FalconsForPeace
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The status of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) within the Pakistani constitutional framework has been an issue that has ebbed and flowed over the past 60 years. Previously, sectarian strife and the demographic restructuring of the region were reportedly responsible for the playing up of this issue.
However, more recently, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project finally moving ahead, the issue has reignited owing to the perceived lack of scope and role of the region in the CPEC.
In addition, the complex nature of the larger Kashmir issue always looms large. Consequently, the constitutional status of G-B poses a tricky question to the Pakistani government; if left unresolved, it can cause serious trouble to the CPEC project.
G-B, previously known as the Northern Areas, was part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, and currently falls under Pakistan-governed Kashmir. The exact status of G-B is undefined and the region has existed in a state of political limbo for decades.
The $46 billion, approximately 3,000 km-long CPEC will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan.
In contrast, the Pakistani government, in 1947, had almost immediately provided the rest of the Pakistan-governed Kashmir – or better known in Pakistan as "Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK)" – with the instruments of being a state, through the accordance of a special status.
There has since been a long-standing debate on whether or not Gilgit-Baltistan should be accorded the constitutional status by merging it as Pakistan’s fifth province.
In recent years, the resentment among the people of G-B against the Pakistani authorities has risen. Till the 1990s, the political demands in G-B were largely focused on civil rights and a constitutional status at par with AJK, but off late the demand has been growing for complete inclusion as the fifth province of Pakistan, if full autonomy is not an option.
Additionally, G-B, with a Shia majority, has had its share of religiously motivated and sectarian violence – which the locals believe has been a ploy by the federal governments to divert attention from the issues of autonomy. This has only contributed to the local population’s grievances about subjugation by Pakistan.
Furthermore, people in the region have complained that the hydroelectric, tourism, mineral, and trade revenues of the region were being unethically directed away to the federal coffers and used by other provinces.
Pakistan’s G-B conundrum: Power generation woes, CPEC and Chinese interests versus the larger Kashmir issue
At times, Pakistan’s power generation falls 40 per cent short of demand, and around a third of the total power generation comes from oil-fired power stations. However, as per the Asian Development Bank (ADB), G-B has the potential to produce nearly 30,000-50,000 MW of energy.
Along the Karakoram Highway, the potential of run-of-the-river projects is phenomenal. At Bunji alone, a project of 7,400MW of energy can be established along with two additional projects, of 2,000MW each, upstream from this location. These alone can meet much of Pakistan’s energy requirements. The region has enormous water resources as almost all the peaks are covered with heavy snow in the winter, and yet, less than 10 per cent of the total hydroelectric potential of the region has been tapped for local use.
In addition, this region has notable reserves of copper, coal, iron, silver, and gold among other metals and minerals. The region also has reserves of Uranium-238.
The $46 billion, approximately 3,000 km-long CPEC will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan; however,as the region is a disputed territory, the federal government has not even invited G-B representatives to any national-level meetings on CPEC. A discontented population at the head of the economic corridor can very well derail the entire project, which does not bode well for the people of G-B and Pakistan.
The biggest question, though, that lies at the heart of granting G-B a constitutionally binding provincial status, is the issue of Kashmir. Politically integrating Gilgit-Baltistan as a province will leave Pakistan in a precarious position, as it will run the risk of compromising its broader Kashmir agenda.
This will also require amending Pakistan’s Constitution (Article 258), which, in turn, will be almost improbable to achieve without a decisive political mandate and the endorsement of the Army.
Therefore, the path towards making G-B a province – provisional or permanent – is not going to be an easy one. The Kashmiri leadership on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) have been united in their stand against the granting of constitutional and provincial status to G-B, as they believe it will dilute and undermine the cause for Kashmiri freedom.
However, this current and real stimulus for a renewed consideration to make G-B a province also needs to be analysed through another important lens, ie, China’s long-term strategy in Pakistan, and specifically in G-B.
There have been plenty of reports over the years of Chinese troops being deployed in G-B; however, the Chinese government has attributed this to the construction and maintenance of the Karakoram Highway – which has been a vital strategic route into China and has reportedly also been used for the supply of nuclear material, missiles, and other related components – and to the general economic and infrastructure development of the region.
Even before the region gained elevated importance because of the CPEC, G-B has been of strategic importance to China because of the issue of the Uighur refugees, its proximity to the Siachen glacier, and the massive hydro-potential of the region.
For now, this has turned into a quintessential zero-sum game because if economics are to overcome politics and G-B is to get an elevated status in Pakistan's Constitution, then it will also imply a strategic departure from the country's traditional policy on Kashmir – which will have profound ripple effects on the Kashmir dispute on both sides of the LoC.
Additionally, this will result in Islamabad assuredly losing its credibility as a supporter and champion of the Kashmiri cause. On the other hand, the region is also vital to Pakistan for the smooth progress of the economically beneficial CPEC, and also for its hydro-potential.
