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Background
During the fall of 1940, daylight bomber offensive against England was called off. The Battle of Britain was finally over but the battle of Atlantic was not. British supplies continued to suffer losses at the hands of German U-boats and surface vessels. HMS Hood, pride of the British navy was blown up on May 24 1941. Three days later, battleship Bismarck, the jewel of Kriegsmarine was sunk by the Royal Navy. Hitler's "real war" however had not even started yet. He turned his attention towards the East and most of the Luftwaffe units stationed in France, Belgium, Denmark and Holland were transferred to Poland. On the fateful day of June 22 1941, three million men attacked Russia along a 4000 mile front stretching from Leningrad in the North to Kiev in the South.
To support it's Soviet ally, RAF launched "Operation Nonstop" which was dubbed as "Operation Nonsense" by German propaganda. The objective of this operation was to conduct day time and night time precision and area bombing of Germany and occupied territories. RAF was slowly building it's offensive capability to counter which, the Luftwaffe needed more fighters. Goering, the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe, assured his worried officers that the war against Russia will be over by the winter and Luftwaffe units deployed in the East would be transferred West again.
Force in being
Since March and June 1941, the following battleships were lying in the French port of Brest:
These three battleships posed a serious threat to the shipping in the Atlantic, hence the Royal Navy was forced to take the following steps to protect her convoys in the channel.
Battleship Scharnhorst
Thoughts for Redeployment
These three battleships diverted the attention of British from more pressing matters however in the winter of 1941, Hitler wanted to take these battleships out of Brest and into the safety of Norwegian waters. The following developments influenced his thoughts.
1- Danger from the air
The RAF had made 299 attacks on these battleships in Brest harbor. The British during these actions lost 43 airplanes and 247 airmen. The Gneisenau was hit twice and the Scharnhorst once very heavily. Yet both could be fully repaired.
With the increasing intensity of these attacks, it was expected that these battleships might one day be put out of action or even become a total loss. In that event, all the positive effect of this "force in being" would have ended and so would any hope of German navy resuming operations in the Atlantic, based on Brest.
2- Danger of a new front
Air attacks on Brest did not worry Hitler much. His main concern was something else..... A new summer offensive was being prepared against the Soviet Union. Russia was being supplied by the Western powers however, instead of more supplies, Russia demanded from her Anglo-American allies the opening of a new front to assist her in her desperate struggle with Germany.
Hitler suspected that Scandinavia would be the most suitable territory for the allies to open a new front. His suspicion was strengthened when the British launched "Operation Claymore" ---a series of commando raids in Norway. There were reports that Sweden would join the allies and will be given Narvik and some territory around Pechenga as a price. There was a danger of a British-Soviet-Scandinavian offensive against the Northern flank of Germany in the spring of 1942. Hitler regarded this threat as very serious and saw the success of his own coming offensive against the Soviet Union endangered.
Despite all this, neither the navy, nor the Chief of Staff had any enthusiasm for this plan. They thought that the threat was not an acute one considered the risk was too big.
Route for transfer of battleships
For the transfer of German units from Brest to Norway, only two possible routes could be envisaged.
1- Northern route
The first route was around Scotland. For this route, the fleet had to set sail in a North-Westerly heading from Brest, sail around Ireland and finally turn East towards Norway. The RAF was sort of bypassed if the ships were to sail on this route.
Following were the disadvantages in adopting this route:
2- Southern route (Channel dash)
The Second route was to pass straight through the English channel and head towards Norwegian waters.
Following were the disadvantages in adopting this route:
Map of Western Europe for reference
Balance of air power
As most of the Luftwaffe forces were engaged on the Eastern front, only two Jagdgeschwaders(Fighter Wings) were present along the channel coast. A Geschwader was roughly equivalent of a British Wing and consisted of about 90-120 aircraft. The primary task of the Luftwaffe in the West at that time was air defense against RAF raids. Because of such a low strength, the local commanders usually refrained from taking any offensive action against RAF fighter sweeps. Squadrons were scrambled only when there was a good chance of inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy.
The Luftwaffe operated the Messerschmitt ME 109 and Focke Wolfe FW 190. Both aircraft had excellent performance characteristics and were dependable. Some ME 110 double-engine aircraft performed night-fighter duties.Some bomber units were also available. There were numerous airfields all along the coast on which these units were stationed.
ME 109(left), FW 190(Center), ME 110(right)
Compared to the Luftwaffe(In the West), the RAF enjoyed a significant numerical superiority. The British spitfire was a good match for the ME 109 and a good pilot could hold out pretty well against a FW 190. The RAF operated several types of double-engine bombers---Blenheims, Wellingtons and Whirlwinds which posed a serious threat to German surface vessels. Also in the arsenal of RAF and Royal Navy, was the Swordfish torpedo bomber, which, despite being a slow speed bi-plane could inflict a great deal of damage upon enemy battleships.
Spitfire(left), Swordfish(center), Blenheim(right)
The British Spitfire was more of a turn-fighter where as the German fighter planes were energy fighters with better climbing and diving capabilities. The Spitfire excelled at lower altitudes where as the ME 109 flew at it's full potential at high altitudes. The FW 190 performed well at medium and low altitudes. What mattered during dogfights was skill of the pilot, distance from base to the battle area and tactics employed rather than the machine (As spitfires were neither greatly inferior to ME 109s nor it was the other way around)
Organization of Luftwaffe
For the sake of reference, below is an overview of the operational organization of the Luftwaffe;
1- Luftlotte
The operational Luftwaffe was organized in several multi-role Luftlotte(Air fleets). Each Luftlotte was responsible for the territory allotted to it.
Each Luftlotte was made up of a number of fliegerkorps, which were formations of varying sizes and were responsible for all operational matters. Fliegerkorps had several Fliegerdivisions(Jagddivision for fighters), the Fliegerdivisions were operational commands.
2- Geschwader
Geschwader was the same as a Wing in the RAF. Geschwaders were single-role formations with an average strength of 90-120 aircraft. A prefix indicated the role of the geschwader and the type of planes it flew. They were designated as follows:
3- Gruppe
Each Geschwader was divided into three Gruppe. A Gruppe was the basic combat unit having 30-40 aircraft.
4- Staffel(Squadron)
Staffel was smallest operational unit commanded by captain or lieutenant. It had around 12-16 aircraft. A staffel had 3-4 schwarms(Flights).
Fuhrer's HQ-Decision making
"Most of my decisions are daring. Only those deserve luck who accept the hazards of their venture."
In the final conference at Fuhrer's HQ in East Prussia, Hitler had to make a decision regarding the fate of German warships in Brest. He was to be presented with the detailed war plan evolved by Admiralty Staff.
The Navy, if it chose the Southern route(as was expected) would demand a close and continuous escort, with full air cover by a sufficient strength of fighters. Generaloberst Jeschonnek, the "Chief of General Staff of the Luftwaffe", wanted the Navy to consider the Northern route seriously, however he knew that in the conference, the Navy would vote for a Channel dash. Jeschonnek thought that in no circumstances should the Luftwaffe allow itself to be nailed down to such a demand considering the small number of fighters available. Goering did not intend to attend the conference as he knew that he could not say no to the Fuhrer, although he knew that the available fighter strength on the Channel coast was quite inadequate for such a task.
General der Jagdflieger Oberst(Colonel) Adlof Galland, the "General of the fighter arm", was to assume the operational responsibility of the fighters stationed along the English Channel. Galland was a veteran of the Spanish civil war, Polish and French campaigns, and the Battle of Britain. He had to his credit, 94 aerial victories. Recipient of the "Knight's Cross", Galland started the war as a lieutenant in 1939 and had been appointed the "General of the fighter arm" just a few months earlier. Goering sent Jeschonnek and Galland to attend the conference.
Adolf Galland
On January 12 1942, the conference took place at Hitler's Redoubt. Besides Hitler, Keitel, aides-de-camp and stenographers, were Admiral Reader, the Chief in Command of Navy and Vice-Admiral Otto Cilliax and Commodore Rudge, the "commanders of battleships". At the start of the conference, Reader told Hitler that the preparations and plans for Channel dash had been undertaken without any bias. Reader also suggested that he would not recommend this operation. Ciliax then explained the detailed plans. He stressed three points in particular.
Closing the conference, Hitler summarized: Departure by night, the greatest use of surprise factor, passing between Dover and Calais by day. He did not believe that the English would, take lightning decisions.
The conference closed with the words:
"Therefore the Fuhrer decided in agreement with the opinion of the naval C-in-C, that the operation should be prepared as suggested."
Hitler expressly demanded absolute secrecy as an essential prerequisite for a success. A special document in the form of a pledge was drawn up and all those present had to sign.
Otto Cilliax(left) and Hans Jeschonnek(right)
Preparations
A decision was made by the Fuhrer, the Chief in Command of the Kreigsmarine and the Chief of General staff of the Luftwaffe at the Fuhrer's HQ, that the battleships stationed in the port of Brest must be evacuated.
The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe then started to make all the necessary preparations for that undertaking. By a special "order of the Fuhrer" Galland was made responsible for the preparation and execution of fighter protection for this mission. The official codename for this mission was Operation Thunderbolt. The navy used the code word "Cerberus" in order to disguise their preparations for the common task.
