jaibi
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An interesting article I found online recently. Please critique to my fellow Indian and Pakistani PDF members. My own knowledge of the Naval adventure during 1971 is shaky.
Analysis Of The Pakistan Navy's Accounts Of The 1971 War
http://indiannavy.nic.in/print/book/export/html/962
CHAPTER 12
ANALYSIS OF THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNTS OF THE 1971 WAR
The perceptions, plans and activities of the Pakistan Navy can be discerned from the following source documents:
(a) "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" by Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan published in 1972, soon after the war.
(b) "The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972", compiled by the PN History Section in 1991, twenty years after the war.
(c) "The History of the Pakistan Air Force" by Syed Shabir Hussain and Squadron Leader M Tariq Quareshi published in 1982 by the PAF Press.
To present a balanced overview, excerpts which relate to specific naval operations have already been conjoined with the Indian accounts of these operations eg the First Missile Attack, the Second Missile Attack, the Sinking of the KHUKRI and Naval Operations in East Pakistan. The remaining excerpts of relevance have been presented in this chapter.
To facilitate analysis, the source material has been rearranged under the following headings :
(a) Pakistan Flotilla Operations
(b) Pakistan Submarine Deployment
(c) Assessment of Pakistan Air Force Performance
(d) Pakistan Navy and Air Force Cooperation
(e) Pakistan Maritime Reconnaissance
The timings in the Pakistan documents are Pakistan Standard Time. 30 minutes should be added to Pakistan Standard Time to bring it to Indian Standard Time.
PAKISTAN FLOTILLA OPERATIONS
Excerpts from "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"The naval war plans had last been reviewed in March 1971 and were based on the limited aim achievable by the available strength and state of weapons and the equipment that the Navy held. As there had been no changes in the Navy, no need was felt to review or revise them after that date. While planning, the Navy had assumed that it would be given a minimum of one weeks' notice before the war to redeploy and alert its units at sea. It had also expected that the promised limited air support would be made available within eighty miles of Karachi.
"As for the Indian intentions, the Navy had visualised that with Osa class missile boats and submarines available to the Indians, together with the threat from Pakistan submarines, their Navy would not attempt to attack Pakistan ships by their surface ships unless submarines, missiles and air attacks failed to neutralise the Pakistan Navy. Therefore its plans were based on the appreciation that it had no answer to the Indian Navy's missile boats. The surface ships were not to be exposed to this danger until the missile boat threat had been neutralised. The ships had to remain at sea within the Air Force fighter cover. The submarines, however, were to be deployed on offensive patrols off the major Indian ports and other focal areas.
"Like other major military decisions, the C-in-C Navy had neither been consulted nor associated with any of the deliberations that resulted in the decision to counter-attack from West Pakistan. He was merely called up by COS Army, to Rawalpindi on November 29, 1971, and informed of the President's decision to open hostilities in the West in a few days. He was not given the actual date and time, which were to be conveyed to him by C-in-C Air through a mutually agreed code word at the appropriate time.
"The mutually agreed code word was passed to C-in-C Navy at 1515 hours on December 3, 1971, personally by the C-in-C Air. The commanders concerned were hurriedly collected and given their instructions and signals were despatched to all ships by 1700 hours. The Navy had been deployed in their war stations earlier, when Indian belligerent intentions had become clear and on subsequent Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Some ships were patrolling 40 miles off Karachi and others 70 miles off the port. This was done for monitoring and checking the incoming ships and suspected craft approaching Karachi.
"On December 3, the PIA Fokker flying along the Kathiawar coast reported the sighting of India's Western fleet. The Pakistani submarines deployed in the area were not able to attack it, as they got their orders to commence their operations late that evening. Indeed the submarines had themselves seen the Indian Fleet proceeding overhead on December 2 but were unable to attack for the same reasons. As an alternative, an air strike was requested by the Navy but it was not available. Thus, by not giving sufficient notice of starting the operations to the Navy, a good opportunity to attack the Indian Western Fleet was missed.
"The first Indian Naval action took place on December 4, 1971. The Indian Air Force and the Navy seemed to have first class coordination. They had already established a Joint Centre in Bombay a few months earlier. Indian Naval attacks were always covered by the Indian Air Force by keeping Karachi under air attacks. At 0800 hours, the Indian Air Force started strafing Karachi. Two aircraft flew very low over the harbour and an oil tank in Keamari was hit by rockets. Indian aircraft strafed at intervals for the whole of the day on December 4. While the air raids were going on, the radar picked up a suspect contact at 2100 hours about 40 miles south of Karachi. It must be mentioned here that the presence of Osa Missile Boats of Russian origin, which had been taken over by the Indians, was known and upto the middle of November 1971, Russian naval personnel were seen on these boats in Bombay harbour. The Russian method of deployment which was followed by these boats was that they operated with submarines which acted as watch-dogs and observation posts. The Indian submarines were keeping 60 miles off Karachi and closed up only during the night. The Osa Boats had to have the submarines as directing platforms for their operations.
"After having been informed about the suspect contact, efforts were made to identify this contact. While this was being pursued, the attack came. At 2330 hours the Indian Air Force attack was still on, when PNS KHYBER out on patrol 70 miles off Karachi, signalled that it had been hit by an aircraft bomb. The NHQ was taken aback by this information.They could not believe that an aircraft could do this in the middle of the night. They asked for further information. No reply came from the ship as all communications with it had been lost in the meantime.
"About the same time HQ PNS Qasim, at Manora, reported having seen a big fire glow on the horizon out at sea. A fast patrol boat was at once despatched to investigate. On arriving at the site, it found mine sweeper PNS MUHAFIZ, 40 miles off Karachi, burning. The first person to be picked up by this boat from the water was the Captain of the minesweeper. It only came to light through him that the ship had been hit by missiles. No report of this incident had been received from this ship. The Indians had hit the two ships simultaneously. Other survivors were also picked up. On receiving information of the missile hit on PNS KHYBER, the boat despatched to pick up its survivors returned without success with the excuse that the weather at sea was very choppy and the survivors picked up from the minesweeper were in a bad way and needed medical attention immediately. All efforts were made to locate the KHYBER's survivors and 70 of them were rescued the next afternoon after about 18 hours of its sinking, although the search had continued by sea and air for the whole day.
"At midnight on December 4, the local Air Force Commanding Officer was approached to order an attack on the retreating missile boats. It was calculated that they would take six hours to reach their nearest sanctuary and thus allow enough time for the Air Force to attack them early next morning, but no air strike could be made available. It was known later that after the missile attack, the Indian boats instead of retreating south, had sailed westward off Gawadar where they stayed for three days. This fact came to notice by a chance conversation with someone travelling in a Cessna which had flown over Gawadar on December, 5. After having seen the pictures of the boats, he came out with the information that he had seen two of them near Gawadar.
"Anyway the Air Force in Karachi did not react to the Navy's request; therefore, the C-in-C Navy rang up the C-in-C PAF in Rawalpindi at 0400 hours and woke him up. After all sorts of pleading, the answer he obtained was `Well old boy, this happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do something in the future'.
"After the missile attack, the position of the surface ships at sea became almost untenable, as they had no defence against missiles. On December 7, the Flag Officer Commanding the Flotilla, after consulting his sea going Commanders, met the C-in-C. He acquainted him with the prevailing situation and suggested a withdrawal of the ships inside the harbour in order to escape a missile attack which was most likely to occur. The ships would of course be more susceptible to air attack there, but could also provide a powerful anti-aircraft threat, particularly against a low flying attack. It was, therefore, decided to withdraw all ships to the harbour on December 8, except for the fleet oil tanker which was fully loaded. It had to stay out because of fire hazard within the harbour by its presence and also that its deep draught restricted her entry into port. The oil tanker DACCA was, therefore, ordered to anchor with the other merchant ships away from the port.
"The Indian missile boats on their passage from Gawadar to Bombay, attacked the merchant ships outside the anchorage at night on December 8. Gulf Star, flying the Panama flag and the US owned ship Venus Challenger were sunk and Harmatton, a British vessel was severely damaged. DACCA along with three merchant ships, was also hit. Her company valiantly fought the fire and saved the ship after heavy damage had been done. One of the missiles fired by the missile boats flew over Manora and hit the first big steel structure it came cross. That was one of the oil tanks at Keamari which started huge fires in the oil farm. The course followed by this missile was strange, perhaps its homing device had failed.
