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- Prakash Katoch
Asymmetric battlefields require cross-communicating systems that connect nodes across the spectrum of inter-service agencies, and across the entire ‘security sector.’
The battlefield of today requires transverse communications. Not only is interoperability imperative intra-Service and inter-Services in the military, it is also necessary across the entire Security Sector since unconventional warfare and asymmetric threats are borderless in contrast to classical conventional battlefields. Communication systems need to meet multi-mission requirements, functioning through cyber and electronic warfare environment while engaged in battle. Development of the software defined radios and cognitive radios are operational breakthroughs. There is increasing overlap of communications and information systems in militaries across the world, optimizing Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) System provides great operational advantage for the defence establishment; force multiplier for commanders at all levels.
Future Battlefield
The battlefield has become non-linear, multi-dimensional battle space characterized by increased lethality, high degree of mobility coupled with simultaneity of engagement and increased tempo of operations in compressed time and space coupled with high degree of transparency. This calls for swift and concerted response by the military and quick decision making, framework in place, with a joint command and control structure to direct operations. No single Service can cope with future scenarios. For Army, mission specific link up with sister Services and fighting elements of Security Sector will optimize combat potential even at tactical levels. Militaries require micro-processing and miniaturisation technologies complementing real-time intelligence and information sharing, distributed decision making, and rapid execution of orders from a wide variety of forces and systems for concentrated effect over the entire spectrum of operations. Communication networks today are a system of systems and a network of networks; they have to be integrated seamlessly and interoperable to be of value despite the challenges of spectrum, bandwidth, low density and laws of physics.
Strategic Communications
In terms of strategic communications, the major project coming up for the Indian Military is Project Defence Communications Network (DCN), which has been awarded to HCL Infosys in early 2013 for development over two years. Phase 1 will consist of two data centres in hot standby and multiple switching centres with adequate redundancy and over a hundred entities with assured backup through an overlay of satellites. This exclusive network will permeate down to the level of the Corps Headquarters of the Army and equivalents of the Navy and Air Force, the Strategic Forces Command and Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). Post the test bed phase; the project will be implemented with a two year period. However, most significantly, the project does not include development of requisite software. If the three Services and Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) develop the software individually, there will be attendant problems of interoperability. The vital handshake therefore is missing without which DCN actually boils down to a highway sans traffic. This denotes a lopsided approach and indicates the low priority accorded to a strategic communications project like the DCN.
Tactical Communications
The Indian Army has a complete Corps nominated as Test Bed but none of the Operational Information Systems (OIS) under development / already fielded could be tested in envisaged manner – at a full Corps level. This was because of the lack of a Tactical Communication System (TCS). The TCS had been approved thrice by Defence Ministers in the past and should have been fielded into the Army in year 2000. This critical delay should actually be a case study; bureaucratic red-tapism, lackadaisical approach or pressures from DRDO / PSUs. Truncated test bed for information systems result in avoidable problems coming up at fielding/equipping stage that could have been corrected in the test bed itself. Concurrent are avoidable additional costs accruing through upgrades required immediately post fielding these systems. Since 2002, MoD has been vacillating on categorization of the TCS project under Make (High-Tech Systems) and Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems), since private sector participation is allowed in the former category and not latter, and classifying it as former category was attributed to the secrecy of the “frequency hopping algorithm” contained in a tiny microchip. However, now Bharat Electronics (BEL) and a consortium of L&T, Tata Power SED and HCL Infosys Ltd have reportedly been selected by the government. This is the first project under the ‘Buy Indian, Make Indian’ clause introduced in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The government will pay 80 per cent of the development cost while 20 per cent will be funded by the industry. For TCS, both the selected parties will make the prototype system and the best bidder will then execute the whole project. The TCS is vital for operational preparedness and force multiplication endeavour. Decisive victory in future conflicts will be difficult to achieve without robust and survivable communications, both in the strategic and tactical domain.
The TCS is to have: a new generation meshed network exploiting the growth in microprocessor, radio, mobility and satellites; based on light weight high mobility vehicles which will form highly mobile communication nodes connected as a grid; largely based on tested COTS technologies; high bandwidth with voice, video and data; high capacity point to point radio backbone with multiple redundancies; high capacity point to multipoint wireless access at the user end; robust and survivable trunk and access radios; redundancy and scalability based on satellites; inbuilt protection against cyber and electronic attacks using firewalls and frequency hopping spread spectrum techniques; encryption and multi-level network security; real time management of spectrum; integration with legacy systems, strategic networks, national communication systems; effective interoperability within the Army and other services during joint operations; light weight user terminals; integrate OIS.