The three warships were to secretly leave the port of Brest at night. Escorted by other naval vessels, they were expected to be between Cherbourg and Le Harve at dawn. Crossing the strait of Dover by day, under the air umbrella of Luftwaffe fighters, the flotilla will continue sailing till it reaches the safety of German waters.
Secrecy and bluff
The preparations began immediately under strictest secrecy. No one besides those present at the conference, was allowed to be taken into confidence without special permission from the C-in-C of the navy and the air force. Preparations for Operation Thunderbolt were made under the pretense of an imminent large-scale offensive against England. The navy pretended that the units would soon be sailing into the Atlantic, possibly even to the Pacific! Thus the purpose of all the preparations was camouflaged from the British secret service in occupied France. Misleading radio messages were also sent---for the consumption of British officials.
The channel through which the British Admiralty now received intelligence of the moves of destroyers, activities in minefields and the moves of fighter units were manifold.
Command, Control and Communications
This was a combined operation of navy and airforce. It's technical coordination was planned in such a way that the Luftwaffe was not under the navy but had to rely on teamwork. A lot depended on communications. The airfields of each sector were linked up with the respective head quarters by a multitude of cross-connections.
The Naval High Command gave the basic instructions for operations. The operative command fell on the Naval Command Groups in whose sector the ships were at the time; The sector between Brest and Sheldt Estuary was under the West Naval Command Group with HQ in Paris. The sector from Sheldt upto the home ports was under the Northern Naval Command Group with HQ in Kiel.
Vice Admiral Cilliax, came under the command of these Naval Command Groups for the duration of operation. He assumed the role of tactical commander from his flagship at the sea. The Scharnhorst was to be his flagship. The commanders of participating ships were Captain Hoffmann (Scharnhorst), Captain Fein (Gneisenau), and Captain Brinkmann (Prinz Eugen).
For the best chance of teamwork, liaison officers were exchanged between the naval centers of command and the airforce. "Fighter command afloat" was the most important liaison of Galland with the naval C-in-C. Fighter command Afloat was headed by Oberst Ibel. With him were with first and second fighter officers, along with Oberst Elle, who was in charge of necessary wireless personnel. This staff was to be on board the flagship during the operation. In the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen there were a pilot officer and a wireless operator.
Galland maintained communications with the C-in-C of the flotilla and the leader of Fighter Command Afloat via an ultra-short wave and a long radio line. A speed code was used on this line and all intelligence was given according to a fighter signal chart. The leader of Fighter Command Afloat was in direct communication with the fighter liaison officers on the other two ships by ultra-short wave.
Navigation and mine-sweeping
Of the decisive importance to the navy were the preparations for navigation and mine-sweeping. The course of the naval units through the Channel was fixed not too close to the French coast, because of a greater safety from ground mines and the ability to reach greater speed in deep waters, it was decided to plot the course roughly in the middle of the Channel, with a depth of not less than 15 fathoms (~90 ft). The ships were to sail with an average speed of 26 knots. To aid navigation, the route was stalked out by marking boats.
Eighty mine-sweepers cleared 98 anchor mines and 21 ground mines on route. Three mine barriers were detected and removed. During this operation, one mine-sweeper and one destroyer were lost. All these operations had to be performed under absolute secrecy and could therefore only be carried out by night.
Trial Runs
The ships made several trail runs. These trial runs were essential for testing engines, radio communications, and guns. Naturally they were reduced to a minimum. Staffs and Liaisons were working into shape. Between January 22 and February 10,1942, on eight different days, single trial runs were made. During these eight days, the Luftwaffe flew 450 sorties providing escort for the trials. Several British planes were shot down. The RAF came almost every night to raid Brest, but the German warships were not damaged.
Strength of Luftwaffe
The English Channel was the area of responsibility of Luftlotte 3(Air fleet 3) which was commanded by Generalfeldmarshal Hugo Sperrle. The fighters of Luftlotte 3 were commnanded by Oberst Galland.
The two remaining Jagdgeschwaders(Fighter Wings) on the Channel coast, the 2nd (JG2) and 26th (JG26), were initially available. Strength of each was increased to 90 serviceable aircraft---ME 109s and FW 190s. A further 12 ME 109s were transferred from the Fighter Training School of Paris to Le Harve for this operation. The 1st Fighter Wing (1JG) stationed in North-West Germany was also released for this operation. 1JG had 60 ME 109s, it's task was to escort the flotilla next morning on it's way through the German Bight once it had succeeded in breaking through the Channel. At best, therefore, the Luftwaffe had to count temporarily on 252 aircraft. In addition to those, 30 ME 110s were available for early morning and evening periods.
KG2 had 30 DO-217 bombers available. Some reconnaissance aircraft were also available. For electronic warfare, two modified He-111 bombers were present.
Plan for air-cover
The details of the plan were worked out by Oberst Koller who was Sperrle's Chief of the Staff.
After the experience gathered during the eight days of trial, Adolf Galland drew up a rigid battle order: "Rules for the execution of protective escorts to merchant convoys and naval flotillas."
Following were the key features of the escort plan for fighter squadrons, who were to fly a protective cover over the fleet:
Map for reference. Red rings indicate Luftwaffe airfields
As the ships were expected to be between Cherbourg and Le Harve at dawn, the fighter units were supposed to be ready for action in the sector Abbeville-Lille-Calais. The HQ for this sector was at Le Touquet. If for one reason or another the progress of the battleships was delayed, their position at dawn might well be much further West. For this emergency, a second sector of bases had to be established in the area Le Harve-Caen-Cherbourg with Headquarters at Caen. A third sector lay between Scheldt, the Rhine, and the Zuider Zee, with it's Headquarters at Schiphol. A fourth sector reached from Jever to Wilhelmshaven and had it's Headquarters at Jever.
If everything went according to plan the fighters returning from action after 15:00 hours would land in the third sector, reservice, and take off again as soon as possible to rejoin the ships. Fighters stationed on the airbases in the fourth sector would cover the ships on the following day, when they reached the German Bight.
Deception against radar
The technical chief of communication and intelligence of the Luftwaffe, General Martini, was preparing new and secret means of interference and deception against enemy's radar system. He had outfitted two He-111 bombers with special instruments inorder to conduct electronic warfare against the British. The effectiveness of these were still unknown. The actual importance of such a deception and confusion of the enemy's command could not yet be judged.
The X Day
In fixing X Day (The day of departure from Brest), many factors had to be taken into account. The operation was specified as urgent. A later date than February was out of question because the short nights would have robbed the navy of the surprise element. Until the middle of February darkness would last from 20:30 to 8:30 hours. On February 15, there would be a new moon, which meant that there would be complete darkness, giving the greatest security for night action. Between the seventh and fifteenth the water and tide conditions were most favourable for operation. The time between these dates was therefore considered. The C-in-C of the Navy Command Group West was responsible for fixing the date.
The weather played an important if not the decisive part. Because of the prevailing western weather conditions over the channel, German metrologists needed data from the far Atlantic which was unavailible. They were dependent on the reports brought back by long-distance recconniassance planes. Three U-Boats were now stationed in the Eastern Atlantic and the important weather area around Ireland, to observe conditions. On February 7th, weather became very uncertain, with a depression over the continent. The metrologists gave the following weather forecast for February 12:
"A depression has formed south of Ireland. Strong winds with the barometer falling north of scotland make it highly possible that the depression will travel soth with a speed of 25mph and will reach the Eastern aproaches of Channel February 12, between six and ten'O clock. From there it will move further south. Therefore the weather in the Channel will detoriate rapidly during the morning, and after crossing the front (duration two-three hours) it will clear up again."
This meant that during the morning, the weather over the English bases would be favourable however over the German bases, it would not be good. In the afternoon German bases, too, should have better weather.
Despite the rather unfavourable forecast General-Admiral Saalwachter, at that time C-in-C of Navy Group Command,West, decided on February 11,1942, as the date on which the ships were to leave port on Operation Thunderbolt-Ceberus at 20:00 hours. This was after a last operational conference held at Palais Luxembourg in Paris on the same day.
From Paris, General Galland went to the Pas de Calais, where he assembled the chiefs of all flying units, right down to the squadron leaders, for a briefing, which took place during the night. Where he revealed the purpose and aim of all the secret preparations that had fully occupied them during the past weeks. On return to their units they were to open the detailed orders for action which he had previously handed them in sealed envelopes.
British preparations
On the night of February 11-12, the RAF was also in a state of alert. The Vice-Admiral commanding of Dover station had recieved additional swordfish torpedo planes and MTBs(Motorized torpedo boats). During the previous days British aircraft dropped 1100 magnetic mines between the Frisian islands and Brest.
Therefore it cannot be said that the British Command was completely taken by surprise. The preparations made at the doorstep of the British house, could not have possibly gone unnoticed. The counter-measures taken by the British point out that they envisaged the possibility of a Channel dash by the German warships. The British expected the German fleet to cross the narrow Dover-Calais strait during the night---and made preparations accordingly. However, the German plan dictated the fleet to leave the port of Brest during the darkness and cross the Dover-Calais strait during daylight!
