What's new

CHINA: INDIA’S ENEMY NO. 1

Status
Not open for further replies.

mirage2K

FULL MEMBER
Joined
Feb 20, 2011
Messages
1,100
Reaction score
-6
Country
India
Location
United Arab Emirates
In the current situation it would be helpful to recall the background of India- China relationship. This background is based on the account I have given of India-China and Pakistan-US relations in my book on Ayub Khan. Few people seem to know how much pressure was brought upon Ayub Khan by the Americans to align himself with the Indians during the China-India war in 1962. It is also important to remember that China and India were close friends in the 1950s and it was India which converted China into her enemy No. 1.

In the early 1950s friendship with China was the cornerstone of India’s foreign policy. China’s response to Indian gestures of friendship was warm and enthusiastic. This great relationship, dramatized by the much-chanted slogan “Hindi-Cheenee Bhai- Bhai” was a little soured when Nehru discovered at the Bandung conference, the first-ever get-together of Afro-Asian leaders in 1955, that Chou En-Lai, whom he regarded as a protégé, was in fact a formidable rival. It was Chou En-Lai, soldier, poet, and scholar, who outshone all the other luminaries and came to dominate the conference. Nehru, the great pundit, a shining symbol of anti-imperialism, was completely eclipsed.

The relations turned sour when India and China started squabbling over some desolate Himalayan peaks. A summit meeting between Nehru and Chou En-Lai in April 1960 ended in frustration and ill-concealed recrimination. Thereafter, the two sides continued to exchange protest notes, while the Indians tried to establish an improved communications network along the border. The Indians also set up a number of posts and pickets in the western sector running from the Karakoram Pass to Demchock on the Indus river, while lodging protests against Chinese intrusions in the area. However, nothing mush of significance happened, and as a result of Soviet mediation the two countries agreed to enter into formal talks. These talks, too, ended in a stalemate in December 1960.The Indian President, in his address to the budget session of the Indian parliament in February 1961, announced that the Government of India was “alert to the problems of aggression on and incursions into the sovereign territory of the Union.” During the debate on the President’s address in the Upper House Nehru said: “ the major advance of the Chinese forces into Indian territory took place in the summer of 1959. Ever since then there has been no advance anywhere.” The Chines wanted that the border should be delimited and marked but Nehru rejected any suggestion of sitting down with the Chinese to define the border.

The situation was transformed when Ayub Khan suggested to the Chinese in November 1959 that the Pakistan-China should be demarcated to eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding or dispute in the future. Ayub’s move caused a stir not only in India but also among Pakistan’s western allies and in the Soviet Union. Pakistan had introduced a wholly unexpected dimension into the strategic situation in the region.

The India leadership was positively cocky about their military prowess. Had the Indian forces not captured Goa in October 1961? The conquest of Goa “had thrilled his people” Nehru claimed. In January 1962, Nehru, while campaigning for Krishna Menon’s election to the Lok Sabha, announced: “I say that after Menon became Defence Minister our defence forces have become for the first time a very strong and efficient fighting force. I say it with a challenge and with intimate knowledge … that it is for the first time that our defence forces have a new spirit and modern weapons.”

India and China had signed a trade agreement covering the Tibet region in 1954, which was hailed by the two sides as a model for peaceful co-existence in Asia and elsewhere. Six months before the expiry of the agreement the Chines suggested that negotiations should be taken up to renew the agreement. India declined to have any negotiations for a new agreement until China withdrew from the territory claimed by India. Two border incidents, one in Chipchap valley and the other in Galwan valley, resulted in a serious clash between Indian and Chinese forces, but on both occasions the Chines withdrew and this confirmed the Indian belief that in the event of a real showdown “the Chinese would do no more than huff and puff” and if the Indian troops remained resolute the Chinese would “swerve away before the impact.” ( See Neville Maxwell’s India ‘s China war, 1970)

India pressed on with its forward policy in the Western sector to push the Chinese out of the territory claimed by India. It was in the Eastern sector, however, where the Chinese were not in occupation of any territory claimed by India that the India action of setting up a new post north of the McMahon Line invited swift retaliation. Diplomatic exchanges between India and China continued during August and September 1962. In October the Indians announced that a special force had been created to “oust the Chinese.” When Nehru was asked by a reporter what orders had been given to the special force, he replied: “Our instructions are to free our territory.” The reported pressed: “When?” and Nehru replied: “I cannot fix a date. That is entirely for the army.” With that India had given an ultimatum to China. The Chinese troops opened a heavy barrage on Indian leading to a full-scale war in October 1962. Within less than thirty days the Indian forces along the front were encircled and routed and the entire disputed border was captured by the Chinese. Quite unexpectedly, the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November and announced that their frontier guards would withdraw to positions behind the line of actual control that had existed between India and China on 7 November 1959. The Chines decision astonished the world and turned India’s military defeat into a national humiliation.