USA
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is the US Army’s current and future tactical communications network backbone that provides seamless, assured, mobile communications for the soldier along with advanced network management tools to support implementation of a commander’s intent and priorities – incrementally. WIN-T Increment 1, formerly known as the “Joint Network Node Network,” began fielding in 2004 and provides networking at-the-quick-halt capability down to battalion level, with a follow-on enhanced networking upgrade, referred to as the “Colorless Core Upgrade,” underway to improve the efficiency and security of the network. WIN-T Increment 1 components reside at the theater, corps, division, brigade and battalion level and in August 2012 completed fielding to 100 percent of the units identified to receive the system. Increments 2 and 3 have also been planned progressively. The Communications Infrastructure provides secure, agile, and survivable end-to-end connectivity and on-demand bandwidth that is dynamically allocated, based on operational priority and precedence among millions of space, air, sea, and terrestrial-based fixed, and mobile users. The $10 billion Win-T program is jointly developed by Team Matrix. The prime contractor is General Dynamics leading a team including Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Harris Corporation, L-3 Communications and CISCO Systems.
UK
The FALCON trunk communication program being introduced incrementally in British Army has been developed by BAE Systems. It provides modem, secure communications infrastructure for deployed formations and operating bases. Designed around Internet protocol architecture, the system replaces ageing asynchronous transfer mode equipment with a scalable application that can be configured rapidly to meet the needs of an expeditionary force. It also interoperates with other digital communications technologies now entering service with the British military and provides a secure messaging channel to coalition allies, operating as a meshed network consisting of nodes deployed in mobile shelters mounted on the back of Supacat transport vehicles, a wide area service provision (WASP) designed to provide wireless data and radio connectivity. It is built around a networking technology called All Internet Protocol (ALL-IP), which allows it to link seamlessly into other systems. Because Falcon can connect to systems such as Cormorant and Skynet, it provides a reach-back capability to headquarters in the United Kingdom and can link with civil and coalition networks. Falcon uses less manpower and has greater bandwidth compared to previous systems and is transportable by C-130 Hercules aircraft.
Canada
The $1.4 billion Tactical Command and Control, and Communications System (TCCCS) developed by CDC Systems UK Limited, a business unit of General Dynamics Corporation, has replaced old radio equipment used by the Canadian Army. It includes the Combat Net Radio (CNR). The TCCCS allows users to access other users through various nodes and the Information Distribution System. It operates over fibre optic cables and UHF and SHF Line-of-Sight Radio Relays. The ranges of tactical communications links are extended through the long range capability of the Iris System (which supports land tactical and strategic communications capabilities) to strategic, allied, or commercial networks. The Combat Net Radio system consists of a full range of tactical radios. These include net-radio, point-to-point, ship-to-shore, air-ground-air, long range, and voice and data communications covering the HF, VHF, and UHF bands.
Domestic Scene
Success in conflict situations is contingent on jointness as seamless integration. No single weapon or force reaches its full potential unless employed with complementary capabilities of the other Services. Smooth and real time communication will be the battle winning factor. Jointness, however, in our military presently is misnomer. We have yet to fully realize essential requirement of viewing information from the strategic viewpoint, recognizing it as mission critical resource and required a synthesis of communications and information. Communications cannot be planned in isolation anymore. They must be part and parcel of the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability (C4I2) package in concert with our pursuit of Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities. The DCN is only a very small part of how defence communications need to be strategized, synergized and developed. In the present dispensation, communications of the three Services are mismatched and the concept of ICT is yet to fully take off, which can be gauged from the following:
l There is no common Tri-Service ICT / Communication Philosophy. ICT plans discussed actually are a separate one for Communications and another one for Information Systems.
l There is mismatch between radio Sets of the three Services. For certain contingencies and army is required to give additional radio sets to sister Service(s) as ad hoc measure.
l DCN is coming up as a strategic highway development of software by individual Services and HQ IDS implies serious problems of interoperability.