"The withdrawal of the naval surface ships into harbour was thus claimed by NHQ as a sound tactical move as otherwise, all the naval units would have been attacked by the missile boats and in all probability most of them would have been sunk. Some officers of the Navy thought that it was a shameful act for the Navy to retreat to the harbour. This withdrawal is however a point on which any verdict is best left to Naval experts who would probably be discussing this as a case study for years.
"On December 8, air attacks on Karachi had started at 2000 hours. Again the air attacks were well coordinated with the missile attack at 2300 hours. Karachi was kept under air attack till 0200 hours on December 9 to give enough time to these missile boats to get away. The Navy was blamed all along by the public for doing nothing against the constant air attacks on Karachi. But the public did not know that the Navy had neither the means nor the responsibility for the air defence of Karachi. The Navy's presence in the harbour, however, acted as a deterrent to Indian aircraft. The dockyard was bombed but providentially remained safe. Four Indian aircraft were brought down by the Navy's anti-aircraft guns that night.
"In the meantime PNS BABUR while operating with other units of the Flotilla off the Makran coast in the evening on December 5, engaged a submarine. Destroyers were immediately despatched to carry out anti-submarine operations. Sonar contact of the submarine was achieved with the submarine which had by now submerged, and a number of attacks were carried out with anti-submarine mortars. Later, on basis of the evidence collected, the Navy claimed to have damaged the Indian submarine".
Excerpts from "Story of the Pakistan Navy"
"On 22 November, the Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation of state of emergency. The Pakistan Navy took on added precautions on 24 November, and the fleet came to standby with instructions to avoid creating the impression of an aggressive posture, as directed by the Government. Harbour defence measures were advanced and the Pakistan Navy took over control of all merchant shipping. Sea traffic from the west was diverted to a safe route.
"A critical element in the war at sea was the correct and timely deployment of the submarines. As tensions with India continued unabated, hostilities were inevitable. The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS VIKRANT, which was reported to be operating in that area. Interdiction of merchant shipping was, however, not permitted due to lack of Government approval for this form of warfare. It may be mentioned that the Indians suffered no such inhibitions.
"On 27 November, NHQ instructed FOFPAK (Rear Admiral MAK Lodi) to supplement the patrol undertaken by the minesweepers. The minesweepers were employed on an inner patrol and destroyers on an outer patrol. The object of the outer and inner patrols was to provide early warning of an enemy attack developing towards Karachi and to enable the fleet to make a timely interception. It was mistakenly thought that a missile attack would be neutralised by the PAF. At one stage commanding officers of ships of the flotilla expressed the view that greater emphasis should be placed on the possibility of a missile attack, and the concept of inner and outer patrols was abandoned. This was subsequently reinstituted.
"A plan for a counter-offensive in the West was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 November, 1971 and the high command decided to initiate military operations in the West on 3 December 1971. Pre-emptive strikes were carried out by the PAF at several Indian air bases along the western border and 3 December 1971. NHQ announced the outbreak of the war at 1845 on 3 December.
"The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted. The Indian naval units operated with no such inhibition; they attacked and captured several merchant vessels. However, the important point was that the submarines were at their war stations on 3 December when open hostilities started, poised to attack Indian naval units.
"The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when the war had just started; but the naval observer, being unaware of war having started, made his contact report hours later after landing. Had the Pakistan Navy been consulted or at least informed in time, this enemy force would have been destroyed or seriously damaged by our submarines and PAF effort. The outcome of naval warfare would then have been completely different than just being able to draw equal blood.
"On 3 December 1971, most of the Pakistan Navy ships were operational. BABUR and MUHAFIZ were at anchorage. DACCA was at Manora anchorage for a 5 day maintenance period with dockyard hands on board. SHAHJAHAN, MUJAHID and MAHMOOD were in harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan. The only other operational destroyer in harbour was BADR.
"ALAMGIR was under repairs scheduled to be completed on 15 December, 1971 and TUGHRIL was under refit. Two gun boats from Saudi Arabia, re-named SADAQAT and RAFAQAT, were at Karachi under the direct operational control of MHQ.
"KHAIBAR and TIPPU SULTAN were searching for MV Jhelum about 80 miles south-west of Karachi on a mission to escort her to Karachi. JAHANGIR was on patrol about 60 miles south of Karachi. She had been tasked to assist KHAIBAR to locate MV Jhelum and was to resume patrol thereafter. ZULFIQAR was on the inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.
"On the outbreak of hostilities, BADR and SHAHJAHAN were ordered to join FOFPAK at Gaddani. The minesweepers were sailed and tasked to carry out check sweeps outside the harbour and maintain a patrol between Cape Monze and Manora lighthouse. Within a few hours of the outbreak of war, all operational Pakistan Navy ships had put to sea and were on their war stations as planned: the surface fleet operating off the Makran coast and the submarines in their allocated areas off the Indian coast.
"KHAIBAR, with TIPPU SULTAN and JAHANGIR in company, learnt about the outbreak of hostilities through Radio Pakistan broadcast at 1800, when she was searching for MV Jhelum which was to be escorted to Karachi. C-in-C's message regarding outbreak of hostilities was received by these ships about an hour later at 1905. Three hours later at 2200, this task unit was alerted to the presence of a force consisting of two merchant ships screened by 8 warships off Diu Head on the Kathiawar coast (in position 20 50N, 67 23E at 2140 on 3 December) through a message transmitted to ships at sea by MHQ. The information in this message was based on an enemy report made by PN S/M HANGOR on patrol in the area.
"The presence and composition of this force had also been confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft on the evening of 3 December. An amplifying report indicated that the force had moved 30 miles southwards by 0332 on 4 December, although it was reported on a north-westerly course in the initial message. This tallies
with the movement of Western Indian Fleet which had sailed out of Bombay on 2 December, and subsequently, suspecting detection by our submarines and reconnaissance aircraft had split and moved south. Probably this was the MYSORE group, which had been allocated two Osas for a missile attack on Karachi.
"Although this was not the force which launched the first missile attack off Karachi on 4 December, MHQ's assessment was substantially correct; for the ships of this force did, in fact, have missile boats in tow to be released for an attack which had to be postponed from 5 to 8 December.
"After ordering TIPPU SULTAN to release an Indian dhow which had been taken in tow by her earlier, the OTC increased the speed of the force to 25 knots and at 2345 signalled his intention to join the flotilla. It will be recalled that the last orders for this unit were for KHAIBAR and TIPPU SULTAN to take MV Jhelum under escort and for JAHANGIR to resume outer patrol. With the changed situation, however, the ships expected new orders, but having received none decided to join the flotilla".
"As has been related in the section on Naval Operations in the Western Naval Command, two missile attacks took place. The "Story of the Pakistan Navy" states:
"There followed in the wake of the second missile attack yet another controversial decision: orders were issued at 1400 on 9 December to ships at Karachi to reduce their ammunition outfit.
"After the return of the ships to harbour on 8 December, their vulnerability in the port remained a topic of continuing debate. In the early hours of 9 December, only a few hours after the missile attack, dockyard workshops and buildings were severely damaged in a low level attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted by the huge flames of the fire at the oil farm - by an IAF bomber. Under these circumstances anxiety about the catastrophic consequences of an explosion in a ship fully loaded with ammunition was only natural.
"The decision to reduce the ammunition outfit, not withstanding the logic behind it, continues to be questioned by many. The adverse effect on morale of men, who were inclined to see it as a step to limit the surface ships operational role, was immediate. Not accepted by most as a necessary rational step, the decision remained a controversional issue.
"It was perhaps in consideration of the morale factor, and to avoid the impression that the fleet was immobilised, that a strategy of high speed probes was introduced. This required random sorties of short duration to be carried out at high speed by designated ships. Destroyers and frigates were employed in this manner until the end of the war.
"This speaks much for the mettle of officers and men who readily undertook these operations with enthusiasm, inspite of the knowledge that the ships had no viable defence against the surface missiles.
