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Dhanoa's 'Plan B' and implications for Pakistan

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CriticalThought

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At the conclusion of the recent Gaganshakti exercise, the Indian Air Chief B.S. Dhanoa delivered a lecture followed by a Q&A session. Amongst many other insights that the Air Chief provided, one very crucial piece of information stands out. Dhanoa hinted at preparing a 'Plan B', in the backdrop of Gaganshakti wherein the IAF accomplished successful movement of large number of its assets across disparate regions.

Classically, the Indian Cold Start Doctrine has been interpreted as an armored assault for a quick, decisive, incisive cut across Pakistan. In response, there have been significant moves by the Pakistan Army to disabuse any Indian notion of an easy victory. Yet, cold start in its very essence is an existential threat, one which could be brought to bear in a number of ways. And one very significant manner, is through the use of Indian strategic depth.

Consider the scenario, where instead of making an armored assault, India actually pulls its forces back from any forward positions that can be threatened by Pakistan Airforce, or by Pakistani cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles. I will call this tactic the 'Indian Tsunami'. Just like the natural phenomenon where water recedes before the actual destructive wave arrives, the 'Indian Tsunami' would start by a strategic pull back of forces. With its own forces well within the safety of its own borders, India can launch a volley of cruise missile at Pakistani forward positions, especially airbases. Here, Pakistan is at a significant disadvantage due to lack of strategic depth. And because of India's significant depth, any potential Pakistani response would be significantly muted.

In war, if the enemy knows where you will attack from, the enemy has a significant advantage in defence. Unfortunately, all of Pakistan's military strategy is focused on an East to West threat. The reality of the situation is that India will attempt a 360 degree encirclement for a comprehensive and decisive blow against Pakistan. It will utilize assets in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Oman, Bhutan, and within the Indian mainland.

In such a situation, Pakistan must work to increase the cost of war for the enemy. Currently, other than ballistic missiles, there is no credible Pakistani offense that can represent a material 360 degree threat to India. Yes, the Indian forces will be on high alert in all sectors, but when offensive capabilities are so clearly lacking, and Pakistan's attack pattern so evidently known, we cannot say we have a credible deterrent in place that can counter the Indian Tsunami.

In this background, it must be noted that Pakistan has recently lost a golden opportunity to increase defence cooperation with Maldives. There is a reason why India wants to keep its neighbours close - the Indian government and military planners realize the deleterious effects of a 360 degree encirclement and are always on the front foot to manage this risk.

This should be a lesson learned, and an eye opener for the Pakistani security establishment. There are still significant opportunities of military cooperation when it comes to Myanmar and Malaysia. And China can play a significant role in nurturing such cooperation. An example of such cooperation could be military training facilities for special forces and fighter pilots. Pakistani forces and aircraft could be permanently stationed to provide ongoing military training.

The Pakistan China friendship should be solidified by establishing a mountain warfare facility near Doklam. If fighter pilots are to take off from high altitude bases, they need to be in constant conditioning. A high altitude training facility that has Pakistani pilots and fighter jets permanently stationed near Doklam would further enhance the Iron Bond between China and Pakistan. This should be accompanied by special forces training facilities for mountain warfare.

Finally, it should be evident that an SSBN is a crucial element of deterrence to create a material 360 degree risk for India and make it think twice about 'Indian Tsunami'. Hopefully, as the negative effects of the Zardari and Nawaz Sharif governments decrease and the economy picks up, Pakistan can look into acquiring an aircraft carrier in the distant future.
 
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The idea espoused isn’t a retreat of forces as much as reposition of assets tl meet fronts with the greater risk. The idiotic idea of a two front war they are stuck with due to hawkish planning is driving their idea of having units move from one front to another in a staged manner.

The problems with this is being able to predict which front is going active first or later or simultaneously(if they do this at all).

The bigger aspect of the exercise was trying to generate a high sortie ratio despite the disparity in personnel. Unfortunately, this is only possible for the short duration of a week or so before Indian pilots will start maming mistakes out of sheer exhaustion due to the high tempo.
The plus for this that they expect only a week before they achieve complete air superiority; that lies on the assumption that current PAF force makeup will persist versus the PAF makeup ten years from now.

The only true aspect of this exercise that poses a challenge to the PAF is the usage of MKi’s from facilities originally equipped to handle other smaller aircraft.
 
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This article seems incomplete. It spells out the India-problem but gives no solutions.

The IAF's Plan B is temporary, only designed for a smaller than required IAF, which is set to change over the next 10 years. So I don't see its relation to Pakistan acquiring SSBNs and carriers in the distant future.
 
