CRPF, State police ignored pinpoint warning on ambush

[Koovie]

CRPF, State police ignored pinpoint warning on ambush

Intelligence reports preceded Tuesday’s Maoist strike
The Central Reserve Police Force and the Chhattisgarh Police ignored their own intelligence services’ pinpoint warnings that Maoist insurgents were preparing an ambush along the road where 15 police personnel were killed on Tuesday, highly placed government sources told The Hindu.

The revelations will raise questions why India’s $220-million fleet of Israeli-made surveillance drones was not used to track the build-up, and whether local counter-insurgency units were warned that a lethal Maoist strike was imminent.

The Chhattisgarh Police Intelligence wing, the sources said, issued the warning on the looming attack on March 5.

The warning recorded that 40-45 Maoist cadre had been sighted practising ambush manoeuvres between the villages of Gadam and Munga, under the jurisdiction of the Katekalyan police station on the Darba plateau in the Bastar region.

The report cited an informant as saying the ambush team was led by the head of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) Darba divisional committee ‘Surendra.’

Earlier, intelligence reports had identified Surendra, along with ‘Deval,’ ‘Vinod’ and ‘Nirmalakka,’ as a key figure in the local Maoist hierarchy, reporting to Dandakaranya’s overall zonal chief, Ravulu Srinivas.

The CRPF generated a similar warning on March 6, saying the Maoists were planning ambush manoeuvres inside a small area bound by the villages of Kukanar, Paknar and Tongpal. It recorded that the cadre were sheltering under tarpaulin sheets. Local CRPF and State police units, however, do not appear to have been ordered to launch offensive operations against the ambush team, or to take additional precautions against an attack.

The Home Affairs Ministry declined on-record comment on the story, but on Tuesday blamed the State government for failing to act on available intelligence.

Drones lose punch in tracking Naxals after long flights

India’s super-secret National Technical Reconnaissance organisation, or NTRO, operates a fleet of 12 Israeli-made Searcher tactical drones for surveillance of the vast forest tracts on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa-Chhattisgarh border, home to the largest Maoist formations in the country.

The expensive investment in remotely piloted reconnaissance assets has not, however, led to success in detecting hundreds-strong Maoist units.

The major problem, NTRO sources said, is that the fleet operates out of the Begumpet airbase in Hyderabad, pushing the drones to the extremities of their range by the time they reach the Darba plateau and leaving them with little hover-time to gather imagery.

The NTRO and the Air Force, government sources said, rejected calls for relocation of the fleet at a Defence Research and Development Organisation-run airstrip in Jagdalpur, near the site of Tuesday’s attack.

The NTRO agreed, though, to move to an airstrip run by the Steel Authority of India in Bhilai — which, over 250 km from Jagdalpur, is less than half the air-distance from Hyderabad.

Neither NTRO nor Ministry officials offered comment on why the fleet had not moved since 2012, when the agreement to relocate to Bhilai was made.

However, one NTRO official said there were concerns over housing and living conditions for pilots, who currently stay at Fortune Hotel in Begumpet during their fortnight-long rotational postings from their base station in Dehradun.

In addition, the NTRO fleet, dependent on the Air Force for pilots trained in handling the remote-control aircraft, has been hit by a chronic manpower shortage. “For all practical purposes,” an NTRO official said, “the fleet is available only some 20 days of a month, and that for only a few hours a day.”

Late information

Police officials deployed on counter-insurgency duties in the region say information comes in so late that it is often useless. The IAF passes on the data harvested by its drones to the NTRO for analysis.

The NTRO, however, complains it does not have real-time access to the ground intelligence being generated by the police and the Intelligence Bureau.

CRPF, State police ignored pinpoint warning on ambush - The Hindu

 

[kurup]

So there was no intelligence failure .

Instead they decided not to act upon the obtained intelligence report .....

 

[Koovie]

Once again utter ignorance of facts and a big superiority complex led to the defeat of a superior force against a bunch of rag tag fighters

History is full of such genius commanders.