President Kennedy had urged Ayub Khan during the war to give India an assurance that it would do nothing to create any difficulties for her during her confrontation with China. Ayub declined to do that and, instead, used the opportunity provided by the war to conclude a boundary agreement with China, which caused consternation in India.

The Americans had totally misread the situation. They thought the Chinese ‘invasion’ of India was the opening bid in the communist strategy to overwhelm ‘the free world’. Just when Kennedy had called the Russian bluff over Cuba, the Chinese, it seemed, were trying to enact a similar drama in the Indian subcontinent. For more than a decade the Americans had been trying to wean India away from communist influence. The Chinese action in the Himalayas gave them the opportunity they had been looking for, and they immediately proceeded to extract the maximum advantage, regardless of their commitments to Pakistan.

John Kenneth Galbraith, the US ambassador to India, persuaded Kennedy that India should be given full military assistance including, if necessary, the protection of the nuclear umbrella, and that nothing should be done to encourage India formally to forsake its policy of non-alignment or to settle its differences with Pakistan.. Galbraith made the India- China war his war and expressed great impatience with Pakistan’s insistence that the US should exercise some pressure on Nehru to resolve the Kashmir dispute. He accused Pakistan of trying to blackmail India. There were the Chinese grabbing Indian territory and the Pakistanis wanted the US to ask Nehru to hand over Kashmir to them. Since Dean Rusk, the US secretary of state and Robert McNamara, the defence secretary, were both engrossed in the Cuban crisis, Galbraith could approach Kennedy directly, ignoring the state department and the department of defence.

Walter McConaughy, the Us ambassador in Islamabad met the foreign minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, and gave him a letter from Kennedy addressed to Ayub. He impressed upon Bogra the urgency of giving some sort of assurance to Nehru that he might be able to withdraw his forces from Pakistan’s borders and deploy them against the Chinese. Such a gesture, he said, would soften India’s attitude toward the Kashmir problem and would be greatly appreciated by the US and other Western countries. Bogra told the US ambassador that Pakistan had to contend with two hostile neighnours, India and Afghanistan. There was no reason for her to incur hostility of China. However, if the US would underwrite India’s pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, the American request could be considered. McConaughy told Bogra that Nehru would react strongly against any such proposal. The US ambassador continued to press the urgency of the situation, and suggested that any indication given by Pakistan to India would remain in the strictest confidence. Bogra said that he understood the American argument but the feelings of the people would not allow Pakistan to make a unilateral gesture of friendship to India.

Ayub Khan continued to resist the American pressure. It was Ayub’s determination not to follow the American line which provided the basis for the establishment of friendly relations between China and Pakistan.

CHINA: INDIA
 
To be really honest Nehru was India's first ENEMY, Honestly there have been very few selfless leaders in India. Look at Gandhi the so called Father of the nation he is a politician cunning to the core and seeking personal glory at the nations expense look at what they did to Subhash Chandra Bose.

It was Nehru's ambition to potray himself as a champion of third world countries that cost us the debacle with Chou En-Lai .

We need good and moral leaders not politicians.

1962 was India's fault. To be honest it was a failure of the political class who were daydreaming to be world class leaders when they were only ****** politicians.

Personal glorification and ego clashes coupled with overestimation of capabilities led to 1962
 
Okay, good for you buddy. India is like China's enemy #, err, I don't know. To be honest, China couldn't care less about India. It's some of the Indian posters who are so brainwashed by Indian media that think the Chinese are sitting on round-tables at Tiananmen carefully plotting your demise.
 
In the current situation it would be helpful to recall the background of India- China relationship. This background is based on the account I have given of India-China and Pakistan-US relations in my book on Ayub Khan. Few people seem to know how much pressure was brought upon Ayub Khan by the Americans to align himself with the Indians during the China-India war in 1962. It is also important to remember that China and India were close friends in the 1950s and it was India which converted China into her enemy No. 1.