"While evaluating the performance of the surface fleet, it must be noted that in spite of the tremendous advantage, particularly in weapon range, which the Indian Navy enjoyed, our actual physical losses amounted to only one destroyer and a minesweeper sunk. This cannot be construed as the destruction of our fleet which was the Indian objective. The Indian Navy did succeed in gaining initial advantage through surprise but failed to fully press home its gains. The second missile attack cannot be called an unqualified success when evaluated against the strategic objective of destruction of the Pakistan Navy Fleet. The shock effect created by the missile attacks was more significant and it was aggravated by the thought that we would not have air support.
"As far as the Pakistan Fleet is concerned, the psychological impact was far greater than that warranted by physical losses. Though the surface force managed to survive, it failed to retain its threat and deterrent value as a Fleet-in-Being. The obsolescence of its weapons apart, lack of adequate air support inhibited the success of its operations. It must also be a admitted that our surveillance capability and command and control facilities were far from satisfactory. The neglect of the Navy over several decades came through clearly in the 1971 war."
PAKISTAN SUBMARINE DEPLOYMENT
In Dec 71, the Pakistan Navy had four submarines - the GHAZI on loan from America since 1964 and three new Daphne class submarines HANGOR, MANGOR and SHUSHUK acquired in 1970/71.
"Excerpt from Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"With the outmoded surface fleet almost neutralised by the missile threat, the burden of the Pakistan Navy's entire offensive effort hinged on the small but effective submarine force.
"The submarines were to be deployed on offensive patrols off the major Indian ports and other focal areas. Three Daphne submarines were deployed off the Bombay and Kathiawar coast and the submarine GHAZI was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The GHAZI's task was to carry out offensive mine-laying against Visakhapatnam and the other three submarines had to attack Indian warships when ordered."
Excerpt from the " Story of the Pakistan Navy"
"The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. The Daphnes were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal to locate VIKRANT.
"The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted."
On 22 November after the skirmish off Boyra in East Pakistan the previous day, COMSUB signal DTG 221720 to SUBRON 5 stated:
"Following areas occupied.
1. PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR.
2. PAPA FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT.
3. BRAVO ONE, TWO THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX.
4. MIKE".
The occupied areas referred to as PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT were the inner and outer patrol areas of ships of the Pakistan Fleet. The BRAVO areas were off Bombay occupied by MANGRO. Area MIKE was Madras occupied by GHAZI.
On the evening of 22 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 222117 addressed only to GHAZI and MANGRO directed them to "Arm all torpedoes."
On 23 November, the day Pakistan declared a national emergency, COMSUBS signal DTG 231905 to SUBRON 5 directed the submarine squadron to "Assume Precautionary stage".
On 25 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 252307 addressed only to GHAZI stated "Occupy Zone Victor with all despatch. Intelligence indicates carrier in port". Zone VICTOR was off Visakhapatnam.
On 1 December, one Daphne class submarine was seen entering Karachi harbour. This appears to have been SHUSHUK.
Role of Pakistani Submarines
`The Story of the Pakistan Navy' states :
"Interdiction of merchant shipping was not permitted due to lack of Government approval for this form of warfare.
The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attack against warships only."
HANGOR's Movements Till 9 December
"HANGOR slipped in the early hours of 22 November 1971 for a patrol off the Indian Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when a state of emergency was declared by Pakistan, HANGOR was off Porbandar close to the Indian cost. On 1 December, she received orders directing her to shift to a patrol area off Bombay vacated by PNS Submarine Mangro on completion of her patrol.
"HANGOR was on the surface on the night of 2 December when, at 2340, a large formation of ships was detected on her radar on an easterly bearing about 35 miles away. Such abnormal detection ranges are frequently obtained in this area in the winter months due to anomalous propagation of radio waves, a phenomenon which results from the trapping of radio waves in ducts formed due to temperature inversions in the atmosphere. HANGOR closed this formation to a range of 26 miles at 0049 on 3 December, when she dived to a depth of 40 metres and tracked the ships on her sonar till the early hours of the morning. A quick sweep by her radar at periscope depth revealed that the formation consisted of 6 escorts screening a main body of four ships. This was undoubtedly the Western Fleet comprising the cruiser INS MYSORE with supporting auxiliaries and her escorts which had sailed from Bombay on 2 December.
"At this time, though an all out war was raging in East Pakistan, hostilities had not broken out in the West. HANGOR could not attack these ships as she did not have clearance to do so. It was not until 0820 on the morning of 4 December that HANGOR learnt about the outbreak of hostilities through C-in-C's message received on the submarine broadcast. Frustration and disappointment at missing their prey by such a narrow margin was great for the Commanding Officer and the crew. But HANGOR's endeavours were not entirely in vain. Location of the Indian Fleet at this crucial time was by itself a significant accomplishment. In this case, however, her vigilance also contributed towards the cancellation of a missile attack which this force was scheduled to launch at Karachi on the night of 5 December. Suspecting detection by the submarine, the Indian Fleet split and moved so far south that it was no longer in a position to execute its attack plan.
"HANGOR continued her patrol. Occasionally she closed Bombay harbour and detected some warships operating in waters too shallow for the submarine to make an approach and launch its torpedoes. At other times, her limited submerged speed-the main handicap of conventional submarines-prevented interception of good targets. The officers and men of HANGOR were not deterred by these disappointments."
ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANI SUBMARINE DEPLOYMENT
Deployment of GHAZI
GHAZI, having the longest distance to go, sailed from Karachi on 14 November. She was off Madras on 23 November in Area Mike, until she was ordered on night 25/26 November to occupy Zone Victor off Visakhapatnam, where she sank on night 3/4 December.
Deployment of Daphne Class Submarines
MANGRO.
MANGRO sailed around 14 December to her patrol area off Bombay. COMSUBS signal DTG 222117 to "Arm all torpedoes" was addressed only to GHAZI (who was nearing Madras) and to MANGRO who was off Bombay till 1 December, occupying the areas referred to as BRAVO ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX in COMSUBS signal DTG 221720. This area stretched from Diu Head to Dabhol on the west coast of India. MANGRO vacated her patrol area in end November and returned to Karachi.
HANGOR
HANGOR sailed in the early hours of 22 November for a patrol off the Indian Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when Pakistan declared a state of emergency, HANGOR was off Porbandar.
On 1 Dec, HANGOR shifted from off Porbandar to the patrol area off Bombay vacated by MANGRO on completion of its patrol. On the night of 2 December, HANGOR detected the Indian Fleet and tracked it till the early hours of 3 December. News of the outbreak of hostilities reached HANGOR only on the morning of 4 December.
From 4 Dec to 8 Dec HANGOR operated in the approaches to Bombay. She found that Indian warships were operating in waters too shallow for her to approach and attack. She extended her patrol northwards towards Diu. On five occasions, she transmitted on HF, which enabled her position to be established.
(a) On 4 December at 1004 in position 271 Dabhol Lt 71.
(b) On 4 December at 1745 in position 285 Khanderi Lt 135.
(c) On 7 December at 1538 in position 265 Khanderi Lt 285.
(d) On 9 December at 1045 in position 239 Diu 59.
(e) On 9 December at 1720 in position 220 Okha 60.
By 8 December her identity as HANGOR had been established. In the early hours of 9 December, she located KHUKRI and KIRPAN, who had been deployed to locate and attack her.
HANGOR sank the KHUKRI at 2045 on the evening of 9 December, eighteen miles southwest of Diu and headed for Karachi. Operation FALCON did not succeed in crippling her and she reached Karachi on 18 December after the ceasefire.
SHUSHUK.
"The Story of Pakistan Navy" makes no mention of SHUSHUK's deployment. Intelligence reports after the war indicated that SHUSHUK was initially employed in the approaches to Karachi but had to be withdrawn for emergency docking to rectify leaks in the stern glands and defects in her torpedo tubes.
Deployment of Midget Submarines
The naval element of the Special Surface Group which manned the midget submarines were an elite, rigorously trained group. The offensive capability of the midget submarine had been seriously depleted as early as 1968 when it was found that it could not carry a torpedo. That reduced its role to carrying frogmen to enemy harbours, into depths where larger submarines could not penetrate.
In mid 1971, some SSG personnel had to be deployed to East Pakistan to cope with the Mukti Bahini. They returned to Karachi only in September. Their absence lowered the combat readiness of the midgets.
Midget crews had been trained to be towed underwater by GHAZI. For sorties longer than three days, the relief crew took over on passage and the attack crew took over just before being detached to attack.
During the 1971 war, midgets could not play any role because GHAZI's role was changed to minelaying and she was deployed to the Bay of Bengal.
Deployment of Chariots
There is no evidence that the chariots were deployed during the war. Reportedly, a shortage of spare parts affected their operational readiness.
ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN AIR FORCE PERFORMANCE
In his book, Pakistan's "Crisis in Leadership", Maj Gen Fazal Muqueem Khan analysed the Pakistan Air Force's performance during the 1971 war. His conclusions were:
(a) The PAF plan was based on the war lasting six months.
(b) The PAF C-in-C's main idea was to conserve the Air Force. The PAF chose to be on the defensive,both tactically and strategically. It was committed to defending its air bases only and waiting for the enemy to come and attack them. This kept the aircraft perpetually busy in air patrols over the defended air bases.
(c) The PAF defensive strategy relied too heavily on the expectation that the IAF would carry out mass raids on the PAF air bases and would thus suffer heavily. Confining the PAF to selected airfields away from the border decreased the effective strike range of PAF aircraft and increased the reaction time.
(d) The C-in-C PAF over-centralised his command and allowed little flexibility to his subordinates. Hardly any action could be taken without clearance from the C-in-C.
(e) The PAF deployment in airfields a long distance away from the scene of action affected the ability of the PAF to intervene effectively in the naval battles in the South.
(f) In East Pakistan, there was only one squadron of 16 Sabres. Two of these were lost over Boyra on 22 November. Three were lost on 4 December in the air battles over Dacca. Eleven were immobilised by the PAF itself on the ground in Dacca, to prevent their falling into enemy hands.
(g) The Indian victory was due as much to their careful and patient planning as it was to the lack of all this in Pakistan.
Excerpts from "History of the Pakistan Air Force"
This document is conspicuously sparse on information regarding sorties in support of the Pakistan Navy. The only information of naval relevance is :
(a) In November 1971, No 7 Canberra Squadron based at Mauripur (Masroor)flew six sorties in support of the Pakistan Navy. These were armed recce missions in search of hostile naval vessels within 180 miles south and southwest of Karachi.
(b) In December 1971 on 5 December, the Indian Naval base for missile boats at Okha was set ablaze; the fire continued for full six days. Okha was attacked again on 10 Dec.
PAKISTAN NAVY - AIR FORCE COOPERATION
Excerpts from "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"The PAF was not equipped to support naval operations. Maritime reconnaissance was only provided by the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and civil aviation aircraft which had been pressed into service after the emergency (i.e. on 23 November 1971). In all, 59 sorties by PIA aircraft and 68 sorties by civil aviation aircraft were provided during the war. In spite of all their limitations and their pilots' lack of training for this particular task, these aircraft still performed very well. One Fokker aircraft was lost during these operations.
"The PAF launched a B-57 mission against the Indian missile boat harbour at Okha and some harbour installations were set on fire, but this was late in the war and much after the time when the Navy had asked for it, and none of the missile boats, already out to sea, was affected. Repeat strikes were also launched on December 9 and 10 and some other installations and two large oil tanks were set ablaze. The last strike was carried out by a section of F - 104s, which sighted an anti-submarine Alize aircraft of the Indian Navy and shot it down.
"After the Indian air attacks on Karachi, the people wondered why the PAF did not strike at Bombay harbour. It failed to attack Bombay in retaliation to the Indian attacks on Karachi's civilian targets. This should have been done even for psychological reasons, but the PAF missed the opportunity. The excuse for not doing so was that it had night capability only for a strike at Bombay and was not convinced of gaining any military advantage there. The Indian announcement of a PAF strike at Bombay and stories of the damages done there, were, therefore, surprising.
"The air support which the Navy wanted was never catered for. It was vaguely promised a few reconnaissance sorties and some close support sorties which were dependent on availability. It never occurred to the C-in-C Navy to ask for the PAF plan.
"The Pakistan Air Force flew 27 sorties in support of Pakistan Navy Operations.
"The PAF's performance in 1971 did not come up to public expectation. The C-in-C, PAF failed to provide imaginative leadership to plan and direct the air effort. Both strategically and tactically the air force was kept on the defensive. It was deployed in depth but too thinly. Whereas it could undertake its own defence, it could not generate offensive effort. When the Indians changed their strategy on or about December 7, after the first three days, the PAF was not prepared to change over during the short war to meet the new enemy threat, and remained helpless. In addition, by too much centralized control, it was kept on the leash all the time. It operated at only about 50 percent of its war time capability. As for inter-service cooperation, it had not acquired any maritime support capability and did not provide any meaningful support to the Navy."
PAKISTAN MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE
"Excerpt from Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"The Navy, in the absence of any shore based radar and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, was virtually blind. Therefore the services of a civilian radar were requisitioned and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) willingly provided a Fokker Friendship flight to operate reconnaissance flights. The PIA plane had its own limitations for the purpose it was being used. Its radar was a weather radar and it had only 7 degree decline which could not see downwards. The civil pilots, however, did an extremely good job of work without any previous training in this particular field.
"At about the same time on December 3, when Naval HQ was issuing orders and instructions, the Fokker flying along the Kathiawar coast - PIA air patrols had been started on November 30 - reported the sighting of India's Western Fleet consisting of a cruiser, six destroyers and an oil tanker off the Rann of Kutch coast. It was operating around its forward base at Okha."
"Excerpts from the Story of Pakistan Navy"
"The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when the war had just started, but the naval observer, being unaware of war having started, made his contact report hours later after landing.
"After the first missile attack, Commodore Hanif took over as DCNS(O) on 5 December and contacted the Air Priority Board which provided a mixed bag of a dozen aircraft including the Governor of Punjab's Cessna, a plant protection aircraft, an old DC3 Dakota, some Aero Club Austers and two armed Cessnas. We also obtained two Fokkers and two Twin Otters fitted with radar. All these aircraft were lined-up at Karachi civil airport where a "Fleet Air Arm" was set up immediately. The aircraft were controlled by naval officers positioned at the airport along with a PAF liaison officer provided by MHQ.
"The aircraft were manned by civilian volunteer crews from PIA and the Flying Club and maintained by PIA and CAA at Karachi in such an efficient manner that there was no problem in operating 3 or 4 light aircraft at a time during day in their respective sectors on an arc 200 miles from Karachi covering the entire area from Jamnagar to the Makran coast. At night, two radar-fitted aircraft at a time covered the same arc. Thus, from the afternoon of 5 December, it was difficult for an Osa to approach within 200 miles of Karachi undetected.
ANALYSIS
Indian Naval ships and submarines reported shadowing aircraft on the following dates. Available records do not indicate whether all the aircraft made detection reports.
03 Dec - PM - Western Fleet 210 miles south of Karachi
04 Dec - AM - Western fleet southwest of Okha.
- AM - Submarine KURSURA returning to Bombay after R/V with KARANJ.
05 Dec - AM - Trident force withdrawing from Karachi.
PM - TIR and Trident force refuelling at Mangrol.
06 Dec -PM - RANJIT south of Makran Coast.
07 Dec -AM - TIR, KATCHALL,missile boat group west of Okha.
08 Dec -PM - Western Fleet 75 miles south of Jiwani. Submarine KARANJ off Karachi. TIR off Saurashtra.
09 Dec - AM - Submarine KARANJ east of Ormara. KIRPAN off Diu.
-PM KHUKRI, KIRPAN off Diu.
10 Dec - PM - Submarine KARANJ south of Ormara.
Naval observers were flown in the PIA Fokker recce aircraft which had been tasked with locating missile boats :
(a) The naval observer correctly recgnised the Western Fleet on 3 Dec and correctly reported its alteration of course southward.