 

[vk17]

I will tell what is truth. I was forced to tell this on internet after I read shameful comments about CRPF martyrs who gave their life for these ungrateful bunch of low quality human beings who are here discussing why these martyrs gave their life. ..

This foolish media get feeded like infant what they are told by govt official n delhi based so called pseudo security expert n novice reader just understand what media states.

This has to change people shud develop there own comprehensive skill about news they hear n not make view abt any agency on one incident by media reports.

Do anyone know this is only road that
connects Bastar to khammam, Andhra Pradesh, its is abt 200km long with dense forest both sides of it. With mountaineous terrain of several hundred sq km both side makes it world's most difficult place to fight guerilla wars. Also it is declared liberated zone by maiost from several years.

These m***** f****** are talking abt intelligence. There are no police establishment in this 200 km national highway. And if they are, they remain inside highly fortified buildings dat too is protected by CRPF itself. N these son of b***** abt intelligence. Wen there is no state govt estblshmnt so what sources they are talking abt.

CRPF personnels sight naxalite everyday walking in front of their camps with weapons in their hand so they dont need any intel abt naxal presence in that area. They just can't rush out to kill them because it could be naxalite trap.

They already know abt dere presence n wen CRPF go out for operations they have carefully tread n do ops succesfully.

After every operations these naxalite run to nearby villages hide their weapon underground and start living like tribal villagers. CRPF people know they are naxalite but can't kill or arrest them because to prove them naxalite u had to catch them with weapons otherwise some human right bitch like Arundhati Roy wud come up n say they are innocent villagers. Many security personnels have lost their jobs because naxals run away wid weapon after their cadre is dead n then they spread propaganda that innocent villagers were killed. You can imagine the pain of CRPF who are seeing n identifying that bastard who killed their fellow brother who was sleeping in adjacent bed few days back n is now martyred but they cannot take action.

N who says they are rug tag. They are highly trained guerrilla fighters with sophisticated weapons. They use satellite phns to communicate n use VHF sets to communicate btwn them like organised army. There ambushs are planned in JNU on Google earth and sent to them for practice on ground zero. In congress leaders attack students from top eng colleges and JNU were reported to be involved. As per survivor's owns word they were carrying Himalaya mineral water bottle and Samsung Tabs. While their cadres were killing congressmen.

 

[IndoUS]

I really wish that the agencies get their act together, if there is a lack of trust between the Intelligence agencies and the CRPF or the regional police force then it should be cleared before such actions are taken. Otherwise the small guys who do the dangerous work will pay the price.

 

[axisofevil]

However, one NTRO official said there were concerns over housing and living conditions for pilots, who currently stay at Fortune Hotel in Begumpet during their fortnight-long rotational postings from their base station in Dehradun.


The release of such information is a security nightmare. Telling where these pilotcs rest is a very stupid move. Who needs intel when you have the media and our stupid politicans?


N who says they are rug tag. They are highly trained guerrilla fighters with sophisticated weapons. They use satellite phns to communicate n use VHF sets to communicate btwn them like organised army. There ambushs are planned in JNU on Google earth and sent to them for practice on ground zero. In congress leaders attack students from top eng colleges and JNU were reported to be involved. As per survivor's owns word they were carrying Himalaya mineral water bottle and Samsung Tabs. While their cadres were killing congressmen.

Thanks, you confirmed what I already knew however may on this site tend to believe that the Maoists/naxals are just a rag tag group who can be easily destroyed. What many ppl miss is that they have more than 40 yrs experience in jungle warfare.

 

[Not Sure]

CRPF has been asking for drone support for last 5 years because over 90% of the deployed personnel are completely unfamiliar with the area and the local languages. The locals too risk their lives in helping the CRPF in that area but the allocated funds for employing local informants is much less than the metaphorical peanuts.

Thus, more often than not, the intelligence reports that the force gets are too blurry to conduct a sharp preemptive strike without incurring any losses. Still, much more than the local police, it is the force that conducts the operations and loses its personnel.

And yet it is none but the force that gets blamed for everything, even for losing its own men.

