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By Colonel E M Azizul Kahhar, psc, G
Introduction IN-MN relation had always been coaxed by IN’s conflicting need for upholding its democratic value in one side and the need for geo-strategic and economic development on the other. Due to its unique geo-political location, MN offers enormous advantage for IN geostrategically, economically and from security point of view. Yet IN-MN relation has never fathomed out fully to the desired strategic level.
China (CN)’s growing presence always cast a shadow on IN-MN relations. In many ways, IN has also played a distant secondary role to CN’s outsized influence. MN has long been described as a “de facto Chinese client state” or “a virtual Chinese satellite,” within the construct of CN’s strategic design to develop its western region. (1)
Notwithstanding the trend, the last decade has seen a positive mark in IN-MN relation. Reforming of ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’ in 2014 is a clear indication of IN’s urge to explore the stagnant relation. However, the urge is not only from IN’s side. MN, who frequently remains skeptic about CN’s role as a strategy of exploitation, (2) has also its own stake to develop the relation with IN. Thus this recent shift in IN-MN relation is accentuated by both individual and mutual interests.
However, in today’s global world, no bi-lateral relation is devoid of regional and global factors. Accordingly, IN-MN relation also remains hostage to both Sino-IN and Sino-US power struggles respectively at regional level and Sino-US power struggle at global level. Neither USA nor CN would like to see MN is occupied by the other.
CN wants to see MN is militarily controlled while USA expects a democratic MN devoid of CN’s grip. Although MN has gone into democratic process yet Sino-US and Sino-IN power struggle over military or democratic control of MN will prevail in near future. This may risk MN’s transition to democracy that in turn may affect the development of IN-MN relation.
Developing IN-MN relation manifests multi-dimensional implications based on the course and trends of the development. A strong IN-MN relation may push BD at backset in dealing her bilateral issues with both MN and IN. For example, in the recent past we have seen how IN’s stand on Rohingya Issue mattered for BD or for that matter how the ‘Look East’ policy of BD will be accommodated with in the greater length and breadth of IN’s ‘Look/ Act East’ policy, will definitely depend on IN-MN relation.
At this context, the paper will first discuss the historical perspective of IN-MN relation. Having discussed so, the paper will embark on analyzing the global and regional dynamics affecting the development of IN-MN relation and MN’s geostrategic importance to IN. Later, the paper will discuss the present trends of IN-MN relation and finally will forecast the implications for BD.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historical Trends
IN had long historical relationship with MN since antiquity due to cultural exchanges through import of Theravada Buddhism from IN. Britain subjugated Burma as a province of India in 1886 but brought under own colonial rule in 1937. During Second World War in 1942, Japanese captured MN that lasted upto 1944 till Japanese were defeated. IN established diplomatic relations after MN’s independence from Great Britain in 1948. In this initial period, IN-MN relations were strong due to (3):
a. Political and cultural links.
b. Flourishing commerce, common interests in regional affairs.
c. Both IN and MN were close allies in the Non-Alignment Movement and Common Wealth in 50s.
d. IN-MN Treaty of Friendship signed in 1951.
However, the overthrow of the MN’s democratic government by the Military in 1962 led to strains in ties. IN condemned the suppression of democracy and MN ordered the expulsion of the Burmese IN community amounting 100,000. MN’s neutral stand during IN-CN war in 1962 was seen as a pro-Chinese tilt by IN.
Consequently, stagnancy on IN-MN relations prevailed for next two decades. A breakthrough seemed to be visible in 1987 when the then-PM Rajiv Gandhi visited MN. Soon the relation worsened after IN’s reaction to the MN military regime’s suppression of ‘People’s Uprising’ in 1988. Relation worsened further in 1990, when IN partnered the UN sanction against MN. (4)
Bi-lateral relations between MN and IN started improving considerably in 1992 although many agree that India was warming up for improving its relations with the de facto military rulers from 1990. Many consider the visit of MN’s vice-foreign minister, U. Baswa, to IN in August 1992 as the turning point where the MN delegation made three points: (5)
a. MN respects IN’s commitment to democracy and hopes India would be patient about the revival of democracy in Myanmar.
b. Myanmar acknowledges that security and political concerns existed which are shared by both countries and intends to cooperate with India.
c. The third point was that Myanmar will be willing to increase economic and technological cooperation with India.
The period between 1994 and 1996, as a result, witnessed an enhancement of economic cooperation between the two countries that continued to 2000 and beyond. During this phase there have been military to military dialogues and political rapprochement. Initiatives like BIMSTEC also took off during this period.
The first decade of the 21st century witnessed growing strategic engagement between IN and MN that grew truly multi-faceted. Mutual visit of General Than and President Abdul Kalam respectively in 2004 and 2006 opened up co-operation in energy sector, troubled border, defence issues and arms sales. (6) Later Man Mohan Singh’s state visit in 2012, many new initiatives were announced and around a dozen MOUs were signed that are carried forward by the new IN government of Modi. (7)
Evaluation of Historical Perspective
IN-MN relation had always been contingent to the conflicting need of democratic value and economic development. Thus, IN-MN relation have never had a continued trend rather followed a graph of ups and downs mainly growing during MN’s brief democratic era and declining during mil regime as depicted in figure -1 below:
IN’s foreign policy approaches towards MN from the 1960s to the early 1990s represent a classic case in which India’s strategic interests were given a go-by in pursuit of moralistic policies. IN’s non-diplomatic propaganda on democratic norms pushed MN to embrace CN. Realists argued that IN’s pro-democracy stance had driven Myanmar into “China’s lap.” (8)
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL STRATEGIC DYNAMICS AFFECTING IN-MN RELATION
Global Dynamics
Uni-polar Power Centric Multi-polarity. Fall of communism led the world to the international system of the Post-Cold War era actually reflects a mixture of both unipolar and multipolar system in which at least five major powers, the United States, China, EU, Japan, and Russia, dominate international affairs. (9) Trends further forecast CN to be the next only power to challenge USA. Thus USA will have increased interest in fostering a strong IN- MN relation devoid of CN.