Channel Dash
Departure
With the fall of darkness on the evening of February 11, seven German destroyers assembled at the harbour entrance of Brest. These were to form a safety belt around the capital ships. At 20:00 hours as arranged, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen left their berths. But they did not get very far. Air-raid warning alarm! The ships returned to their berths and tied up again. A smoke screen was thrown over the harbour. Flak guns of all calibers barked. Searchlights traversed the sky. About 20 to 25 British bombers made a routine raid from 6000 to 9000 feet. The men of ships' AA guns were at action stations and joined the fireworks which greeted the intruders. Bombs whistled and exploded in the harbour area. Luckily there was no damage to the ships. After the All Clear the ships were put to the sea. The time was 22:00 hours. Two hours delay!
A few minutes before 23:00 hours the capital ships left the harbour of Brest. The flotilla started on it's night journey. Operation Thunderbolt-Cerberus had begun.
Once the warships had left port two questions arose:
1- Would the unit succeed in making up the time lost through air raid?
2- Had the attacking British bombers discovered that the expected German operation was about to begin?
It was planned that the fleet should keep an average speed of 26 knots. In the beginning, with favorable tides, they were actually making 30 knots. After rounding Ushant to the West of Brittany the formation set course for Channel at 00:13 o'clock. Complete radio silence was observed, because of which, reports of the position of formation came only from German radar stations along the French coast. The radar stations picked up warships at intervals.
As for any possible delay in the arrival of ships at the preplanned location at dawn, the Luftwaffe had made allowances in it's plan for such a contingency. After the loss of two precious hours, Galland was fairly certain that at dawn, he would have to transfer the fighter forces standing by from Pas De Calais to Le Harve-Caen-Cherbourg sector, however such a decision would have meant an additional strain on everyone concerned. However each new report showed that the warships were catching up on their initial delay. Finally it was clear that with the first light, the warships would be in their pre-arranged position.
At their present location, the ships were out of the reach for the British coastal radar. The answer to the second question---of a possible discovery by the English of the preparations to leave port..... was satisfying for the Germans because nothing had stirred on the British side.
Before Dawn
At 6:30 hours decks were cleared for action on board the battleships, which were travelling at high speed through the darkness towards the Channel. Off Cherbourg, a flotilla of torpedo boats joined the unit to strengthen the outer safety belt, which so far had only been formed by destroyers. The whole unit now consisted of seven destroyers and eight to fifteen torpedo boats besides the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen. The torpedo boats were relieved from sector to sector.
The arrival of fighter-escorts
The weather was cloudy with a 1500-foot ceiling and relatively good visibility. At 8:14 hours the first night fighters(ME 110s) took off in complete darkness. They were over the fleet at 8:50 hours.
The air umbrella, a small one of course, was opened. The night fighters were flying only a few feet above the water in order not to be detected by the English radar stations. All communications were silenced. At 8:54 hours the dawn broke. The units were off to Cotentin peninsula.
The naval security forces discovered a previously unnoticed mine field off Dieppe only a few hours before ships were due. By an all-out effort of four mine-sweepers a path was swiftly cleared. Nevertheless the decision to pass through this barely cleared path was a very risky one. But there was no alternative except turning back and calling the whole operation off. The unit passed through without incident.
The night fighters flying on the port side of the warships, the side towards the enemy, had been joined in the meantime by the day fighters. The operation ran according to plan. Discovery by the enemy had to be avoided as long as possible. Luckily the British had not discovered them yet.
In order to avoid detection, the commanders who briefed their pilots stressed to the utmost orders:"fly at lowest possible level and maintain radio silence". Unlike the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe was notorious for it's lack of radio discipline, but during the course of this operation, the fighter pilots equaled the seamen in this regard. Only later, in the afternoon, when the naval formation was detected and under heavy British air attacks did the well-known radio chaos of the Luftwaffe broke out again.
In addition to the escorting fighters flying in relays, the Luftwaffe had in reserve for immediate action about 25 to 30 aircraft standing by on different bases. The pilots sat in their machines, belts fastened, and aircraft ready to take off.
The night fighters broke off at about 11:00 hours. They landed on the airfields in Holland ready to resume the escort in the evening. At this hour the naval units were just off the mouth of Somme---only 40 miles from the narrowest point of the Channel between Dover and Calais. For two hours in full daylight German warships had been passing along the English coast, following a route which in the history of British sea supremacy no enemy has dared to take since the seventeenth century. The silence was almost sinister.
Detection
At 11:00 hours the following radio message was intercepted by the German listening service:
"A large German naval formation consisting of three capital ships and about 20 warships steaming at high speed towards the strait of Dover, present position about 50 miles off the mouth of Somme."
The secret was out!
After this radio interception, the decision of giving the cue to drop all attempts at disguising the German operation lay with Galland. He refrained from doing so. The fact that the first countermeasures were not taken by the British for at least another hour proved the wisdom of his decision.
It appeared that the British gave no credence to the report; they simply sent another reconnaissance plane and ordered full alert. An hour later that plane brought the confirmation of the first report which had been regarded as impossible. The British Admiralty received this report no earlier than 12:25!
By then the German warships had nearly reached the narrowest point of the Channel. The cloud ceiling had descended to 600 to 900 feet. It was raining slightly, but the English coast was faintly visible. Off Boulogne an additional 15 torpedo boats joined the formation, screening it on enemy's side. So far the Germans had an incredible luck. If that discovery had happened earlier, this would have been the climax of the battle. The fighter crews would have been exhausted. Now the pilots were looking forward with confidence to the air battle which was bound to start shortly.
Electronic interference
In creating confusion among the ranks of the enemy, the German high-frequency experts took their share. They had created a strong interference with the British radar stations by a series of installations and other methods. They had also directed interference transmissions against the British fighter intercoms. Bomber planes outfitted with special instruments had simulated radar signals which were taken by the British as large bomber formations inbound for England---The RAF actually scrambled it's fighters against non-existent bomber formations. This confusion continued long after the warships had been located and when practical deception was no longer possible.
Initial attacks by RAF and Royal Navy
The first enemy action was recorded at 13:16 hours, British coastal artillery fired on the Prinz Eugen. Simultaneously a scrap started between British and German MTBs. The German destroyer Hermann Schomman interfered and closed the action. Scharnhorst reported being under artillery fire from 300 to 400 yards to port.
The first air encounter took place at 13:34 hours. German fighters were now operating from closest range to their bases. Therefore the fighter cover could be increased. In the first attack, six swordfish torpedo planes escorted by Spitfires made a low-level attack. The fighter radio control on board the ships was first to break silence in order to direct the fighters according to sight. Part of the air cover engaged with the spitfires in dogfight while the remaining fighters moved in position to attack the swordfish planes. The torpedo attack of Swordfish was foiled by cooperative action of ships and fighters. All six swordfish were shot down.
Thus the English attack performed with death defying courage was repulsed.
Galland gave the cue word "Open Visor". This canceled the order for radio silence and regulations for low-level flying. Fighter cover was now graded at different altitudes.
The journey continues
At 15:29 the flagship Scharnhorst hit a mine. It was heavily shaken. The lights failed and the wireless went dead. She left a trail of oil behind her. Now she was standing still. The leading ship of the destroyers, the Z-29, was ordered to take abroad the commander and the fighter liaison. At the same time the weather was deteriorating rapidly (Cloud ceiling 500 to 600 feet, visibility one-half to one mile, rain). The naval formation proceeded with Prinz Eugen and Gneisenau as well as the bulk of destroyers and MTBs. The enemy concentrated on Scharnhorst and Z-29.
Vice Admiral Ciliax and fighter liaison were finally on board the destroyer Z-29.
At 15:50 hours an MTB approached near Prinz Eugen and fired a torpedo. Prinz Eugen changed course and the torpedo detonated 100 yards aft. With the stopping of the Scharnhorst the naval formation split up. Prinz Eugen and Gneisenau proceeded with the escorts, while Scharnhorst stayed behind. Scharnorst was totally unable to move and it was decided to tow her to the nearest Dutch port.
Because of bad visibility, destroyer Z-29 lost contact with the formation and was now alone.
At 15:55 hours, twin-engined bombers headed for Z-29---they were attacked and pursued by a schwarm of German fighters. They vanished from sight. Five minutes later, a bomber attacked Scharnhorst and bombs fell 80 to 100 yards to port. Moments later, three bombers attacked Z-29 but were beaten off by the ship's AA.
At 6:14 hours, several Blenheim Mark IVs attacked Gneisenau from starboard but failed to score any hit. Two Blenheims attacked Prinz Eugen, one of them was shot down by AA fire. A few minutes later, Gneisennau reported gunfire to port from English destroyer units from Harwich.
At 6:30, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were attacked by swordfish torpedo-carrying planes. The ships performed evasive action by changing course. Two bombers approached Z-29 from astern but were beaten off by AA fire.
Meanwhile the weather grew worse. The cloud ceiling dropped to 450 feet. The low clouds offered a welcome cover for the attacking bombers. Most of the ensuing combats up in the air could not be observed from the warships.