In the early 1950s friendship with China was the cornerstone of India’s foreign policy. China’s response to Indian gestures of friendship was warm and enthusiastic. This great relationship, dramatized by the much-chanted slogan “Hindi-Cheenee Bhai- Bhai” was a little soured when Nehru discovered at the Bandung conference, the first-ever get-together of Afro-Asian leaders in 1955, that Chou En-Lai, whom he regarded as a protégé, was in fact a formidable rival. It was Chou En-Lai, soldier, poet, and scholar, who outshone all the other luminaries and came to dominate the conference. Nehru, the great pundit, a shining symbol of anti-imperialism, was completely eclipsed.

The relations turned sour when India and China started squabbling over some desolate Himalayan peaks. A summit meeting between Nehru and Chou En-Lai in April 1960 ended in frustration and ill-concealed recrimination. Thereafter, the two sides continued to exchange protest notes, while the Indians tried to establish an improved communications network along the border. The Indians also set up a number of posts and pickets in the western sector running from the Karakoram Pass to Demchock on the Indus river, while lodging protests against Chinese intrusions in the area. However, nothing mush of significance happened, and as a result of Soviet mediation the two countries agreed to enter into formal talks. These talks, too, ended in a stalemate in December 1960.The Indian President, in his address to the budget session of the Indian parliament in February 1961, announced that the Government of India was “alert to the problems of aggression on and incursions into the sovereign territory of the Union.” During the debate on the President’s address in the Upper House Nehru said: “ the major advance of the Chinese forces into Indian territory took place in the summer of 1959. Ever since then there has been no advance anywhere.” The Chines wanted that the border should be delimited and marked but Nehru rejected any suggestion of sitting down with the Chinese to define the border.

The situation was transformed when Ayub Khan suggested to the Chinese in November 1959 that the Pakistan-China should be demarcated to eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding or dispute in the future. Ayub’s move caused a stir not only in India but also among Pakistan’s western allies and in the Soviet Union. Pakistan had introduced a wholly unexpected dimension into the strategic situation in the region.

The India leadership was positively cocky about their military prowess. Had the Indian forces not captured Goa in October 1961? The conquest of Goa “had thrilled his people” Nehru claimed. In January 1962, Nehru, while campaigning for Krishna Menon’s election to the Lok Sabha, announced: “I say that after Menon became Defence Minister our defence forces have become for the first time a very strong and efficient fighting force. I say it with a challenge and with intimate knowledge … that it is for the first time that our defence forces have a new spirit and modern weapons.”

India and China had signed a trade agreement covering the Tibet region in 1954, which was hailed by the two sides as a model for peaceful co-existence in Asia and elsewhere. Six months before the expiry of the agreement the Chines suggested that negotiations should be taken up to renew the agreement. India declined to have any negotiations for a new agreement until China withdrew from the territory claimed by India. Two border incidents, one in Chipchap valley and the other in Galwan valley, resulted in a serious clash between Indian and Chinese forces, but on both occasions the Chines withdrew and this confirmed the Indian belief that in the event of a real showdown “the Chinese would do no more than huff and puff” and if the Indian troops remained resolute the Chinese would “swerve away before the impact.” ( See Neville Maxwell’s India ‘s China war, 1970)

India pressed on with its forward policy in the Western sector to push the Chinese out of the territory claimed by India. It was in the Eastern sector, however, where the Chinese were not in occupation of any territory claimed by India that the India action of setting up a new post north of the McMahon Line invited swift retaliation. Diplomatic exchanges between India and China continued during August and September 1962. In October the Indians announced that a special force had been created to “oust the Chinese.” When Nehru was asked by a reporter what orders had been given to the special force, he replied: “Our instructions are to free our territory.” The reported pressed: “When?” and Nehru replied: “I cannot fix a date. That is entirely for the army.” With that India had given an ultimatum to China. The Chinese troops opened a heavy barrage on Indian leading to a full-scale war in October 1962. Within less than thirty days the Indian forces along the front were encircled and routed and the entire disputed border was captured by the Chinese. Quite unexpectedly, the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November and announced that their frontier guards would withdraw to positions behind the line of actual control that had existed between India and China on 7 November 1959. The Chines decision astonished the world and turned India’s military defeat into a national humiliation.

