Chinese Nuclear Proliferation, an Attempt to Destroy World

[sunny_aus]

China Hands Over Intel Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program

China Hands Over Intel Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program Waste Of My Oxygen
April 2, 2008

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China, a long time defender of Iran over it’s potential nuclear weapons program, has turned over intel regarding the program. China is probably in a good position to actually reveal what Iran’s intentions are as it is believed they helped Iran develope their nuclear program. This is a turning point for Iran, as one of their staunchest allies is afraid enough of what Iran’s plans are, they are releasing their information on it.

VIENNA, Austria — China, an opponent of harsh U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran, has nonetheless recently provided the International Atomic Energy Agency with intelligence linked to Tehran’s alleged attempts to make nuclear arms, diplomats have told The Associated Press.
Beijing has acted as a brake within the council, consistently watering down a U.S.-led push to impose severe penalties on Tehran for its nuclear defiance since the first set of sanctions was passed in late 2006.

A Chinese decision to provide information for use in the agency’s attempts to probe Iran’s purported nuclear weapons program would appear to reflect growing international unease about how honest the Islamic republic has been in denying it ever tried to make such arms.

The new development was revealed by two senior diplomats who closely follow the IAEA probe of Iran’s nuclear program. One commented late last week and the other Wednesday.
The IAEA declined comment, and nobody was picking up phones at the Iranian and Chinese missions to the IAEA.

John Bolton, the previous U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and before that the U.S. undersecretary of state in charge of the Iran nuclear dossier, said any such Chinese move would be “potentially significant” because of Beijing’s former military ties to Tehran. /**/

In a telephone call from Washington, Bolton said America believed that the Chinese had helped Iran develop its nuclear program, particularly in one area of uranium enrichment, “plus they had cooperation on ballistic missile programs as well.”

The diplomats said Beijing was the most surprising entry among a fairly substantial list of nations recently forwarding information to the agency that adds to previously provided intelligence, and which could be relevant in attempts to probe Iran for past or present nuclear weapons research.
But they said several other countries not normally considered to be in the anti-Iran camp had also done so in recent weeks.
The diplomats — who demanded anonymity because their information was confidential — declined to name individual nations. But they attributed a generally increased flow of information to the U.N. nuclear watchdog to concerns sparked by a multimedia presentation to the 35 IAEA board members by the agency in February about intelligence previously forwarded by member states on Iran’s alleged clandestine nuclear arms program.
One of the diplomats said the agency also was on the lookout for misleading information provided it, either inadvertently or in attempts to falsely implicate Iran.

One example, he said was a document showing experiments with implosion technology that can be used to detonate a nuclear device. While the document appeared genuine, it was unclear whether it originated from Iran, said the diplomat.

Suspected weapons-related work outlined in the February presentation and IAEA reports preceding it include:
—uranium conversion linked to high explosives testing and designs of a missile re-entry vehicle, all apparently interconnected through involvement of officials and institutions;
—procurement of so-called “dual use” equipment and experiments that also could be used in both civilian and military nuclear programs; and
—Iran’s possession of a 15-page document outlining how to form uranium metal into the shape of a warhead.
A U.S. intelligence estimate late last year said Tehran worked on nuclear weapons programs until 2003, while Israel and other nations say such work continued past that date.

Tehran continues uranium enrichment, which can generate the fissile core of nuclear warheads, and has led to three sets of Security Council sanctions but insists it is developing the technology only for its other use — power generation.

It denies ever trying to make atomic arms and last month declared the issue of its purported nuclear weapons strivings — and any attempt to investigate them — closed, asserting that information suggesting it ever had a nascent nuclear arms program is fabricated.

But the agency has signaled it is not giving up on its efforts to investigate purported military aspects of Tehran’s nuclear activities. Other diplomats told the AP that deputy director general Olli Heinonen planned to meet in the next few days with Ali-Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran’s chief delegate to the agency, to press for answers.