l Little progress has been made in evolving common standards and protocols for the military. Large number of command and control equipments and networks are being established by individual services but lack common standards and protocols. Additionally, several intra-Service interoperability constraints exist.
l e-learning in the Army has not begun because Army Intranet is not yet fully secure. Army Intranet extended to HQ IDS since was withdrawn some three years back. Army Intranet has also not been extended to Defence Services Staff College and College of Defence Management since these are joint institutions under HQ IDS though 90 percent of students and faculty are from Army. This indicates utter disregard to jointness.
l The TCS approved by successive Defence Ministers which should have been fielded in year 2000 is still 5-6 years away, its void seriously affecting test beds and fielding of OIS. Then, TCS is only looking inwards – within Army. Not only sister Services, its linking with fighting elements of the Security Sector is still not being thought of.
l Contracts were concluded with Bharat Electronics in March 2011 by the Army for equipping the Command Information Dissemination and Support System (Rupees 1,035 crores) and for the Battlefield Surveillance System (Rupees 2,635 crores) but these contracts have not been taken to their logical conclusion in the required time frame.
l The military still has not developed an Enterprise level Geographical Information System.
l No Tri-Service Policy for Information Assurance has been evolved. Similarly, no Tri-Service Policy for Data Handling and Data Storage has been defined and therefore data centres mushrooming all over.
l The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has no institutionalised framework within itself for strategic though. That is why we have voids of National Security Strategy, Roadmap for Revolution in Military Affairs, Tri-Service NCW Philosophy, Tri-Service ICT / Communication Philosophy etc. Even the initial projections for a defence communications satellite were solely by
the Navy.
Requirement
The MoD and military must focus on the following:
l Accept true military jointness cannot be achieved without a CDS. The political hierarchy needs to thrust down military jointmanship as fait accompli by appointing a CDS with full operational powers. This would also help evolve effective vital policies like Tri-Service ICT / Communication Philosophy amongst others, and viewing ‘Information’ from the strategic viewpoint and recognizing it as mission critical resource.
l The project to evolve common standards, structures, exchange formats and protocols for the three Services must be accorded top priority.
l Experience of advanced militaries proves that bandwidth requirements increase exponentially over the years. This must be catered to with a dedicated Defence Band with adequate security.
l Uniformity of communications and information systems under procurement by the three Services should be ensured including items like Software Defined Radios (SDRs). The SDR is being built by the DRDO on a priority basis.
l Communications and Information Systems planning should be seamless; horizontally and vertically with adequate safeguards and authority. An integrated communication network that enables requisite standard signal communication support to all the three Services needs to be established. Even a project like TCS (which needs acceleration) should cater for parallel links with sister Services to meet mission specific requirements.
l The military must evolve and implement an enterprise level Information Security Assurance Program (ISAP). Necessary enablers to provide core competencies for gestating and sustaining the ISAP must be developed as part of capacity building. Presently, numerous applications are coming up all over, some of them without adequate security solutions. This would jeopardize security once total networking is achieved.
l The Army Intranet must be made fully secure and should be re-extended to HQ IDS. It should also connect the DSSC and CDM for which additional funds could be allotted by HQ IDS with approval of MoD. This will enhance jointness and facilitate e-learning of the three Services.
l Indigenous capability needs to be developed against enemy Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks (nuclear and non nuclear) as also for checking / testing of hardware and software against embedded malware. The Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Robotics (CAIR) needs to exponentially increase capacity to develop new and varied algorithms in order to keep pace with rapid induction of new systems. The Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) must find ways and means to accord SAG approvals in telescoped time frame. We need to speedily advance our chip manufacturing capabilities, a sphere in which we are decades behind China and which has serious implications for network and communication security.
Communications, Information and their confluence are vital for our military given present and future conflict scenarios. In the jointmanship paradigm our military has only taken some nascent steps. Actually, we are decades away from integration in its true form and spirit. We need to take measures from the existing state of `cooperative functioning’ and `patchy jointness’ to `de-conflicted operations’, advancing to `joint’ and finally `integrated operations’. Unless vital steps as indicated above are taken, shedding the baggage of legacy thinking, jointmanship will be elusive and our goal of achieving Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities will remain utopian. MoD and the Military need to take holistic stock and act. We must speedily establish a reliable and robust ICT network which allows interoperability of the three Services within themselves, and with the requisite government agencies spanning the strategic, operational and tactical domains.