Growing Importance of Indian Ocean (IO). A T Mahan said almost 100 yrs before that “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls the seven seas; the destiny of the world will be written in its waters” (10)
IO region provides world’s largest market and cheap pull of labour. It contains 6 imp sea Today, more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Malacca making its status as the most important global geo-political feature. Relation with MN, thus, will aid any global or regional power to have control over Malacca and in turn over entire region.
Shifting Focus to Asia. Having successfully dealt with USSR and containing ME, USA and other superpowers now is in the process of shifting their look towards Asia. Within next 20 years, Asia is likely to be the larger economy than G-7 with present growth rate as said by IMF. After ME next highest oil reserve is in central Asian states.
Asian nuclear states like Pakistan, North Korea are not in-confidence list of USA and the West. (11) Fighting global terrorism will urge the focus in Asian Sector. CN is a major concern for USA and western block. All these strategic factors are likely to bring world’s attention to Asia, thus, will obviously affect IN-MN relation.
Change of Power Equation in Asia. With the collapse of the USSR, the strategic utility of PK to USA in controlling Afghan affair has diminished. On the contrary, the interests of the strongest and the largest democracy converged on containing CN and fighting over global terrorism. Thus, USA embraced IN as a better card to play with CN that changed long existing Asian power equation which will definitely affect IN-MN relation.
Regional Dynamics
Rohingya Issue. Denial of citizenship, violence between Rohingya Muslims and Arakan Buddhists, military repression and follow up standings of superpowers and regional actors have already turned the Rohingya crisis into a global issue. IN’s standing on Rohingya issue not only bears the potential to shape IN-MN bi-lateral relation but also its relation with other regional countries and its ideological image at international level.
US Strategic Interest in MN and the Regions. The overarching US aim for this region to gain strategic pre-eminence, rather than dominance. The US objective for IOR includes ensuring that US interests are not jeopardized by states such as CN and Iran. Relation with IN and control over Malacca Strait helps USA to achieve edge over the entire Asian strategic theatre and IO.
It will also assist USPACOM to attain its objective of forward force posture strategy, gaining land access to CN. US interest in normalizing ties with Myanmar was also aimed essentially at distancing the country from North Korea to halt the former’s nuclear ambition and desired missile technological development.
CN’s Strategic Interest in MN and the Regions. Presence in MN in the form of partnership or any other, offers CN to secure his life line and land and river outlet to IO. One of the strategic objectives of CN is to strategically encircle IN. For this he pursues the strategy of string of pearl, OBOR etc as shown in the diagram. Thus presence in MN helps CN in establishing strategic encirclement of IN and also to pursue its recently adopted Ocean Offensive strategy with forward pre-positioning of military power.
Pakistan’s Strategic Interest in MN and the Region. Pakistan Army needs MN to counterbalance India’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. (12) With China to the north, MN to the east, Sri Lanka to the south and Pakistan itself to the west, India’s overzealous ambitions to become a ‘regional superpower’ can be rigorously monitored. The Chinese maritime expansion in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea with the logistic support of MN and Pakistan respectively has created a situation of perceived CN encirclement of IN.
Russian Strategic Interest in MN and the Region. Moscow’s strategic focus on expanding its relations with non-western countries, specifically those in Asia and ASEAN, encapsulates the core of its interest in Myanmar. MN’s bilateral ties with Russia focus heavily on military and security-related matters. The international boycott imposed by the West since the late 1980’s has further warmed their relationship. ‘At this juncture, Russia is diversifying its cooperation with Myanmar to include the economic, cultural and scientific fields.
Evaluation of Global Geo-Strategic Dynamics
Development of IN-MN relation remains hostage to Sino-US and Sino-IN power struggle respectively at global and at regional level. Neither USA nor CN will like to see MN is occupied by the other. CN wants to see a military controlled MN while USA expects a democratic MN devoid of CN’s grip.
This bears the risk of jeopardizing the transition of democracy in MN affecting development of IN-MN relation. Due to changed power equation and growing US-IN strategic partnership, development of IN-MN relation will commensurate with the converging need of both US and IN. IN-MN relation will also escalate by the course of Sino-MN relation in the region.
Overall geo-strategic set up of the region, does not allow Rohingya’s plight to end up making an Asian Kossovo. Thus, it will remain as a volatile factor in shaping not only IN-MN relation but also IN-BD and BD-MN relation.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF IN AND MN TO EACH OTHER
Geo-Strategic Location
MN is the second- largest IN’s neighbours and located south of the states of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast IN. Four of IN’s north-eastern states, are geographically contiguous to MN placing both of them crucial for IN counter insurgency operation. MN provides the Eastern littoral of the Bay of Bengal.
IN also shares the strategic waters of Bay of Bengal, including the area of strategically important Andaman and Nicobar islands. An unfriendly Myanmar hosting foreign naval presence would be a grave threat to India’s security. Geo-politically, with a friendly Myanmar, India can add more substance to her ‘Look East’ policies of building up relationships with South East Asia. (13)
Counter – Balancing CN’s Influence
A strong CN-MN relation strengthens the fear of IN’s strategic encirclement by CN. IN’s move to forge close relations with MN are driven by a desire to counter CN’s growing influence there. As of March 2017, China remained Myanmar’s largest foreign investor and closest defense ally. To counter CN’s such strong tie, the only effective solution available to IN is to build and promote stronger strategic, economic and overall relation with MN. IN also has certain advantage over CN that includes geographical proximity, democracy, US sponsoring, regional forums like SAARC, BIMSTEC, Mekong initiative, Sukyee’s second home, political and cultural linkage etc. However, the lead margin of CN is so vast that IN may need years to evade CN’s grip over MN.
Materializing IN’s Look East Policy (LEP).
The Look East Policy, launched under the P. V. Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s – was aimed to connect the Indian economy with the flourishing economy of neighboring Southeast Asia. (14) Considering its importance, it is reframed as ‘Act East’ in 2004. MN is IN’s gateway to Southeast Asia and should India wish to realize its ‘Act East’ policy, it must consolidate its relation with Myanmar first.
