Bang Galore
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 21, 2010
- Messages
- 10,685
- Reaction score
- 12
- Country
- Location
Difficult ties
By Moeed Yusuf
CRITICS want to know what the prime minister’s trip to India has achieved. The answer is simple: it has avoided what could have been a much worse start to India-Pakistan ties under Modi. Was it worth it? Absolutely — for not showing up would have played right into the hands of those wishing to use Modi’s ascendance to derail Sharif’s commitment to peace.
But what next? Is the argument that the BJP is much better placed to pursue peace with Pakistan for real? Will Sharif be able to stay the course? No. Even if the ‘good Modi’ shows up for Pakistan, he has a number of internal battles to fight. Topping the list is his bureaucracy.
If he gets caught up with the babus in South Block, he’s done as far as Pakistan is concerned. He is not a foreign policy guy.
This means that unless he signals soon that he will make the Pakistan portfolio his own, the relevant bureaucracies would be all too eager to take over.
There’s no pressure on Modi to reach out to Pakistan.
As for his political team, he’s already made it tougher for himself by appointing traditional hardliners on Pakistan to the most relevant cabinet and associated positions.
Why would Modi take on the bureaucracy? After all he is no liberal when it comes to Pakistan. And he has a right-wing constituency he relies on far more than any Indian leader has ever done. The answer you are likely to get from the most optimistic: Modi’s pro-business outlook will trump everything.
I can understand this when it comes to relations with China given what Beijing means for the Indian economy. It is also clear that Pakistan has a compulsion to open up with India.
But for India, Pakistan is not that important.
Even in the best case scenario, India-Pakistan trade will be no more than a blip on India’s economic radar — $1-2 billion of additional Indian exports in the medium term. Of course, taken in isolation, no country should forego this. And I am not saying India will. But when you extend the argument to say this will help push ties towards normalisation, it doesn’t hold.
There are two problems. First, India knows it can’t see trade in isolation. If it could, it would be ideal for Delhi: increase economic ties, hold the rest back, and hope that these other outstanding issues with Pakistan lose salience over time. But Delhi realises that Pakistan is not ready to let the other issues slide.
Sharif may be committed to his India policy and India-bashing may no longer be very potent in Pakistan. But the outlook, most importantly in the military, is nowhere near the point that would qualify as a fundamental departure from the country’s traditional stance on the conflicts with India.
So the equation for Modi reads as follows: progress on trade still requires continuing a conversation on other issues that he has no interest or compulsion to compromise on.
His country is okay with the status quo and his right-wing constituency doesn’t want to hear the word compromise when it comes to Pakistan. In fact, the reality is that India won’t even get what it really wants on the business front — ie transit rights to Afghanistan and Central Asia — until Pakistan feels things have moved on other fronts.
Second, and this is only natural, the potency of Mumbai in India dwarfs what Kargil managed in the years after that episode. There’s a whole generation of young Indians who see Pakistan as a nuisance. Pakistan equals Mumbai in their minds.
Mind you, even young Indian Muslims have no emotional connection to Pakistan regardless of what our state narrative would have us believe. So, there won’t be any serious bottom-up pressure on Modi to go the extra mile with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Sharif’s dilemma was summed up recently by one of his most able ministers in a public talk: commerce ministries won’t be able to run ahead of the others for too long. Sharif will need something beyond economics from Delhi to fend off the naysayers — military and non-military. Since it is Modi, that ‘something’ can’t be just promises of more trade and platitudes about the rest.
Only that will leave Sharif politically vulnerable. But precisely because it is Modi, it is going to be difficult for him to provide what Sharif needs.
A brighter outlook is only warranted if Modi proves everything said here wrong.
Or if Sharif is able to internalise Pakistan’s weakness and convince his civilian and military bureaucracy that the best Pakistan can hope for is trade concessions and that — given the internal situation and the global outlook favouring India’s view on Pakistan — there is no point creating a fuss about the rest for the foreseeable future. Neither is likely.
The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington D.C.
Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2014
Difficult ties - Newspaper - DAWN.COM
By Moeed Yusuf
CRITICS want to know what the prime minister’s trip to India has achieved. The answer is simple: it has avoided what could have been a much worse start to India-Pakistan ties under Modi. Was it worth it? Absolutely — for not showing up would have played right into the hands of those wishing to use Modi’s ascendance to derail Sharif’s commitment to peace.
But what next? Is the argument that the BJP is much better placed to pursue peace with Pakistan for real? Will Sharif be able to stay the course? No. Even if the ‘good Modi’ shows up for Pakistan, he has a number of internal battles to fight. Topping the list is his bureaucracy.
If he gets caught up with the babus in South Block, he’s done as far as Pakistan is concerned. He is not a foreign policy guy.
This means that unless he signals soon that he will make the Pakistan portfolio his own, the relevant bureaucracies would be all too eager to take over.
There’s no pressure on Modi to reach out to Pakistan.
As for his political team, he’s already made it tougher for himself by appointing traditional hardliners on Pakistan to the most relevant cabinet and associated positions.
Why would Modi take on the bureaucracy? After all he is no liberal when it comes to Pakistan. And he has a right-wing constituency he relies on far more than any Indian leader has ever done. The answer you are likely to get from the most optimistic: Modi’s pro-business outlook will trump everything.
I can understand this when it comes to relations with China given what Beijing means for the Indian economy. It is also clear that Pakistan has a compulsion to open up with India.
But for India, Pakistan is not that important.
Even in the best case scenario, India-Pakistan trade will be no more than a blip on India’s economic radar — $1-2 billion of additional Indian exports in the medium term. Of course, taken in isolation, no country should forego this. And I am not saying India will. But when you extend the argument to say this will help push ties towards normalisation, it doesn’t hold.
There are two problems. First, India knows it can’t see trade in isolation. If it could, it would be ideal for Delhi: increase economic ties, hold the rest back, and hope that these other outstanding issues with Pakistan lose salience over time. But Delhi realises that Pakistan is not ready to let the other issues slide.
Sharif may be committed to his India policy and India-bashing may no longer be very potent in Pakistan. But the outlook, most importantly in the military, is nowhere near the point that would qualify as a fundamental departure from the country’s traditional stance on the conflicts with India.
So the equation for Modi reads as follows: progress on trade still requires continuing a conversation on other issues that he has no interest or compulsion to compromise on.
His country is okay with the status quo and his right-wing constituency doesn’t want to hear the word compromise when it comes to Pakistan. In fact, the reality is that India won’t even get what it really wants on the business front — ie transit rights to Afghanistan and Central Asia — until Pakistan feels things have moved on other fronts.
Second, and this is only natural, the potency of Mumbai in India dwarfs what Kargil managed in the years after that episode. There’s a whole generation of young Indians who see Pakistan as a nuisance. Pakistan equals Mumbai in their minds.
Mind you, even young Indian Muslims have no emotional connection to Pakistan regardless of what our state narrative would have us believe. So, there won’t be any serious bottom-up pressure on Modi to go the extra mile with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Sharif’s dilemma was summed up recently by one of his most able ministers in a public talk: commerce ministries won’t be able to run ahead of the others for too long. Sharif will need something beyond economics from Delhi to fend off the naysayers — military and non-military. Since it is Modi, that ‘something’ can’t be just promises of more trade and platitudes about the rest.
Only that will leave Sharif politically vulnerable. But precisely because it is Modi, it is going to be difficult for him to provide what Sharif needs.
A brighter outlook is only warranted if Modi proves everything said here wrong.
Or if Sharif is able to internalise Pakistan’s weakness and convince his civilian and military bureaucracy that the best Pakistan can hope for is trade concessions and that — given the internal situation and the global outlook favouring India’s view on Pakistan — there is no point creating a fuss about the rest for the foreseeable future. Neither is likely.
The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington D.C.
Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2014
Difficult ties - Newspaper - DAWN.COM