Asymmetric battlefields require cross-communicating systems that connect nodes across the spectrum of inter-service agencies, and across the entire ‘security sector.’
The battlefield of today requires transverse communications. Not only is interoperability imperative intra-Service and inter-Services in the military, it is also necessary across the entire Security Sector since unconventional warfare and asymmetric threats are borderless in contrast to classical conventional battlefields. Communication systems need to meet multi-mission requirements, functioning through cyber and electronic warfare environment while engaged in battle. Development of the software defined radios and cognitive radios are operational breakthroughs. There is increasing overlap of communications and information systems in militaries across the world, optimizing Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) System provides great operational advantage for the defence establishment; force multiplier for commanders at all levels.
Future Battlefield
The battlefield has become non-linear, multi-dimensional battle space characterized by increased lethality, high degree of mobility coupled with simultaneity of engagement and increased tempo of operations in compressed time and space coupled with high degree of transparency. This calls for swift and concerted response by the military and quick decision making, framework in place, with a joint command and control structure to direct operations. No single Service can cope with future scenarios. For Army, mission specific link up with sister Services and fighting elements of Security Sector will optimize combat potential even at tactical levels. Militaries require micro-processing and miniaturisation technologies complementing real-time intelligence and information sharing, distributed decision making, and rapid execution of orders from a wide variety of forces and systems for concentrated effect over the entire spectrum of operations. Communication networks today are a system of systems and a network of networks; they have to be integrated seamlessly and interoperable to be of value despite the challenges of spectrum, bandwidth, low density and laws of physics.
Strategic Communications
In terms of strategic communications, the major project coming up for the Indian Military is Project Defence Communications Network (DCN), which has been awarded to HCL Infosys in early 2013 for development over two years. Phase 1 will consist of two data centres in hot standby and multiple switching centres with adequate redundancy and over a hundred entities with assured backup through an overlay of satellites. This exclusive network will permeate down to the level of the Corps Headquarters of the Army and equivalents of the Navy and Air Force, the Strategic Forces Command and Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). Post the test bed phase; the project will be implemented with a two year period. However, most significantly, the project does not include development of requisite software. If the three Services and Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) develop the software individually, there will be attendant problems of interoperability. The vital handshake therefore is missing without which DCN actually boils down to a highway sans traffic. This denotes a lopsided approach and indicates the low priority accorded to a strategic communications project like the DCN.
Tactical Communications
The Indian Army has a complete Corps nominated as Test Bed but none of the Operational Information Systems (OIS) under development / already fielded could be tested in envisaged manner – at a full Corps level. This was because of the lack of a Tactical Communication System (TCS). The TCS had been approved thrice by Defence Ministers in the past and should have been fielded into the Army in year 2000. This critical delay should actually be a case study; bureaucratic red-tapism, lackadaisical approach or pressures from DRDO / PSUs. Truncated test bed for information systems result in avoidable problems coming up at fielding/equipping stage that could have been corrected in the test bed itself. Concurrent are avoidable additional costs accruing through upgrades required immediately post fielding these systems. Since 2002, MoD has been vacillating on categorization of the TCS project under Make (High-Tech Systems) and Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems), since private sector participation is allowed in the former category and not latter, and classifying it as former category was attributed to the secrecy of the “frequency hopping algorithm” contained in a tiny microchip. However, now Bharat Electronics (BEL) and a consortium of L&T, Tata Power SED and HCL Infosys Ltd have reportedly been selected by the government. This is the first project under the ‘Buy Indian, Make Indian’ clause introduced in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The government will pay 80 per cent of the development cost while 20 per cent will be funded by the industry. For TCS, both the selected parties will make the prototype system and the best bidder will then execute the whole project. The TCS is vital for operational preparedness and force multiplication endeavour. Decisive victory in future conflicts will be difficult to achieve without robust and survivable communications, both in the strategic and tactical domain.
The TCS is to have: a new generation meshed network exploiting the growth in microprocessor, radio, mobility and satellites; based on light weight high mobility vehicles which will form highly mobile communication nodes connected as a grid; largely based on tested COTS technologies; high bandwidth with voice, video and data; high capacity point to point radio backbone with multiple redundancies; high capacity point to multipoint wireless access at the user end; robust and survivable trunk and access radios; redundancy and scalability based on satellites; inbuilt protection against cyber and electronic attacks using firewalls and frequency hopping spread spectrum techniques; encryption and multi-level network security; real time management of spectrum; integration with legacy systems, strategic networks, national communication systems; effective interoperability within the Army and other services during joint operations; light weight user terminals; integrate OIS.