Ahead of that tentative meeting, Gregory L. Schulte, the chief U.S. delegate to the IAEA, urged Tehran to end its stonewalling. He told the AP that with the next IAEA report due in about two months, time was running out for Iran to “explain these serious indications of troubling activities.”

An IAEA report in February said suspicions about most past Iranian nuclear activities had eased or been laid to rest. But it also noted that Iran had rejected the information provided by IAEA member nations to the agency for its probe of suspected weapons research as false and irrelevant.

It also noted that Iran had blocked agency requests to talk to key officials suspected of possible involvement in past military nuclear programs, among them one identified by diplomats as nuclear engineer Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
They told the AP that he and others active as academics in Iran’s civilian nuclear faculties are suspected by the agency of key roles in secret nuclear activities with a possible military dimension, including the procurement of “dual use” equipment.

In a summary recently forwarded to the AP, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group that claims to have informants inside the Iranian government, identified three others as Revolutionary Guard commander Fereydoon Abbasi, Seyed Jaber Safdari and Mohammed Mehdi Nejad-Nouri.

It said the three and others are involved in clandestine nuclear weapons-related research at three Iranian universities: Beheshti; Malek Ahstar and Imam Hossein.

Asked for verification, a senior diplomat of an IAEA member state said that a fact check run by his country’s relevant agency showed the claims to be generally accurate. Another senior diplomat also said the information appeared to be fairly reliable.

China Hands Over Intel Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program Waste Of My Oxygen

 

[sunny_aus]

CHINA'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
(BY EDWARD J. MARKEY, BENJAMIN A. GILMAN AND CHRISTOPHER COX)

CHINA'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY -- (BY EDWARD J. MARKEY, BENJAMIN A. GILMAN AND CHRISTOPHER COX) (Extension of Remarks - October 30, 1997)


• Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend my colleagues, Mr. Markey, Mr. Gilman, and Mr. Cox, for their bipartisan efforts to shed light on China's pending nuclear nonproliferation certification in this morning's Washington Post. These distinguished gentlemen present us with the facts on China's most recent and egregious nonproliferation violations. Now it's up to President Clinton to face the facts and deny certification to China as a responsible member of the international nonproliferation community.

• The Central Intelligence Agency released its biannual report to Congress this past summer and listed China as one of the two biggest nations to export nuclear materials to Iran and Pakistan. Now, less than 4 months later, China is pledging to limit its exports to Iran and end nuclear cooperation with the rogue nation. This agreement arrives at the dawn of `new and improved' United States-China relationship. As a nuclear weapons state and party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, China is obligated to promote `the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.' If China can break its pledge made in an international treaty, it certainly has the capability of breaking its pledge made to the Clinton administration. What evidence does the United States have that China will keep its promise to curb sales of nuclear materials to its largest consumers?

• None. China's Government has denied accusations of selling nuclear technology and material to rogue nations. It has been barred from receiving United States technology for over 10 years for these transactions and now we're supposed to believe that China will reverse its current policy. I hope the Clinton administration doesn't expect Congress to buy this bogus change of heart. The administration has delinked human rights from trade and now it wants to ignore its own intelligence reports on nuclear proliferation. If the United States agrees to sell nuclear technology to China, it will open up the nuclear arms market to Iran and Pakistan. This is irresponsible, unacceptable, and goes beyond a policy of engagement.

• China has not given any substantive signs of changing its current nuclear sales to Iran, yet the administration acquiesces on all requests for cooperation. China's leader, Jiang Zemin, insisted upon a fanfare welcome from the United States and his request was granted. However, compliance of the warm welcome should not set the tone for the upcoming discussions between the two leaders. President Clinton must send a clear, firm message regarding U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. The United States must lead by example and show China--and the world--that we are not open to sending nuclear technology to Iran via China.

