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As Iran Deal Nears, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Relations Chill
Frida Ghitis Thursday, June 11, 2015
Among the many challenges Saudi Arabia has faced in recent months, one has come as a particularly unexpected disappointment: the cooling of relations between the desert kingdom and one of the main recipients of its largesse, Pakistan.
For decades Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a robust friendship with significant strategic and financial ramifications. But suddenly, Islamabad appears to feel much less warmly disposed toward its wealthy Arab friend.
The change came as a blast of cold air in April, when the Pakistani parliament voted unanimously to rebuff a Saudi request for troops and equipment to help its war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. After a lengthy, mostly one-sided debate, legislators resolved that “Pakistan should maintain neutrality” in the conflict.
Then last week, during a visit to Washington, Pakistan’s top diplomat emphatically shot down speculation that Islamabad would provide Riyadh with nuclear weapons or know-how in response to what the Saudis might view as a weak deal on Iran’s nuclear program between Tehran and world powers. Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry called all the talk of Pakistan helping the Saudis develop a nuclear arsenal “unfounded and baseless,” adding, “Pakistan is not talking to Saudi Arabia on nuclear issues. Period.”
For Saudi Arabia, the change in attitude from Pakistan must come as a shocking development. After all, Riyadh has invested heavily in nurturing the relationship. Not only that, the two countries play prominent roles in the Sunni Muslim world, and the Saudis might have thought the prospect of a rising Iran, the foremost Shiite power that Riyadh claims is arming and supporting the Houthis, would provide Pakistan with its own motivation to work together on the issue. But Pakistan had its own concerns, and Islamabad’s cost-benefit calculus of the relationship is now changing.
One reason for snubbing the Saudi request to help in Yemen is the fear that it would worsen sectarian relations at home, but there is more. Suddenly, Islamabad does not need Riyadh as much as it once did. Saudi Arabia’s legendarily vast treasury now faces competition from another state with very deep pockets: China. In addition, and this must come as source of great consternation for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is looking forward to renewing profitable ties with Iran should an end to sanctions come.
The Saudi-Pakistani relationship has not been free of controversy. The Saudis worked with Pakistani intelligence coordinating efforts to remove the Soviets from Afghanistan. But many Pakistanis blame the Saudis for fomenting extremism and worsening sectarian tensions in Pakistan.
And yet, redefining ties would transform bonds that have existed for more than half a century. In the 1960s, Pakistan placed tens of thousands of its soldiers on Saudi soil, under Saudi command. Pakistani trainers helped build the Saudi military machine, construct Saudi fortifications and train Saudi air force pilots. In 1991, when a U.S.-led coalition helped protect Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi invasion during the first Gulf War, Pakistan sent 15,000 troops to protect the kingdom.
For almost 20 years, Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan with 50,000 barrels of petroleum a day, free of charge—a gift valued at almost $2 billion. The kingdom is also home to millions of Pakistani workers, who not only make their livelihood there but send home vast sums in remittances that are vital to the Pakistani economy.
When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a coup during a previous term in office in 1999, the Saudis helped broker a deal that allowed him to leave the country. He found a comfortable exile in Saudi Arabia. When he returned home and once again won election to the top post in May 2013, the Saudis naturally expected ties to grow even more. Military, commercial and financial ties had remained strong until now.
Last year, newly enthroned King Salman, then the defense minister, paid a rare visit to Islamabad. As a result, Sharif rallied to the Saudi stance on Syria, calling for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power. Not long after that, Pakistan’s finances received a surprise boost. The central bank announced that an unnamed “brotherly country” had made an eye-popping $1.5 billion deposit into the nation’s central bank, helping lift the sagging Pakistani currency.
That kind of generosity is hard to replace. And Pakistan is by no means discarding its diplomatic ties with the Saudi kingdom.
Just after Parliament rejected the Saudi request for help in Yemen, a massive top-level delegation traveled to Riyadh hoping to mend the frayed links. The group included the prime minister, army chief of staff, foreign secretary, defense minister and a slew of other representatives.
The uncommon plea for forgiveness, as it were, raised a few eyebrows at home. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a respected nuclear scientist, wrote an article entitled, “Let Saudi Arabia Fume,” unfurling an unsparingly snide realpolitik assessment of the balance of power between the two countries. The Saudis, he wrote, could not afford to expel Pakistani workers in hopes of punishing Islamabad because the Saudis themselves “are hopelessly poor in skill and work habits.” Moreover, wrote Hoodbhoy, the Saudis must restrain their anger because “Pakistan is the only country that can . . . potentially provide the kingdom with nuclear weapons, or with a nuclear umbrella,” though he added that Pakistan should not do so.
The fact is that neither Pakistan nor Saudi Arabia want to see the relationship unravel. The two still need each other. Pakistan has enormous economic, financial and energy needs, which Saudi Arabia is well-positioned to alleviate.
But China is already filling some of the gap. Just as Riyadh was convalescing from the Islamabad-inflicted wound, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Pakistan and outlined plans to build a $46 billion transport link, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, linking China to the Persian Gulf. Sharif vowed that the Pakistani army would create a special division to protect Chinese laborers working on the corridor’s many projects.
Even more importantly, Islamabad is eyeing Iran, its next-door neighbor and petroleum powerhouse, as the future source of expanded trade and affordable fuel. The two countries have had a gas pipeline project in the works for many years, but sanctions against Iran stalled progress on completing it.
The end of international sanctions against Iran would deal one more blow to the Saudi-Pakistani special relationship. To Saudi Arabia, that would be the most offensive and troubling of them all.
Frida Ghitis is an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor. Her weekly WPR column, World Citizen, appears every Thursday.
