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Are war-mongers narrating the China-India story? - India - DNA
A lot of good points in this article. The lack of Chinese language expertise among China watchers in India, the lack of grass-root level interactions are both contributing to the mutual misunderstanding.
Paradoxically, the abundance of English-speakers in China also means the latest China-bashing articles in the Indian press often get translated and posted on the Chinese forum thus fanning up a growing anti-Indian sentiment among the more radical youth in China.
Anti-U.S sentiment was the predominant from of nationalist sentiment in China for the late 1990s and early 2000s, then followed by anti-Japanese sentiment during the mid 2000s and anti-South Korean sentiment during the late 2000s. I've read someone predicting after anti-South Korean sentiment runs its course the next in line may be anti-Indian.
Anyway the Sino-Indian relationship is going to be very complex, and despite the much-touted 4,000 years of peaceful coexistence, we really don't know each other that well. And I don't think trust and understanding can be developed in any short period of time.
Perhaps the best we can hope is for the cooler heads to prevail, on both sides.
Recently, on the Chinese internet, there surfaced a thrilling account of a naval war scenario involving China and India. It was a vivid rendering of how Chinese navy vessels entered the Bay of Bengal and, in just a few days, destroyed the entire fleet of Indian warships, recalls Prof Liu Jian of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), one of Chinas most influential policy think tanks.
The narrative, it turned out, was a work of fiction, the product of a fevered imagination. And although such crazy stories arent representative of how most Chinese leaders and ordinary people perceive India, says Liu, it was a manifestation of the antagonism and hostility towards India that resonates among small sections of Chinese military circles and extremely nationalist youth.
A similar China-directed hawkish streak is discernible in the public discourse in India, points out Dr Jagannath Panda, research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. In recent times, there have been countless alarmist narratives about China in the media and among sections of the strategic think tank community, which offer no constructive insight on China, but only feed a nationalist sentiment, he adds.
Recent manifestations of strains between the two giant trans-
Himalayan neighbours over Chinas denial of a visa to an Indian army general serving in Kashmir, and the reported presence of Chinese troops in ***************** Kashmir have accentuated the trust deficit, endangered by the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute, which led to the war of 1962. Prime minister Manmohan Singhs recent (off-the-record) comments about China seeking a foothold in South Asia have disconcertingly escalated the war of words to the highest rung of the ladder of policymaking circles.
Is all this unchecked nationalist war-mongering rhetoric in the media and strategic think tank space now distorting the tone of the official narrative? Will such narratives harden public and official attitudes on both sides and make it harder to resolve long-pending disputes?
Media headlines shouldnt be allowed to make policy, asserts former foreign secretary Salman Haidar, who served as Indias ambassador to China in the early 1990s, when the PV Narasimha Rao government formulated its Look East foreign policy. Of course, we cant ignore the things that divide the two countries, but while some watchfulness may be warranted, we shouldnt get swayed by alarmist media reports or give them undue importance.
To the credit of policymakers and diplomats on both sides, Haidar sees Sino-Indian relations as equable, despite the frictions and problems. War, he adds, is inconceivable and there is a basic good sense and stability in the relationship.
Liu of CASS shares that sentiment, and points to a changing perception of India among Chinese leaders and scholars. Chinese leaders attitudes and mindset towards India today are very reasonable: more reasonable than was the case with leaders in the Mao Zedong era, he says. And even in the media discourse in China, positive coverage of India outweighs the negative reportage, he adds.
Dr Zhao Hong, a visiting Chinese scholar at the National University of Singapores East Asian Institute, too points out that Indian perceptions of China as reflected in official trade policies and the popular media discourse are generally negative and suspicious, whereas Chinese public perceptions of India are benign.
If thats true, what accounts for what IDSA scholar Panda calls the fragmented dialogue vis-a-vis China among the Indian strategic elite, including the government, the media and policy think tanks? He points to several reasons. The strategic community in India seems to be struggling between conceding and apprehending Chinas rise, he notes.
Additionally, difficulties in China-watching persist in India given that there arent enough scholars on China and most students who learn Chinese opt for better-paying corporate careers rather than join the government, think tanks or the media. There is limited policy discourse in India about China, and the alarmist media narrative has confused Indias China policy at a broader level, he adds.
Panda says outdated impressions of Chinas progress as a state can lead to poor policy formulations. As Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, analysts at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, point out in a recent report, new foreign policy actors are emerging in China on the margins of the traditional power structure, and foreign governments must take into account these agencies that have a say in foreign policy decision.
Other scholars point to a more fundamental problem in the Sino-Indian discourse. Despite occasional incantations about a Chindia framework, mutual mistrust between the two countries cannot easily be overcome so long as the relationship is driven only by a strategic elite community, without much grassroots-level people-to-people interaction, reasons Dr Renaud Egreteau, who heads the China-India project at the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
Indicatively, he adds, the US-India relationship and the US-China relationship are influenced or mellowed to an extent by the Indian and Chinese diaspora in the US, which act as lobbying groups. But China and India dont have similar deep civil society interactions. India is perhaps the only big country without a Chinatown today: even the Chinese settlement in Kolkata was dispersed after the 1962 war.
Likewise, the Indian diaspora in China is fairly insubstantial; even student exchange programs are thin on the ground - although that will be addressed by human resource development minister Kapil Sabils upcoming China visit, during which agreements on mutual recognition of degrees will be signed.
So, how can the tone of the Sino-Indian narrative be changed from hysterical war-mongering on both sides to finding the pragmatic balance of competitive cooperation? Haidar, the distinguished diplomat, recalls the counsel he received, ahead of his China ambassadorial appointment, from renowned political strategist PN Haksar.
He said that the border dispute and other political issues werent going to disappear overnight and that the two sides could begin by understanding what their societies were about: how are they advancing, what are they doing to make better lives for themselves. Perhaps, muses Haidar, thats ultimately where the two countries peoples can relate to each other.
The trick, adds Egreteau, is not to have a naive notion of friendly relations, but have a more pragmatic discourse having a dialogue, while recognising there are differences and disputes that can be discussed without derailing the entire process.
A lot of good points in this article. The lack of Chinese language expertise among China watchers in India, the lack of grass-root level interactions are both contributing to the mutual misunderstanding.
Paradoxically, the abundance of English-speakers in China also means the latest China-bashing articles in the Indian press often get translated and posted on the Chinese forum thus fanning up a growing anti-Indian sentiment among the more radical youth in China.
Anti-U.S sentiment was the predominant from of nationalist sentiment in China for the late 1990s and early 2000s, then followed by anti-Japanese sentiment during the mid 2000s and anti-South Korean sentiment during the late 2000s. I've read someone predicting after anti-South Korean sentiment runs its course the next in line may be anti-Indian.
Anyway the Sino-Indian relationship is going to be very complex, and despite the much-touted 4,000 years of peaceful coexistence, we really don't know each other that well. And I don't think trust and understanding can be developed in any short period of time.
Perhaps the best we can hope is for the cooler heads to prevail, on both sides.