 

[axisofevil]

CRPF has been asking for drone support for last 5 years because over 90% of the deployed personnel are completely unfamiliar with the area and the local languages. The locals too risk their lives in helping the CRPF in that area but the allocated funds for employing local informants is much less than the metaphorical peanuts.

Thus, more often than not, the intelligence reports that the force gets are too blurry to conduct a sharp preemptive strike without incurring any losses. Still, much more than the local police, it is the force that conducts the operations and loses its personnel.

And yet it is none but the force that gets blamed for everything, even for losing its own men.

Sadly I agree.....the blame should only lie on these the politicans who involved themsleves in such matters and slow such acquisitions to a snail's pace.

 

[Not Sure]

Sadly I agree.....the blame should only lie on these the politicans who involved themsleves in such matters and slow such acquisitions to a snail's pace.

Top CRPF officers, who come from IPS cadre, too are to be equally blamed for this. While those from the CRPF, who spend the longest time in the paramilitary yet rarely ever reach top executive positions, keep asking for better facilities, the IPS officers spend no more than 3 years max and spend the entire time to appease the politicians who decide on their next postings. These IPS officers, who are more of bureaucrats, use the CRPF as a springboard to jump on to more lucrative posts after their tenure.

Contrast it with the NSG, which includes personnel from the Army, the CRPF, and the BSF. Since the NSG is responsible for the security of the top politicians, and not of the common people of the country, the politicians make sure that nothing as such happens in that institution.

 

[axisofevil]

Top CRPF officers, who come from IPS cadre, too are to be equally blamed for this. While those from the CRPF, who spend the longest time in the paramilitary yet rarely ever reach top executive positions, keep asking for better facilities, the IPS officers spend no more than 3 years max and spend the entire time to appease the politicians who decide on their next postings. These IPS officers, who are more of bureaucrats, use the CRPF as a springboard to jump on to more lucrative posts after their tenure.

Contrast it with the NSG, which includes personnel from the Army, the CRPF, and the BSF. Since the NSG is responsible for the security of the top politicians, and not of the common people of the country, the politicians make sure that nothing as such happens in that institution.

Yeah I have heard that as well. There is sort of separation within the forces that is contributing to us not meshing well enough. I mean I remember when that US female soldier came to India to train , and she noted how different it was in terms of the shaby treatment meted out to jawans by the officers. Sort of like a class or caste system within the military itself. Crap like that needs to be stamped out......like making tea, BS chorese, bending over backward to appease high command.....MFers think its the British Raj still....no wonder you hear of incidents where jawans shoot officers dead.....

 

[kurup]

Ambush at Tongpal: History Repeats Itself

In his book “The Life of Reason”, George Santayana, the Spanish American philosopher observed, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”. This statement, made in the larger historical context, has equal applicability to conflict situations. If operational lessons are not correctly learned, casualties will continue to occur with monotonous regularity. The Maoist ambush of police personnel in Chhattisgarh on 11 March 2014is yet another chilling reminder of the truism of Santayana’s words.

A 45 man strong police party left their post at Tongpal on the morning of the 11thto sanitise the area. Moving north along the road, the Maoists ambushed the group about three kilometres from their start point, killing 16 people, 11 of whom were from the CRPF, four from the local police and one civilian. The Maoists used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms to cause casualties, and post the encounter, made away with 18 rifles, a few under barrel grenade launchers and a large number of magazines from the ambushed police party. It is evident that no lessons were learnt from the earlier ambushat Km 43 carried out by the Maoists on 25 May 2013 in which 31 people were killed, including a major part of the state level leadership of the Congress party.The recent ambush of 11thMarch was about 15 km form the Km 43 ambush site and was in open terrain. The area comes under the responsibility of the CRPF at Tongpal, which invites the question as to why no lessons were learntfrom past operations? Perhaps the answer lies in the way we record incidents, especially those where hostile forces have got the better of the security forces. The right questions are invariably never asked, unpleasant facts are covered up and accountability rarely established. In deference to those who have laid down their lives, statements are given to the media on the brave resistance put up by the security forces.So history repeats itself, not because it has been forgotten, but because we failed to record it correctly in the first place, leading to continuous loss of life and a further cycle of cover-ups and misreporting.