• The following article appeared in today's Washington Post:
[Page: E2128]

(BY EDWARD J. MARKEY, BENJAMIN A. GILMAN AND CHRISTOPHER COX)
During Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit this week, President Clinton is expected to activate a 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China. American companies would then be authorized to start selling nuclear reactors and fuel to a country that has been identified by the CIA as `a key supplier of most destructive arms technology' to rogue regimes such as Iran's. We believe that providing access to American technologies that could end up assisting Iran's nuclear weapons programs would constitute an intolerable risk to U.S. national security.

When the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was finalized in 1985, Congress placed conditions on the resolution approving it that required the president to certify that China had become a responsible member of the international nonproliferation community before the agreement could go into effect. No U.S. president, not Regan, not Bush and until now not Clinton, has made such a certification. A glance at the record quickly shows why.

Communist China's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation has made it the Wal-Mart of international nuclear commerce. Consider the following list of only the worst and most recent of China's nonproliferation violations:

In February 1996 the People's Republic of China was discovered to have sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan for use in Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment facility, though it publicly denied doing so.

In May 1997 the State Department cited seven Chinese entities for exporting chemical weapons technology to Iran.

In June 1997 Time magazine reported that China had not only transferred nuclear-capable missiles to Pakistan but was also helping Pakistan build missiles of its own.

In July 1997 the CIA identified China as being `the most significant supplier of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related goods and technology to foreign countries.'

In August 1997 Israeli intelligence reports confirmed that China is supplying long-range nuclear missile technologies to Iran.

In September 1997 the U.S. Navy reported that China is the most active supplier of Iran's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs.

This record speaks for itself. China has continually assure the United States that it would stop providing technologies for weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Iran and Pakistan. China has continually failed to live up to its promises. Before implementing the 1985 agreement, we need to be certain that this time the promises are for real.

The 1985 agreement requires the president to certify that China has made sufficient progress in halting proliferation. President Clinton, however, seems to believe that China's past proliferation record is irrelevant, and that we should blindly trust the vague and untested promises China has made to implement its own export controls and regulations. China has yet to make a tangible demonstration of its commitment to cease its sales of WMD technologies. Implementation of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is profoundly ill advised, at least until the following criteria are met:
(1) China must join the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). The NSG members have agreed not to sell nuclear technologies to any country that does not allow international inspections of all of its nuclear facilities all of the time, a criterion known as `full-scope safeguards.' A 1993 statement by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher calls the NSG `a fundamental component of the international nonproliferation regime,' and says that `the United States has been a strong proponent of requiring full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for significant new nuclear supply commitments.' Christopher's first statement remains true, but the Clinton administration is considering reversing itself on the second. Why should countries such as Canada and Switzerland, both NSG members, be held to a higher nonproliferation standard than Communist China?

(2) China must cease all proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including missiles and chemical and biological weapons. A promise to cease nuclear proliferation without similar assurances to cease the proliferation of other mass destruction technologies is a lot like an alcoholic's swearing off scotch without bothering to stop drinking beer or wine.

(3) China must follow through with its promise to implement an export controls system, but it must be proved to be effective. This can be accomplished only through the passage of time. With such a long legacy of transgressions and broken promises, we need to see evidence of true reform before moving forward with certification.

President Clinton has an opportunity, as well as an obligation, to require that the People's Republic of China demonstrate its compliance with global nonproliferation norms (as opposed to mere promises) by resisting pressure from the Chinese government (and the American nuclear industry). But if the president certifies China as a nonproliferator, despite the record we have outlined and without a demonstrated change of behavior on the part of Beijing, he will have eviscerated U.S. nonproliferation policy and compromised U.S. national security.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY -- (BY EDWARD J. MARKEY, BENJAMIN A. GILMAN AND CHRISTOPHER COX) (Extension of Remarks - October 30, 1997)

 

[sunny_aus]

China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design

China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-Indo-US nuke deal-The Times of India


WASHINGTON: While an assortment of non-proliferation hardliners and hi-tech suppliers treat India with immense suspicion in the matter of nuclear trade predicated on tests, it turns out that the United States and the west were fully aware of Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation to Pakistan, including conducting a proxy test for it, as far back as 1990.

