Could offensive IAF use in ’62 have reversed history?

[thestringshredder]

Fifty years have gone by since our infamous defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, but no firm answer has come from any quarter why it happened.

However, recently, the current Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne has made a statement that 1962’s outcome would have been very different had Jawaharlal Nehru allowed the IAF to be used offensively as was done by Nehru during the 1947-48 Kashmir war and Goa’s Liberation in 1961 and Indira Gandhi did likewise in the Bangladesh War of 1971. It was because of such use of the IAF that we succeeded on all three occasions.

A Copy-Book Case

In the Longewala Battle in the Rajasthan desert in 1971, a Pakistani tank regiment advancing without adequate air cover was completely destroyed by just three Hunter fighter-bombers operating from Jaisalmer thus saving a large amount of strategic territory and Jaisalmer and Jodhpur cities.
Similarly, in the East, it was again aggressive use of the IAF which quickly decimated the Pakistani Air Force thereby enabling our Army to capture Dacca speedily.

The Unsolved Mystery

With such a record, why did Nehru fail to use IAF offensively in 1962? The Chinese Air Force (CAF) was located deep inside the Chinese mainland far from the Sino-Indian border.
Furthermore, bulk of the CAF consisted of old Soviet Mig-15s and 17s. Only its a few modern Mig-19s were generally on par with our Hunters and Gnats, performence wise.

According to British military historian, Wg Cdr Asher Lee in the British War Journal of September 1965, all CAF IL-28 light bombers were by early 1962 facing serious technical problems and desperate shortage of fuel and the state of the Mig Fleet was not much better. Lee’s overall assessment was: by 1962 the CAF was nearly totally grounded.
The “Intelligence” of our IB was: Chinese air bases were at Tashigong, Radol and Gartok.

Actually, these bases did not exist until as recently as 2007! The IAF’s independent and correct “Intelligence” was that the bases were at: Khotan (1380 metres altitude) and Kashgar in the West and Kuming (2030m), Chumdo (3230m), Jaykundo (3800m) and Nachu (4500m) in the East. Only Mig-19s operated from the Western bases had the range to reach our border Army positions. However, due to “altitude — impact” limitations, the fuel and weapon loads which even they could carry were severely limited thereby posing no threat to our Army or IAF fighters had we deployed them. As for the East even the Mig-19s could reach the Border only from Kuming.

The others were far too high. Our fighters/fighter bombers in contrast were: technologically and performance wise far superior to those of the CAF. Moreover, they would take-off from bases close to see a level and so would be able to carry their full fuel and weapons loads. Consequently, they would have been overwhelmingly effective against the Chinese Army and CAF over a huge radius of action. They would also have been able to spend much more time over the target areas, enabling repeated strikes against the same target in a single sortie there by ensuring total target destruction.

Thus, in the East, Chinese ground advance could have been effectively neutralised and their capture of the critical towns of Tawang and Bomdila, and the strategic Sela Pass, would have been avoided. As for the West, the Chinese would have been unable to capture the additional 30,000 square kilometres they did consequent to the War. IAF fighter bombers would also have been able to dislodge the Chinese even from much of the 50,000 square kilometres, they had captured in Aksai Chin over 1952 to 1960 by progressive clandestine aggression. The War would, therefore have ended as a Chinese rout instead of an Indian debacle. It is, therefore, surprising that, at a presentation to the PM just before the start of the war by the Air Commodore (Intelligence) at Air Hqrs, he was severely chastised by Nehru for suggesting offensive use of the IAF. This fell like a huge wet blanket on the entire IAF’s morale.

How the USA Shaped Nehru’s Thinking

It was then US ambassador, Galbraith and his “military advisers” who practically “threatened” Nehru that, if he used IAFs fighter-bombers against the Chinese, the CAF would “retaliate” by bombing our major cities — believe it or not — right down to Madras!! Tragically, this “threat” was also supported by IB director, B.N. Mullick. Our nervous national leadership, including senior IAF officers like group captain H.C. Dewan, felt the CAF “retaliation”, would also interfere with supply drops to the Army. It was such totally baseless assessments that compelled the IAF’s fighting arm to be entirely unused.

Gailbraith’s deliberately wrong advice to Nehru was for two reasons: Firstly, the USA was involved at that very time in the Cuban Missile Crisis with the Soviets and it did not want a major global instability arising from a possible further escalation of a Sino-Indian conflict. Secondly, because the USA feared it may be drawn into the conflict by having to not just make major weapon supplies to lndia, but, perhaps, even commit US ground and air forces as in the Korean War.

However, the actual development in the War’s very first week, led a frightened Nehru to dash off a top secret letter to President Kennedy beseeching him to supply the IAF immediately with supersonic F-104 fighters, and even B-47 long range strategic bombers!! Thus, Nehru finally realised our desperate need to have used our offensive air power right from the start of the War. But it came far too late! Consequently, he was roundly responsible for converting a victory into a humiliating defeat.

Link - Could offensive IAF use in