USA
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is the US Army’s current and future tactical communications network backbone that provides seamless, assured, mobile communications for the soldier along with advanced network management tools to support implementation of a commander’s intent and priorities – incrementally. WIN-T Increment 1, formerly known as the “Joint Network Node Network,” began fielding in 2004 and provides networking at-the-quick-halt capability down to battalion level, with a follow-on enhanced networking upgrade, referred to as the “Colorless Core Upgrade,” underway to improve the efficiency and security of the network. WIN-T Increment 1 components reside at the theater, corps, division, brigade and battalion level and in August 2012 completed fielding to 100 percent of the units identified to receive the system. Increments 2 and 3 have also been planned progressively. The Communications Infrastructure provides secure, agile, and survivable end-to-end connectivity and on-demand bandwidth that is dynamically allocated, based on operational priority and precedence among millions of space, air, sea, and terrestrial-based fixed, and mobile users. The $10 billion Win-T program is jointly developed by Team Matrix. The prime contractor is General Dynamics leading a team including Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Harris Corporation, L-3 Communications and CISCO Systems.
UK
The FALCON trunk communication program being introduced incrementally in British Army has been developed by BAE Systems. It provides modem, secure communications infrastructure for deployed formations and operating bases. Designed around Internet protocol architecture, the system replaces ageing asynchronous transfer mode equipment with a scalable application that can be configured rapidly to meet the needs of an expeditionary force. It also interoperates with other digital communications technologies now entering service with the British military and provides a secure messaging channel to coalition allies, operating as a meshed network consisting of nodes deployed in mobile shelters mounted on the back of Supacat transport vehicles, a wide area service provision (WASP) designed to provide wireless data and radio connectivity. It is built around a networking technology called All Internet Protocol (ALL-IP), which allows it to link seamlessly into other systems. Because Falcon can connect to systems such as Cormorant and Skynet, it provides a reach-back capability to headquarters in the United Kingdom and can link with civil and coalition networks. Falcon uses less manpower and has greater bandwidth compared to previous systems and is transportable by C-130 Hercules aircraft.
Canada
The $1.4 billion Tactical Command and Control, and Communications System (TCCCS) developed by CDC Systems UK Limited, a business unit of General Dynamics Corporation, has replaced old radio equipment used by the Canadian Army. It includes the Combat Net Radio (CNR). The TCCCS allows users to access other users through various nodes and the Information Distribution System. It operates over fibre optic cables and UHF and SHF Line-of-Sight Radio Relays. The ranges of tactical communications links are extended through the long range capability of the Iris System (which supports land tactical and strategic communications capabilities) to strategic, allied, or commercial networks. The Combat Net Radio system consists of a full range of tactical radios. These include net-radio, point-to-point, ship-to-shore, air-ground-air, long range, and voice and data communications covering the HF, VHF, and UHF bands.
Domestic Scene
Success in conflict situations is contingent on jointness as seamless integration. No single weapon or force reaches its full potential unless employed with complementary capabilities of the other Services. Smooth and real time communication will be the battle winning factor. Jointness, however, in our military presently is misnomer. We have yet to fully realize essential requirement of viewing information from the strategic viewpoint, recognizing it as mission critical resource and required a synthesis of communications and information. Communications cannot be planned in isolation anymore. They must be part and parcel of the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability (C4I2) package in concert with our pursuit of Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities. The DCN is only a very small part of how defence communications need to be strategized, synergized and developed. In the present dispensation, communications of the three Services are mismatched and the concept of ICT is yet to fully take off, which can be gauged from the following:
l There is no common Tri-Service ICT / Communication Philosophy. ICT plans discussed actually are a separate one for Communications and another one for Information Systems.
l There is mismatch between radio Sets of the three Services. For certain contingencies and army is required to give additional radio sets to sister Service(s) as ad hoc measure.
l DCN is coming up as a strategic highway development of software by individual Services and HQ IDS implies serious problems of interoperability.