In some of the most startling revelations to emerge on the subject, a high-ranking former US official who was also a nuclear weapons designer has disclosed that ''in 1982 China's premier Deng Xiaoping began the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan.''

The whistleblower isn't a think-tank academic or an unnamed official speaking on background. Thomas Reed, described as a former U.S ''nuclear weaponeer'' and a Secretary of the Air Force (1976-77) writes in the latest issue of Physics Today that China’s transfers to Pakistan included blueprints for the ultrasimple CHIC-4 design using highly enriched uranium, first tested by China in 1966. A Pakistani derivative of CHIC-4 apparently was tested in China on 26 May 1990, he adds.

Reed makes an even more stunning disclosure, saying Deng not only authorized proliferation to Pakistan, but also, "in time, to other third world countries.'' The countries are not named. He also says that during the 1990s, China conducted underground hydronuclear experiments—though not full-scale device tests—for France at Lop Nur.

Reed’s disclosures are based on his knowledge of and insights into the visits to China by Dan Stillman, a top US nuclear expert who went there several times in the late 1980s at Beijing invitation, in part because the Chinese wanted to both show-off and convey to the US the progress they had made in nuclear weaponisation.

One of Stillman's visit to the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research (SINR), writes Reed, ''also produced his first insight into the extensive hospitality extended to Pakistani nuclear scientists during that same late-1980s time period,'' which would eventually lead to the joint China-Pak nuclear test.

Chinese nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, including the supply of hi-tech items like ring magnets in the early 1990s, has always been known to the non-proliferation community (which largely slept on the reports). But this is the first time it has been confirmed by such a senior official.

In the late 1980s, both the Reagan and the George Bush Sr administration repeatedly fudged the issue to certify that Pakistan had not gone nuclear despite obvious evidence to the contrary.

In his assessment of the Chinese nuclear program based on Stillman’s visits, Reed writes admiringly about Beijing’s successes, saying ''Over a period of 15 years, an intellectually talented China achieved parity with the West and pre-eminence over its Asian peers in the design of nuclear weapons and in understanding underground nuclear testing.''

"China now stands in the first rank of nuclear powers," he concludes.

In trenchant observation, Reed writes, ''Any nuclear nation should consider its nuclear tests to be giant physics experiments. The Chinese weaponeers understood that well; other proliferators do not. Many states have considered their early nuclear shots to be political demonstrations or simple proof tests. In China, however, extremely sophisticated instrumentation was used on even the first nuclear test.''

Chronicling the progress of China’s nuclear weapons program, Reed writes: Atop a tower on 16 October 1964, China's first nuclear device, 596, was successfully fired. US intelligence analysts were astonished by the lack of plutonium in the fallout debris and by the speed with which China had broken into the nuclear club, but that was only the beginning.

Eighteen months later, in the spring of 1966, China entered the thermonuclear world with the detonation of a boosted-fission, airdropped device that used lithium-6, a primary source of tritium when bombarded with neutrons. That test, their third, achieved a yield of 200–300 kilotons. By the end of the year, they made the leap to multistage technology with a large two-stage experiment that yielded only 122 kilotons, but it again displayed 6Li in the bomb debris.

The Chinese then closed the circle on 17 June 1967, unambiguously marching into the H-bomb club with a 3.3-megaton burst from an aircraft-delivered weapon. On 27 December 1968, the Chinese bid the Johnson administration farewell with an improved, airdropped 3-megaton thermonuclear device that for the first time used plutonium in the primary.

It is clear from the reactor-to-bomb progression times that by 1968 China had unequivocally entered the European nuclear cartel on a par with the U, says Reed. Furthermore, China had become a thermonuclear power. It had achieved the leap from the initial A-bomb test to a 3.3-megaton thermonuclear blast in a record-breaking 32 months. It had taken the US more than seven years to accomplish that feat.