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The idea espoused isn’t a retreat of forces as much as reposition of assets tl meet fronts with the greater risk. The idiotic idea of a two front war they are stuck with due to hawkish planning is driving their idea of having units move from one front to another in a staged manner.

It's not just two-front war, we are preparing a multi-front war as any great power does. Two-front is the main focus of the current modernisation, but we will ultimately create at least three theatre commands capable of going to war independently. So there's nothing "idiotic" about it.

The problems with this is being able to predict which front is going active first or later or simultaneously(if they do this at all).

The bigger aspect of the exercise was trying to generate a high sortie ratio despite the disparity in personnel. Unfortunately, this is only possible for the short duration of a week or so before Indian pilots will start maming mistakes out of sheer exhaustion due to the high tempo.

Surge operations are not expected to go beyond a few days, let alone a week.

The plus for this that they expect only a week before they achieve complete air superiority; that lies on the assumption that current PAF force makeup will persist versus the PAF makeup ten years from now.

Your assumption is wrong here. Plan B is for the current scenario, with 30 squadrons in a two-front war setting. In 10 years, we will have made up most of our squadron numbers, which is Plan A, ie, playing with the full team. We expect to have 39 squadrons by 2027-28.

In 10 years, the PAF will be up against the IAF's Plan A.

The only true aspect of this exercise that poses a challenge to the PAF is the usage of MKi’s from facilities originally equipped to handle other smaller aircraft.

Naturally, the MKI can do everything the Soviets had designed the Su-27 to do, including operating from rough fields. So it shouldn't come as a surprise to the PAF.
 
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The idea espoused isn’t a retreat of forces as much as reposition of assets tl meet fronts with the greater risk. The idiotic idea of a two front war they are stuck with due to hawkish planning is driving their idea of having units move from one front to another in a staged manner.

The problems with this is being able to predict which front is going active first or later or simultaneously(if they do this at all).

The bigger aspect of the exercise was trying to generate a high sortie ratio despite the disparity in personnel. Unfortunately, this is only possible for the short duration of a week or so before Indian pilots will start maming mistakes out of sheer exhaustion due to the high tempo.
The plus for this that they expect only a week before they achieve complete air superiority; that lies on the assumption that current PAF force makeup will persist versus the PAF makeup ten years from now.

The only true aspect of this exercise that poses a challenge to the PAF is the usage of MKi’s from facilities originally equipped to handle other smaller aircraft.

I am extrapolating from what he said, under the assumption he won't give away everything. I am trying to collate Gaganshakti with the Cold Start Doctrine. Of course moving assets between different commands also has implications for the two front war, but it would be disingenuous on our part to overlook the implications for cold start.
 
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It's not just two-front war, we are preparing a multi-front war as any great power does. Two-front is the main focus of the current modernisation, but we will ultimately create at least three theatre commands capable of going to war independently. So there's nothing "idiotic" about it.



Surge operations are not expected to go beyond a few days, let alone a week.



Your assumption is wrong here. Plan B is for the current scenario, with 30 squadrons in a two-front war setting. In 10 years, we will have made up most of our squadron numbers, which is Plan A, ie, playing with the full team. We expect to have 39 squadrons by 2027-28.

In 10 years, the PAF will be up against the IAF's Plan A.



Naturally, the MKI can do everything the Soviets had designed the Su-27 to do, including operating from rough fields. So it shouldn't come as a surprise to the PAF.
so we are assuming india is going to induct 400 fighters in 10 years..because that is the only way india can hit 39 squardons
 
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so we are assuming india is going to induct 400 fighters in 10 years..because that is the only way india can hit 39 squardons

Not 400, less than that.

We need 15 new squadrons to get to 39 by 2028. With 6 LCAs and 4 Rafales, we will have already hit the 34 squadron mark by 2025-26. That's an addition of 195 jets.

4 squadrons in a few years after that isn't a big deal. All the future production programs will start delivering by then, MCA and Rafale.
 
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At the conclusion of the recent Gaganshakti exercise, the Indian Air Chief B.S. Dhanoa delivered a lecture followed by a Q&A session. Amongst many other insights that the Air Chief provided, one very crucial piece of information stands out. Dhanoa hinted at preparing a 'Plan B', in the backdrop of Gaganshakti wherein the IAF accomplished successful movement of large number of its assets across disparate regions.

Classically, the Indian Cold Start Doctrine has been interpreted as an armored assault for a quick, decisive, incisive cut across Pakistan. In response, there have been significant moves by the Pakistan Army to disabuse any Indian notion of an easy victory. Yet, cold start in its very essence is an existential threat, one which could be brought to bear in a number of ways. And one very significant manner, is through the use of Indian strategic depth.

Consider the scenario, where instead of making an armored assault, India actually pulls its forces back from any forward positions that can be threatened by Pakistan Airforce, or by Pakistani cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles. I will call this tactic the 'Indian Tsunami'. Just like the natural phenomenon where water recedes before the actual destructive wave arrives, the 'Indian Tsunami' would start by a strategic pull back of forces. With its own forces well within the safety of its own borders, India can launch a volley of cruise missile at Pakistani forward positions, especially airbases. Here, Pakistan is at a significant disadvantage due to lack of strategic depth. And because of India's significant depth, any potential Pakistani response would be significantly muted.

In war, if the enemy knows where you will attack from, the enemy has a significant advantage in defence. Unfortunately, all of Pakistan's military strategy is focused on an East to West threat. The reality of the situation is that India will attempt a 360 degree encirclement for a comprehensive and decisive blow against Pakistan. It will utilize assets in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Oman, Bhutan, and within the Indian mainland.

In such a situation, Pakistan must work to increase the cost of war for the enemy. Currently, other than ballistic missiles, there is no credible Pakistani offense that can represent a material 360 degree threat to India. Yes, the Indian forces will be on high alert in all sectors, but when offensive capabilities are so clearly lacking, and Pakistan's attack pattern so evidently known, we cannot say we have a credible deterrent in place that can counter the Indian Tsunami.

In this background, it must be noted that Pakistan has recently lost a golden opportunity to increase defence cooperation with Maldives. There is a reason why India wants to keep its neighbours close - the Indian government and military planners realize the deleterious effects of a 360 degree encirclement and are always on the front foot to manage this risk.

This should be a lesson learned, and an eye opener for the Pakistani security establishment. There are still significant opportunities of military cooperation when it comes to Myanmar and Malaysia. And China can play a significant role in nurturing such cooperation. An example of such cooperation could be military training facilities for special forces and fighter pilots. Pakistani forces and aircraft could be permanently stationed to provide ongoing military training.

The Pakistan China friendship should be solidified by establishing a mountain warfare facility near Doklam. If fighter pilots are to take off from high altitude bases, they need to be in constant conditioning. A high altitude training facility that has Pakistani pilots and fighter jets permanently stationed near Doklam would further enhance the Iron Bond between China and Pakistan. This should be accompanied by special forces training facilities for mountain warfare.

Finally, it should be evident that an SSBN is a crucial element of deterrence to create a material 360 degree risk for India and make it think twice about 'Indian Tsunami'. Hopefully, as the negative effects of the Zardari and Nawaz Sharif governments decrease and the economy picks up, Pakistan can look into acquiring an aircraft carrier in the distant future.
Few points
1 lets assume that indian armed forces do move major chunks away that sudden movement will ring bells in china and Pakistan so pakistan and china will move there assets too
2 most of this will depend on one major thing which will be the time it will take for them to move and redeploy those assets back and push them inside pakistani territory
3 alot will ride on IAF ,are they able to gain supremacy in air in 1st 24 hrs or not
4th even if india just uses CM success rate will be only high with 1st few surprise strikes and after that paf will and armed forces will move to bunker and start responding and major chunk will be in air and bunkers before even those hit pakistan
5th people keep complaining about pakistan doesn't have strategic depth yes it is a negative point but this can and most probably will be used to full advantage as Pakistan will be relocate there forces much quickly from point to points and can keep asserting pressure in invading forces which will have physical and mental affects as they have huge infrastructure already developed close to border
6th cold start has one major flaw with its doctrine is pakistan has alot of populated small cities right close to border and india force most probably will have to clear these cities street by street which will slower there movement and currently which will give extra time to defenders and provide cover so defending forces will smaller force will be able to stop much bigger force and in last decade Pakistani armed has much better experience urban warfare
 
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1 lets assume that indian armed forces do move major chunks away that sudden movement will ring bells in china and Pakistan so pakistan ans china will move there assets too
2 most of this will develop on one major thing which will be the time it will take for them to move and redeploy those assets back ans push them inside pakistani territory
3 alot will ride on IAF are they able to gain supremacy in air in 1st 24 hrs

It depends on how quickly the war starts. The Chinese will take weeks to buildup. If war is inevitable, then if India takes the initiative and attacks first, then the IAF will be able to use more aircraft against Pakistan than if war happens simultaneously at both fronts.

The biggest threat to India is if there's a Sino-India war and Pakistan tries to take advantage of that by opening their front.

clear these cities street by street

Cold Start's objective is to hold rural territory to be used as a bargaining chip, not hold urban settlements.
 
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It depends on how quickly the war starts. The Chinese will take weeks to buildup. If war is inevitable, then if India takes the initiative and attacks first, then the IAF will be able to use more aircraft against Pakistan than if war happens simultaneously at both fronts.

The biggest threat to India is if there's a Sino-India war and Pakistan tries to take advantage of that by opening their front.

Cold Start's objective is to hold rural territory to be used as a bargaining chip, not hold urban settlements.
These areas urban and rural areas are attached

Regarding your 1st comment
Man when your enemy moves few thousands soldiers suddenly any force will keep a eye on that

And hes talking about few thousands to 100000+
I never ever added china into equation, let's assume its just india using cold start doctrine
India won't fight against china alone Unless have backing of other countries
And with all madness with pakistan it will only be on Loc
Few media sponsored surgical strikes ( big big maybe) unless that gov wants to gain some brownie points

MAD at work protecting world peace since 1960s ;)
 
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A bit about Plan B.

@Oscar
Focus on the bold.

https://theprint.in/opinion/how-indian-air-forces-gagan-shakti-packed-a-punch-with-army-navy/54555/
How Indian Air Force’s Gagan Shakti exercise packed a punch together with Army and Navy

The exercise has demonstrated that whenever the call of duty has been blown, the services have pulled together with alacrity.

Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa seems determined to position the Indian Air Force as a critical tool of statecraft in an increasingly complex strategic neighbourhood. Speaking at the Vivekanada Foundation recently, he strongly argued a case for the IAF as a force that has the capability to punch well above its weight.

The Gagan Shakti exercise, which saw the IAF fly over 11,000 sorties between 10 and 22 April, helped dispel widespread apprehensions that IAF’s combat edge was seriously blunted by declining force levels. The exercise demonstrated that offensive capability was still at the heart of Indian air power.

With India’s armed forces in complete agreement that future conventional conflicts are more likely than not to fall under the template of ‘high-tempo and intense limited conflict’ scenarios, the operational outcomes expected in both continental and maritime domains would revolve around speedy depletion of the enemy’s combat potential.

In such operational scenarios, it would be disastrous for India’s strategic community to ignore IAF-delivered air power as a key constituent of its deterrent, enabling and coercive strategies.

It is in this context that five doctrinal underpinnings of the IAF were exercised and validated during Gagan Shakti exercise. These are persistence, persuasion, compellence, endurance and jointness. It demonstrated the capacity to fly more than 5,000 sorties during the first 3-4 days of the exercise in a ‘sustained surge’ phase that comprised missions ranging from long-distance precision strikes, interdiction of army and maritime targets, attacks against targets in the tactical battle area (TBA) and robust multi-layered air defence.

A battalion level airborne drop in the second phase of the exercise and speedy inter-valley and inter-theatre switching of forces with the entire array of the IAF’s modern and legacy airlift capability (C-17s, C-130s, Il-76s, An-32s and Mi-17 helicopters of varied sophistication) demonstrated a persuasiveness that has been a work-in-progress over the past few years.

More than anything, this capability gives some heft to the current debate on how serious is India’s two-front capability. While some analysts are sceptical about India’s capability to orchestrate adequate operational capability to support a credible two-front strategy, the air chief refused to be drawn into the debate. He said, “You have seen our capability, we do have a Plan-B.”

What this reflects is that while there is a ‘public position’ on a two-front threat, there is also a more professional position that looks at it not as an inescapable possibility, but as a contingency that needs careful attention without unnecessary alarm.

Displaying a flexibility of operational thought in recent years, the IAF has progressively moved away from the traditional air power template of deep strikes on stand-alone targets to create strategic effects. Gagan Shakti has, however, validated the proposition that offensive air power remains the best tool for compellence in a conventional scenario, but this time around, the IAF rotated this strategy around joint missions with the Indian Army and Indian Navy.

For example, interdiction missions around the TBA against high-value elements of an adversary’s combat potential like his armour, artillery and transportation networks, and simulated maritime strikes in littorals like Lakshadweep and around choke points in the global commons like the Malacca and Sunda Straits reflect a willingness to convert doctrinal pronouncement into deliverables. The ability to operate high-end offensive platforms from short air strips in remote locations of Arunachal Pradesh and deliver both precision and non-precision weapons with accuracy indicates that the IAF is indeed in good training-shape.

Sustaining operations over slightly under two weeks and generating more than 11,000 sorties is reflective of combat endurance, a trait that India’s armed forces have had to demonstrate to force favourable war-outcomes as they did in 1971 and 1999.

Finally, even though this author and others in the recent past have been critical of ‘jointness’ and continue to argue that systemic changes are needed to leverage the actual potential of the three services, Gagan Shakti has demonstrated that whenever the call of duty has been blown, the services have pulled together with alacrity. Never have so many joint operations been squeezed into an exercise as was done in Gagan Shakti. The search for optimal jointness will continue to be a strange quest in the Indian context.

Arjun Subramaniam is a retired Air Vice Marshal from the IAF and currently a Visiting Fellow at Oxford.

Although not completely related, the writer wanted to highlight this point the IAF Chief made, that the IAF doesn't consider the J-20 to be a significant threat.

These areas urban and rural areas are attached

Nope. Rural areas generally mean roads, rivers, bridges, dams etc. You can cut off access to cities.

Regarding your 1st comment
Man when your enemy moves few thousands soldiers suddenly any force will keep a eye on that

And hes talking about few thousands to 100000+

It will take a month for China to prepare for an invasion at the earliest. And it's only possible from Spring to before Fall.

I never ever added china into equation, let's assume its just india using cold start doctrine

Okay, but Plan B is for a two front war.

India won't fight against china alone Unless have backing of other countries

No such thing. Our Navy Chief said no one's gonna help us in a Sino-India war only a few weeks ago.

And with all madness with pakistan it will only be on Loc

The opposite. War will happen in the plains of Punjab. That's where our objectives lie.

MAD at work protecting world peace since 1960s ;)

There is no such thing as MAD.

Post WW2, war is no longer profitable for any country.
 
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Nope. Rural areas generally mean roads, rivers, bridges, dams etc. You can cut off access to cities
Man do you know the terrain of the area no well i do
Jhelum closest dam full of small town after town next town start in 10 mints drive , cant use armour inside city as roads are small not that easy

Okay, but Plan B is for a two front war
Pakistan is not going for two front war neither are they ready
The opposite. War will happen in the plains of Punjab. That's where our objectives lie.
1960s and Punjab and 2018s Punjab are two different punjabs it will be mostly urban which will be really really slow
There is no such thing as MAD.

Post WW2, war is no longer profitable for any country.
Exactly no such thing as MAD please do tell me what stopped us and russia and whats stopping india for testing so called cold start
TIN TIN TIN MAD AT RESCUE
 
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Man do you know the terrain of the area no well i do
Jhelum closest dam full of small town after town next town start in 10 mints drive , cant use armour inside city as roads are small not that easy

Now you are hung up on dams? I gave that as an example, not that we are aiming to take dams.

Pakistan is not going for two front war neither are they ready

Pakistan is not the one that will fight a two-front war, India will.

1960s and Punjab and 2018s Punjab are two different punjabs it will be mostly urban which will be really really slow

It's fine. But we have no plans of entering cities.

Exactly no such thing as MAD please do tell me what stopped us and russia and whats stopping india for testing so called cold start
TIN TIN TIN MAD AT RESCUE

It's simple. There was no profit in a nuclear war. What's the objective? And is the objective worth going to war? Even in a conventional setting, like right after WW2, there was no point in going to war. WW1 ended warfare as a whole. It was just Hitler who was nuts enough to go to war. So even without nukes, there was no possibility of war between the US and SU.

The Soviet Union never operated with MAD in mind. Their belief was they would win a nuclear war. And their entire MIC was geared towards winning the conventional war that followed a nuclear war. The Soviets never believed in MAD because they had conventional superiority. With the dissolution of the SU, the US also stopped talking about MAD since they now have conventional superiority. Their withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and commencing the development of ICBM stoppers was a proof of that. The Russians followed it up with the development of the S-500.

The reason why nuclear war can be fought is because of this thing called tunnelling. You could simply tunnel your way to safety.

In India's case, it's two-fold. One, if we go to war today, we will win, but at the cost of destabilising the entire region, like in Iraq and Syria. Although the Kashmir issue will be resolved, the cost will be far too much.

Second, we want to be able to defeat Pakistan overwhelmingly, like what the US did in Iraq. We want to do it with minimum casualties, even if the war goes nuclear. We are slowly reaching a point where SR/MR/IRBMs are becoming useless because of BMD. When that happens, the nuclear threat from Pakistan will diminish considerably, and our conventional superiority would have further improved. We do not have this advantage yet.

Regardless, there is no objective worth pursuing by waging war on Pakistan as of today.
 
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