President Kennedy had urged Ayub Khan during the war to give India an assurance that it would do nothing to create any difficulties for her during her confrontation with China. Ayub declined to do that and, instead, used the opportunity provided by the war to conclude a boundary agreement with China, which caused consternation in India.

The Americans had totally misread the situation. They thought the Chinese ‘invasion’ of India was the opening bid in the communist strategy to overwhelm ‘the free world’. Just when Kennedy had called the Russian bluff over Cuba, the Chinese, it seemed, were trying to enact a similar drama in the Indian subcontinent. For more than a decade the Americans had been trying to wean India away from communist influence. The Chinese action in the Himalayas gave them the opportunity they had been looking for, and they immediately proceeded to extract the maximum advantage, regardless of their commitments to Pakistan.

John Kenneth Galbraith, the US ambassador to India, persuaded Kennedy that India should be given full military assistance including, if necessary, the protection of the nuclear umbrella, and that nothing should be done to encourage India formally to forsake its policy of non-alignment or to settle its differences with Pakistan.. Galbraith made the India- China war his war and expressed great impatience with Pakistan’s insistence that the US should exercise some pressure on Nehru to resolve the Kashmir dispute. He accused Pakistan of trying to blackmail India. There were the Chinese grabbing Indian territory and the Pakistanis wanted the US to ask Nehru to hand over Kashmir to them. Since Dean Rusk, the US secretary of state and Robert McNamara, the defence secretary, were both engrossed in the Cuban crisis, Galbraith could approach Kennedy directly, ignoring the state department and the department of defence.

Walter McConaughy, the Us ambassador in Islamabad met the foreign minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, and gave him a letter from Kennedy addressed to Ayub. He impressed upon Bogra the urgency of giving some sort of assurance to Nehru that he might be able to withdraw his forces from Pakistan’s borders and deploy them against the Chinese. Such a gesture, he said, would soften India’s attitude toward the Kashmir problem and would be greatly appreciated by the US and other Western countries. Bogra told the US ambassador that Pakistan had to contend with two hostile neighnours, India and Afghanistan. There was no reason for her to incur hostility of China. However, if the US would underwrite India’s pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, the American request could be considered. McConaughy told Bogra that Nehru would react strongly against any such proposal. The US ambassador continued to press the urgency of the situation, and suggested that any indication given by Pakistan to India would remain in the strictest confidence. Bogra said that he understood the American argument but the feelings of the people would not allow Pakistan to make a unilateral gesture of friendship to India.

Ayub Khan continued to resist the American pressure. It was Ayub’s determination not to follow the American line which provided the basis for the establishment of friendly relations between China and Pakistan.

CHINA: INDIA

Buddy read up more before posting threads on 1962 coz information available is against us. We dug our own grave in 1962.
 
Usually I never said this (As in almost never), but this some pretty F'up article. This is a much "better" article about the real relationship of China & India.

India and China
Friend, enemy, rival, investor
How can India make its economic relations with China less lopsided?
Jun 30th 2012 | MUMBAI |From the print edition
20120630_ASD001_0.jpg

DEALINGS between India and China are stunted in many ways. Rich cultural links once existed long ago, from the study of eclipses to Buddhist chanting, but hardly anyone remembers that today, laments Amartya Sen, a Nobel-prize-winning economist. After a love-in during the 1950s, China thumped India in a border war in 1962, and the two have continued to growl over their high-altitude frontier since. Indians envy China's economic rise, but console themselves by pointing out that it is no democracy. Aside from stiff displays of fraternity at summits, most recently the G20 bash in Mexico on June 18th-19th, China seems not to think much about India at all. Investment flows are negligible. There are still no direct flights between Beijing or Shanghai and Mumbai, India's commercial hub.

And yet a huge shift has taken place in the make-up of Indian trade. When India began to liberalise its economy in 1991, the West still dominated the world economy, and it was to the West that India turned for trade. China's rise has now changed everything—for India, too. China is now its third-largest trading partner in goods, and the biggest if you include Hong Kong. For China's East Asian neighbours a dominant trade with China is a given, but Indians are still trying to digest the development.
In this section

20120630_ASC490.png


Rising trade with China has been good for India. It mainly imports Chinese capital goods, with firms benefiting from cheap and decent gear. The giant Reliance Group has bought kit for power stations and telecoms networks—partly paid for with competitive Chinese loans. Chinese firms have often strived to win such business. Pan Song of Shanghai Electric, which makes power equipment for Reliance, among others, recounts years of hard slog in India.