Some minutes later, Gneisnenau gives orders to the destroyers to attack enemy destroyers. She herself opened fire with medium and heavy guns. Prinz Eugen also opened fire at enemy destroyers with heavy guns. British destroyer HMS Worcester was hit and set on fire. (HMS Worcester managed to limp back to English port)
While all the above mentioned events were taking place, an air battle raged up in the skies---Dogfights and bomber intercepts. Several British fighters and bombers were shot down. In the meantime German bombers also went in action and attacked enemy destroyers. German reconnaissance aircraft were ordered to keep an eye on the British Home Fleet.
Because of low clouds and bad visibility, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe could only fly singly or in small formations. The flotilla was far drawn out. In the incidents of friendly fire, some German fighters and bombers attacked their own naval units. Except a few moments, a great chaos reigned over the battle area until nightfall.
At 17:00 hours, a German DO-217 bomber dropped two bombs on the destroyer Hermann Schomann in an incident of friendly fire.
A wave of British Hampden bombers attacked the German naval units. Gneisenau shot down one aircraft, parts of which floated nearby. Ten minutes later, another wave of bombers attacked without making any impression. Prinz Eugen, Gneisenau and Z-29 were also attacked by British bombers without any success.
It was now evening. At 17:42, as the attacks of RAF intensified, Ciliax requested renewed and stronger fighter protection. Night fighters took off from Dutch airfields and joined the action.
At 17:55, The German fighters pursued a bomber flying straight over Prinz Eugen and shot him down in flames. A British Hampden was shot down by AA fire from destroyer Z-29.
At 18:06, a low flying swordfish, flying through AA barrage dropped a surface running torpedo against Gneisenau, the ship avoided it by changing course. Further attacks were made on Prinz Eugen.
At 18:20 hours, Prinz Eugen sent a message to Gneisennau: " Hanging on to you 5260 yards astern."
After a short lull in activities, at 18:31, Gneisenau had to temporarily reduce revolutions on her starboard shaft for technical reasons. This caused her to fall back in speed and position.
In Pas de Calais (No I) take off and landing were still unaffected. The fighters which took off from Pas de Calais and had completed their escort mission for 30 minutes were now 120 miles away from their base, their return to their starting base was out of question. The fighters therefore had to land on Dutch territory (No II). But there the weather was at it's worst. Over large stretches clouds were at ground level. It was no easy decision to send fighters there into the bad-weather zone to land, but there was no alternative. Despite such weather, most of the pilots landed safely. There were quite a few emergency landings outside the air fields, some of which ended in crashes.
On their own initiative, without waiting for orders, a few determined pilots took off again with small formations before darkness fell after rapid servicing and refueling. They were conscious that everything was at stake here. No scruples about safety existed on that day. The fighter pilots had done more than their duty.
Meanwhile, Commander of the battleships, Otto Cilliax had renewed misfortunes. Since his flagship had received damage from the mine he had been aboard the destroyer Z-29 which had now developed engine trouble. Again Cilliax and fighter liaison had to be transferred. The destroyer Hermann Schomman was ordered to stand by. Under continuous attacks by RAF and in a rough sea the transfer was effected by means of a cutter. The Scharnhorst which had been brought under way again, went off at full speed, trying to catch up with the flotilla. The Scharnhorst was now able to continue toward her destination.
The day ends
Toward 19:00 hours it was getting dark. Day and night fighters were battling with the last Wellington bombers which attacked incessantly and with tenacity. All three capital ships reported kills by AA fire. At 19:35 hours total darkness reigned. Fighter action was ended for the day. The Luftwaffe action station was no transferred to Jever on the German Bight.
During the night the RAF was very active. Besides intensive air reconnaissance they were mainly busy with mine laying operations, in order to mine the route right upto the German Bight and the Elbe Estuary. German night-fighters kept in contact with the enemy, but there were no major actions.
Shortly after 21:00 hours the Gneisenau shook under an explosion. All engines stopped. She had hit a mine! Yet the damage was slight. After a short time she was under way again making 25 knots. One and a half hour later the Scharnhorst hit a mine, luckily no severe damage occurred and she was able to continue her journey.
Still during darkness the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen reached the mouth of Elbe and cast anchor. The German Bight was out of the range of British fighters. This area was relatively safe because since 1939, the RAF bombers had stopped venturing into this area during daytime as it was well covered with radar stations.
Success of Operation thunderbolt-Cerberus
Next morning, February 13, the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen continued their journey to Keil in daylight through the Kaiser-Wilhelm canal. At dawn, Cilliax and fighter liaison boarded the Scharnhorst when the ship was in the estuary of the Weser. At 10:30 hours she arrived together with Hermann Schomman at Wilhelmshaven.
The German high command made the following statement:
" During the air and sea battle in the Channel area on February 12, one English destroyer was hit and set on fire. The full complement of a German Naval force under the command of Vice-Admiral Cilliax, after breaking through the Channel between Calais and Dover, reached their ports of destination, sustaining the loss of only one E-boat. Forty nine British aircraft were shot down. Generalfeldmarshal Sperre's fighter units under the command of General Coeler(Bomber and recconniassance) and Oberst Galland(fighter and night-fighter) especially distinguished themselves."
The above statement was reserved as the ships had not yet reached their destination port in Norway, hence the operation at that time could not be regarded as complete.
Shortly after the Scharnhorst had anchored at Wilhelmshaven there was a conference on board the flagship. Present were the commanders of navy and airforce who had taken part in the combined operation. The findings were:
After the necessary repairs, preparations and discussions, the naval units reformed and sailed in a northerly direction. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau remained in German ports for the time being because of the damage sustained. Their place was taken by two older cruisers. Once again, Adolf Galland provided the air cover to these ships as they traveled North. After further heavy engagements with the RAF, the ships sailed unscathed into the fjords. The fjords offered natural cover and were protected with flak batteries. The operation finally came to it's conclusion.
Aftermath
Churchill blamed this failure on the fact that the British Command, at that time, had been forced to send a large number of it's torpedo bombers to Egypt. Nevertheless the forces employed by the British were considerable. According to Vice-Admiral R. de Ballot: " About 250 aircraft of the fleet Air Arm, Coastal Command, Bomber Command, and the Strategic Bomber Command, assisted and escorted by about 15 fighter squadrons, took part in the attack. Only 39 aircraft managed to launch attacks on the German Naval formation, but without success."
Churchill gave this event considerable space in his history of World War II. He admitted that the British public was "shocked by the news." In order to calm down the heated minds an official inquiry was held which came to the amazing conclusion that after all the Channel dash "had been of extreme advantage to us".
The factor which contributed to the German success was that, when faced with surprise the British had shown a little ability to improvised. Hitler in his planning judged the suspected British reaction.
It was a military sensation of the first order considering that this operation was accomplished within the range of Home Fleet and in an operational area that is one of the narrowest and most difficult natural straits in the world. Moreover, despite the fact that the bulk of Luftwaffe was engaged in Russia at that time, it managed to maintain a decisive superiority over the RAF.
Fate of the capital ships
On the night of 26–27 February, the RAF launched a heavy air raid on Gneisennau which was docked at Keil. The ship was hit by a single bomb in her forecastle that penetrated the armored deck and exploded.Red-hot bomb fragments ignited propellant charges in the forward turret and caused a tremendous explosion. The turret was thrown off its mount and the entire bow section was burned out. The crew partially flooded the magazine to prevent a more catastrophic explosion. The blast killed 112 men and wounded 21 others.
Repairs were planned and carried out. By early 1943 the ship was repaired. It remained in German port till the end of the war.
The Sharnhorst was sunk by the Royal Navy in the battle of the North Cape in December 1943.
Prinz Eugen survived the war.
During the fall of 1940, daylight bomber offensive against England was called off. The Battle of Britain was finally over but the battle of Atlantic was not. British supplies continued to suffer losses at the hands of German U-boats and surface vessels. HMS Hood, pride of the British navy was blown up on May 24 1941. Three days later, battleship Bismarck, the jewel of Kriegsmarine was sunk by the Royal Navy. Hitler's "real war" however had not even started yet. He turned his attention towards the East and most of the Luftwaffe units stationed in France, Belgium, Denmark and Holland were transferred to Poland. On the fateful day of June 22 1941, three million men attacked Russia along a 4000 mile front stretching from Leningrad in the North to Kiev in the South.
To support it's Soviet ally, RAF launched "Operation Nonstop" which was dubbed as "Operation Nonsense" by German propaganda. The objective of this operation was to conduct day time and night time precision and area bombing of Germany and occupied territories. RAF was slowly building it's offensive capability to counter which, the Luftwaffe needed more fighters. Goering, the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe, assured his worried officers that the war against Russia will be over by the winter and Luftwaffe units deployed in the East would be transferred West again.
Force in being
Since March and June 1941, the following battleships were lying in the French port of Brest:
- Battlecruiser Gneisenau (26,000 tons)
- Battlecruiser Scharnhorst (26,000 tons)
- Cruiser Prinz Eugen (10,000 tons)
These three battleships posed a serious threat to the shipping in the Atlantic, hence the Royal Navy was forced to take the following steps to protect her convoys in the channel.
- Keep heavy sea forces on alert.
- Suspend the use of Force H and keep it in the strait of Gibraltar. (The task of Force H was to operate against German and Italian supply ships in the Mediterranean. Those supply ships were vital for Rommel's Afrika korps which was fighting the British Commonwealth forces in North Africa.)
