sometimes do think from our head which lies between our legs and no over our shoulders. That's unfortunate.
DesiGuy
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Economy is least of priority...when enemy has crossed the border...there are other ways to get "help". Anyways...Pakistan has and will keep india at it toes.
Look at the history...they have kept india in defensive mode for the last 60+ ...only thing i love about them.
Talwar e Pakistan
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That wasn't a war at all; it was a small-scale insurgency which involved less than 3000-5000 Pakistani soldiers. In an actual war; you'd be facing 650,000 Pakistani Soldiers spanning over 2000 KM
Budget my ###; have you seen the average Indian soldier? I'd say even Ethiopian soldiers looks better armed.
Only in 1971; when we were at our weakest moment; times have changed - meanwhile your soldiers still use the same equipment from 1971.
There is so such thing as an Afghan. Afghanistan is confused and divided with each ethnic group having contradicting loyalties.
The hell does that have to do with war-time planning?
John Reese
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Great Assessment Sir No offence but Assessment Should Always Include What Enemy Capabilities Are
The Key Element That always discarded By Pakistan Establishment from 1947 to 1999
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