A question to be asked is, ‘was the area under the domination of the security forces’? The answer unfortunately is in the negative. While the police forces do dominate the area by day, the area is left to the Maoists by night. Domination requires patrolling by night also and setting up ambushes where movement of Maoists is likely.Such ambush sites are chosen randomly, to avoid the pitfall of falling into a fixed and predictable routine. Only then can caution be imposed on the Maoists. In the present ambush, the Maoists came by night in large numbers and set up IEDs on the road. Evidently, they had a free run to do so! So the questions to be asked with respect to area domination are; does the CRPF carry out night patrolling? Are they trained to do so? Do they have the requisite night vision equipment? Do they set up ambushes at random to prevent the move of armed militant groups? Unless we ask these questions, how can we even hope to improve the quality of our response?

The next question is, were the police forces moving tactically? While moving out for operations, there is a laid down standard operating procedure where troops move well spaced on either side of the road. It is important to remember that the leading elements carry out such movement cross-country, about 25 to 50 meters off the road and not on the road itself, with the rest of the column following tactically in file formation. Movement in such a manner increases the chances of detecting an ambush and obviates the possibility of the whole group being hit simultaneously. Should the leading elements come under fire, the rest of the group is in a position to react and break the ambush, in turn causing severe casualties to the militants.

The Maoists took away 18 weapons from the conflict site. This indicates a lack of resistance by the rest of the group, which enabled the Maoists to collect the weapons and magazines from the bodies of the killed and injured policemen. Resistance would have prevented such an occurrence. The question to be asked is what did the rest of the group do when the leading lot came under fire? It would be important to get an answer, if corrective measures are to be applied in terms of training in battlefield skills and junior level leadership training.

The last question pertains to leadership. Where were the leaders located? Where were the company commander, the battalion commander, and the DIG and IG level ranked officers? What was the briefing given to the troops? Were they trained in anti-ambush drills? How much ammunition was being carried by each man? What was the communication within the group? It is important to ask these questions and hold commanders at all levels accountable for acts of omission or commission if the war on terror is to be won.

The discourse unfortunately has shifted to peripheral issues. The media consistently refers to lack of intelligence, but this does not apply to security forces moving out on operations. They have to be prepared for an ambush each and everytime they move out. Another point emphasised by the media is the large number of Maoists who took part in the attack. Some figures suggest that the Maoist strength was in the region of two to three hundred people. This does not stand up to analysis. The terrain was open, the ambush was laid near the road and such large numbers would easily have been spotted. In any case, what is the intelligence set up of the unit if such large numbers of people can lie undetected within three kilometres of the post? As the police personnel taking part in the operation could only have provided information regarding the strength of the Maoists, it begs another question. If indeed such large numbers were there, they would afford an equally big target. Why could the police not shoot down even one militant at close range?

There are basic weaknesses in the training and leadership levels of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) taking part in anti Naxal operations. These need to be addressed on priority if we are to win the war against terror. For a start, CRPF units must start operating as an organised body under their own commanding officers. They must also be trained in unit or company groups. Officers of the rank of DIG and IG must leave the towns and live with their personnel who are taking part in operations to provide frontline leadership. We must train our police forces taking part in such operations to make them adept at jungle fighting. The road ahead is arduous but it is one that must be traversed. Failure to do so will only embolden the Maoists and perpetuate conflict in the affected areas.

Ambush at Tongpal: History Repeats Itself

 

[third eye]

This is silly

After every such even Intel agencies start this " I told you.." tirade.

Sitting in my office I can give ' confirmed' intel that there will be an accident on the National Highway leading to xyz place. How will this be of any use to highway police ?

Action abe intel is obtained through infiltration of the enemy combined & cross checked through other sources. This should lead to both - loss prevention & destruction of the enemy.

Such generic baat Cheet type intel is useless , more to keep your tail clear.