- Conduct bomber raids on these ships.
Battleship Scharnhorst
Thoughts for Redeployment
These three battleships diverted the attention of British from more pressing matters however in the winter of 1941, Hitler wanted to take these battleships out of Brest and into the safety of Norwegian waters. The following developments influenced his thoughts.
1- Danger from the air
The RAF had made 299 attacks on these battleships in Brest harbor. The British during these actions lost 43 airplanes and 247 airmen. The Gneisenau was hit twice and the Scharnhorst once very heavily. Yet both could be fully repaired.
With the increasing intensity of these attacks, it was expected that these battleships might one day be put out of action or even become a total loss. In that event, all the positive effect of this "force in being" would have ended and so would any hope of German navy resuming operations in the Atlantic, based on Brest.
2- Danger of a new front
Air attacks on Brest did not worry Hitler much. His main concern was something else..... A new summer offensive was being prepared against the Soviet Union. Russia was being supplied by the Western powers however, instead of more supplies, Russia demanded from her Anglo-American allies the opening of a new front to assist her in her desperate struggle with Germany.
Hitler suspected that Scandinavia would be the most suitable territory for the allies to open a new front. His suspicion was strengthened when the British launched "Operation Claymore" ---a series of commando raids in Norway. There were reports that Sweden would join the allies and will be given Narvik and some territory around Pechenga as a price. There was a danger of a British-Soviet-Scandinavian offensive against the Northern flank of Germany in the spring of 1942. Hitler regarded this threat as very serious and saw the success of his own coming offensive against the Soviet Union endangered.
Despite all this, neither the navy, nor the Chief of Staff had any enthusiasm for this plan. They thought that the threat was not an acute one considered the risk was too big.
Route for transfer of battleships
For the transfer of German units from Brest to Norway, only two possible routes could be envisaged.
1- Northern route
The first route was around Scotland. For this route, the fleet had to set sail in a North-Westerly heading from Brest, sail around Ireland and finally turn East towards Norway. The RAF was sort of bypassed if the ships were to sail on this route.
Following were the disadvantages in adopting this route:
- For the most part of it's journey, the fleet would have no air cover as the distance involved was too great as compared to the range of Luftwaffe fighters.
- An encounter with the British home fleet stationed at Scapa Flow would have been unavoidable.
2- Southern route (Channel dash)
The Second route was to pass straight through the English channel and head towards Norwegian waters.
Following were the disadvantages in adopting this route:
- The whole RAF was bound to be attracted.
- At the Calais Dover strait, the English channel was very narrow hence the fleet would be most vulnerable when passing through the strait of Dover. British coastal artillery also posed a threat to the fleet as it passed through the strait.
Map of Western Europe for reference
Balance of air power
As most of the Luftwaffe forces were engaged on the Eastern front, only two Jagdgeschwaders(Fighter Wings) were present along the channel coast. A Geschwader was roughly equivalent of a British Wing and consisted of about 90-120 aircraft. The primary task of the Luftwaffe in the West at that time was air defense against RAF raids. Because of such a low strength, the local commanders usually refrained from taking any offensive action against RAF fighter sweeps. Squadrons were scrambled only when there was a good chance of inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy.
The Luftwaffe operated the Messerschmitt ME 109 and Focke Wolfe FW 190. Both aircraft had excellent performance characteristics and were dependable. Some ME 110 double-engine aircraft performed night-fighter duties.Some bomber units were also available. There were numerous airfields all along the coast on which these units were stationed.
ME 109(left), FW 190(Center), ME 110(right)
Spitfire(left), Swordfish(center), Blenheim(right)
The British Spitfire was more of a turn-fighter where as the German fighter planes were energy fighters with better climbing and diving capabilities. The Spitfire excelled at lower altitudes where as the ME 109 flew at it's full potential at high altitudes. The FW 190 performed well at medium and low altitudes. What mattered during dogfights was skill of the pilot, distance from base to the battle area and tactics employed rather than the machine (As spitfires were neither greatly inferior to ME 109s nor it was the other way around)
Organization of Luftwaffe
For the sake of reference, below is an overview of the operational organization of the Luftwaffe;
1- Luftlotte
The operational Luftwaffe was organized in several multi-role Luftlotte(Air fleets). Each Luftlotte was responsible for the territory allotted to it.
Each Luftlotte was made up of a number of fliegerkorps, which were formations of varying sizes and were responsible for all operational matters. Fliegerkorps had several Fliegerdivisions(Jagddivision for fighters), the Fliegerdivisions were operational commands.
2- Geschwader
Geschwader was the same as a Wing in the RAF. Geschwaders were single-role formations with an average strength of 90-120 aircraft. A prefix indicated the role of the geschwader and the type of planes it flew. They were designated as follows:
- Jagdgeschwader (JG): single-engine fighter
- Natchtjagdgeschwader (NJG): night-fighter
- Kampfgeschwader (KG): level bomber
- Sturzkampfgeschwader (StG): dive-bomber
- Kampfschulegeschwader (KSG): bomber training
- Zertorergeschwader (ZG): destroyer(ground attack)
- Schnellkampfgeschwader (SKG): fast-bomber
- Lehrgeschwader (LG): advanced-training
- Transportgeschwader (TG): transport
- Luftlandgeschwader (LLG): air-landing(glider)
3- Gruppe
Each Geschwader was divided into three Gruppe. A Gruppe was the basic combat unit having 30-40 aircraft.
4- Staffel(Squadron)
Staffel was smallest operational unit commanded by captain or lieutenant. It had around 12-16 aircraft. A staffel had 3-4 schwarms(Flights).
Fuhrer's HQ-Decision making
"Most of my decisions are daring. Only those deserve luck who accept the hazards of their venture."
- Adolf Hitler
In the final conference at Fuhrer's HQ in East Prussia, Hitler had to make a decision regarding the fate of German warships in Brest. He was to be presented with the detailed war plan evolved by Admiralty Staff.
The Navy, if it chose the Southern route(as was expected) would demand a close and continuous escort, with full air cover by a sufficient strength of fighters. Generaloberst Jeschonnek, the "Chief of General Staff of the Luftwaffe", wanted the Navy to consider the Northern route seriously, however he knew that in the conference, the Navy would vote for a Channel dash. Jeschonnek thought that in no circumstances should the Luftwaffe allow itself to be nailed down to such a demand considering the small number of fighters available. Goering did not intend to attend the conference as he knew that he could not say no to the Fuhrer, although he knew that the available fighter strength on the Channel coast was quite inadequate for such a task.
General der Jagdflieger Oberst(Colonel) Adlof Galland, the "General of the fighter arm", was to assume the operational responsibility of the fighters stationed along the English Channel. Galland was a veteran of the Spanish civil war, Polish and French campaigns, and the Battle of Britain. He had to his credit, 94 aerial victories. Recipient of the "Knight's Cross", Galland started the war as a lieutenant in 1939 and had been appointed the "General of the fighter arm" just a few months earlier. Goering sent Jeschonnek and Galland to attend the conference.
Adolf Galland
- The movements of ships must be reduced to a minimum before the start of the operation.
- The ships must leave the port of Brest by night, so that when passing through the Channel they could use the daylight for the most effective defense.
- The ships must be escorted from early dawn to twilight by the strongest possible fighter force.
Closing the conference, Hitler summarized: Departure by night, the greatest use of surprise factor, passing between Dover and Calais by day. He did not believe that the English would, take lightning decisions.
The conference closed with the words:
"Therefore the Fuhrer decided in agreement with the opinion of the naval C-in-C, that the operation should be prepared as suggested."
Hitler expressly demanded absolute secrecy as an essential prerequisite for a success. A special document in the form of a pledge was drawn up and all those present had to sign.
Otto Cilliax(left) and Hans Jeschonnek(right)
Preparations
A decision was made by the Fuhrer, the Chief in Command of the Kreigsmarine and the Chief of General staff of the Luftwaffe at the Fuhrer's HQ, that the battleships stationed in the port of Brest must be evacuated.
The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe then started to make all the necessary preparations for that undertaking. By a special "order of the Fuhrer" Galland was made responsible for the preparation and execution of fighter protection for this mission. The official codename for this mission was Operation Thunderbolt. The navy used the code word "Cerberus" in order to disguise their preparations for the common task.
The three warships were to secretly leave the port of Brest at night. Escorted by other naval vessels, they were expected to be between Cherbourg and Le Harve at dawn. Crossing the strait of Dover by day, under the air umbrella of Luftwaffe fighters, the flotilla will continue sailing till it reaches the safety of German waters.
Secrecy and bluff
The preparations began immediately under strictest secrecy. No one besides those present at the conference, was allowed to be taken into confidence without special permission from the C-in-C of the navy and the air force. Preparations for Operation Thunderbolt were made under the pretense of an imminent large-scale offensive against England. The navy pretended that the units would soon be sailing into the Atlantic, possibly even to the Pacific! Thus the purpose of all the preparations was camouflaged from the British secret service in occupied France. Misleading radio messages were also sent---for the consumption of British officials.
The channel through which the British Admiralty now received intelligence of the moves of destroyers, activities in minefields and the moves of fighter units were manifold.