(b) The naval observer mistook the ZULFIQAR for a missile boat near Cape Monze on 6 Dec, which led to ZULFIQAR being attacked by the PAF.
Analysis Of The Pakistan Navy's Accounts Of The 1971 War
http://indiannavy.nic.in/print/book/export/html/962
CHAPTER 12
ANALYSIS OF THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNTS OF THE 1971 WAR
The perceptions, plans and activities of the Pakistan Navy can be discerned from the following source documents:
(a) "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" by Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan published in 1972, soon after the war.
(b) "The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972", compiled by the PN History Section in 1991, twenty years after the war.
(c) "The History of the Pakistan Air Force" by Syed Shabir Hussain and Squadron Leader M Tariq Quareshi published in 1982 by the PAF Press.
To present a balanced overview, excerpts which relate to specific naval operations have already been conjoined with the Indian accounts of these operations eg the First Missile Attack, the Second Missile Attack, the Sinking of the KHUKRI and Naval Operations in East Pakistan. The remaining excerpts of relevance have been presented in this chapter.
To facilitate analysis, the source material has been rearranged under the following headings :
(a) Pakistan Flotilla Operations
(b) Pakistan Submarine Deployment
(c) Assessment of Pakistan Air Force Performance
(d) Pakistan Navy and Air Force Cooperation
(e) Pakistan Maritime Reconnaissance
The timings in the Pakistan documents are Pakistan Standard Time. 30 minutes should be added to Pakistan Standard Time to bring it to Indian Standard Time.
PAKISTAN FLOTILLA OPERATIONS
Excerpts from "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"The naval war plans had last been reviewed in March 1971 and were based on the limited aim achievable by the available strength and state of weapons and the equipment that the Navy held. As there had been no changes in the Navy, no need was felt to review or revise them after that date. While planning, the Navy had assumed that it would be given a minimum of one weeks' notice before the war to redeploy and alert its units at sea. It had also expected that the promised limited air support would be made available within eighty miles of Karachi.
"As for the Indian intentions, the Navy had visualised that with Osa class missile boats and submarines available to the Indians, together with the threat from Pakistan submarines, their Navy would not attempt to attack Pakistan ships by their surface ships unless submarines, missiles and air attacks failed to neutralise the Pakistan Navy. Therefore its plans were based on the appreciation that it had no answer to the Indian Navy's missile boats. The surface ships were not to be exposed to this danger until the missile boat threat had been neutralised. The ships had to remain at sea within the Air Force fighter cover. The submarines, however, were to be deployed on offensive patrols off the major Indian ports and other focal areas.
"Like other major military decisions, the C-in-C Navy had neither been consulted nor associated with any of the deliberations that resulted in the decision to counter-attack from West Pakistan. He was merely called up by COS Army, to Rawalpindi on November 29, 1971, and informed of the President's decision to open hostilities in the West in a few days. He was not given the actual date and time, which were to be conveyed to him by C-in-C Air through a mutually agreed code word at the appropriate time.
"The mutually agreed code word was passed to C-in-C Navy at 1515 hours on December 3, 1971, personally by the C-in-C Air. The commanders concerned were hurriedly collected and given their instructions and signals were despatched to all ships by 1700 hours. The Navy had been deployed in their war stations earlier, when Indian belligerent intentions had become clear and on subsequent Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Some ships were patrolling 40 miles off Karachi and others 70 miles off the port. This was done for monitoring and checking the incoming ships and suspected craft approaching Karachi.
"On December 3, the PIA Fokker flying along the Kathiawar coast reported the sighting of India's Western fleet. The Pakistani submarines deployed in the area were not able to attack it, as they got their orders to commence their operations late that evening. Indeed the submarines had themselves seen the Indian Fleet proceeding overhead on December 2 but were unable to attack for the same reasons. As an alternative, an air strike was requested by the Navy but it was not available. Thus, by not giving sufficient notice of starting the operations to the Navy, a good opportunity to attack the Indian Western Fleet was missed.
"The first Indian Naval action took place on December 4, 1971. The Indian Air Force and the Navy seemed to have first class coordination. They had already established a Joint Centre in Bombay a few months earlier. Indian Naval attacks were always covered by the Indian Air Force by keeping Karachi under air attacks. At 0800 hours, the Indian Air Force started strafing Karachi. Two aircraft flew very low over the harbour and an oil tank in Keamari was hit by rockets. Indian aircraft strafed at intervals for the whole of the day on December 4. While the air raids were going on, the radar picked up a suspect contact at 2100 hours about 40 miles south of Karachi. It must be mentioned here that the presence of Osa Missile Boats of Russian origin, which had been taken over by the Indians, was known and upto the middle of November 1971, Russian naval personnel were seen on these boats in Bombay harbour. The Russian method of deployment which was followed by these boats was that they operated with submarines which acted as watch-dogs and observation posts. The Indian submarines were keeping 60 miles off Karachi and closed up only during the night. The Osa Boats had to have the submarines as directing platforms for their operations.
"After having been informed about the suspect contact, efforts were made to identify this contact. While this was being pursued, the attack came. At 2330 hours the Indian Air Force attack was still on, when PNS KHYBER out on patrol 70 miles off Karachi, signalled that it had been hit by an aircraft bomb. The NHQ was taken aback by this information.They could not believe that an aircraft could do this in the middle of the night. They asked for further information. No reply came from the ship as all communications with it had been lost in the meantime.
"About the same time HQ PNS Qasim, at Manora, reported having seen a big fire glow on the horizon out at sea. A fast patrol boat was at once despatched to investigate. On arriving at the site, it found mine sweeper PNS MUHAFIZ, 40 miles off Karachi, burning. The first person to be picked up by this boat from the water was the Captain of the minesweeper. It only came to light through him that the ship had been hit by missiles. No report of this incident had been received from this ship. The Indians had hit the two ships simultaneously. Other survivors were also picked up. On receiving information of the missile hit on PNS KHYBER, the boat despatched to pick up its survivors returned without success with the excuse that the weather at sea was very choppy and the survivors picked up from the minesweeper were in a bad way and needed medical attention immediately. All efforts were made to locate the KHYBER's survivors and 70 of them were rescued the next afternoon after about 18 hours of its sinking, although the search had continued by sea and air for the whole day.
"At midnight on December 4, the local Air Force Commanding Officer was approached to order an attack on the retreating missile boats. It was calculated that they would take six hours to reach their nearest sanctuary and thus allow enough time for the Air Force to attack them early next morning, but no air strike could be made available. It was known later that after the missile attack, the Indian boats instead of retreating south, had sailed westward off Gawadar where they stayed for three days. This fact came to notice by a chance conversation with someone travelling in a Cessna which had flown over Gawadar on December, 5. After having seen the pictures of the boats, he came out with the information that he had seen two of them near Gawadar.
"Anyway the Air Force in Karachi did not react to the Navy's request; therefore, the C-in-C Navy rang up the C-in-C PAF in Rawalpindi at 0400 hours and woke him up. After all sorts of pleading, the answer he obtained was `Well old boy, this happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do something in the future'.
"After the missile attack, the position of the surface ships at sea became almost untenable, as they had no defence against missiles. On December 7, the Flag Officer Commanding the Flotilla, after consulting his sea going Commanders, met the C-in-C. He acquainted him with the prevailing situation and suggested a withdrawal of the ships inside the harbour in order to escape a missile attack which was most likely to occur. The ships would of course be more susceptible to air attack there, but could also provide a powerful anti-aircraft threat, particularly against a low flying attack. It was, therefore, decided to withdraw all ships to the harbour on December 8, except for the fleet oil tanker which was fully loaded. It had to stay out because of fire hazard within the harbour by its presence and also that its deep draught restricted her entry into port. The oil tanker DACCA was, therefore, ordered to anchor with the other merchant ships away from the port.
"The Indian missile boats on their passage from Gawadar to Bombay, attacked the merchant ships outside the anchorage at night on December 8. Gulf Star, flying the Panama flag and the US owned ship Venus Challenger were sunk and Harmatton, a British vessel was severely damaged. DACCA along with three merchant ships, was also hit. Her company valiantly fought the fire and saved the ship after heavy damage had been done. One of the missiles fired by the missile boats flew over Manora and hit the first big steel structure it came cross. That was one of the oil tanks at Keamari which started huge fires in the oil farm. The course followed by this missile was strange, perhaps its homing device had failed.