l Little progress has been made in evolving common standards and protocols for the military. Large number of command and control equipments and networks are being established by individual services but lack common standards and protocols. Additionally, several intra-Service interoperability constraints exist.
l e-learning in the Army has not begun because Army Intranet is not yet fully secure. Army Intranet extended to HQ IDS since was withdrawn some three years back. Army Intranet has also not been extended to Defence Services Staff College and College of Defence Management since these are joint institutions under HQ IDS though 90 percent of students and faculty are from Army. This indicates utter disregard to jointness.
l The TCS approved by successive Defence Ministers which should have been fielded in year 2000 is still 5-6 years away, its void seriously affecting test beds and fielding of OIS. Then, TCS is only looking inwards – within Army. Not only sister Services, its linking with fighting elements of the Security Sector is still not being thought of.
l Contracts were concluded with Bharat Electronics in March 2011 by the Army for equipping the Command Information Dissemination and Support System (Rupees 1,035 crores) and for the Battlefield Surveillance System (Rupees 2,635 crores) but these contracts have not been taken to their logical conclusion in the required time frame.
l The military still has not developed an Enterprise level Geographical Information System.
l No Tri-Service Policy for Information Assurance has been evolved. Similarly, no Tri-Service Policy for Data Handling and Data Storage has been defined and therefore data centres mushrooming all over.
l The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has no institutionalised framework within itself for strategic though. That is why we have voids of National Security Strategy, Roadmap for Revolution in Military Affairs, Tri-Service NCW Philosophy, Tri-Service ICT / Communication Philosophy etc. Even the initial projections for a defence communications satellite were solely by
the Navy.
Requirement
The MoD and military must focus on the following:
l Accept true military jointness cannot be achieved without a CDS. The political hierarchy needs to thrust down military jointmanship as fait accompli by appointing a CDS with full operational powers. This would also help evolve effective vital policies like Tri-Service ICT / Communication Philosophy amongst others, and viewing ‘Information’ from the strategic viewpoint and recognizing it as mission critical resource.
l The project to evolve common standards, structures, exchange formats and protocols for the three Services must be accorded top priority.
l Experience of advanced militaries proves that bandwidth requirements increase exponentially over the years. This must be catered to with a dedicated Defence Band with adequate security.
l Uniformity of communications and information systems under procurement by the three Services should be ensured including items like Software Defined Radios (SDRs). The SDR is being built by the DRDO on a priority basis.
l Communications and Information Systems planning should be seamless; horizontally and vertically with adequate safeguards and authority. An integrated communication network that enables requisite standard signal communication support to all the three Services needs to be established. Even a project like TCS (which needs acceleration) should cater for parallel links with sister Services to meet mission specific requirements.
l The military must evolve and implement an enterprise level Information Security Assurance Program (ISAP). Necessary enablers to provide core competencies for gestating and sustaining the ISAP must be developed as part of capacity building. Presently, numerous applications are coming up all over, some of them without adequate security solutions. This would jeopardize security once total networking is achieved.
l The Army Intranet must be made fully secure and should be re-extended to HQ IDS. It should also connect the DSSC and CDM for which additional funds could be allotted by HQ IDS with approval of MoD. This will enhance jointness and facilitate e-learning of the three Services.
l Indigenous capability needs to be developed against enemy Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks (nuclear and non nuclear) as also for checking / testing of hardware and software against embedded malware. The Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Robotics (CAIR) needs to exponentially increase capacity to develop new and varied algorithms in order to keep pace with rapid induction of new systems. The Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) must find ways and means to accord SAG approvals in telescoped time frame. We need to speedily advance our chip manufacturing capabilities, a sphere in which we are decades behind China and which has serious implications for network and communication security.
Communications, Information and their confluence are vital for our military given present and future conflict scenarios. In the jointmanship paradigm our military has only taken some nascent steps. Actually, we are decades away from integration in its true form and spirit. We need to take measures from the existing state of `cooperative functioning’ and `patchy jointness’ to `de-conflicted operations’, advancing to `joint’ and finally `integrated operations’. Unless vital steps as indicated above are taken, shedding the baggage of legacy thinking, jointmanship will be elusive and our goal of achieving Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities will remain utopian. MoD and the Military need to take holistic stock and act. We must speedily establish a reliable and robust ICT network which allows interoperability of the three Services within themselves, and with the requisite government agencies spanning the strategic, operational and tactical domains.