Command, Control and Communications
This was a combined operation of navy and airforce. It's technical coordination was planned in such a way that the Luftwaffe was not under the navy but had to rely on teamwork. A lot depended on communications. The airfields of each sector were linked up with the respective head quarters by a multitude of cross-connections.
The Naval High Command gave the basic instructions for operations. The operative command fell on the Naval Command Groups in whose sector the ships were at the time; The sector between Brest and Sheldt Estuary was under the West Naval Command Group with HQ in Paris. The sector from Sheldt upto the home ports was under the Northern Naval Command Group with HQ in Kiel.
Vice Admiral Cilliax, came under the command of these Naval Command Groups for the duration of operation. He assumed the role of tactical commander from his flagship at the sea. The Scharnhorst was to be his flagship. The commanders of participating ships were Captain Hoffmann (Scharnhorst), Captain Fein (Gneisenau), and Captain Brinkmann (Prinz Eugen).
For the best chance of teamwork, liaison officers were exchanged between the naval centers of command and the airforce. "Fighter command afloat" was the most important liaison of Galland with the naval C-in-C. Fighter command Afloat was headed by Oberst Ibel. With him were with first and second fighter officers, along with Oberst Elle, who was in charge of necessary wireless personnel. This staff was to be on board the flagship during the operation. In the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen there were a pilot officer and a wireless operator.
Galland maintained communications with the C-in-C of the flotilla and the leader of Fighter Command Afloat via an ultra-short wave and a long radio line. A speed code was used on this line and all intelligence was given according to a fighter signal chart. The leader of Fighter Command Afloat was in direct communication with the fighter liaison officers on the other two ships by ultra-short wave.
Navigation and mine-sweeping
Of the decisive importance to the navy were the preparations for navigation and mine-sweeping. The course of the naval units through the Channel was fixed not too close to the French coast, because of a greater safety from ground mines and the ability to reach greater speed in deep waters, it was decided to plot the course roughly in the middle of the Channel, with a depth of not less than 15 fathoms (~90 ft). The ships were to sail with an average speed of 26 knots. To aid navigation, the route was stalked out by marking boats.
Eighty mine-sweepers cleared 98 anchor mines and 21 ground mines on route. Three mine barriers were detected and removed. During this operation, one mine-sweeper and one destroyer were lost. All these operations had to be performed under absolute secrecy and could therefore only be carried out by night.
Trial Runs
The ships made several trail runs. These trial runs were essential for testing engines, radio communications, and guns. Naturally they were reduced to a minimum. Staffs and Liaisons were working into shape. Between January 22 and February 10,1942, on eight different days, single trial runs were made. During these eight days, the Luftwaffe flew 450 sorties providing escort for the trials. Several British planes were shot down. The RAF came almost every night to raid Brest, but the German warships were not damaged.
Strength of Luftwaffe
The English Channel was the area of responsibility of Luftlotte 3(Air fleet 3) which was commanded by Generalfeldmarshal Hugo Sperrle. The fighters of Luftlotte 3 were commnanded by Oberst Galland.
The two remaining Jagdgeschwaders(Fighter Wings) on the Channel coast, the 2nd (JG2) and 26th (JG26), were initially available. Strength of each was increased to 90 serviceable aircraft---ME 109s and FW 190s. A further 12 ME 109s were transferred from the Fighter Training School of Paris to Le Harve for this operation. The 1st Fighter Wing (1JG) stationed in North-West Germany was also released for this operation. 1JG had 60 ME 109s, it's task was to escort the flotilla next morning on it's way through the German Bight once it had succeeded in breaking through the Channel. At best, therefore, the Luftwaffe had to count temporarily on 252 aircraft. In addition to those, 30 ME 110s were available for early morning and evening periods.
KG2 had 30 DO-217 bombers available. Some reconnaissance aircraft were also available. For electronic warfare, two modified He-111 bombers were present.
Plan for air-cover
The details of the plan were worked out by Oberst Koller who was Sperrle's Chief of the Staff.
After the experience gathered during the eight days of trial, Adolf Galland drew up a rigid battle order: "Rules for the execution of protective escorts to merchant convoys and naval flotillas."
Following were the key features of the escort plan for fighter squadrons, who were to fly a protective cover over the fleet:
- The route was subdivided into three sectors based upon the existing Jafu (Fighter Sector) boundaries. The liaison aboard Scharnhorst will be able communicate with the local units as per the demand of the situation.
- The fighters flying air cover had to avoid detection by British radar for as long as possible by flying at a very low altitude. Radio silence was to be maintained till any further orders.
- Considering the meager resources at the disposal of the Luftwaffe, a continuous escort could not be carried out by more than 16 fighter planes.
- The 16 planes were split into two formations of eight aircraft each. Each group further had two schwarms(4 aircraft in each schwarm). The tactics involved one formation flying to sea and one to land in a zigzag pattern. All schwarm were ordered to fly back and fourth along the line of ships in wide figures of eight.
- After detection, formations were to split and carry out escort at both high and low altitude. If there were two formations, one would keep on flying at low altitude while the other had to climb and patrol at high altitude.
- Each single wave of 16 aircraft remained approximately 35 minutes over the protected object. This varied according to the distance from base to object. If they made no contact or only slight contact with the enemy during this time they had to stay for another ten minutes.
- The relieving wave arrived according to a precisely fixed schedule ten minutes before the time was up for the first escort to return. The number of aircraft over the ships could therefore increase to 32 for a period of at least ten minutes and at most 20 minutes.
- The briefing orders demanded attacking enemy aircraft without loss of time from any position. If any enemy should penetrate to deliver an attack on the ships, the orders were to put these out of action by all available means---And if necessary, to ram them.
- Fights with enemy aircraft leaving the combat zone were to be avoided. The result of the fighter action would not be expressed in the numbers of enemy aircraft shot down, but solely by the successful protection extended to the warships.
- In spite of the numerically small continuous air cover of an exclusively defensive nature, there were at all times sufficient forces fully alert to undertake an offensive action against approaching enemy aircraft formations.
- The bombers were to raid British airbases and if possible, attack British naval units.
- Reservicing time had been reduced to half an hour, which was only possible by the greatest efforts on the part of ground and air crews.
- The reconnaissance planes were to keep an aye on the activities of British Home Fleet.
- The specially equipped planes of General Martini were to cause electronic interference against British radar stations.
Map for reference. Red rings indicate Luftwaffe airfields
As the ships were expected to be between Cherbourg and Le Harve at dawn, the fighter units were supposed to be ready for action in the sector Abbeville-Lille-Calais. The HQ for this sector was at Le Touquet. If for one reason or another the progress of the battleships was delayed, their position at dawn might well be much further West. For this emergency, a second sector of bases had to be established in the area Le Harve-Caen-Cherbourg with Headquarters at Caen. A third sector lay between Scheldt, the Rhine, and the Zuider Zee, with it's Headquarters at Schiphol. A fourth sector reached from Jever to Wilhelmshaven and had it's Headquarters at Jever.
If everything went according to plan the fighters returning from action after 15:00 hours would land in the third sector, reservice, and take off again as soon as possible to rejoin the ships. Fighters stationed on the airbases in the fourth sector would cover the ships on the following day, when they reached the German Bight.
Deception against radar
The technical chief of communication and intelligence of the Luftwaffe, General Martini, was preparing new and secret means of interference and deception against enemy's radar system. He had outfitted two He-111 bombers with special instruments inorder to conduct electronic warfare against the British. The effectiveness of these were still unknown. The actual importance of such a deception and confusion of the enemy's command could not yet be judged.
The X Day
In fixing X Day (The day of departure from Brest), many factors had to be taken into account. The operation was specified as urgent. A later date than February was out of question because the short nights would have robbed the navy of the surprise element. Until the middle of February darkness would last from 20:30 to 8:30 hours. On February 15, there would be a new moon, which meant that there would be complete darkness, giving the greatest security for night action. Between the seventh and fifteenth the water and tide conditions were most favourable for operation. The time between these dates was therefore considered. The C-in-C of the Navy Command Group West was responsible for fixing the date.
The weather played an important if not the decisive part. Because of the prevailing western weather conditions over the channel, German metrologists needed data from the far Atlantic which was unavailible. They were dependent on the reports brought back by long-distance recconniassance planes. Three U-Boats were now stationed in the Eastern Atlantic and the important weather area around Ireland, to observe conditions. On February 7th, weather became very uncertain, with a depression over the continent. The metrologists gave the following weather forecast for February 12:
"A depression has formed south of Ireland. Strong winds with the barometer falling north of scotland make it highly possible that the depression will travel soth with a speed of 25mph and will reach the Eastern aproaches of Channel February 12, between six and ten'O clock. From there it will move further south. Therefore the weather in the Channel will detoriate rapidly during the morning, and after crossing the front (duration two-three hours) it will clear up again."
This meant that during the morning, the weather over the English bases would be favourable however over the German bases, it would not be good. In the afternoon German bases, too, should have better weather.
Despite the rather unfavourable forecast General-Admiral Saalwachter, at that time C-in-C of Navy Group Command,West, decided on February 11,1942, as the date on which the ships were to leave port on Operation Thunderbolt-Ceberus at 20:00 hours. This was after a last operational conference held at Palais Luxembourg in Paris on the same day.