"The withdrawal of the naval surface ships into harbour was thus claimed by NHQ as a sound tactical move as otherwise, all the naval units would have been attacked by the missile boats and in all probability most of them would have been sunk. Some officers of the Navy thought that it was a shameful act for the Navy to retreat to the harbour. This withdrawal is however a point on which any verdict is best left to Naval experts who would probably be discussing this as a case study for years.
"On December 8, air attacks on Karachi had started at 2000 hours. Again the air attacks were well coordinated with the missile attack at 2300 hours. Karachi was kept under air attack till 0200 hours on December 9 to give enough time to these missile boats to get away. The Navy was blamed all along by the public for doing nothing against the constant air attacks on Karachi. But the public did not know that the Navy had neither the means nor the responsibility for the air defence of Karachi. The Navy's presence in the harbour, however, acted as a deterrent to Indian aircraft. The dockyard was bombed but providentially remained safe. Four Indian aircraft were brought down by the Navy's anti-aircraft guns that night.
"In the meantime PNS BABUR while operating with other units of the Flotilla off the Makran coast in the evening on December 5, engaged a submarine. Destroyers were immediately despatched to carry out anti-submarine operations. Sonar contact of the submarine was achieved with the submarine which had by now submerged, and a number of attacks were carried out with anti-submarine mortars. Later, on basis of the evidence collected, the Navy claimed to have damaged the Indian submarine".
Excerpts from "Story of the Pakistan Navy"
"On 22 November, the Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation of state of emergency. The Pakistan Navy took on added precautions on 24 November, and the fleet came to standby with instructions to avoid creating the impression of an aggressive posture, as directed by the Government. Harbour defence measures were advanced and the Pakistan Navy took over control of all merchant shipping. Sea traffic from the west was diverted to a safe route.
"A critical element in the war at sea was the correct and timely deployment of the submarines. As tensions with India continued unabated, hostilities were inevitable. The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS VIKRANT, which was reported to be operating in that area. Interdiction of merchant shipping was, however, not permitted due to lack of Government approval for this form of warfare. It may be mentioned that the Indians suffered no such inhibitions.
"On 27 November, NHQ instructed FOFPAK (Rear Admiral MAK Lodi) to supplement the patrol undertaken by the minesweepers. The minesweepers were employed on an inner patrol and destroyers on an outer patrol. The object of the outer and inner patrols was to provide early warning of an enemy attack developing towards Karachi and to enable the fleet to make a timely interception. It was mistakenly thought that a missile attack would be neutralised by the PAF. At one stage commanding officers of ships of the flotilla expressed the view that greater emphasis should be placed on the possibility of a missile attack, and the concept of inner and outer patrols was abandoned. This was subsequently reinstituted.
"A plan for a counter-offensive in the West was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 November, 1971 and the high command decided to initiate military operations in the West on 3 December 1971. Pre-emptive strikes were carried out by the PAF at several Indian air bases along the western border and 3 December 1971. NHQ announced the outbreak of the war at 1845 on 3 December.
"The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted. The Indian naval units operated with no such inhibition; they attacked and captured several merchant vessels. However, the important point was that the submarines were at their war stations on 3 December when open hostilities started, poised to attack Indian naval units.
"The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when the war had just started; but the naval observer, being unaware of war having started, made his contact report hours later after landing. Had the Pakistan Navy been consulted or at least informed in time, this enemy force would have been destroyed or seriously damaged by our submarines and PAF effort. The outcome of naval warfare would then have been completely different than just being able to draw equal blood.
"On 3 December 1971, most of the Pakistan Navy ships were operational. BABUR and MUHAFIZ were at anchorage. DACCA was at Manora anchorage for a 5 day maintenance period with dockyard hands on board. SHAHJAHAN, MUJAHID and MAHMOOD were in harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan. The only other operational destroyer in harbour was BADR.
"ALAMGIR was under repairs scheduled to be completed on 15 December, 1971 and TUGHRIL was under refit. Two gun boats from Saudi Arabia, re-named SADAQAT and RAFAQAT, were at Karachi under the direct operational control of MHQ.
"KHAIBAR and TIPPU SULTAN were searching for MV Jhelum about 80 miles south-west of Karachi on a mission to escort her to Karachi. JAHANGIR was on patrol about 60 miles south of Karachi. She had been tasked to assist KHAIBAR to locate MV Jhelum and was to resume patrol thereafter. ZULFIQAR was on the inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.
"On the outbreak of hostilities, BADR and SHAHJAHAN were ordered to join FOFPAK at Gaddani. The minesweepers were sailed and tasked to carry out check sweeps outside the harbour and maintain a patrol between Cape Monze and Manora lighthouse. Within a few hours of the outbreak of war, all operational Pakistan Navy ships had put to sea and were on their war stations as planned: the surface fleet operating off the Makran coast and the submarines in their allocated areas off the Indian coast.
"KHAIBAR, with TIPPU SULTAN and JAHANGIR in company, learnt about the outbreak of hostilities through Radio Pakistan broadcast at 1800, when she was searching for MV Jhelum which was to be escorted to Karachi. C-in-C's message regarding outbreak of hostilities was received by these ships about an hour later at 1905. Three hours later at 2200, this task unit was alerted to the presence of a force consisting of two merchant ships screened by 8 warships off Diu Head on the Kathiawar coast (in position 20 50N, 67 23E at 2140 on 3 December) through a message transmitted to ships at sea by MHQ. The information in this message was based on an enemy report made by PN S/M HANGOR on patrol in the area.
"The presence and composition of this force had also been confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft on the evening of 3 December. An amplifying report indicated that the force had moved 30 miles southwards by 0332 on 4 December, although it was reported on a north-westerly course in the initial message. This tallies
with the movement of Western Indian Fleet which had sailed out of Bombay on 2 December, and subsequently, suspecting detection by our submarines and reconnaissance aircraft had split and moved south. Probably this was the MYSORE group, which had been allocated two Osas for a missile attack on Karachi.
"Although this was not the force which launched the first missile attack off Karachi on 4 December, MHQ's assessment was substantially correct; for the ships of this force did, in fact, have missile boats in tow to be released for an attack which had to be postponed from 5 to 8 December.
"After ordering TIPPU SULTAN to release an Indian dhow which had been taken in tow by her earlier, the OTC increased the speed of the force to 25 knots and at 2345 signalled his intention to join the flotilla. It will be recalled that the last orders for this unit were for KHAIBAR and TIPPU SULTAN to take MV Jhelum under escort and for JAHANGIR to resume outer patrol. With the changed situation, however, the ships expected new orders, but having received none decided to join the flotilla".
"As has been related in the section on Naval Operations in the Western Naval Command, two missile attacks took place. The "Story of the Pakistan Navy" states:
"There followed in the wake of the second missile attack yet another controversial decision: orders were issued at 1400 on 9 December to ships at Karachi to reduce their ammunition outfit.
"After the return of the ships to harbour on 8 December, their vulnerability in the port remained a topic of continuing debate. In the early hours of 9 December, only a few hours after the missile attack, dockyard workshops and buildings were severely damaged in a low level attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted by the huge flames of the fire at the oil farm - by an IAF bomber. Under these circumstances anxiety about the catastrophic consequences of an explosion in a ship fully loaded with ammunition was only natural.
"The decision to reduce the ammunition outfit, not withstanding the logic behind it, continues to be questioned by many. The adverse effect on morale of men, who were inclined to see it as a step to limit the surface ships operational role, was immediate. Not accepted by most as a necessary rational step, the decision remained a controversional issue.
"It was perhaps in consideration of the morale factor, and to avoid the impression that the fleet was immobilised, that a strategy of high speed probes was introduced. This required random sorties of short duration to be carried out at high speed by designated ships. Destroyers and frigates were employed in this manner until the end of the war.
"This speaks much for the mettle of officers and men who readily undertook these operations with enthusiasm, inspite of the knowledge that the ships had no viable defence against the surface missiles.