China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-Indo-US nuke deal-The Times of India

 

[nitesh]

one more here:

China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-USA-World-The Times of India

China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design
5 Sep 2008, 1046 hrs IST, CHIDANAND RAJGHATTA,TNN

WASHINGTON: While an assortment of non-proliferation hardliners and hi-tech suppliers treat India with immense suspicion in the matter of nuclear trade predicated on tests, it turns out that the United States and the west were fully aware of Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation to Pakistan, including conducting a proxy test for it, as far back as 1990.

In some of the most startling revelations to emerge on the subject, a high-ranking former US official who was also a nuclear weapons designer has disclosed that ''in 1982 China's premier Deng Xiaoping began the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan.''

The whistleblower isn't a think-tank academic or an unnamed official speaking on background. Thomas Reed, described as a former U.S ''nuclear weaponeer'' and a Secretary of the Air Force (1976-77) writes in the latest issue of Physics Today that China’s transfers to Pakistan included blueprints for the ultrasimple CHIC-4 design using highly enriched uranium, first tested by China in 1966. A Pakistani derivative of CHIC-4 apparently was tested in China on 26 May 1990, he adds.

Reed makes an even more stunning disclosure, saying Deng not only authorized proliferation to Pakistan, but also, "in time, to other third world countries.'' The countries are not named. He also says that during the 1990s, China conducted underground hydronuclear experiments—though not full-scale device tests—for France at Lop Nur.

Reed’s disclosures are based on his knowledge of and insights into the visits to China by Dan Stillman, a top US nuclear expert who went there several times in the late 1980s at Beijing invitation, in part because the Chinese wanted to both show-off and convey to the US the progress they had made in nuclear weaponisation.

One of Stillman's visit to the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research (SINR), writes Reed, ''also produced his first insight into the extensive hospitality extended to Pakistani nuclear scientists during that same late-1980s time period,'' which would eventually lead to the joint China-Pak nuclear test.

Chinese nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, including the supply of hi-tech items like ring magnets in the early 1990s, has always been known to the non-proliferation community (which largely slept on the reports). But this is the first time it has been confirmed by such a senior official.

In the late 1980s, both the Reagan and the George Bush Sr administration repeatedly fudged the issue to certify that Pakistan had not gone nuclear despite obvious evidence to the contrary.

In his assessment of the Chinese nuclear program based on Stillman’s visits, Reed writes admiringly about Beijing’s successes, saying ''Over a period of 15 years, an intellectually talented China achieved parity with the West and pre-eminence over its Asian peers in the design of nuclear weapons and in understanding underground nuclear testing.''

"China now stands in the first rank of nuclear powers," he concludes.

In trenchant observation, Reed writes, ''Any nuclear nation should consider its nuclear tests to be giant physics experiments. The Chinese weaponeers understood that well; other proliferators do not. Many states have considered their early nuclear shots to be political demonstrations or simple proof tests. In China, however, extremely sophisticated instrumentation was used on even the first nuclear test.''

Chronicling the progress of China’s nuclear weapons program, Reed writes: Atop a tower on 16 October 1964, China's first nuclear device, 596, was successfully fired. US intelligence analysts were astonished by the lack of plutonium in the fallout debris and by the speed with which China had broken into the nuclear club, but that was only the beginning.

Eighteen months later, in the spring of 1966, China entered the thermonuclear world with the detonation of a boosted-fission, airdropped device that used lithium-6, a primary source of tritium when bombarded with neutrons. That test, their third, achieved a yield of 200–300 kilotons. By the end of the year, they made the leap to multistage technology with a large two-stage experiment that yielded only 122 kilotons, but it again displayed 6Li in the bomb debris.

The Chinese then closed the circle on 17 June 1967, unambiguously marching into the H-bomb club with a 3.3-megaton burst from an aircraft-delivered weapon. On 27 December 1968, the Chinese bid the Johnson administration farewell with an improved, airdropped 3-megaton thermonuclear device that for the first time used plutonium in the primary.