As Iran Deal Nears, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Relations Chill
Frida Ghitis Thursday, June 11, 2015
Among the many challenges Saudi Arabia has faced in recent months, one has come as a particularly unexpected disappointment: the cooling of relations between the desert kingdom and one of the main recipients of its largesse, Pakistan.
For decades Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a robust friendship with significant strategic and financial ramifications. But suddenly, Islamabad appears to feel much less warmly disposed toward its wealthy Arab friend.
The change came as a blast of cold air in April, when the Pakistani parliament voted unanimously to rebuff a Saudi request for troops and equipment to help its war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. After a lengthy, mostly one-sided debate, legislators resolved that “Pakistan should maintain neutrality” in the conflict.
Then last week, during a visit to Washington, Pakistan’s top diplomat emphatically shot down speculation that Islamabad would provide Riyadh with nuclear weapons or know-how in response to what the Saudis might view as a weak deal on Iran’s nuclear program between Tehran and world powers. Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry called all the talk of Pakistan helping the Saudis develop a nuclear arsenal “unfounded and baseless,” adding, “Pakistan is not talking to Saudi Arabia on nuclear issues. Period.”
For Saudi Arabia, the change in attitude from Pakistan must come as a shocking development. After all, Riyadh has invested heavily in nurturing the relationship. Not only that, the two countries play prominent roles in the Sunni Muslim world, and the Saudis might have thought the prospect of a rising Iran, the foremost Shiite power that Riyadh claims is arming and supporting the Houthis, would provide Pakistan with its own motivation to work together on the issue. But Pakistan had its own concerns, and Islamabad’s cost-benefit calculus of the relationship is now changing.
One reason for snubbing the Saudi request to help in Yemen is the fear that it would worsen sectarian relations at home, but there is more. Suddenly, Islamabad does not need Riyadh as much as it once did. Saudi Arabia’s legendarily vast treasury now faces competition from another state with very deep pockets: China. In addition, and this must come as source of great consternation for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is looking forward to renewing profitable ties with Iran should an end to sanctions come.
The Saudi-Pakistani relationship has not been free of controversy. The Saudis worked with Pakistani intelligence coordinating efforts to remove the Soviets from Afghanistan. But many Pakistanis blame the Saudis for fomenting extremism and worsening sectarian tensions in Pakistan.
And yet, redefining ties would transform bonds that have existed for more than half a century. In the 1960s, Pakistan placed tens of thousands of its soldiers on Saudi soil, under Saudi command. Pakistani trainers helped build the Saudi military machine, construct Saudi fortifications and train Saudi air force pilots. In 1991, when a U.S.-led coalition helped protect Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi invasion during the first Gulf War, Pakistan sent 15,000 troops to protect the kingdom.
For almost 20 years, Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan with 50,000 barrels of petroleum a day, free of charge—a gift valued at almost $2 billion. The kingdom is also home to millions of Pakistani workers, who not only make their livelihood there but send home vast sums in remittances that are vital to the Pakistani economy.
When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a coup during a previous term in office in 1999, the Saudis helped broker a deal that allowed him to leave the country. He found a comfortable exile in Saudi Arabia. When he returned home and once again won election to the top post in May 2013, the Saudis naturally expected ties to grow even more. Military, commercial and financial ties had remained strong until now.
Last year, newly enthroned King Salman, then the defense minister, paid a rare visit to Islamabad. As a result, Sharif rallied to the Saudi stance on Syria, calling for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power. Not long after that, Pakistan’s finances received a surprise boost. The central bank announced that an unnamed “brotherly country” had made an eye-popping $1.5 billion deposit into the nation’s central bank, helping lift the sagging Pakistani currency.
That kind of generosity is hard to replace. And Pakistan is by no means discarding its diplomatic ties with the Saudi kingdom.
Just after Parliament rejected the Saudi request for help in Yemen, a massive top-level delegation traveled to Riyadh hoping to mend the frayed links. The group included the prime minister, army chief of staff, foreign secretary, defense minister and a slew of other representatives.
The uncommon plea for forgiveness, as it were, raised a few eyebrows at home. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a respected nuclear scientist, wrote an article entitled, “Let Saudi Arabia Fume,” unfurling an unsparingly snide realpolitik assessment of the balance of power between the two countries. The Saudis, he wrote, could not afford to expel Pakistani workers in hopes of punishing Islamabad because the Saudis themselves “are hopelessly poor in skill and work habits.” Moreover, wrote Hoodbhoy, the Saudis must restrain their anger because “Pakistan is the only country that can . . . potentially provide the kingdom with nuclear weapons, or with a nuclear umbrella,” though he added that Pakistan should not do so.
The fact is that neither Pakistan nor Saudi Arabia want to see the relationship unravel. The two still need each other. Pakistan has enormous economic, financial and energy needs, which Saudi Arabia is well-positioned to alleviate.
But China is already filling some of the gap. Just as Riyadh was convalescing from the Islamabad-inflicted wound, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Pakistan and outlined plans to build a $46 billion transport link, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, linking China to the Persian Gulf. Sharif vowed that the Pakistani army would create a special division to protect Chinese laborers working on the corridor’s many projects.
Even more importantly, Islamabad is eyeing Iran, its next-door neighbor and petroleum powerhouse, as the future source of expanded trade and affordable fuel. The two countries have had a gas pipeline project in the works for many years, but sanctions against Iran stalled progress on completing it.
The end of international sanctions against Iran would deal one more blow to the Saudi-Pakistani special relationship. To Saudi Arabia, that would be the most offensive and troubling of them all.
Frida Ghitis is an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor. Her weekly WPR column, World Citizen, appears every Thursday.
As Iran Deal Nears, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Relations Chill