"While evaluating the performance of the surface fleet, it must be noted that in spite of the tremendous advantage, particularly in weapon range, which the Indian Navy enjoyed, our actual physical losses amounted to only one destroyer and a minesweeper sunk. This cannot be construed as the destruction of our fleet which was the Indian objective. The Indian Navy did succeed in gaining initial advantage through surprise but failed to fully press home its gains. The second missile attack cannot be called an unqualified success when evaluated against the strategic objective of destruction of the Pakistan Navy Fleet. The shock effect created by the missile attacks was more significant and it was aggravated by the thought that we would not have air support.
"As far as the Pakistan Fleet is concerned, the psychological impact was far greater than that warranted by physical losses. Though the surface force managed to survive, it failed to retain its threat and deterrent value as a Fleet-in-Being. The obsolescence of its weapons apart, lack of adequate air support inhibited the success of its operations. It must also be a admitted that our surveillance capability and command and control facilities were far from satisfactory. The neglect of the Navy over several decades came through clearly in the 1971 war."
PAKISTAN SUBMARINE DEPLOYMENT
In Dec 71, the Pakistan Navy had four submarines - the GHAZI on loan from America since 1964 and three new Daphne class submarines HANGOR, MANGOR and SHUSHUK acquired in 1970/71.
"Excerpt from Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"With the outmoded surface fleet almost neutralised by the missile threat, the burden of the Pakistan Navy's entire offensive effort hinged on the small but effective submarine force.
"The submarines were to be deployed on offensive patrols off the major Indian ports and other focal areas. Three Daphne submarines were deployed off the Bombay and Kathiawar coast and the submarine GHAZI was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The GHAZI's task was to carry out offensive mine-laying against Visakhapatnam and the other three submarines had to attack Indian warships when ordered."
Excerpt from the " Story of the Pakistan Navy"
"The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. The Daphnes were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal to locate VIKRANT.
"The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted."
On 22 November after the skirmish off Boyra in East Pakistan the previous day, COMSUB signal DTG 221720 to SUBRON 5 stated:
"Following areas occupied.
1. PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR.
2. PAPA FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT.
3. BRAVO ONE, TWO THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX.
4. MIKE".
The occupied areas referred to as PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT were the inner and outer patrol areas of ships of the Pakistan Fleet. The BRAVO areas were off Bombay occupied by MANGRO. Area MIKE was Madras occupied by GHAZI.
On the evening of 22 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 222117 addressed only to GHAZI and MANGRO directed them to "Arm all torpedoes."
On 23 November, the day Pakistan declared a national emergency, COMSUBS signal DTG 231905 to SUBRON 5 directed the submarine squadron to "Assume Precautionary stage".
On 25 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 252307 addressed only to GHAZI stated "Occupy Zone Victor with all despatch. Intelligence indicates carrier in port". Zone VICTOR was off Visakhapatnam.
On 1 December, one Daphne class submarine was seen entering Karachi harbour. This appears to have been SHUSHUK.
Role of Pakistani Submarines
`The Story of the Pakistan Navy' states :
"Interdiction of merchant shipping was not permitted due to lack of Government approval for this form of warfare.
The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attack against warships only."
HANGOR's Movements Till 9 December
"HANGOR slipped in the early hours of 22 November 1971 for a patrol off the Indian Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when a state of emergency was declared by Pakistan, HANGOR was off Porbandar close to the Indian cost. On 1 December, she received orders directing her to shift to a patrol area off Bombay vacated by PNS Submarine Mangro on completion of her patrol.
"HANGOR was on the surface on the night of 2 December when, at 2340, a large formation of ships was detected on her radar on an easterly bearing about 35 miles away. Such abnormal detection ranges are frequently obtained in this area in the winter months due to anomalous propagation of radio waves, a phenomenon which results from the trapping of radio waves in ducts formed due to temperature inversions in the atmosphere. HANGOR closed this formation to a range of 26 miles at 0049 on 3 December, when she dived to a depth of 40 metres and tracked the ships on her sonar till the early hours of the morning. A quick sweep by her radar at periscope depth revealed that the formation consisted of 6 escorts screening a main body of four ships. This was undoubtedly the Western Fleet comprising the cruiser INS MYSORE with supporting auxiliaries and her escorts which had sailed from Bombay on 2 December.
"At this time, though an all out war was raging in East Pakistan, hostilities had not broken out in the West. HANGOR could not attack these ships as she did not have clearance to do so. It was not until 0820 on the morning of 4 December that HANGOR learnt about the outbreak of hostilities through C-in-C's message received on the submarine broadcast. Frustration and disappointment at missing their prey by such a narrow margin was great for the Commanding Officer and the crew. But HANGOR's endeavours were not entirely in vain. Location of the Indian Fleet at this crucial time was by itself a significant accomplishment. In this case, however, her vigilance also contributed towards the cancellation of a missile attack which this force was scheduled to launch at Karachi on the night of 5 December. Suspecting detection by the submarine, the Indian Fleet split and moved so far south that it was no longer in a position to execute its attack plan.
"HANGOR continued her patrol. Occasionally she closed Bombay harbour and detected some warships operating in waters too shallow for the submarine to make an approach and launch its torpedoes. At other times, her limited submerged speed-the main handicap of conventional submarines-prevented interception of good targets. The officers and men of HANGOR were not deterred by these disappointments."
ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANI SUBMARINE DEPLOYMENT
Deployment of GHAZI
GHAZI, having the longest distance to go, sailed from Karachi on 14 November. She was off Madras on 23 November in Area Mike, until she was ordered on night 25/26 November to occupy Zone Victor off Visakhapatnam, where she sank on night 3/4 December.
Deployment of Daphne Class Submarines
MANGRO.
MANGRO sailed around 14 December to her patrol area off Bombay. COMSUBS signal DTG 222117 to "Arm all torpedoes" was addressed only to GHAZI (who was nearing Madras) and to MANGRO who was off Bombay till 1 December, occupying the areas referred to as BRAVO ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX in COMSUBS signal DTG 221720. This area stretched from Diu Head to Dabhol on the west coast of India. MANGRO vacated her patrol area in end November and returned to Karachi.
HANGOR
HANGOR sailed in the early hours of 22 November for a patrol off the Indian Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when Pakistan declared a state of emergency, HANGOR was off Porbandar.
On 1 Dec, HANGOR shifted from off Porbandar to the patrol area off Bombay vacated by MANGRO on completion of its patrol. On the night of 2 December, HANGOR detected the Indian Fleet and tracked it till the early hours of 3 December. News of the outbreak of hostilities reached HANGOR only on the morning of 4 December.
From 4 Dec to 8 Dec HANGOR operated in the approaches to Bombay. She found that Indian warships were operating in waters too shallow for her to approach and attack. She extended her patrol northwards towards Diu. On five occasions, she transmitted on HF, which enabled her position to be established.
(a) On 4 December at 1004 in position 271 Dabhol Lt 71.
(b) On 4 December at 1745 in position 285 Khanderi Lt 135.
(c) On 7 December at 1538 in position 265 Khanderi Lt 285.
(d) On 9 December at 1045 in position 239 Diu 59.
(e) On 9 December at 1720 in position 220 Okha 60.
By 8 December her identity as HANGOR had been established. In the early hours of 9 December, she located KHUKRI and KIRPAN, who had been deployed to locate and attack her.
HANGOR sank the KHUKRI at 2045 on the evening of 9 December, eighteen miles southwest of Diu and headed for Karachi. Operation FALCON did not succeed in crippling her and she reached Karachi on 18 December after the ceasefire.
SHUSHUK.
"The Story of Pakistan Navy" makes no mention of SHUSHUK's deployment. Intelligence reports after the war indicated that SHUSHUK was initially employed in the approaches to Karachi but had to be withdrawn for emergency docking to rectify leaks in the stern glands and defects in her torpedo tubes.
Deployment of Midget Submarines
The naval element of the Special Surface Group which manned the midget submarines were an elite, rigorously trained group. The offensive capability of the midget submarine had been seriously depleted as early as 1968 when it was found that it could not carry a torpedo. That reduced its role to carrying frogmen to enemy harbours, into depths where larger submarines could not penetrate.