It is clear from the reactor-to-bomb progression times that by 1968 China had unequivocally entered the European nuclear cartel on a par with the U, says Reed. Furthermore, China had become a thermonuclear power. It had achieved the leap from the initial A-bomb test to a 3.3-megaton thermonuclear blast in a record-breaking 32 months. It had taken the US more than seven years to accomplish that feat.

 

[sunny_aus]

Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China
Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans

washingtonpost.com: Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China

By Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, February 15, 2004; Page A01


Investigators have discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China, exposing yet another link in a chain of proliferation that stretched across the Middle East and Asia, according to government officials and arms experts.

The bomb designs and other papers turned over by Libya have yielded dramatic evidence of China's long-suspected role in transferring nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the early 1980s, they said. The Chinese designs were later resold to Libya by a Pakistani-led trading network that is now the focus of an expanding international probe, added the officials and experts, who are based in the United States and Europe.

The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said.

"It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered."

U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon -- assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said.

China's actions "were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else China provided to Pakistan's nuclear program," said David Albright, a nuclear physicist and former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq. "These documents also raise questions about whether Iran, North Korea and perhaps others received these documents from Pakistanis or their agents."

The package of documents was turned over to U.S. officials in November following Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction and open his country's weapons laboratories to international inspection. The blueprints, which were flown to Washington last month, have been analyzed by experts from the United States, Britain and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

Weapons experts in Libya also found large amounts of equipment used in making enriched uranium, the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. That discovery helped expose a rogue nuclear trading network that officials say funneled technology and parts to Libya as well as Iran and North Korea. A central figure in the network, Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged in a televised confession last month that he had passed nuclear secrets to others. Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then pardoned Khan.

Of the many proliferation activities linked to Khan's network, the selling of weapon designs is viewed as the most serious. The documents found in Libya contained most of the information needed to assemble a bomb, assuming the builder could acquire the plutonium or highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear explosion, according to U.S. and European weapons experts familiar with the blueprints. At the same time, one of the chief difficulties for countries trying to build nuclear weapons has been obtaining the plutonium or uranium.

Libya appeared to have made minimal progress toward building a weapon, and had no missile in its arsenal capable of carrying the 1,000-pound nuclear device depicted in the drawings, the officials said. However, weapons experts noted, the blueprints would have been far more valuable to the other known customers of Khan's network.

"This design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North Korea," said Albright, whose Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security has studied the nonconventional weapons programs of both states. The design "appears deliverable by North Korea's Nodong missile, Iran's Shahab-3 missile and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War," he said.

Such a relatively simple design also might be coveted by terrorist groups who seek nuclear weapons but lack the technical sophistication or infrastructure to build a modern weapon, said one Europe-based weapons expert familiar with the blueprints. While such a bomb would be difficult to deliver by air, "you could drive it away in a pickup truck," the expert said.

The device depicted in the blueprints appears similar to a weapon known to have been tested by China in the 1960s, officials familiar with the documents said. Although of an older design, the bomb is an implosion device that is smaller and more sophisticated than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Implosion bombs use precision-timed conventional explosives to squeeze a sphere of fissile material and trigger a nuclear chain reaction.

Pakistan's first nuclear test in 1998 involved a more modern design than the one sold to Libya. Albright said the Libyan documents "do not appear to contain any information about the nuclear weapons Pakistan has built."

The documents at the center of the investigation were handed over to IAEA inspectors in two white plastic shopping bags from a Pakistani clothing shop. The shop's name -- Good Looks Tailor -- and Islamabad address were printed on the bags in red letters. One of the bags contained drawings and blueprints of different sizes; the other contained a stack of instructions on how to build not only a bomb but also its essential components.

The documents themselves seemed a hodgepodge -- some in good condition, others smudged and dirty; some professionally printed, others handwritten. Many of the papers were "copies of copies of copies," said one person familiar with them. The primary documents were entirely in English, while a few ancillary papers contained Chinese text. The package also included open-literature articles on nuclear weapons from U.S. weapons laboratories, officials familiar with the documents said.