From Paris, General Galland went to the Pas de Calais, where he assembled the chiefs of all flying units, right down to the squadron leaders, for a briefing, which took place during the night. Where he revealed the purpose and aim of all the secret preparations that had fully occupied them during the past weeks. On return to their units they were to open the detailed orders for action which he had previously handed them in sealed envelopes.
British preparations
On the night of February 11-12, the RAF was also in a state of alert. The Vice-Admiral commanding of Dover station had recieved additional swordfish torpedo planes and MTBs(Motorized torpedo boats). During the previous days British aircraft dropped 1100 magnetic mines between the Frisian islands and Brest.
Therefore it cannot be said that the British Command was completely taken by surprise. The preparations made at the doorstep of the British house, could not have possibly gone unnoticed. The counter-measures taken by the British point out that they envisaged the possibility of a Channel dash by the German warships. The British expected the German fleet to cross the narrow Dover-Calais strait during the night---and made preparations accordingly. However, the German plan dictated the fleet to leave the port of Brest during the darkness and cross the Dover-Calais strait during daylight!
Channel Dash
With the fall of darkness on the evening of February 11, seven German destroyers assembled at the harbour entrance of Brest. These were to form a safety belt around the capital ships. At 20:00 hours as arranged, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen left their berths. But they did not get very far. Air-raid warning alarm! The ships returned to their berths and tied up again. A smoke screen was thrown over the harbour. Flak guns of all calibers barked. Searchlights traversed the sky. About 20 to 25 British bombers made a routine raid from 6000 to 9000 feet. The men of ships' AA guns were at action stations and joined the fireworks which greeted the intruders. Bombs whistled and exploded in the harbour area. Luckily there was no damage to the ships. After the All Clear the ships were put to the sea. The time was 22:00 hours. Two hours delay!
A few minutes before 23:00 hours the capital ships left the harbour of Brest. The flotilla started on it's night journey. Operation Thunderbolt-Cerberus had begun.
Once the warships had left port two questions arose:
1- Would the unit succeed in making up the time lost through air raid?
2- Had the attacking British bombers discovered that the expected German operation was about to begin?
It was planned that the fleet should keep an average speed of 26 knots. In the beginning, with favorable tides, they were actually making 30 knots. After rounding Ushant to the West of Brittany the formation set course for Channel at 00:13 o'clock. Complete radio silence was observed, because of which, reports of the position of formation came only from German radar stations along the French coast. The radar stations picked up warships at intervals.
As for any possible delay in the arrival of ships at the preplanned location at dawn, the Luftwaffe had made allowances in it's plan for such a contingency. After the loss of two precious hours, Galland was fairly certain that at dawn, he would have to transfer the fighter forces standing by from Pas De Calais to Le Harve-Caen-Cherbourg sector, however such a decision would have meant an additional strain on everyone concerned. However each new report showed that the warships were catching up on their initial delay. Finally it was clear that with the first light, the warships would be in their pre-arranged position.
At their present location, the ships were out of the reach for the British coastal radar. The answer to the second question---of a possible discovery by the English of the preparations to leave port..... was satisfying for the Germans because nothing had stirred on the British side.
Before Dawn
At 6:30 hours decks were cleared for action on board the battleships, which were travelling at high speed through the darkness towards the Channel. Off Cherbourg, a flotilla of torpedo boats joined the unit to strengthen the outer safety belt, which so far had only been formed by destroyers. The whole unit now consisted of seven destroyers and eight to fifteen torpedo boats besides the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen. The torpedo boats were relieved from sector to sector.
The arrival of fighter-escorts
The weather was cloudy with a 1500-foot ceiling and relatively good visibility. At 8:14 hours the first night fighters(ME 110s) took off in complete darkness. They were over the fleet at 8:50 hours.
The air umbrella, a small one of course, was opened. The night fighters were flying only a few feet above the water in order not to be detected by the English radar stations. All communications were silenced. At 8:54 hours the dawn broke. The units were off to Cotentin peninsula.
The naval security forces discovered a previously unnoticed mine field off Dieppe only a few hours before ships were due. By an all-out effort of four mine-sweepers a path was swiftly cleared. Nevertheless the decision to pass through this barely cleared path was a very risky one. But there was no alternative except turning back and calling the whole operation off. The unit passed through without incident.
The night fighters flying on the port side of the warships, the side towards the enemy, had been joined in the meantime by the day fighters. The operation ran according to plan. Discovery by the enemy had to be avoided as long as possible. Luckily the British had not discovered them yet.
In order to avoid detection, the commanders who briefed their pilots stressed to the utmost orders:"fly at lowest possible level and maintain radio silence". Unlike the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe was notorious for it's lack of radio discipline, but during the course of this operation, the fighter pilots equaled the seamen in this regard. Only later, in the afternoon, when the naval formation was detected and under heavy British air attacks did the well-known radio chaos of the Luftwaffe broke out again.
In addition to the escorting fighters flying in relays, the Luftwaffe had in reserve for immediate action about 25 to 30 aircraft standing by on different bases. The pilots sat in their machines, belts fastened, and aircraft ready to take off.
The night fighters broke off at about 11:00 hours. They landed on the airfields in Holland ready to resume the escort in the evening. At this hour the naval units were just off the mouth of Somme---only 40 miles from the narrowest point of the Channel between Dover and Calais. For two hours in full daylight German warships had been passing along the English coast, following a route which in the history of British sea supremacy no enemy has dared to take since the seventeenth century. The silence was almost sinister.
Detection
At 11:00 hours the following radio message was intercepted by the German listening service:
"A large German naval formation consisting of three capital ships and about 20 warships steaming at high speed towards the strait of Dover, present position about 50 miles off the mouth of Somme."
The secret was out!
After this radio interception, the decision of giving the cue to drop all attempts at disguising the German operation lay with Galland. He refrained from doing so. The fact that the first countermeasures were not taken by the British for at least another hour proved the wisdom of his decision.
It appeared that the British gave no credence to the report; they simply sent another reconnaissance plane and ordered full alert. An hour later that plane brought the confirmation of the first report which had been regarded as impossible. The British Admiralty received this report no earlier than 12:25!
By then the German warships had nearly reached the narrowest point of the Channel. The cloud ceiling had descended to 600 to 900 feet. It was raining slightly, but the English coast was faintly visible. Off Boulogne an additional 15 torpedo boats joined the formation, screening it on enemy's side. So far the Germans had an incredible luck. If that discovery had happened earlier, this would have been the climax of the battle. The fighter crews would have been exhausted. Now the pilots were looking forward with confidence to the air battle which was bound to start shortly.
Electronic interference
In creating confusion among the ranks of the enemy, the German high-frequency experts took their share. They had created a strong interference with the British radar stations by a series of installations and other methods. They had also directed interference transmissions against the British fighter intercoms. Bomber planes outfitted with special instruments had simulated radar signals which were taken by the British as large bomber formations inbound for England---The RAF actually scrambled it's fighters against non-existent bomber formations. This confusion continued long after the warships had been located and when practical deception was no longer possible.
Initial attacks by RAF and Royal Navy
The first enemy action was recorded at 13:16 hours, British coastal artillery fired on the Prinz Eugen. Simultaneously a scrap started between British and German MTBs. The German destroyer Hermann Schomman interfered and closed the action. Scharnhorst reported being under artillery fire from 300 to 400 yards to port.
The first air encounter took place at 13:34 hours. German fighters were now operating from closest range to their bases. Therefore the fighter cover could be increased. In the first attack, six swordfish torpedo planes escorted by Spitfires made a low-level attack. The fighter radio control on board the ships was first to break silence in order to direct the fighters according to sight. Part of the air cover engaged with the spitfires in dogfight while the remaining fighters moved in position to attack the swordfish planes. The torpedo attack of Swordfish was foiled by cooperative action of ships and fighters. All six swordfish were shot down.
Thus the English attack performed with death defying courage was repulsed.
Galland gave the cue word "Open Visor". This canceled the order for radio silence and regulations for low-level flying. Fighter cover was now graded at different altitudes.
The journey continues
At 15:29 the flagship Scharnhorst hit a mine. It was heavily shaken. The lights failed and the wireless went dead. She left a trail of oil behind her. Now she was standing still. The leading ship of the destroyers, the Z-29, was ordered to take abroad the commander and the fighter liaison. At the same time the weather was deteriorating rapidly (Cloud ceiling 500 to 600 feet, visibility one-half to one mile, rain). The naval formation proceeded with Prinz Eugen and Gneisenau as well as the bulk of destroyers and MTBs. The enemy concentrated on Scharnhorst and Z-29.
Vice Admiral Ciliax and fighter liaison were finally on board the destroyer Z-29.
At 15:50 hours an MTB approached near Prinz Eugen and fired a torpedo. Prinz Eugen changed course and the torpedo detonated 100 yards aft. With the stopping of the Scharnhorst the naval formation split up. Prinz Eugen and Gneisenau proceeded with the escorts, while Scharnhorst stayed behind. Scharnorst was totally unable to move and it was decided to tow her to the nearest Dutch port.