In mid 1971, some SSG personnel had to be deployed to East Pakistan to cope with the Mukti Bahini. They returned to Karachi only in September. Their absence lowered the combat readiness of the midgets.
Midget crews had been trained to be towed underwater by GHAZI. For sorties longer than three days, the relief crew took over on passage and the attack crew took over just before being detached to attack.
During the 1971 war, midgets could not play any role because GHAZI's role was changed to minelaying and she was deployed to the Bay of Bengal.
Deployment of Chariots
There is no evidence that the chariots were deployed during the war. Reportedly, a shortage of spare parts affected their operational readiness.
ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN AIR FORCE PERFORMANCE
In his book, Pakistan's "Crisis in Leadership", Maj Gen Fazal Muqueem Khan analysed the Pakistan Air Force's performance during the 1971 war. His conclusions were:
(a) The PAF plan was based on the war lasting six months.
(b) The PAF C-in-C's main idea was to conserve the Air Force. The PAF chose to be on the defensive,both tactically and strategically. It was committed to defending its air bases only and waiting for the enemy to come and attack them. This kept the aircraft perpetually busy in air patrols over the defended air bases.
(c) The PAF defensive strategy relied too heavily on the expectation that the IAF would carry out mass raids on the PAF air bases and would thus suffer heavily. Confining the PAF to selected airfields away from the border decreased the effective strike range of PAF aircraft and increased the reaction time.
(d) The C-in-C PAF over-centralised his command and allowed little flexibility to his subordinates. Hardly any action could be taken without clearance from the C-in-C.
(e) The PAF deployment in airfields a long distance away from the scene of action affected the ability of the PAF to intervene effectively in the naval battles in the South.
(f) In East Pakistan, there was only one squadron of 16 Sabres. Two of these were lost over Boyra on 22 November. Three were lost on 4 December in the air battles over Dacca. Eleven were immobilised by the PAF itself on the ground in Dacca, to prevent their falling into enemy hands.
(g) The Indian victory was due as much to their careful and patient planning as it was to the lack of all this in Pakistan.
Excerpts from "History of the Pakistan Air Force"
This document is conspicuously sparse on information regarding sorties in support of the Pakistan Navy. The only information of naval relevance is :
(a) In November 1971, No 7 Canberra Squadron based at Mauripur (Masroor)flew six sorties in support of the Pakistan Navy. These were armed recce missions in search of hostile naval vessels within 180 miles south and southwest of Karachi.
(b) In December 1971 on 5 December, the Indian Naval base for missile boats at Okha was set ablaze; the fire continued for full six days. Okha was attacked again on 10 Dec.
PAKISTAN NAVY - AIR FORCE COOPERATION
Excerpts from "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"The PAF was not equipped to support naval operations. Maritime reconnaissance was only provided by the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and civil aviation aircraft which had been pressed into service after the emergency (i.e. on 23 November 1971). In all, 59 sorties by PIA aircraft and 68 sorties by civil aviation aircraft were provided during the war. In spite of all their limitations and their pilots' lack of training for this particular task, these aircraft still performed very well. One Fokker aircraft was lost during these operations.
"The PAF launched a B-57 mission against the Indian missile boat harbour at Okha and some harbour installations were set on fire, but this was late in the war and much after the time when the Navy had asked for it, and none of the missile boats, already out to sea, was affected. Repeat strikes were also launched on December 9 and 10 and some other installations and two large oil tanks were set ablaze. The last strike was carried out by a section of F - 104s, which sighted an anti-submarine Alize aircraft of the Indian Navy and shot it down.
"After the Indian air attacks on Karachi, the people wondered why the PAF did not strike at Bombay harbour. It failed to attack Bombay in retaliation to the Indian attacks on Karachi's civilian targets. This should have been done even for psychological reasons, but the PAF missed the opportunity. The excuse for not doing so was that it had night capability only for a strike at Bombay and was not convinced of gaining any military advantage there. The Indian announcement of a PAF strike at Bombay and stories of the damages done there, were, therefore, surprising.
"The air support which the Navy wanted was never catered for. It was vaguely promised a few reconnaissance sorties and some close support sorties which were dependent on availability. It never occurred to the C-in-C Navy to ask for the PAF plan.
"The Pakistan Air Force flew 27 sorties in support of Pakistan Navy Operations.
"The PAF's performance in 1971 did not come up to public expectation. The C-in-C, PAF failed to provide imaginative leadership to plan and direct the air effort. Both strategically and tactically the air force was kept on the defensive. It was deployed in depth but too thinly. Whereas it could undertake its own defence, it could not generate offensive effort. When the Indians changed their strategy on or about December 7, after the first three days, the PAF was not prepared to change over during the short war to meet the new enemy threat, and remained helpless. In addition, by too much centralized control, it was kept on the leash all the time. It operated at only about 50 percent of its war time capability. As for inter-service cooperation, it had not acquired any maritime support capability and did not provide any meaningful support to the Navy."
PAKISTAN MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE
"Excerpt from Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"
"The Navy, in the absence of any shore based radar and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, was virtually blind. Therefore the services of a civilian radar were requisitioned and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) willingly provided a Fokker Friendship flight to operate reconnaissance flights. The PIA plane had its own limitations for the purpose it was being used. Its radar was a weather radar and it had only 7 degree decline which could not see downwards. The civil pilots, however, did an extremely good job of work without any previous training in this particular field.
"At about the same time on December 3, when Naval HQ was issuing orders and instructions, the Fokker flying along the Kathiawar coast - PIA air patrols had been started on November 30 - reported the sighting of India's Western Fleet consisting of a cruiser, six destroyers and an oil tanker off the Rann of Kutch coast. It was operating around its forward base at Okha."
"Excerpts from the Story of Pakistan Navy"
"The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when the war had just started, but the naval observer, being unaware of war having started, made his contact report hours later after landing.
"After the first missile attack, Commodore Hanif took over as DCNS(O) on 5 December and contacted the Air Priority Board which provided a mixed bag of a dozen aircraft including the Governor of Punjab's Cessna, a plant protection aircraft, an old DC3 Dakota, some Aero Club Austers and two armed Cessnas. We also obtained two Fokkers and two Twin Otters fitted with radar. All these aircraft were lined-up at Karachi civil airport where a "Fleet Air Arm" was set up immediately. The aircraft were controlled by naval officers positioned at the airport along with a PAF liaison officer provided by MHQ.
"The aircraft were manned by civilian volunteer crews from PIA and the Flying Club and maintained by PIA and CAA at Karachi in such an efficient manner that there was no problem in operating 3 or 4 light aircraft at a time during day in their respective sectors on an arc 200 miles from Karachi covering the entire area from Jamnagar to the Makran coast. At night, two radar-fitted aircraft at a time covered the same arc. Thus, from the afternoon of 5 December, it was difficult for an Osa to approach within 200 miles of Karachi undetected.
ANALYSIS
Indian Naval ships and submarines reported shadowing aircraft on the following dates. Available records do not indicate whether all the aircraft made detection reports.
03 Dec - PM - Western Fleet 210 miles south of Karachi
04 Dec - AM - Western fleet southwest of Okha.
- AM - Submarine KURSURA returning to Bombay after R/V with KARANJ.
05 Dec - AM - Trident force withdrawing from Karachi.
PM - TIR and Trident force refuelling at Mangrol.
06 Dec -PM - RANJIT south of Makran Coast.
07 Dec -AM - TIR, KATCHALL,missile boat group west of Okha.
08 Dec -PM - Western Fleet 75 miles south of Jiwani. Submarine KARANJ off Karachi. TIR off Saurashtra.
09 Dec - AM - Submarine KARANJ east of Ormara. KIRPAN off Diu.
-PM KHUKRI, KIRPAN off Diu.
10 Dec - PM - Submarine KARANJ south of Ormara.
Naval observers were flown in the PIA Fokker recce aircraft which had been tasked with locating missile boats :
(a) The naval observer correctly recgnised the Western Fleet on 3 Dec and correctly reported its alteration of course southward.
(b) The naval observer mistook the ZULFIQAR for a missile boat near Cape Monze on 6 Dec, which led to ZULFIQAR being attacked by the PAF.