Strikingly, although most of the essential design elements were included, a few key parts were missing, the officials and experts said. Some investigators have speculated that the missing papers could have been lost, or hadn't yet been provided -- possibly they were being withheld pending additional payments. Others suggested that the drawings were simply thrown in as a bonus with the purchase of uranium-enrichment equipment -- "the cherry on the sundae," one knowledgeable official said.

Libyan scientists interviewed by international inspectors about the designs said they had not seriously studied them and were unaware that anything was missing. As Libya had no suitable missile or delivery system for a nuclear weapon, the scientists might have decided to delay work on bomb designs until other parts of their weapons program were further advanced, one knowledgeable U.S. official said.

U.S. and European investigators said there were many similarities among the other nuclear-related designs and components found in Libya and Iran, suggesting they were provided by the same network.

As for who delivered the material to the Libyans, a European official who has studied the question said the connection to the Khan network was indirect. "The middleman is quite invisible. The middleman has covered his tracks very well."

The evidence of China's transfer of nuclear plans to Pakistan confirms something that U.S. officials have believed since at least the early 1980s. A declassified State Department report on Pakistan's nuclear program written in 1983 concluded that China had "provided assistance" to Pakistan's bomb-making program. "We now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly nuclear device design," the report said.

While the discovery of direct evidence of such cooperation was disturbing, it was noteworthy that China's views on proliferation have changed dramatically since the 1980s, and its leaders now generally cooperate with the United States and other countries in stopping the leaking of sensitive weapons technology, said Jonathan Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"Did the Chinese make a huge mistake in sharing technology with Pakistan? Sure. Did we make a mistake by looking the other way in the 1980s when Pakistan was developing the bomb? Yes," Wolfsthal said. "But none of that should get in the way of dealing with the real threats we face today. Our priority must be to drain the swamp created by the action of these nuclear suppliers and businessmen over the past 10 years."

Researcher Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.

washingtonpost.com: Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China

 

[Myth_buster_1]

Dr. B. K. Subba Rao
, a former Indian Navy Captain, who
holds a Ph.D. in Nuclear Technology from the I.I.T., has
charged the Department of Atomic Energy, Mumbai with
passing off a thermonuclear device with the yield in
mere kilotonnes as a success while it was in fact a
failure.

 

[sunny_aus]

Where China Fits in the Missile Trade

Where China Fits in the Missile Trade - New York Times


William Safire (column, March 5) notes that China is assisting Syria to obtain a missile production program. However, Mr. Safire's characterization of Congressional legislation as "linking China's missile restraint to M.F.N. status" is off the mark.

A report on China's missile trade issued by the international missile proliferation project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where I am a research associate, notes that the most important long-term cause for proliferation concern is China's tendency to provide technical and manufacturing assistance to would-be third world missile powers, rather than sell complete systems. China helps create new and powerful missile-producing states, which are likely to operate outside limitations on the sales of such systems.

For example, North Korea, having received vital aid from China for its cruise and ballistic missile programs, has become a prime supplier of missile technology to the Middle East, including sales to Syria, Libya, Iran, Egypt and possibly Iraq. Iran has also been a major recipient of Chinese missile largess (including production technology transfer) and has recently signaled its intention to sell third world buyers ballistic and cruise missiles.

Syria now appears next on the list of states whose missile factories were built, wholly or in part, with a helping hand from Beijing. Such second- and third-tier proliferation is particularly troublesome, because of the limited options for its control.

But the United States-China bill the Senate recently voted on makes no mention of Chinese missile technology transfer or production assistance. It would deny extension of most favored nation status if the President determines China has transferred to Syria or Iran "ballistic missiles or launchers for the weapons systems known as the M-9 or M-11." The bill avoids linking the long-term difficulties posed by China's missile practices and most favored nation status.