Because of bad visibility, destroyer Z-29 lost contact with the formation and was now alone.
At 15:55 hours, twin-engined bombers headed for Z-29---they were attacked and pursued by a schwarm of German fighters. They vanished from sight. Five minutes later, a bomber attacked Scharnhorst and bombs fell 80 to 100 yards to port. Moments later, three bombers attacked Z-29 but were beaten off by the ship's AA.
At 6:14 hours, several Blenheim Mark IVs attacked Gneisenau from starboard but failed to score any hit. Two Blenheims attacked Prinz Eugen, one of them was shot down by AA fire. A few minutes later, Gneisennau reported gunfire to port from English destroyer units from Harwich.
At 6:30, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were attacked by swordfish torpedo-carrying planes. The ships performed evasive action by changing course. Two bombers approached Z-29 from astern but were beaten off by AA fire.
Meanwhile the weather grew worse. The cloud ceiling dropped to 450 feet. The low clouds offered a welcome cover for the attacking bombers. Most of the ensuing combats up in the air could not be observed from the warships.
Some minutes later, Gneisnenau gives orders to the destroyers to attack enemy destroyers. She herself opened fire with medium and heavy guns. Prinz Eugen also opened fire at enemy destroyers with heavy guns. British destroyer HMS Worcester was hit and set on fire. (HMS Worcester managed to limp back to English port)
While all the above mentioned events were taking place, an air battle raged up in the skies---Dogfights and bomber intercepts. Several British fighters and bombers were shot down. In the meantime German bombers also went in action and attacked enemy destroyers. German reconnaissance aircraft were ordered to keep an eye on the British Home Fleet.
Because of low clouds and bad visibility, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe could only fly singly or in small formations. The flotilla was far drawn out. In the incidents of friendly fire, some German fighters and bombers attacked their own naval units. Except a few moments, a great chaos reigned over the battle area until nightfall.
At 17:00 hours, a German DO-217 bomber dropped two bombs on the destroyer Hermann Schomann in an incident of friendly fire.
A wave of British Hampden bombers attacked the German naval units. Gneisenau shot down one aircraft, parts of which floated nearby. Ten minutes later, another wave of bombers attacked without making any impression. Prinz Eugen, Gneisenau and Z-29 were also attacked by British bombers without any success.
It was now evening. At 17:42, as the attacks of RAF intensified, Ciliax requested renewed and stronger fighter protection. Night fighters took off from Dutch airfields and joined the action.
At 17:55, The German fighters pursued a bomber flying straight over Prinz Eugen and shot him down in flames. A British Hampden was shot down by AA fire from destroyer Z-29.
At 18:06, a low flying swordfish, flying through AA barrage dropped a surface running torpedo against Gneisenau, the ship avoided it by changing course. Further attacks were made on Prinz Eugen.
At 18:20 hours, Prinz Eugen sent a message to Gneisennau: " Hanging on to you 5260 yards astern."
After a short lull in activities, at 18:31, Gneisenau had to temporarily reduce revolutions on her starboard shaft for technical reasons. This caused her to fall back in speed and position.
In Pas de Calais (No I) take off and landing were still unaffected. The fighters which took off from Pas de Calais and had completed their escort mission for 30 minutes were now 120 miles away from their base, their return to their starting base was out of question. The fighters therefore had to land on Dutch territory (No II). But there the weather was at it's worst. Over large stretches clouds were at ground level. It was no easy decision to send fighters there into the bad-weather zone to land, but there was no alternative. Despite such weather, most of the pilots landed safely. There were quite a few emergency landings outside the air fields, some of which ended in crashes.
On their own initiative, without waiting for orders, a few determined pilots took off again with small formations before darkness fell after rapid servicing and refueling. They were conscious that everything was at stake here. No scruples about safety existed on that day. The fighter pilots had done more than their duty.
Meanwhile, Commander of the battleships, Otto Cilliax had renewed misfortunes. Since his flagship had received damage from the mine he had been aboard the destroyer Z-29 which had now developed engine trouble. Again Cilliax and fighter liaison had to be transferred. The destroyer Hermann Schomman was ordered to stand by. Under continuous attacks by RAF and in a rough sea the transfer was effected by means of a cutter. The Scharnhorst which had been brought under way again, went off at full speed, trying to catch up with the flotilla. The Scharnhorst was now able to continue toward her destination.
The day ends
Toward 19:00 hours it was getting dark. Day and night fighters were battling with the last Wellington bombers which attacked incessantly and with tenacity. All three capital ships reported kills by AA fire. At 19:35 hours total darkness reigned. Fighter action was ended for the day. The Luftwaffe action station was no transferred to Jever on the German Bight.
During the night the RAF was very active. Besides intensive air reconnaissance they were mainly busy with mine laying operations, in order to mine the route right upto the German Bight and the Elbe Estuary. German night-fighters kept in contact with the enemy, but there were no major actions.
Shortly after 21:00 hours the Gneisenau shook under an explosion. All engines stopped. She had hit a mine! Yet the damage was slight. After a short time she was under way again making 25 knots. One and a half hour later the Scharnhorst hit a mine, luckily no severe damage occurred and she was able to continue her journey.
Still during darkness the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen reached the mouth of Elbe and cast anchor. The German Bight was out of the range of British fighters. This area was relatively safe because since 1939, the RAF bombers had stopped venturing into this area during daytime as it was well covered with radar stations.
Success of Operation thunderbolt-Cerberus
Next morning, February 13, the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen continued their journey to Keil in daylight through the Kaiser-Wilhelm canal. At dawn, Cilliax and fighter liaison boarded the Scharnhorst when the ship was in the estuary of the Weser. At 10:30 hours she arrived together with Hermann Schomman at Wilhelmshaven.
The German high command made the following statement:
" During the air and sea battle in the Channel area on February 12, one English destroyer was hit and set on fire. The full complement of a German Naval force under the command of Vice-Admiral Cilliax, after breaking through the Channel between Calais and Dover, reached their ports of destination, sustaining the loss of only one E-boat. Forty nine British aircraft were shot down. Generalfeldmarshal Sperre's fighter units under the command of General Coeler(Bomber and recconniassance) and Oberst Galland(fighter and night-fighter) especially distinguished themselves."
The above statement was reserved as the ships had not yet reached their destination port in Norway, hence the operation at that time could not be regarded as complete.
Shortly after the Scharnhorst had anchored at Wilhelmshaven there was a conference on board the flagship. Present were the commanders of navy and airforce who had taken part in the combined operation. The findings were:
- The operation was a complete success.
- The British destroyer Worcester was set on fire.
- According to reports 49 English aircraft, bombers,torpedo-bombers, and fighters were shot down by fighters and naval AA guns. (This figure later rose to over 60)
- German losses had been small. One advance boat (a fishing vessel) had been lost in air attack; Eight other ships were damaged.
- The damage by mines to the capital ships had been unavoidable but was not irreparable.The navy lost 13 men killed and 68 wounded; the Luftwaffe lost 11 men and 17 aircraft.
After the necessary repairs, preparations and discussions, the naval units reformed and sailed in a northerly direction. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau remained in German ports for the time being because of the damage sustained. Their place was taken by two older cruisers. Once again, Adolf Galland provided the air cover to these ships as they traveled North. After further heavy engagements with the RAF, the ships sailed unscathed into the fjords. The fjords offered natural cover and were protected with flak batteries. The operation finally came to it's conclusion.
Aftermath
Churchill blamed this failure on the fact that the British Command, at that time, had been forced to send a large number of it's torpedo bombers to Egypt. Nevertheless the forces employed by the British were considerable. According to Vice-Admiral R. de Ballot: " About 250 aircraft of the fleet Air Arm, Coastal Command, Bomber Command, and the Strategic Bomber Command, assisted and escorted by about 15 fighter squadrons, took part in the attack. Only 39 aircraft managed to launch attacks on the German Naval formation, but without success."
Churchill gave this event considerable space in his history of World War II. He admitted that the British public was "shocked by the news." In order to calm down the heated minds an official inquiry was held which came to the amazing conclusion that after all the Channel dash "had been of extreme advantage to us".
The factor which contributed to the German success was that, when faced with surprise the British had shown a little ability to improvised. Hitler in his planning judged the suspected British reaction.
It was a military sensation of the first order considering that this operation was accomplished within the range of Home Fleet and in an operational area that is one of the narrowest and most difficult natural straits in the world. Moreover, despite the fact that the bulk of Luftwaffe was engaged in Russia at that time, it managed to maintain a decisive superiority over the RAF.
Fate of the capital ships
On the night of 26–27 February, the RAF launched a heavy air raid on Gneisennau which was docked at Keil. The ship was hit by a single bomb in her forecastle that penetrated the armored deck and exploded.Red-hot bomb fragments ignited propellant charges in the forward turret and caused a tremendous explosion. The turret was thrown off its mount and the entire bow section was burned out. The crew partially flooded the magazine to prevent a more catastrophic explosion. The blast killed 112 men and wounded 21 others.
Repairs were planned and carried out. By early 1943 the ship was repaired. It remained in German port till the end of the war.
The Sharnhorst was sunk by the Royal Navy in the battle of the North Cape in December 1943.
Prinz Eugen survived the war.
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