Dealing with Insurgency
For decades, majority of the seven states in India’s north-eastern region have witnessed emergence and growth of insurgency movements with demands ranging from independence, autonomy, tribal rights etc. MN borders four of IN’s seven sisters. Fighting the existing insurgency in the region is almost impossible for IN without effective assistance from MN.
IN’s Energy Need
India currently ranks the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, accounting for about 3.3 percent of the world’s total annual energy consumption. Despite its large annual energy production, India is a net energy importer, mostly due to the large imbalance between oil production and consumption. Myanmar has oil reserves of around 600 million barrels and total gas reserves of 88 trillion cubic feet (TCF) which are crucial to IN energy needs.
Promotion of Democracy
The Indian stand about MN’s democracy was made fairly clear in 2006 by stating that ” India cannot “export democracy” to neighboring countries. It was, in fact, a policy driven by the then strategic reality. IN now would welcome and can assist the establishment of inclusive and broadbased multiparty democracy in MN. IN’s ambition of becoming global power also depends on its role and image on promoting democracy in MN.
Evaluation of MN’s Geo-Strategic Importance
MN, due to its unique geo-political location, offers enormous advantage for IN geostrategically, economically and from security point of view. CN growing presence casts a shadow on Indian-Myanmar relations, thus IN feels to counter it. IN is geo-strategically dependent on MN for pursuing its Act East Policy. Better IN-MN relation has greater significance in developing collectivity for fighting the insurgency. IN can also take advantage of MN’s energy reserve and pursue its ambition to be global power by promoting democracy in MN.
GROWING STATE OF IN-MN RELATIONS
Strategic Cooperation
While the region’s focus has revolved around the SAARC countries and CN, MN is becoming increasingly important for IN in both strategic and economic context through following issues:
a. BIMSTEC. MN became a member of BIMSTEC in December 1997 and trades mostly with Thailand and India in the BIMSTEC region. MN’s major exports to India are agricultural products like beans, pulses and maize and forest products such as teak and hardwoods. Its import from India includes chemical products, pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances and transport equipment.
b. Mekong Ganga Cooperation. MN is a member of the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) since November 2000. MGC is an initiative by six countries – IN and five ASEAN countries namely, Cambodia, Laos, MN, Thailand and Vietnam. It aims to foster cooperation in the fields of tourism, education, culture, transport and communication.
Defense Cooperation
As of 2013, IN and MN are set to cooperate in military and help modernize MN’s Defence Forces. The joint statement of the IN- MN Joint Consultative Commission on July 16, included IN’s commitment to supporting “the modernization of MN Armed Forces”, cooperation in terms of training as well as cooperation “in building a professional and capable MN Navy to safeguard and ensure its maritime security.”
IN under the Modi government has also demonstrated the capability and willingness to boost the naval capabilities of its neighbors in a similar fashion. As early as mid-2013, the two countries were said to have reached a decision to build OPVs for MN in IN shipyards and provide training to MN Navy officers and sailors at IN establishments. According to a press release by the Indian Navy, the visit by Admiral Sunil Lanba in November 4, 2017 is intended to “consolidate and enhance the bilateral maritime relations between India and MN.
Economic Cooperation
MN’s bilateral engagement with India in trade has gained momentum since 2008. Bilateral trade has grown from $12.4 million in 1980-81 to $2.18 billion in 2013-14 as shown in figure below:
Both countries also signed a border trade agreement in 1994 and have two trade points along their 1,643 km border. IN-MN trade has been more than doubled in the last seven years and has crossed $2 billion in 2013-14. IN is the largest market for MN’s exports, buying about US$ 220 million worth of goods in 2000; IN’s exports to MN stood at US$75.36 million.
Infrastructure Initiatives
IN is also closely working with MN for Border Area Development where IN has granted an assistance of USD 5 Million each year for next five years. Under this MOU 21 schools, 17 health centres and 8 bridges were constructed / built during the first year in Chin State and Naga SelfAdministered Zone of MN.
On 13 February 2001, IN Army’s Border Roads Organization constructed 250 kilometre Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highway, to provide a major strategic and commercial transport route connecting North-East IN, and South Asia as a whole.
a. IN-MN-Thailand Friendship Highway. Both IN and MN have agreed to construct a 3200 km high 4-lane triangular highway connecting IN, MN and Thailand. The route will run from India’s northeastern states into MN. The route begins from Guwahati in IN and connects to Mandalay in MN and continues to Yangon in MN and then to Mae Sot in Thailand, which then continues to Bangkok.
b. Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Route. The Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project will connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe sea port in MN by sea; it will then link Sittwe seaport to Lashio in MN via Kaladan river boat route and then from Lashio on to Mizoram in India by road transport.
IN is also helping Myanmar by setting up high-speed data links in 32 cities. Trade through sea is another way of intensifying economic cooperation between the two countries. The Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project (KMMTP) that connects Kolkata port with Sittwe port presents such an opportunity.
Evaluation of Growing State of IN-MN’s Relation
Strategically IN pursues MN to get MN free from CN control through BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga cooperation. In defense sector although CN is contributing MN for long but recently IN has set to cooperate in modernizing MN’s Defence Forces through training and infrastructure assistance.
It is encouraging that IN-MN trade has more than doubled in the last seven years and has crossed $2 billion in 2013-14. IN’s assistance to MN’s infrastructure development hinges on INMN-Thailand Friendship Highway and Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Route.
IMPLICATIONS FOR BD
Strategic Implications
IN-MN relation is on the development but not yet fully fathomed to be a big concern for BD. IN-MN relation manifests various types of strategic implications based on the course and trends of the relation. A strong IN-MN relation will pose more challenges for BD in dealing with BDMN or BD-IN bilateral issues. It will also entail BD to be embroiled by the Sino-US power struggle at global level and Sino-IN power struggle at regional level. If IN and MN remains omni-focused on their individual and bilateral interests, BD may find its strategic discourse articulated on the premise of IN or MN interest.
In resolving bilateral issues with IN or MN separately, BD may have to face a stronger collective resistance emanating from growing IN-MN partnership. Strong IN-MN relation tends to push BD to fall pray of Regional and Global power play in the region. In case of likely BDMN issues, IN siding with MN, will push BD to CN. In extreme strained situation, IN may manipulate MN to unleash Rohingya card against BD. Contrarily, MN may also ride on IN and persuade him to use water or insurgency cards against BD.