The Chinese know that transfer of such systems would harm Chinese-American relations; they are content to hold off on these sales and continue to earn hard currency by selling their missile expertise. Thus, even if the President's veto of the bill is overridden, erroneous assumptions about the Chinese missile proliferation problem will still be guiding United States policy. TIMOTHY V. MC CARTHY Monterey, Calif., March 8, 1992

Where China Fits in the Missile Trade - New York Times

 

[maniac]

The biggest threat of nuclear proliferation is caused by the countries which refused to sign the NNPT. India should be responsible for the nuclear crisis in South Asia subcontinent in 1998 and countries like Israel and India has set a very bad example for a non UNSC permanent member to have nuclear weapons.

Also, there is nothing wrong to sell short range ballistic missiles like M9 or M11, it does not violate any international law and has nothing to do with nuclear proliferation.

Personally I don't think China has exported nuclear technology to Pakistan, but if China has really done that, it is for the stability of the region. You must blame India to start the nuclear test first. You cannot use double standard where India can have nukes while Pakistan cannot receive nuclear technology from China.

 

[sunny_aus]

The biggest threat of nuclear proliferation is caused by the countries which refused to sign the NPT. India should be responsible for the nuclear crisis in South Asia subcontinent in 1998 and countries like Israel and India has set a very bad example for a non UNSC permanent member to have nuclear weapons.

Also, there is nothing wrong to sell short range ballistic missiles like M9 or M11, it does not violate any international law and has nothing to do with nuclear proliferation.

Personally I don't think China has exported nuclear technology to Pakistan, but if China has really done that, it is for the stability of the region. You must blame India to start the nuclear test first. You cannot use double standard where India can have nukes while Pakistan cannot receive nuclear technology from China.

Boss, I would like to clear one thing here. the question is not about who would have nuclear weapon and who won’t. Just to clear my view, right and wrong starts from even the first ever nuclear test.

Here the question is about the country who missed no chance of nuclear proliferation and transferred nuclear and missile technology to even country like Syria, Libya also and finally your prime news paper, China Daily, claims that this is the country, china, which doesn’t want nuclear proliferation , while everyone knows that this Indo-US nuclear deal was mainly for clean energy supplies to the world largest democratic country, the home of more than 1.1 billion people???????

I personally don’t believe in two powers, one nuclear powers and second veto powers. I believe in a complete nuclear disarmament of the world with keeping nuclear weapon option in control of United Nations only, to face any type of challenge the earth may face from the outer world. thanks

 

[blain2]

Thank Goodness for the Chinese support to Pakistan. We could not have done it without their help. There is not one nation with nuclear weapons which has not used overt and covert help from others in getting things done. So these holier than thou articles are nothing but bakwas.

 

[IceCold]

So these holier than thou articles are nothing but bakwas.

Nothing better could be said. A typical BS with which the indians like to party with.

 

[kvLin]

Sunny you missed a, it's your dearest Nehru who firstly mongered UN the idea of Nuclear-Test-Ban, and your second dearest Vajpayee put your own test overt.

btw, I guess you ought to give thanks to Canada,if not only US,for your Nuke R&D, or charge them with nuclear proliferation.

whatever, clean your *** before pointing finger at others. dont make this fool of yourself over and over again.

 

[gpit]

What a joke again!

China attempts to destroy the world by signing NPT and CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty).

Indian attempts to save the world by being the first to ignite nuclear device in South Asia, and refusing to sign NPT and CTBT.

 

[muse]

This thread is defamation - unsubstantiated sensationalist claims - This thread does not deserve to continue to exist and if "sunny" has made a mistake, well everyone can make mistakes, but if this thread is an example of sunny's behaviour then he too should be made an example and held accountable.

 

[Goodperson]

What a joke again!

China attempts to destroy the world by signing NPT and CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty).

Indian attempts to save the world by being the first to ignite nuclear device in South Asia, and refusing to sign NPT and CTBT.

Its true that China has signed NPT and CTBT but it has done that by keeping Nuclear weapons it has not taken away its rights to test and make develop weapons.

Which is not the same with India, India would like to keep its options open for testing.