While a definitive solution seems improbable in the foreseeable future, the issue is likely to continue getting attention, more so with the impending Assembly elections in AJK – which are to be held later this month.
http://www.dailyo.in/politics/cpec-...lgit-baltistan-loc-siachen/story/1/11107.html
However, more recently, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project finally moving ahead, the issue has reignited owing to the perceived lack of scope and role of the region in the CPEC.
In addition, the complex nature of the larger Kashmir issue always looms large. Consequently, the constitutional status of G-B poses a tricky question to the Pakistani government; if left unresolved, it can cause serious trouble to the CPEC project.
G-B, previously known as the Northern Areas, was part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, and currently falls under Pakistan-governed Kashmir. The exact status of G-B is undefined and the region has existed in a state of political limbo for decades.
The $46 billion, approximately 3,000 km-long CPEC will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan.
In contrast, the Pakistani government, in 1947, had almost immediately provided the rest of the Pakistan-governed Kashmir – or better known in Pakistan as "Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK)" – with the instruments of being a state, through the accordance of a special status.
There has since been a long-standing debate on whether or not Gilgit-Baltistan should be accorded the constitutional status by merging it as Pakistan’s fifth province.
In recent years, the resentment among the people of G-B against the Pakistani authorities has risen. Till the 1990s, the political demands in G-B were largely focused on civil rights and a constitutional status at par with AJK, but off late the demand has been growing for complete inclusion as the fifth province of Pakistan, if full autonomy is not an option.
Additionally, G-B, with a Shia majority, has had its share of religiously motivated and sectarian violence – which the locals believe has been a ploy by the federal governments to divert attention from the issues of autonomy. This has only contributed to the local population’s grievances about subjugation by Pakistan.
Furthermore, people in the region have complained that the hydroelectric, tourism, mineral, and trade revenues of the region were being unethically directed away to the federal coffers and used by other provinces.
Pakistan’s G-B conundrum: Power generation woes, CPEC and Chinese interests versus the larger Kashmir issue
At times, Pakistan’s power generation falls 40 per cent short of demand, and around a third of the total power generation comes from oil-fired power stations. However, as per the Asian Development Bank (ADB), G-B has the potential to produce nearly 30,000-50,000 MW of energy.
Along the Karakoram Highway, the potential of run-of-the-river projects is phenomenal. At Bunji alone, a project of 7,400MW of energy can be established along with two additional projects, of 2,000MW each, upstream from this location. These alone can meet much of Pakistan’s energy requirements. The region has enormous water resources as almost all the peaks are covered with heavy snow in the winter, and yet, less than 10 per cent of the total hydroelectric potential of the region has been tapped for local use.
In addition, this region has notable reserves of copper, coal, iron, silver, and gold among other metals and minerals. The region also has reserves of Uranium-238.
The $46 billion, approximately 3,000 km-long CPEC will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan; however,as the region is a disputed territory, the federal government has not even invited G-B representatives to any national-level meetings on CPEC. A discontented population at the head of the economic corridor can very well derail the entire project, which does not bode well for the people of G-B and Pakistan.
The biggest question, though, that lies at the heart of granting G-B a constitutionally binding provincial status, is the issue of Kashmir. Politically integrating Gilgit-Baltistan as a province will leave Pakistan in a precarious position, as it will run the risk of compromising its broader Kashmir agenda.
This will also require amending Pakistan’s Constitution (Article 258), which, in turn, will be almost improbable to achieve without a decisive political mandate and the endorsement of the Army.
Therefore, the path towards making G-B a province – provisional or permanent – is not going to be an easy one. The Kashmiri leadership on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) have been united in their stand against the granting of constitutional and provincial status to G-B, as they believe it will dilute and undermine the cause for Kashmiri freedom.
However, this current and real stimulus for a renewed consideration to make G-B a province also needs to be analysed through another important lens, ie, China’s long-term strategy in Pakistan, and specifically in G-B.
There have been plenty of reports over the years of Chinese troops being deployed in G-B; however, the Chinese government has attributed this to the construction and maintenance of the Karakoram Highway – which has been a vital strategic route into China and has reportedly also been used for the supply of nuclear material, missiles, and other related components – and to the general economic and infrastructure development of the region.
Even before the region gained elevated importance because of the CPEC, G-B has been of strategic importance to China because of the issue of the Uighur refugees, its proximity to the Siachen glacier, and the massive hydro-potential of the region.
For now, this has turned into a quintessential zero-sum game because if economics are to overcome politics and G-B is to get an elevated status in Pakistan's Constitution, then it will also imply a strategic departure from the country's traditional policy on Kashmir – which will have profound ripple effects on the Kashmir dispute on both sides of the LoC.
Additionally, this will result in Islamabad assuredly losing its credibility as a supporter and champion of the Kashmiri cause. On the other hand, the region is also vital to Pakistan for the smooth progress of the economically beneficial CPEC, and also for its hydro-potential.
While a definitive solution seems improbable in the foreseeable future, the issue is likely to continue getting attention, more so with the impending Assembly elections in AJK – which are to be held later this month.
http://www.dailyo.in/politics/cpec-...lgit-baltistan-loc-siachen/story/1/11107.html