IN-MN relation may geographically isolate BD if both of them overlooks BD. Contrarily, If IN also integrates BD with growing IN-MN relation then BD may find greater dividends from a de facto IN-MN-BD relations.
Economic Implications
Growing IN-MN relation may manifest diversified economic discourse for BD both positive and negative. To rip economic advantage, BD may exploit Infrastructural development emanating from IN-MN cooperation. Greater length and breadth of ‘IN’s Look/ Act East’ policy may out shadow look east policy of BD to explore greater economic opportunity from ASEAN and Far East countries.
IN-MN’s growing partnership may increase existing trade imbalance with IN and MN both. Because both of them are likely to increase their trade and commerce activities shedding off BD’s share. Connectivity projects may offer scopes for India to collaborate to constructively improve MN’s infrastructure, mitigate financial burdens, and strengthen relations.
Identified areas of common ground within the BRI and Indian interests in MN can boost trilateral ties and ultimately create a mutually-beneficial economic relationship for all three actors. Both IN and MN, having each other on their side may try to solve their bi-lateral issues with mil power. In such cases, border skirmishes or even low intensity conflicts may rise over contentious issues. Strong IN-MN relation will embolden their counter insurgency efforts leaving insurgency to resettle or establish safe sanctuary in the soils of BD.
However, for a pro-longed stay they may invite threats across the border in two dimensions. Firstly; both IN and MN may resort to mil means to exterminate insurgency issues; secondly; insurgency amassed along BD border may destabilize the entire situation.
Recommendations
In light of the aforementioned discussions, the recommended options are as follows:
a. BD may pursue regional forums to outflank the negative impacts of strong IN-MN relation.
b. BD may ride on USA to have a strong support in regional and bi-lateral affairs.
Conclusion
IN-MN relation had always been coaxed by the conflicting need for upholding its democratic value and for economic relation. Thus, IN-MN relation has never had a continued trend, rather it had a graph of ups and downs, mainly the relationship was growing during MN’s brief democratic era and declining during military regime.
IN’s approaches towards MN from the 1960s to the early 1990s represent a deficiency by which IN’s strategic interests were given a goby in pursuit of moralistic policies. IN’s such anti MN policy allowed China a space to make a strategic headway from about 1988 to 1992. IN realized that the military would remain as de facto power centre in MN.
So, it is prudent to interact with actual rulers. At this context, IN-MN relation started to boost up through number of visit and agreements. However, CN’s growing presence casts a shadow on IN-MN relations. In many ways, IN has played a distant secondary role to China’s outsized influence. MN, due to its unique geo-political location, offers enormous advantage for IN geostrategically, economically and from security point of view.
IN is geo-graphically dependent on MN with no alternative for pursuing its Look East or Act East Policy as it cannot reach to ASEAN zone without MN. Better IN-MN relation has greater significance in developing collectivity for fighting the insurgency. There are several advantages also that India has over China with regard to Myanmar. One is the democratic process while the other is the cooperation in different multilateral forums such as ASEAN and BIMSTEC strengthen the relationship between the two countries.
IN-MN economic relation also remains hostage to infrastructural backwardness and security situation along their border. As an ascendant economic and political power, India has long been eager to assert its influence on the global stage, particularly in neighboring Southeast Asia. India’s intentions for foreign engagement are best articulated in its so-called Act East policy, an ambitious effort to elevate Indian influence via economic and strategic links with the sub region.
However, IN-MN relation has never fathomed out fully to achieve those strategic aspirations. IN-MN relation is developing and there are positive signs yet not fully fathomed to be a big concern for BD. IN-MN relation manifests various types of strategic implications basing on the course and trends of the relation.
A strong IN-MN relation takes BD at back footing in dealing with BD-MN or BD-IN bilateral issue. IN-MN relation may isolate BD if both of its neighbours overlook BD forming ties. Contrarily, If IN also integrates BD with growing IN-MN relation, BD may find greater dividends from a de facto IN-MN-BD relations. Strong IN-MN relation will entail BD to be embroiled by the Sino-US power struggle at global level and Sino-IN power struggle at regional level.
Growing IN-MN relation may manifest both positive and negative diversified economic discourse for BD. To rip economic advantage, BD may exploit Infrastructural development emanating from IN-MN cooperation. Greater length and breadth of ‘IN’s Look/ Act East’ policy may out shadow look east policy of BD to explore greater economic opportunity from ASEAN and Far East countries.
Both IN and MN, getting each other on their side may try to solve their bi-lateral issues with military power. In such cases, border skirmishes or even low intensity conflicts may rise over contentious issues. IN-MN relation will embolden their counter insurgency efforts leaving insurgence to resettle or establish safe sanctuary in the soils of BD.
Footnote
1 China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar the Journal of East Asian Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1
2 Rajiv Bhatia , India--Myanmar Relations: Changing contours 1st Edition, Routeledg, India , 2017, p 23.
3 Amit Singh , Emerging Trends in IN-MN Relation, Published online: 10 Jan 2013, p 36.
4 George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, Kumaryian Press, International Peace Academy, 1994, p6.
5 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma, Cambridge University Press, UK , 2009, p 45.
6 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma, Cambridge University Press, UK , 2009, p 45.
7 India signs 11 agreements with Myanmar to bolster ties, The Times of India, PTI | Sep 6, 2017, p12.
8 Byron Tau and Carol E. Lee, U.S to End Economic Sanctions Against Myanmar, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 2016, p 11.
9 Dr. GökhanÖzkan, unipolar, bipolar or multipolar international system? the defense industry factor, p37
10 Francis P. Sempa, The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan,The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
11 Joseph ChinyongLiow, ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing terrorism in Southeast Asia and the threat to the homeland, Brookings, April 2016.
12 Pakistan Insider, The Strategic Importance of Pak-Myanmar Military Relations, p 16.
13 Eleanor Albert, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN: Council on Foreign Relation, Nov 2017 p15.
14 Dr.A.Sundaram, International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue5, May 2017.
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Introduction IN-MN relation had always been coaxed by IN’s conflicting need for upholding its democratic value in one side and the need for geo-strategic and economic development on the other. Due to its unique geo-political location, MN offers enormous advantage for IN geostrategically, economically and from security point of view. Yet IN-MN relation has never fathomed out fully to the desired strategic level.
China (CN)’s growing presence always cast a shadow on IN-MN relations. In many ways, IN has also played a distant secondary role to CN’s outsized influence. MN has long been described as a “de facto Chinese client state” or “a virtual Chinese satellite,” within the construct of CN’s strategic design to develop its western region. (1)
Notwithstanding the trend, the last decade has seen a positive mark in IN-MN relation. Reforming of ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’ in 2014 is a clear indication of IN’s urge to explore the stagnant relation. However, the urge is not only from IN’s side. MN, who frequently remains skeptic about CN’s role as a strategy of exploitation, (2) has also its own stake to develop the relation with IN. Thus this recent shift in IN-MN relation is accentuated by both individual and mutual interests.
However, in today’s global world, no bi-lateral relation is devoid of regional and global factors. Accordingly, IN-MN relation also remains hostage to both Sino-IN and Sino-US power struggles respectively at regional level and Sino-US power struggle at global level. Neither USA nor CN would like to see MN is occupied by the other.
CN wants to see MN is militarily controlled while USA expects a democratic MN devoid of CN’s grip. Although MN has gone into democratic process yet Sino-US and Sino-IN power struggle over military or democratic control of MN will prevail in near future. This may risk MN’s transition to democracy that in turn may affect the development of IN-MN relation.
Developing IN-MN relation manifests multi-dimensional implications based on the course and trends of the development. A strong IN-MN relation may push BD at backset in dealing her bilateral issues with both MN and IN. For example, in the recent past we have seen how IN’s stand on Rohingya Issue mattered for BD or for that matter how the ‘Look East’ policy of BD will be accommodated with in the greater length and breadth of IN’s ‘Look/ Act East’ policy, will definitely depend on IN-MN relation.
At this context, the paper will first discuss the historical perspective of IN-MN relation. Having discussed so, the paper will embark on analyzing the global and regional dynamics affecting the development of IN-MN relation and MN’s geostrategic importance to IN. Later, the paper will discuss the present trends of IN-MN relation and finally will forecast the implications for BD.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historical Trends
IN had long historical relationship with MN since antiquity due to cultural exchanges through import of Theravada Buddhism from IN. Britain subjugated Burma as a province of India in 1886 but brought under own colonial rule in 1937. During Second World War in 1942, Japanese captured MN that lasted upto 1944 till Japanese were defeated. IN established diplomatic relations after MN’s independence from Great Britain in 1948. In this initial period, IN-MN relations were strong due to (3):
a. Political and cultural links.
b. Flourishing commerce, common interests in regional affairs.
c. Both IN and MN were close allies in the Non-Alignment Movement and Common Wealth in 50s.
d. IN-MN Treaty of Friendship signed in 1951.
However, the overthrow of the MN’s democratic government by the Military in 1962 led to strains in ties. IN condemned the suppression of democracy and MN ordered the expulsion of the Burmese IN community amounting 100,000. MN’s neutral stand during IN-CN war in 1962 was seen as a pro-Chinese tilt by IN.
Consequently, stagnancy on IN-MN relations prevailed for next two decades. A breakthrough seemed to be visible in 1987 when the then-PM Rajiv Gandhi visited MN. Soon the relation worsened after IN’s reaction to the MN military regime’s suppression of ‘People’s Uprising’ in 1988. Relation worsened further in 1990, when IN partnered the UN sanction against MN. (4)
Bi-lateral relations between MN and IN started improving considerably in 1992 although many agree that India was warming up for improving its relations with the de facto military rulers from 1990. Many consider the visit of MN’s vice-foreign minister, U. Baswa, to IN in August 1992 as the turning point where the MN delegation made three points: (5)
a. MN respects IN’s commitment to democracy and hopes India would be patient about the revival of democracy in Myanmar.
b. Myanmar acknowledges that security and political concerns existed which are shared by both countries and intends to cooperate with India.
c. The third point was that Myanmar will be willing to increase economic and technological cooperation with India.
The period between 1994 and 1996, as a result, witnessed an enhancement of economic cooperation between the two countries that continued to 2000 and beyond. During this phase there have been military to military dialogues and political rapprochement. Initiatives like BIMSTEC also took off during this period.
The first decade of the 21st century witnessed growing strategic engagement between IN and MN that grew truly multi-faceted. Mutual visit of General Than and President Abdul Kalam respectively in 2004 and 2006 opened up co-operation in energy sector, troubled border, defence issues and arms sales. (6) Later Man Mohan Singh’s state visit in 2012, many new initiatives were announced and around a dozen MOUs were signed that are carried forward by the new IN government of Modi. (7)
Evaluation of Historical Perspective
IN-MN relation had always been contingent to the conflicting need of democratic value and economic development. Thus, IN-MN relation have never had a continued trend rather followed a graph of ups and downs mainly growing during MN’s brief democratic era and declining during mil regime as depicted in figure -1 below:
IN’s foreign policy approaches towards MN from the 1960s to the early 1990s represent a classic case in which India’s strategic interests were given a go-by in pursuit of moralistic policies. IN’s non-diplomatic propaganda on democratic norms pushed MN to embrace CN. Realists argued that IN’s pro-democracy stance had driven Myanmar into “China’s lap.” (8)
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL STRATEGIC DYNAMICS AFFECTING IN-MN RELATION
Global Dynamics
Uni-polar Power Centric Multi-polarity. Fall of communism led the world to the international system of the Post-Cold War era actually reflects a mixture of both unipolar and multipolar system in which at least five major powers, the United States, China, EU, Japan, and Russia, dominate international affairs. (9) Trends further forecast CN to be the next only power to challenge USA. Thus USA will have increased interest in fostering a strong IN- MN relation devoid of CN.
Growing Importance of Indian Ocean (IO). A T Mahan said almost 100 yrs before that “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls the seven seas; the destiny of the world will be written in its waters” (10)
IO region provides world’s largest market and cheap pull of labour. It contains 6 imp sea Today, more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Malacca making its status as the most important global geo-political feature. Relation with MN, thus, will aid any global or regional power to have control over Malacca and in turn over entire region.
Shifting Focus to Asia. Having successfully dealt with USSR and containing ME, USA and other superpowers now is in the process of shifting their look towards Asia. Within next 20 years, Asia is likely to be the larger economy than G-7 with present growth rate as said by IMF. After ME next highest oil reserve is in central Asian states.
Asian nuclear states like Pakistan, North Korea are not in-confidence list of USA and the West. (11) Fighting global terrorism will urge the focus in Asian Sector. CN is a major concern for USA and western block. All these strategic factors are likely to bring world’s attention to Asia, thus, will obviously affect IN-MN relation.
Change of Power Equation in Asia. With the collapse of the USSR, the strategic utility of PK to USA in controlling Afghan affair has diminished. On the contrary, the interests of the strongest and the largest democracy converged on containing CN and fighting over global terrorism. Thus, USA embraced IN as a better card to play with CN that changed long existing Asian power equation which will definitely affect IN-MN relation.
Regional Dynamics
Rohingya Issue. Denial of citizenship, violence between Rohingya Muslims and Arakan Buddhists, military repression and follow up standings of superpowers and regional actors have already turned the Rohingya crisis into a global issue. IN’s standing on Rohingya issue not only bears the potential to shape IN-MN bi-lateral relation but also its relation with other regional countries and its ideological image at international level.
US Strategic Interest in MN and the Regions. The overarching US aim for this region to gain strategic pre-eminence, rather than dominance. The US objective for IOR includes ensuring that US interests are not jeopardized by states such as CN and Iran. Relation with IN and control over Malacca Strait helps USA to achieve edge over the entire Asian strategic theatre and IO.
It will also assist USPACOM to attain its objective of forward force posture strategy, gaining land access to CN. US interest in normalizing ties with Myanmar was also aimed essentially at distancing the country from North Korea to halt the former’s nuclear ambition and desired missile technological development.
CN’s Strategic Interest in MN and the Regions. Presence in MN in the form of partnership or any other, offers CN to secure his life line and land and river outlet to IO. One of the strategic objectives of CN is to strategically encircle IN. For this he pursues the strategy of string of pearl, OBOR etc as shown in the diagram. Thus presence in MN helps CN in establishing strategic encirclement of IN and also to pursue its recently adopted Ocean Offensive strategy with forward pre-positioning of military power.
Pakistan’s Strategic Interest in MN and the Region. Pakistan Army needs MN to counterbalance India’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. (12) With China to the north, MN to the east, Sri Lanka to the south and Pakistan itself to the west, India’s overzealous ambitions to become a ‘regional superpower’ can be rigorously monitored. The Chinese maritime expansion in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea with the logistic support of MN and Pakistan respectively has created a situation of perceived CN encirclement of IN.
Russian Strategic Interest in MN and the Region. Moscow’s strategic focus on expanding its relations with non-western countries, specifically those in Asia and ASEAN, encapsulates the core of its interest in Myanmar. MN’s bilateral ties with Russia focus heavily on military and security-related matters. The international boycott imposed by the West since the late 1980’s has further warmed their relationship. ‘At this juncture, Russia is diversifying its cooperation with Myanmar to include the economic, cultural and scientific fields.
Evaluation of Global Geo-Strategic Dynamics
Development of IN-MN relation remains hostage to Sino-US and Sino-IN power struggle respectively at global and at regional level. Neither USA nor CN will like to see MN is occupied by the other. CN wants to see a military controlled MN while USA expects a democratic MN devoid of CN’s grip.
This bears the risk of jeopardizing the transition of democracy in MN affecting development of IN-MN relation. Due to changed power equation and growing US-IN strategic partnership, development of IN-MN relation will commensurate with the converging need of both US and IN. IN-MN relation will also escalate by the course of Sino-MN relation in the region.
Overall geo-strategic set up of the region, does not allow Rohingya’s plight to end up making an Asian Kossovo. Thus, it will remain as a volatile factor in shaping not only IN-MN relation but also IN-BD and BD-MN relation.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF IN AND MN TO EACH OTHER
Geo-Strategic Location
MN is the second- largest IN’s neighbours and located south of the states of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast IN. Four of IN’s north-eastern states, are geographically contiguous to MN placing both of them crucial for IN counter insurgency operation. MN provides the Eastern littoral of the Bay of Bengal.
IN also shares the strategic waters of Bay of Bengal, including the area of strategically important Andaman and Nicobar islands. An unfriendly Myanmar hosting foreign naval presence would be a grave threat to India’s security. Geo-politically, with a friendly Myanmar, India can add more substance to her ‘Look East’ policies of building up relationships with South East Asia. (13)
Counter – Balancing CN’s Influence
A strong CN-MN relation strengthens the fear of IN’s strategic encirclement by CN. IN’s move to forge close relations with MN are driven by a desire to counter CN’s growing influence there. As of March 2017, China remained Myanmar’s largest foreign investor and closest defense ally. To counter CN’s such strong tie, the only effective solution available to IN is to build and promote stronger strategic, economic and overall relation with MN. IN also has certain advantage over CN that includes geographical proximity, democracy, US sponsoring, regional forums like SAARC, BIMSTEC, Mekong initiative, Sukyee’s second home, political and cultural linkage etc. However, the lead margin of CN is so vast that IN may need years to evade CN’s grip over MN.
Materializing IN’s Look East Policy (LEP).
The Look East Policy, launched under the P. V. Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s – was aimed to connect the Indian economy with the flourishing economy of neighboring Southeast Asia. (14) Considering its importance, it is reframed as ‘Act East’ in 2004. MN is IN’s gateway to Southeast Asia and should India wish to realize its ‘Act East’ policy, it must consolidate its relation with Myanmar first.
Dealing with Insurgency
For decades, majority of the seven states in India’s north-eastern region have witnessed emergence and growth of insurgency movements with demands ranging from independence, autonomy, tribal rights etc. MN borders four of IN’s seven sisters. Fighting the existing insurgency in the region is almost impossible for IN without effective assistance from MN.
IN’s Energy Need
India currently ranks the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, accounting for about 3.3 percent of the world’s total annual energy consumption. Despite its large annual energy production, India is a net energy importer, mostly due to the large imbalance between oil production and consumption. Myanmar has oil reserves of around 600 million barrels and total gas reserves of 88 trillion cubic feet (TCF) which are crucial to IN energy needs.
Promotion of Democracy
The Indian stand about MN’s democracy was made fairly clear in 2006 by stating that ” India cannot “export democracy” to neighboring countries. It was, in fact, a policy driven by the then strategic reality. IN now would welcome and can assist the establishment of inclusive and broadbased multiparty democracy in MN. IN’s ambition of becoming global power also depends on its role and image on promoting democracy in MN.
Evaluation of MN’s Geo-Strategic Importance
MN, due to its unique geo-political location, offers enormous advantage for IN geostrategically, economically and from security point of view. CN growing presence casts a shadow on Indian-Myanmar relations, thus IN feels to counter it. IN is geo-strategically dependent on MN for pursuing its Act East Policy. Better IN-MN relation has greater significance in developing collectivity for fighting the insurgency. IN can also take advantage of MN’s energy reserve and pursue its ambition to be global power by promoting democracy in MN.
GROWING STATE OF IN-MN RELATIONS
Strategic Cooperation
While the region’s focus has revolved around the SAARC countries and CN, MN is becoming increasingly important for IN in both strategic and economic context through following issues:
a. BIMSTEC. MN became a member of BIMSTEC in December 1997 and trades mostly with Thailand and India in the BIMSTEC region. MN’s major exports to India are agricultural products like beans, pulses and maize and forest products such as teak and hardwoods. Its import from India includes chemical products, pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances and transport equipment.
b. Mekong Ganga Cooperation. MN is a member of the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) since November 2000. MGC is an initiative by six countries – IN and five ASEAN countries namely, Cambodia, Laos, MN, Thailand and Vietnam. It aims to foster cooperation in the fields of tourism, education, culture, transport and communication.
Defense Cooperation
As of 2013, IN and MN are set to cooperate in military and help modernize MN’s Defence Forces. The joint statement of the IN- MN Joint Consultative Commission on July 16, included IN’s commitment to supporting “the modernization of MN Armed Forces”, cooperation in terms of training as well as cooperation “in building a professional and capable MN Navy to safeguard and ensure its maritime security.”
IN under the Modi government has also demonstrated the capability and willingness to boost the naval capabilities of its neighbors in a similar fashion. As early as mid-2013, the two countries were said to have reached a decision to build OPVs for MN in IN shipyards and provide training to MN Navy officers and sailors at IN establishments. According to a press release by the Indian Navy, the visit by Admiral Sunil Lanba in November 4, 2017 is intended to “consolidate and enhance the bilateral maritime relations between India and MN.
Economic Cooperation
MN’s bilateral engagement with India in trade has gained momentum since 2008. Bilateral trade has grown from $12.4 million in 1980-81 to $2.18 billion in 2013-14 as shown in figure below:
Both countries also signed a border trade agreement in 1994 and have two trade points along their 1,643 km border. IN-MN trade has been more than doubled in the last seven years and has crossed $2 billion in 2013-14. IN is the largest market for MN’s exports, buying about US$ 220 million worth of goods in 2000; IN’s exports to MN stood at US$75.36 million.
Infrastructure Initiatives
IN is also closely working with MN for Border Area Development where IN has granted an assistance of USD 5 Million each year for next five years. Under this MOU 21 schools, 17 health centres and 8 bridges were constructed / built during the first year in Chin State and Naga SelfAdministered Zone of MN.
On 13 February 2001, IN Army’s Border Roads Organization constructed 250 kilometre Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highway, to provide a major strategic and commercial transport route connecting North-East IN, and South Asia as a whole.
a. IN-MN-Thailand Friendship Highway. Both IN and MN have agreed to construct a 3200 km high 4-lane triangular highway connecting IN, MN and Thailand. The route will run from India’s northeastern states into MN. The route begins from Guwahati in IN and connects to Mandalay in MN and continues to Yangon in MN and then to Mae Sot in Thailand, which then continues to Bangkok.
b. Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Route. The Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project will connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe sea port in MN by sea; it will then link Sittwe seaport to Lashio in MN via Kaladan river boat route and then from Lashio on to Mizoram in India by road transport.
IN is also helping Myanmar by setting up high-speed data links in 32 cities. Trade through sea is another way of intensifying economic cooperation between the two countries. The Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project (KMMTP) that connects Kolkata port with Sittwe port presents such an opportunity.
Evaluation of Growing State of IN-MN’s Relation
Strategically IN pursues MN to get MN free from CN control through BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga cooperation. In defense sector although CN is contributing MN for long but recently IN has set to cooperate in modernizing MN’s Defence Forces through training and infrastructure assistance.
It is encouraging that IN-MN trade has more than doubled in the last seven years and has crossed $2 billion in 2013-14. IN’s assistance to MN’s infrastructure development hinges on INMN-Thailand Friendship Highway and Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Route.
IMPLICATIONS FOR BD
Strategic Implications
IN-MN relation is on the development but not yet fully fathomed to be a big concern for BD. IN-MN relation manifests various types of strategic implications based on the course and trends of the relation. A strong IN-MN relation will pose more challenges for BD in dealing with BDMN or BD-IN bilateral issues. It will also entail BD to be embroiled by the Sino-US power struggle at global level and Sino-IN power struggle at regional level. If IN and MN remains omni-focused on their individual and bilateral interests, BD may find its strategic discourse articulated on the premise of IN or MN interest.
In resolving bilateral issues with IN or MN separately, BD may have to face a stronger collective resistance emanating from growing IN-MN partnership. Strong IN-MN relation tends to push BD to fall pray of Regional and Global power play in the region. In case of likely BDMN issues, IN siding with MN, will push BD to CN. In extreme strained situation, IN may manipulate MN to unleash Rohingya card against BD. Contrarily, MN may also ride on IN and persuade him to use water or insurgency cards against BD.
IN-MN relation may geographically isolate BD if both of them overlooks BD. Contrarily, If IN also integrates BD with growing IN-MN relation then BD may find greater dividends from a de facto IN-MN-BD relations.
Economic Implications
Growing IN-MN relation may manifest diversified economic discourse for BD both positive and negative. To rip economic advantage, BD may exploit Infrastructural development emanating from IN-MN cooperation. Greater length and breadth of ‘IN’s Look/ Act East’ policy may out shadow look east policy of BD to explore greater economic opportunity from ASEAN and Far East countries.
IN-MN’s growing partnership may increase existing trade imbalance with IN and MN both. Because both of them are likely to increase their trade and commerce activities shedding off BD’s share. Connectivity projects may offer scopes for India to collaborate to constructively improve MN’s infrastructure, mitigate financial burdens, and strengthen relations.
Identified areas of common ground within the BRI and Indian interests in MN can boost trilateral ties and ultimately create a mutually-beneficial economic relationship for all three actors. Both IN and MN, having each other on their side may try to solve their bi-lateral issues with mil power. In such cases, border skirmishes or even low intensity conflicts may rise over contentious issues. Strong IN-MN relation will embolden their counter insurgency efforts leaving insurgency to resettle or establish safe sanctuary in the soils of BD.
However, for a pro-longed stay they may invite threats across the border in two dimensions. Firstly; both IN and MN may resort to mil means to exterminate insurgency issues; secondly; insurgency amassed along BD border may destabilize the entire situation.
Recommendations
In light of the aforementioned discussions, the recommended options are as follows:
a. BD may pursue regional forums to outflank the negative impacts of strong IN-MN relation.
b. BD may ride on USA to have a strong support in regional and bi-lateral affairs.
Conclusion
IN-MN relation had always been coaxed by the conflicting need for upholding its democratic value and for economic relation. Thus, IN-MN relation has never had a continued trend, rather it had a graph of ups and downs, mainly the relationship was growing during MN’s brief democratic era and declining during military regime.
IN’s approaches towards MN from the 1960s to the early 1990s represent a deficiency by which IN’s strategic interests were given a goby in pursuit of moralistic policies. IN’s such anti MN policy allowed China a space to make a strategic headway from about 1988 to 1992. IN realized that the military would remain as de facto power centre in MN.
So, it is prudent to interact with actual rulers. At this context, IN-MN relation started to boost up through number of visit and agreements. However, CN’s growing presence casts a shadow on IN-MN relations. In many ways, IN has played a distant secondary role to China’s outsized influence. MN, due to its unique geo-political location, offers enormous advantage for IN geostrategically, economically and from security point of view.
IN is geo-graphically dependent on MN with no alternative for pursuing its Look East or Act East Policy as it cannot reach to ASEAN zone without MN. Better IN-MN relation has greater significance in developing collectivity for fighting the insurgency. There are several advantages also that India has over China with regard to Myanmar. One is the democratic process while the other is the cooperation in different multilateral forums such as ASEAN and BIMSTEC strengthen the relationship between the two countries.
IN-MN economic relation also remains hostage to infrastructural backwardness and security situation along their border. As an ascendant economic and political power, India has long been eager to assert its influence on the global stage, particularly in neighboring Southeast Asia. India’s intentions for foreign engagement are best articulated in its so-called Act East policy, an ambitious effort to elevate Indian influence via economic and strategic links with the sub region.
However, IN-MN relation has never fathomed out fully to achieve those strategic aspirations. IN-MN relation is developing and there are positive signs yet not fully fathomed to be a big concern for BD. IN-MN relation manifests various types of strategic implications basing on the course and trends of the relation.
A strong IN-MN relation takes BD at back footing in dealing with BD-MN or BD-IN bilateral issue. IN-MN relation may isolate BD if both of its neighbours overlook BD forming ties. Contrarily, If IN also integrates BD with growing IN-MN relation, BD may find greater dividends from a de facto IN-MN-BD relations. Strong IN-MN relation will entail BD to be embroiled by the Sino-US power struggle at global level and Sino-IN power struggle at regional level.
Growing IN-MN relation may manifest both positive and negative diversified economic discourse for BD. To rip economic advantage, BD may exploit Infrastructural development emanating from IN-MN cooperation. Greater length and breadth of ‘IN’s Look/ Act East’ policy may out shadow look east policy of BD to explore greater economic opportunity from ASEAN and Far East countries.
Both IN and MN, getting each other on their side may try to solve their bi-lateral issues with military power. In such cases, border skirmishes or even low intensity conflicts may rise over contentious issues. IN-MN relation will embolden their counter insurgency efforts leaving insurgence to resettle or establish safe sanctuary in the soils of BD.
Footnote
1 China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar the Journal of East Asian Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1
2 Rajiv Bhatia , India--Myanmar Relations: Changing contours 1st Edition, Routeledg, India , 2017, p 23.
3 Amit Singh , Emerging Trends in IN-MN Relation, Published online: 10 Jan 2013, p 36.
4 George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, Kumaryian Press, International Peace Academy, 1994, p6.
5 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma, Cambridge University Press, UK , 2009, p 45.
6 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma, Cambridge University Press, UK , 2009, p 45.
7 India signs 11 agreements with Myanmar to bolster ties, The Times of India, PTI | Sep 6, 2017, p12.
8 Byron Tau and Carol E. Lee, U.S to End Economic Sanctions Against Myanmar, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 2016, p 11.
9 Dr. GökhanÖzkan, unipolar, bipolar or multipolar international system? the defense industry factor, p37
10 Francis P. Sempa, The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan,The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
11 Joseph ChinyongLiow, ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing terrorism in Southeast Asia and the threat to the homeland, Brookings, April 2016.
12 Pakistan Insider, The Strategic Importance of Pak-Myanmar Military Relations, p 16.
13 Eleanor Albert, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN: Council on Foreign Relation, Nov 2017 p15.
14 Dr.A.Sundaram, International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue5, May 2017.
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