But for India the China connection is also disconcerting. For every dollar's worth of exports to China, India imports three, leading to a trade deficit of up to $40 billion in the year to March 2012, or about 2% of GDP (see chart). China accounts for a fifth of India's overall trade deficit with the world, over half if oil is excluded. Given India's balance-of-payments woes—the rupee has fallen by a fifth in the past year—even Chinese businessmen worry that the discrepancy in bilateral trade is unhealthy.

And it may grow larger. For a start, the little manufacturing India has tends to be quite high-end. As Chinese firms shift to more complex forms of production, they will make life harder for Indian firms. Saif Qureishi of Kryfs, which makes the metal cores of transformers used in, for example, power grids, says China has won a third of the Indian transformer market and is giving locals “a bloody nose”.

Meanwhile, India does not produce much that China wants to buy, a hole that British colonial rulers once plugged with exports of Indian opium. Today India's main exports to China are less iniquitous raw materials, mainly minerals and cotton. But their continuing success is not a given. In the past two years the rivers flowing down to Goa on India's west coast have teemed with barges carrying iron ore bound for China. Yet a crackdown in late 2011 on illegal mining has seen volumes fall by a fifth, says Atul Jadhav, of the Goa Barge Owners' Association. In March India briefly banned cotton exports because of fears of shortages.

India is indeed prone to protectionist impulses. No bilateral free-trade agreement exists, and India often flirts with slapping duties on Chinese imports, most recently of power equipment. The Indian sales of Huawei, a telecoms firm, fell by half after it was hit with anti-dumping duties and labelled a security risk. Chinese firms complain of trouble with visas.

More hopefully, India wants to boost its exports to China. At the G20 summit it struck a deal to sell more rice. India would also like leading firms in industries including drugs, carmaking and IT to have better access to China. Most already have a presence, if only for procurement. Yet what is good for Indian multinationals may not generate jobs or foreign exchange for India. Tata Sons, with the biggest China operation, mainly sells Range Rover cars, made in Britain, and IT services, largely employing local Chinese staff.

And so the trade deficit looks likely to stay. Yet China could do more to help finance it, if given the chance. More loans from Chinese banks would be good—so far India has been wary, with only one Chinese bank allowed to have a branch there. More foreign direct investment would help, too. In 2011 Narendra Modi, the chief minister of Gujarat state, visited China to drum up investment. More often, India seems to regard FDI as the gift of Western multinationals alone.

It need not be so. In a dusty bit of Maharashtra state sits one of the first Chinese factories in India, run by Sany, which makes diggers and other construction machines. Richard Deng, its boss, says it has invested $70m and employs 460 locals; if all goes to plan it will double in size before long. T.C.A. Ranganathan, chairman of Exim Bank of India, reckons ten Chinese firms have or are building plants in India, and 100 firms have offices there.

Despite the usual cold sweats foreigners have about India (nightmarish red tape, a cultural gap), Chinese executives agree that more local production will take place. Sun Haiyan of Trina Solar, a solar-equipment firm, says that, as a global company, it has to manufacture locally. Wu Rong of ZTE, a telecoms concern, says it employs mainly locals and is producing more in India. Huawei, its India problems notwithstanding, is building a new research campus in Bangalore. Niu Qingbao, China's consul in Mumbai, says Chinese firms are mustard-keen to invest in infrastructure, if also a little daunted.

Might this be the start of a wave of Chinese investment? India needs outside capital, and expertise in manufacturing and infrastructure. China must invest its surplus funds abroad, ideally not just in government bonds—as mostly happens in America—and ideally in countries that are not about to go belly up, as may happen in Europe. Chinese investment in India is an idea whose time has come, if only the two sides can conquer a legacy of mistrust.

From the print edition: Asia

India and China: Friend, enemy, rival, investor | The Economist
 
China No. 1 hegemon.....Bangladesh No. 1 Bhikaris
 
China is no.1 trade partner of India

You are right and it seems China has real concerns over Indian military developments. India is changing the status quo by developing rapidly. It will be solved diplomatically and there wont be war. Just that some Indians don't like to be intruded upon, its fair, who will like that. And there are sensible people in both the countries to solve it or else it would be MAD(No one will win this war, it will be a blunder for sure on both parts).
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom